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January 23, 2012

Carmona points out an MLB inequity

Goodbye Fausto! Hello Roberto!

As reported last week, 28-year-old Fausto Carmona is Roberto Hernandez Heredia and perhaps 31 years old.

There are implications here for Carmona-Heredia, for the Indians and, most importantly, for professional baseball and the uneven way it deals with international players.

Since being released on bail, The Sinkerballer Formally Known as Fausto has been apologetic but tight-lipped. He reportedly paid for a false identity that may have incorrectly represented his age. He may have been making periodic payments to maintain the false identity. He eventually balked at paying and somebody talked, leading to his arrest.

He is not the first Latin-American player to take this route. (Last year's most publicized example was Leo Nunez.)

So Heredia lied. But did he do anything wrong to the game of baseball? Does lying about your age and name affect anything about playing the game?

It does not.

While the lies are certainly deplorable, they do not affect the player's ability on the field. People will say that, because his age is uncertain, it could be advantageous for him to have people think he is younger. It could lead to larger bonuses and salaries. He’ll appear more successful since his ability will be compared to that of players younger than him.

But these are issue of deceit based on the current economic model and do not affect the play on the field.

If the same player was actually three years YOUNGER, would we be willing to rectify the situation financially? What happened, as before, is a player found a way to take advantage of the economic system in baseball. For him to be successful, he still had to demonstrate ability and skill.

In doing so, he allegedly broke laws in at least two countries* but he never de-skilled the game. While the misreported younger age would have been helpful during his development, the lying did not give him specific extra ability, or his ability to ignore Lake Erie Midges that Joba Chamberlain could not. Carmona’s lies do not hurt the on-field play of baseball.

* I have no idea if Canada would say anything about a player such as Carmona entering the country with false paperwork. I’m not even sure Canada would prosecute, but I am fairly certain that it is against Canadian law.

When looking at a situation like Carmona’s, I look directly at those running Major League Baseball and the teams. Lying about one’s identity is so advantageous for a specific set of players that it outweighs the risk of punishment. Instead of demonizing players like Carmona and Nunez, it is time to look at the system.

In Japan, younger players are able to develop in a system that gives them the ability to play in their homeland with the possibility of moving to the major leagues in America. In Latin America, players feel the need to break the law to be part of the system. So in one week, Yu Darvish, who has never pitched in even the minor leagues in America, got a $60 million contract after a team paid $51.7 million for the right to give him that contract. During that same week, we learned that, once again a player lied about his identity in an effort to get a portion of that amount of money.

In the end, both players will succeed or fail based on what they do on the field. How they got the opportunity doesn’t affect their ability on the field.

Major League Baseball needs to address the differences. If baseball officials are going to continue to encourage teams to deal individually with international players, they need to address the extreme differences in the system. It is not an easy task. How can baseball expect players not to take the route of Carmona and Nunez when the Darvish situation points out the inequity?

As for the Indians:

While Carmona has not lived up to the promise he flashed in 2007, he has shown, when healthy, to be able to provide a decent set of 30-plus starts and 200-plus innings each year.

In conjunction with this news, it appears the Indians finally pulled the trigger on obtaining Kevin Slowey. The Indians have been interested in him anyway, so this was not in direct relation to Carmona’s issues, but the trade was probably hastened. Carmona will likely end up on the restricted list, leaving the Indians with a hole in the rotation but with an extra $7 million. The Indians gave up Zach Putman, a young pitcher who may have competed for a bullpen position this year.

The Indians have other options for the rotation. David Huff and Jeanmar Gomez will be among those who compete with Slowey for spots behind Justin Masterson, Ubaldo Jimenez, Josh Tomlin and Derek Lowe. In the end, the Indians' depth should be able to cover for Carmona's absence with limited hardship.
Posted by: Mat Kovach

January 12, 2012

On Ryan Madson: Parsing Boras’ comments

Philadelphia general manager Ruben Amaro, Jr. and super-agent Scott Boras are having a skirmish of words regarding the Phillies' non-signing of closer Ryan Madson. Boras seems to be saying the Phillies reneged on their offer of $44 million over four years, while Amaro says, "there never was an agreement."

