November 23, 2009
Order NowThe Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2010 is now in development and will ship in mid November! This year's book will feature articles by THT's staff as well as Bill James, Tom Tango and Craig Wright. If you use this link to purchase the Annual, you will be in the first group to receive it and you'll be supporting THT. Most Recent Comments
Introducing Visual Baseball (1)
HR/FB Park Factors (8) Why Baseball Needs a Visual Facelift (5) Building a Retrosheet database, the short form (4) Is peak at age 29? (7) ![]()
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Friday, August 07, 2009Sox whiff on not getting Gaudin, PavanoAfter the John Smoltz debacle of last night, you would have thought that the Red Sox would have been on the hunt for starting pitching. Apparently not. Apparently, the Red Sox are more than willing to continue ahead with two aces and three No. 6 starters while waiting around for Daisuke Matsuzaka and Tim Wakefield to return -- if they even do so, never mind returning to effectiveness. Two starting pitchers switched teams: the San Diego Padres dealt Chad Gaudin to the New York Yankees during the game last night while the Minnesota Twins just picked up Carl Pavano today from the Cleveland Indians. And the Red Sox sat on their hands. Click for more... If you’re happy and you know it, get on baseAh, the Saber-sphere is all abuzz with talk of regression to the mean. Regression to the mean is a fairly simple concept. If, over the past four years, you have a player who has had HR/PA rates of 2.8%, 1.9%, 2.3%, and 2.4%, then suddenly, his rate goes to 7.3%, what should you expect in the next year? (The correct answer is 2.6%, at least that's what Brady Anderson did in 1997.) Why not expect 7% again? Baseball fans (and a few front office folk) are remarkably good at coming up with justifications for why one should expect 7%. They'll might say, "That year, Brady developed a new swing/changed his routine/changed his diet/began dating Madonna. That must be the reason for his sudden power outburst!" (The more cynical among you might suggest more nefarious reasons*.) How about another explanation? Brady Anderson got insanely lucky in 1996. It's not often that fate smiles that kindly on one man for such a short period of time, but... how to explain this without referring to Kevin Federline... let's just say it doesn't happen very often. After a few years worth of data points from 1992-1995, we have a decent idea that in reality Brady Anderson is the kind of guy who hits a home run once every 40 times to the plate (2.5%). In other words, we can be pretty sure that's Brady's true talent level. When he outshot that true talent level in 1996, it made sense that he was due to come back down to earth the next year (which he did). Or in fancy statistical terms, he regressed to his own mean. His performance regressed (got worse), due to the fact that deep down, he was playing over his head the year before, and the next year, he went back to doing what he usually does. Exactly how to incorporate regression to the mean is the great knuckleball of Sabermetrics. There are as many theories on how to do so as there are Sabermetricians who have looked at the question. This is because what folks are really talking about is not "how do I regress to the mean mathematically?" That's actually really easy. The real question is "How do we estimate a player's true talent level?" In other words, what do I regress back to? What is this player really capable of? Colin Wyers wrote a bit on true score theory in a recent THT article. In the piece, he said that a player's performance is a function of his true talent level, random error (aka luck), and bias in measurement. He made me happy by including measurement bias in his conceptualization (although he then politely dismissed it). I still think there's one extra missing piece that he hadn't considered. Colin began to hint at that missing piece when he talked about Ichiro, who gets a hit in roughly 30% of his at-bats. "Moreover, based on all those factors--and of course many others--a player's true talent level changes from moment-to-moment. Ichiro may have a 30 percent chance of getting a hit in one at-bat, but if his jock strap starts to itch, perhaps that goes down to 29 percent the next. On the other hand, if someone in the dugout makes a funny joke(auth note: in Japanese? - P.C.) that puts Ichiro in a good mood, his true talent could go up to 31 percent so long as that good mood lasts." The actual equation should look like: Observed performance = true talent + measurement bias + contextual factors + luck/random error. If there is a great sin of Sabermetrics, it's that we (and I happily include myself in that pronoun) have treated players as though they were Strat-o-matic cards. That is to say that they don't respond in the least to what's going on around them, which doesn't make common sense (although common sense is not a proof of anything...) We act as if it's as if it's just a matter of finding the right algorithim based on last year's stats plus this year's stats times prime rate minus the square of blah blah blah... After that, we