I’d like to follow up on some issues surrounding Jonathan Halket’s most recent column about backward induction. One of the questions raised by the column is that of holding off on high-round options at positions you’ve confidently targeted sleepers for. How do you balance the appeal of getting high value late in the draft against the risk of not acquiring your targeted sleeper and being left high and dry?
The nightmare scenario would go something like this. An owner pegs Julio Borbon as a great value late in the draft. In the third round, at pick 26, this owner notices Carl Crawford is still on the board. The owner considers Crawford here, as he thinks this is a good value. However, he thinks Borbon could be an even better value a hundred picks later (great players are at a disadvantage here because there’s only so far a highly ranked player can outproduce his cost) and doesn’t want to clog that outfield-speed slot. He thinks rostering both Crawford and Borbon would be overkill and leave him power-deficient. So, the owner drafts Kevin Youkilis instead. Then, several rounds later, somebody else drafts Borbon a round before this owner was planning to. Now, this owner is behind in steals and doesn’t have another player to fit the archetype he needs. He ends up drafting Coco Crisp and hoping he surprises and fills some of the need he was hoping Borbon would (and he knew Crawford would.) To make matters worse, Crawford outproduces Youkilis and other quality corner bats were available the round following the Youkilis pick.
(I realize I could have just used Jonathan’s Ryan Doumit/Victor Martinez/Rod Barajas example here, but then I’d be tangentially entertaining the “should I invest highly in a catcher argument” and if you read my columns you know that I’m anti-high pick catcher. Unless I’m in an AL-only league, Joe Mauer could be sitting on the board in the third round and I’ll most likely pass without giving a second thought.)
Now, I can’t tell anybody how to balance the risk of not getting Borbon versus the perceived value gap between Crawford in his draft position and Borbon in his. This is a rather abstract concept to try to quantify. The answer depends on a number of dynamics, as discussed in Jonathan’s article and the comments section. What other options will be there if I get sniped on my sleeper and how do I feel about those options? How likely is it that others are on the same wavelength as I am regarding my sleeper targets?
There’s another important question though—the most obvious one—that somehow often gets lost in the mix of the more abstract components of this discussion: How do the elite option and my sleeper compare in terms of absolute value and what are these respective players’ realistic downside potential?
To prime this discussion, it seems that a refresher on the actual workings of the market in relation to elite players is in order. Jonathan is actually an economist; I, on the other hand, am just a pedantic know-it-all, so I hope I’m not speaking out of school here.
Everybody must be aware of two factors that go into the price of an elite player. One is dependability. You or I may interpret Borbon as a great value, but it’s also possible that he’s demoted to the minors before the All-Star break, or that he can’t hit lefties at the major league level (he barely even played against them last year) and therefore winds up only getting 400 ABs for the season. I’m not trying to throw water on Borbon optimism, just expressing legitimate possibilities that people tend to totally dismiss once they’ve bought in to a player. Our evaluations don’t matter—only his manager’s and organization’s.
Those risks don’t exist for Carl Crawford. There are no risks that apply to Crawford that don’t apply to Borbon.
So, Borbon has significantly more downside risk than Crawford. This is an important determinant of the price points of the respective players. But, wait … isn’t some of that downside potential difference mitigated by the price I pay for the commodity? Isn’t Crawford’s smaller risk of not producing elite (by his standard) numbers magnified by the amount I invest in him, while Borbon’s greater downside risk cushioned by the fact that I invested less in him?
In an economic sense, yes. That’s an astute observation. (See how I pretended to compliment you, but I really complimented myself—I told you I’m kind of a douche.) But not so fast there, imaginary devil’s advocate.
The goal isn’t really to just accrue the best bang for you buck; the objective is to win your league. Maximizing your value per dollar (or pick) invested is just a tactic by which you do that, not an objective in and of itself. Commenter Jonathan Sher makes a rather poignant point about this in relation to his strategy for one of his leagues, which we will get to a bit later.
If you are relying for Borbon for big-time production, you are still out that production if Borbon flops, or even just performs acceptably but fails to exceed his draft position. What you invested in him is less important than what you depended on him for.
Here’s a real world example: David Wright is a borderline MVP-caliber player, but he only happened to make $7.75M last season. His hugely disappointing 2009 campaign was probably “worth” his salary, but that doesn’t mean the Mets were satisfied with his performance. And more directly, the Mets certainly didn’t do a lot of winning last year! So, in practice, the value consolation is largely irrelevant to a struggling team.
Plus, there’s the third-party production that enters the final equation, which is the opportunity cost of taking Youkilis over Crawford (plus the added value the owner behind you got in Crawford over what would have been his pick. Drafts are particularly conducive settings to see “the butterfly effect” in action.
If Crawford performs exactly as expected, Borbon performs 20% better than expected (and still substantially below Crawford), but you had “budgeted” for 40% better, and Youkilis performs 10% better—are you ahead of where you’d be if you just took Crawford (and some other undefined player in Borbon’s round who performed as expected)? … Hmm … In overall value, you probably are. But do you have the right mix of categories or is some of your value tied up in categorical surplus irrelevant to the standings?
This gets very complicated, so I’m just going to end this part of the discussion and let it stand as a rhetorical. I can only carry on a debate with one imaginary devil’s advocate at a time without devolving into full blown schizophrenia. So, let’s move on to the second market force.
