THT Fantasy Focus

Posted by Paul Singman at 6:00am (6) Comments

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Protecting me from myself

The notion of being true to yourself is a somewhat trite cliché. Closely related, however, is the virtue of self-awareness, an extremely valuable trait in fantasy baseball (among other aspects of life, to say the least). As one plays out more and more fantasy seasons, that manager aims to become more astute and deliberate in terms of applying strategy, but no less important are the lessons one may learn about him/herself. It is important for managers to understand their own tendencies, appetite for risk, behavior patterns, etc. and implement safeguards against those that repeatedly get them in trouble.

For example, I’ve realized that one of the tendencies that can hamstring me is my conservatism and reliance on track record. While I think these traits are generally sound principles, I’m aware that I can over-commit to them, so let me briefly describe how I have attempted to address them.

First, I think that “boring” veterans often make very cost-effective choices on draft day; solid but unspectacular known quantities are frequently undervalued. However, my dependence on these types of players sometimes leaves me short of break-out candidates, and while contending is often largely dependent on a solid core, you generally need a few break-out contributors to take home a title. The situation I’ve decided to try to avoid is having the second half of my roster cluttered with players who are just good enough to not want to drop, but devoid of the potential to be difference-makers. To address this potential paralysis, I’ve quite simply made a concerted effort to take a few more well-calculated risks on draft day.

As the other side to that same coin, I’m often reluctant to drop underperforming players with sound track records even when they are egregiously underperforming. Even in retrospect, it was important not to jump ship immediately on Garrett Atkins and Aubrey Huff, but I readily admit I held on to both of them for too long. Luckily, I didn’t absorb all of their ineptitude because I adapted another one of my beliefs to minimize the impact of holding on to Atkins. Normally, I favor using nearly my entire bench for pitching slots, which allows me to stockpile rate-helping middle relievers and potential future closers. My decision to keep an offensive bench this year allowed me to have other options and enabled me to hang on to Atkins until I was convinced he was done without having to play him regularly.

Certainly, the above accounts do not constitute any form of advanced strategy. But, it is important to note that no matter how accomplished we are as fantasy players, we are prone to do things that are somewhat irrational or counterproductive often because we hold too tightly to our own, otherwise sensible, principles. The more aware we are of our own potentially counterproductive tendencies, the more we can protect against them.

Sometimes these issues are not philosophical or strategic so much as practical. If you’re active on the wire perhaps you can go light on closers on draft day and take advantage of the inevitable shake-ups by finding closers on the wire and capitalizing on breaking news before your leaguemates. If circumstances dictate that you are rarely first to the wire, perhaps it makes more sense to bump up the top closers on draft day, as you are more dependent on reliable options than others.

These are just a few examples of how being aware of your own proclivities can help you evolve as a manager and prevent the repetition of mistakes. It is important to take a bit of time at season’s end to reflect and analyze where you may have erred throughout the season. Many of the tendencies that manifest throughout the course of running a fantasy baseball team are far from endemic to fantasy baseball, so it’s folly to think that you will cease to exhibit the same tendencies simply by virtue of experience. If patterns develop related to your shortcomings, then it’s time to make a conscious effort to protect yourself from yourself.

I invite readers to share the lessons they may have learned about their own behavior (specific to fantasy baseball or even beyond) through seasons of competing, and especially to share the conscious adjustments they’ve made to address them.

Posted by Derek Ambrosino at 1:00am (3) Comments

Player Profile: Carlos Gonzalez

Game Three NLDS-Colorado Rockies Host Philadelphia Phillies

After being passed through three organizations in 12 months, Carlos Gonzalez is starting to look more like a peace pipe than a major league ball player. Though scouts love his tools and his ability to play all three outfield positions, it took Gonzalez a few years to find his approach at the plate. When he did, however, the results were tremendous, as shown by his 2009 season in Colorado. But, as always, there's more to a player than meets the eye, so let's take a look at his minor league stats to see what we can find.

Gonzalez's story begins way back in 2003 as a 17-year-old playing Rookie ball for the Missoula Osprey. The young outfielder flashed some good potential, hitting four homers in 275 at-bats, but walked just 16 times against 71 strikeouts. Still, the batter was young, so he had time to hammer out his approach as he moved along. With a .258/.308/.404 line under his belt, the powers that be in Arizona thought it was time for a different test, promoting him to Low-A in 2004.

The 2004 season was a little better for Gonzalez. Still just 18 years old, he was able to post a .273/.327/.427 line in 300 at-bats before being promoted to A-ball in the Midwest League. Through 377 plate appearances, Gonzalez hit 10 home runs though, again, he struggled with his plate approach, posting just 23 walks against 83 strikeouts. Much like in 2003, the line wasn't the best, especially the K:BB ratio, but he was a young, toolsy player with a lot of potential. Players make careers from those credentials, so Arizona was content letting Gonzalez slug his way out by letting him repeat A-ball in 2005.