Obviously, since Madson is now a Cincinnati Red, Amaro is correct that there never was an agreement—at least not one so formal that it led to a signed contract. However, there may have been a verbal agreement, a handshake deal, a nod-and-wink, nudge-nudge, say-no-more pact that simply needed to be put to paper and submitted to Major League Baseball's offices for confirmation.

Or there may not have been. If we read exactly what Boras said, it becomes clear that he did not say that he and the Phillies had agreed to a four-year, $44 million contract.

Boras first stated, "We never rejected any offer from Philadelphia at four years and $44 million. We advised Philadelphia that we would agree to such a proposal." He followed that comment up with, "We agreed to a four-year, $44 million offer, and Philadelphia decided to sign someone else."

Let's take a look at the first sentence. While he and Madson never rejected the contract in dispute, Boras didn't say the Phillies made such an offer. You can't reject an offer that isn't made, so Boras may not be lying. Also, "never rejected" is not the same as "accepted."

His second sentence says they would have taken such a deal. Hey, so would I, but no one made me such an offer and, again, maybe the Phillies didn't make one to Boras for Madson's services.

The last sentence uses "we" vaguely. Which "we" agreed to the four-year, $44 million contract he mentions? It could be that "we" is Boras and Madson. Perhaps those two men decided between themselves that such an offer would be acceptable. Good for them, but if the Phillies never tendered such a deal, there was nothing for Boras to accept.

Scott Boras obviously is a phenomenally successful agent. He has made his clients billions of dollars and himself a nice cut of those salaries. He produces gold-lettered, platinum-laced, diamond-encrusted binders to demonstrate how clients such as Alex Rodriguez and Prince Fielder are the greatest athletes in the history of the universe and should be paid like minor deities. Boras does his job extraordinarily well.

But his success does not come from blunt directness. It comes from deception, obfuscation and borderline flat-out lying. Boras knows where that borderline is, and he has no fear of going up to it and nudging his toes right up against that line. It's what he gets paid so well to do.
Posted by: Greg Simons

December 29, 2011

2011 A’s vs. 1997 Marlins

In 1997, the Florida (now Miami) Marlins won the World Series, bringing joy and enthusiasm to the team and its fan base. Days later, the destruction of the team began as management shipped off nearly every high-priced veteran it could to save money.

The excuse was that the team couldn't afford such a large payroll without a larger fan base, and more fans would come only if the team got a new stadium. Well, it took nearly 15 years, but that new stadium is finally a reality, and it looks to be a stunning ballpark, though the structural integrity and financing of the facility have been called into question.

In 2011, the Oakland A's went 74-88. There were no victory parades, but the team's teardown has been as thorough as the Marlins' was 14 years ago.

Starting pitchers Trevor Cahill and Gio Gonzalez have been shipped off to the Diamondbacks and Nationals, respectively, in return for a gaggle of hot prospects. Middle reliever Craig Breslow joined Cahill in the move to Arizona, while closer Andrew Bailey and outfielder Ryan Sweeney were just sent to Boston for three more promising youngsters.

Josh Willingham, David DeJesus, Coco Crisp and Hideki Matsui—all solid, if unispiring, offensive contributors—will not be returning to Oakland. The roster has been stripped so bare that at one point Sweeney was listed on the A's official Web site depth chart as the starting outfielder at all three positions.

Like the Marlins, the A's say they need a new ballpark to compete. And with the Angels signing Albert Pujols and C.J. Wilson, and the Rangers coming off back-to-back World Series appearances and acquiring the rights to Yu Darvish, they certainly need something to keep pace.

Rumors abound that the team soon will be allowed to move to San Jose, though Bud Selig's Blue Ribbon Committee that has been studying the issue for a few years now has not made any formal proposals. Given how long the Marlins waited for a new facility, A's fans shouldn't hold their breath.