The other market force relevant here is the non-linear value of luxury goods (there’s probably a 10 dollar economics term for this, but I don’t know it). Superstars are luxury goods. If you are buying a car, for example, there’s something of a “you get what you pay for model” for most options along the price point chain—Ford, Honda, Lexus. However, as you approach the extremes this somewhat linear relationship falls apart. It’s virtually impossible for a Bentley to be something like six times the car a Lexus is. In fantasy baseball, there reaches a point of production at which there are so few players who can replace that player’s value, his production value versus his cost ceases to be linear.
This happens with players in the real game too. A-Rod is nowhere near the best value in terms of, say, cost per win share. But, how many players can produce at his level? The way the market works in real life is that as a player’s production rises, the cost per unit of production rises a bit too. Hypothetically, win share 1–10 costs one price per win share; each win share between 10–20 an escalated price per unit, 20–30 even more, and then the price explodes at the superstar level. If you need one player to produce 35+ win shares, there aren’t many options. So, you pay a premium for A-Rod’s ability to produce virtually unequivocal value (and to protect against other teams usurping that value from you—this is a facet many never bother to consider).
So, what does all this mean in relation to our original question about studs and sleepers? Why did I go through all of that? Do I just like to run on and take advantage of the attention spans of the five people who would actually listen to me? Well, yes, but I also have a point, though it’s not one I haven’t made here before.
You should not let your late-round sleeper targets affect the highest rounds of your draft. At least through the first 50 picks, you should be selecting who you determine to be the best overall player available to you at your pick. Personally, I extent this rule notably further than the top 50, but I think the top 50 is the shortest acceptable period to apply this principle.
Here are a few reasons why I preach this:
First, you need elite producers to win. Everybody is going to have some luxury goods, so pick the ones that are best compared their alternatives. If you are in the market for a $350,000 luxury sedan (which you are, by definition, in the top 25) you should be weighing your options in that price range. You should be comparison shopping the Rolls Royce Phantom against the GT Bentley. The fact that you think a Lexus LS430 represents a far better value than either isn’t relevant. … Your debut rap album isn’t going platinum with a Lexus on the cover; this isn’t 1994 (unfortunately!).
Just to nitpick the metaphor, if you’re considering Ellsbury or Crawford you are really more in the market for a luxury sports car, right? OK, I’m officially getting to close to the Bill Simmons zone now, aren’t I?
So, here’s a big piece of advice I try to give to fantasy players. Don’t outsmart yourself!. Often times, us more advanced players get too wrapped up in our ability to spot value that we forget that leagues are won by absolute production. Don’t romanticize your sleepers to the point that you think they can actually replace studs. Occasionally it happens, but if there was a good chance a player could provide legitimately elite value, he likely wouldn’t be pre-ranked outside the top 100.
By the way, the outsmarting yourself phenomenon is even more dangerous and frequent in fantasy football. I don’t know how many times I had to talk friends off ledges this past year, as they were considering benching their first-round running back or second-round wide receiver for some injury replacement or secondary target blessed with an “attractive match-up.”
Here’s Jonathan Sher in the comments section to Halket’s column, as he talks about this issue in relation to an auction league (emphasis mine):
One’s willingness to [pass on a stud in favor of a sleeper] should also be related to one’s risk tolerance, and not in some generic sense, but the circumstances of one’s auction. This year, for example, I have what I believe is the best keeper list in my league and certainly one of the top 3—high value guys at very low salaries. So rather than risk waiting for a sleeper, I’m much more inclined to pay inflation-adjusted prices for top talent like Longoria than count on Beltre being under-valued. Beltre probably has a greater upside compared to what I expect others will value of him. But I don’t need more high value guys to win. Rather, I need high production guys (since I have most of my budget) and can afford inflation-adjusted prices or even more and still win or finish near the top. My greater risk is running out of available talent before I run out of money.
Second, what is precluding you from taking a stud and your sleeper, even if they are similar in make-up? Drafting is about both building a team and stockpiling value. If your sleeper pans out as you predicted, you have a valuable trade chip either in him or the higher-priced similar player. You can cash either of those chips in for elite production where you need it. In this specific case, you can jump out to a huge lead in SBs, dump one of the players and not even have it affect your standings in that category too much, as the low volume of the steals category makes large leads difficult to overcome.
Third, you should have sleeper targets for all categories. So, if picking the best available player for six or seven picks starts to develop clear categorical needs for your squad, you should have a plan to address them, whatever they are. I much prefer a large list of less profound sleepers than a few pet sleepers to whom I am extremely committed. You will never be able to draft your whole list, so the way I work is to build the best team I can with my top picks and then start to go after the sleepers whose skill sets make the most sense for my team. Obviously, there are exceptions. I drafted Josh Johnson regardless of my pitching staff’s strength in literally every league I played in last year.
Finally, here’s another question for you guys to ponder. I avoided temptation to get into this in this column because my columns are already long enough. But … what exactly even constitutes a “sleeper”? Borbon was discussed a fair amount both in Jonathan’s article (including the comments section) and mine. He’s pre-ranked 113th on Yahoo’s draft; is he even a sleeper? Can you be a sleeper while projected to go in the 10th round of a 12-team draft? I always thought sleepers were much more obscure. Scott Sizemore is a sleeper; Julio Borbon is not. That’s how I see it at least.
While others use the term to refer generically to anybody who they feel will considerably outperform draft pre-draft rank, I tend to reserve the term for either players few know about, or those most have written off as being unable to fulfill their potential or clearly past their tenure of usefulness.