know what a player has the probability to do. And he'll do it no matter what situation he is in. Or will he? Colin correctly points out that we won't be able to know everything. (I frankly don't want to know if Ichiro's jock strap starts to itch.) But there are some things that we can know, and know them rather easily, that might make a big difference. Let's take a truism in life. It's a lot easier to do your job when you are in a good mood than when you're in a bad mood, and overall, you're probably better at the job in a good mood. Does it apply in baseball? Let's take the simplest rough proxy for a good mood that there is: is my team winning? Click for more... Selling low and at the wrong timeOne of the more under-the-radar deals of the off-season involved two low-budget teams looking to gain ground in the NL East. On Novemeber 11th of last year the Marlins sent Josh Willingham and Scott Olsen to the Nationals for Emilio Bonifacio and two prospects. The Marlins avoided having to go to arbitration with two players who had enough playing bulk and quality numbers to get decent-sized contracts. In return they received a young, cost-controlled infielder who would provide speed, a quick bat, and solid defense, while also allowing them to shift Jorge Cantu, a terrible third baseman defensively, over to first base. The prospects the Fish got back were second baseman Jake Smolinski, rated by Baseball America as the Nats best hitter for average in their minor league system, and pitcher P.J. Dean, a 19-year old with a 1.57 ERA pitching in short-season A ball in 2008. For the Marlins, this must’ve been reminiscent of the Willis/Cabrera deal on a much smaller scale. They would deal a pitcher and a hitter whom they felt they no longer could afford for cheaper, younger talent to help them in the future. They were also all too happy to deal Olsen, a pitcher they once had high hopes for but had numerous legal and clubhouse issues that put him in the papers for all the wrong reasons. However, since the start of the season there has been little question that the Nationals got the better end of the deal. Willingham, who had posted wOBAs of .364, .365, .363 over the past three years, has finally broken out in a big way. He’s walking at the highest rate of his career to go along with his highest LD rate (21.4%), giving him a .427(!) wOBA for the year. Although his defense isn’t strong, it isn’t a harbinger either. He’s cost the Nationals only -2.2 runs while playing both right and left field, giving him 3.0 WAR for the year in only 85 games played. His production hasn’t exactly been the tipping point for Washington’s season, but he will surely be a valued commodity in the future for a reasonable price. Olsen had a 4.89 xFIP for 2009 (his lowest since 2006), and seemed to be righting himself off the field as well. However, season-ending surgery cut his year short. The Marlins, on the other hand, have felt the brunt of this trade. Fighting to stay in the Wild Card hunt, they have watched Bonifacio step up to the plate 456 times and hit at a .246/.297/.308 clip, becoming the worst regular in the majors. His defense at third has been worse than Willingham’s in the outfield with a -5.4 UZR/150 for the season. He’s been worth -.6 WAR, all the while manning a position that usually has a good amount of quality hitters. Although Smolinski has played relatively well, Dean hasn’t pitched thus far this year. But here’s the kicker. Last week, the Marlins ironically had to deal their 15th best prospect (according to John Sickels), Aaron Thompson, to the Nationals (of all teams) for Nick Johnson, who basically fits the Willingham-mold and will replace Bonifacio in the lineup. It’s hard to criticize the Marlins. They’ve won two World Series since their inception and usually have a great eye for young talent. However, they sold far too low on Willingham and Olsen, and ironically cancelled out any advantage they had in the prospect portion of the deal by trading Thompson, a better player than either of the ones they got back, for Nick Johnson, whom they basically already had in Willingham. I understand why general managers decide to trade guys in the off-season; they are concerned about injuries, bad performance, or a weak market hurting the value they can get back for their players. However, there was really no reason to believe any of those things would affect Willingham. Besides an injury stint to start 2008, he had been healthy enough to produce 2.4 WAR last year, and if he had even come close to that line this year he would have been a nifty pickup for any contender near July 31st. Moreover, it would give the Marlins time to see if they even wanted to trade Willingham, which they wouldn’t have done considering their place in the standings and how tremendously he’s played for Washington. Some of this would be mitigated if they had gotten solid value back, but Bonifacio has proven himself to be inept at providing positive value for the team he's playing for. There haven't been too many bright days in Washington, but somewhere Jim Bowden is smiling about his highway robbery of Michael Hill. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||