When the Marlins tore things down, they shaved massive financial commitments from their books, but at least they had a title to show for their investment. The A's are dealing away young, cheap, cost-controlled talent for even younger, even cheaper, cost-controlled potential. And they have nothing to show for their efforts other than the possibility of being the cheapest, most anonymous ball team since the 1998 Marlins.

Things were awful in South Florida in '98, as the team fell from 92 victories the season before to a mere 54 wins. The A's starting point is 74 wins. An equal 38-game dropoff would yield a 36-126 record that would make the 1962 Mets look like world beaters.

Oakland is unlikely to be quite that bad in 2012 and beyond, but it's going to be horrendously ugly for the next few years. It may even be so bad that this monstrosity will look good by comparison.
Posted by: Greg Simons

August 30, 2011

What will C.J. be worth?

Last winter, the free agent pitcher headlines were dominated by the courting of Cliff Lee. Everyone seemed to be following his contract negotiations with the Phillies, Rangers and Yankees. Sure there were other semi-big players on the market, but he was the one to sign.

This year there’s not that one big name everyone is after. CC Sabathia has an opt-out clause in his contract, which he will probably use, but he will more than likely stay with the Yankees with a more lucrative deal. Other fairly big names include Chris Carpenter, Mark Buehrle, Edwin Jackson, Erik Bedard and Japanese sensation Yu Darvish. But it seems the most sought-after prize will be C.J. Wilson.

Unlike the others listed above, Wilson, 31, is not too old, not injury prone, and not inconsistent. Or he's just flat-out better. After breaking out in 2010, he has followed up with another very good season. He has pitched to an ERA/FIP/xFIP line of 3.08/3.07/3.43 and has already thrown 181 innings for Texas in 27 starts. It should also be noted that his strikeouts are up (over eight per nine innings) and his walks are down (slightly above three). He did have injuries in the past, but hasn’t suffered from anything since converting to the starting rotation.

This all being said, what type of money should Wilson be looking for? To figure this out, let’s take a look at what some comparable pitchers got and the type of walk years they had. In 2008, A.J. Burnett struck out more nine per nine innings, pitched to a 3.45 FIP and threw over 200 innings. Sure this was a good year for him, but it was an anomaly. Burnett, who was 32 when he hit free agency, spent a lot of time on the disabled list prior to this season and although he always showed great stuff, he was inconsistent and didn’t have command. He wound up getting $82.5 million over five years from the Yankees.

The following year, John Lackey hit the market and received the same contract as Burnett, but from the Red Sox. Lackey, who was also 32, didn’t have the same upside, but still put up solid numbers. He struck out more than seven per nine innings while walking almost two-and-a-half per nine. His velocity was also up in this year, he had a low home run rate, but was injured for a small part of the season. Lackey wasn’t great, but he was a solid starter in a pretty thin starting pitching market, which got him the big deal.

Wilson will get more money than either of these guys, and it’s probably a safe bet that he’ll get a contract that nets him around $100 million. Not only is he younger and a lefty, but he’s just a better pitcher and the best pitcher on the market (not counting Sabathia).

Two things that might hurt him, however, are the fact that there are a lot of pitchers that are a tier or two below him, and if his price is too high, teams could settle for one of them. Also, there is a very strong crop of pitchers in next year’s market (Cole Hamels, John Danks, Matt Cain, etc.), so some teams might be willing to wait another year.

I think the Rangers will make a deal at around $100 million over five or so years to lock him up because they don’t want another Cliff Lee episode.
Posted by: Matt Filippi

July 22, 2011

A bargain worth considering

All right, in the interest of full disclosure: yours truly is the furthest thing from an objective source regarding this book. The author, Bill Gould, befriended me and I read his manuscript and offered him my editing advice. And more than that, I noticed a couple of questionable baseball facts in the manuscript, so Bill hired me to serve as his baseball fact-checker.

So, if you find any misstatements of baseball fact in this book, I'm the party to blame!

But with all those caveats noted, Bargaining with Baseball: Labor Relations in an Age of Prosperous Turmoil is a must-read book for anyone seriously interested in the labor history of baseball.
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Posted by: Steve Treder


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