Finally, after two years of frustration, Gonzalez showed some real signs of growth during a repeat performance in A-ball in 2005. As a 19-year-old, the Venezuelan finally showed some semblance of a workable plate approach, while hitting for more power. With 18 home runs in 568 plate appearances, Gonzalez put together a .307/.371/.489 line on the shoulders of a much improved K:BB ratio (48 BB, 86 K). This was quite the season for Gonzalez, as his improved walk totals gave hope for him to become more than a free-swinging slugger, while his strikeout totals gave even greater reason for optimism, as he struck out in just 15.1 percent of his plate appearances. With burgeoning power and improving plate discipline, Gonzalez seemed close to realizing his full potential. Only time would tell. The pundits certainly agreed, ranking him the 32nd-best prospect in MLB.

The 2006 season, initially filled with great optimism, was very much a mixed bag for Carlos. After earning a promotion to High-A, (with an appearance in Double-A to conclude the year) Gonzalez's plate discipline regressed quite dramatically, as he would go on to post a combined 37 walks against 116 strikeouts in 512 plate appearances between the two levels. Still, the California League aided his power numbers, as he launched 21 homers in 404 at-bats en route to a .300/.355/.562 line in High-A. Still, his poor plate discipline (30 BB, 104 K) made the appearance bittersweet. He flopped at Double-A later that year to the tune of .213/.294/.410, which tempered even the most optimistic of his supporters. Still, Gonzalez's hitting abilities, with or without the plate discipline, were too much to deny, as Arizona punched his ticket to Double-A for 2007. Still brimming with potential, Gonzalez was ranked No. 3 in the Arizona system and No. 18 in MLB.

2007 was definitely a downturn in Gozalez's career path. Already a full season removed from his 2005 breakout, 2007 was definitely a forgettable year in many ways. Though still a very young player at age 21, Gonzalez's performance at Double-A left much to be desired. Despite again hitting for good power (16 HR in 458 at-bats), he did not fulfill expectations of becoming a great slugger, while also failing again to improve his plate discipline, posting a weak K:BB ratio (32 BB, 103 K). Though he was able to cut down on the strikeouts slightly, his walks took a hit. With a .286/.330/.476 line in Double-A, followed by a nice, quick stint in Triple-A (.310/.396/.500 in 42 at-bats, 6BB, 6K), Arizona leveraged Gonzalez's great, but fading potential into a blockbuster trade with the Oakland Athletics, including him as part of the Dan Haren deal. As a result, Gonzalez became the No. 1 prospect in Oakland, while still ranking 22nd in MLB.

2008 was, again, a lackluster season for Gonzalez. Playing for Oakland's Triple-A affiliate in Sacramento, Gonzalez's season was perhaps his worst since becoming a professional. Though he finished with a respectable .283/.344/.416 line in Triple-A, he hit just four home runs in 173 at-bats, while walking 16 times against 35 Ks. The plate discipline was a moderate improvement, though nothing to write home about. Later that year, though he was not ready for the bigs, Oakland decided to call him up. The results were ugly, as his power all but left him and he looked completely lost against major league pitching. In 302 at-bats, he was able to post just 13 walks against 81 strikeouts, hitting only four home runs. His .242/.273/.361 line was quite the debacle.

With the shine fading fast off Gonzalez's star, the outfielder was moved to the Colorado organization as a key piece in the Matt Holliday trade. Though many left him for dead or the scrap-heap home of former prospects, Gonzalez began to put together a quality season in Colorado Springs, the Rockies' Triple-A affiliate. Through 192 at-bats, Gonzalez was finally able to produce the kind of year many expected of him, slugging 10 home runs with a 22:32 BB:K rate. His .339/.418/.630 line seemed to be partially the product of playing at a high altitude, though, when the major league club plays there too, who really cares?

In early June, Gonzalez was promoted to the big leagues, where he would stay for good. After accruing 278 at-bats, the 23-year-old was finally able to prove that he could hit major league hitting, posting a .284/.353/.525 line in 278 at-bats. Gonzalez had arrived. However, while there was much to be thankful for, there were also many reasons to temper the praise showered upon him by his supporters.

When analyzing Gonzalez's sudden ascension to the ranks of very good outfielders, the first thoughts go to how much of this was a Coors Field/altitude affect. On the one hand, there are those who say, rightfully, "who cares," since, as fantasy owners, it doesn't matter how good he is as long as he can put up his stats. The other thought is to determine whether this improvement can be sustained and whether or not the Coors affect in reference to Gonzalez is real—or even important.

Let's start with the Coors affect.

First, there is every reason to believe that Coors Field and Colorado Springs had a good deal to do with Gonzalez's turnaround. Coors Field is one of the best hitting environments in MLB or any level. Any hitter will experience a jump in his power numbers and hitting indicators when switching to the cool environs of Coors. While the stadium is usually credited for its ability to awaken sleeping bats, there may be more to the process than balls flying out of the park at a greater frequency. Of particular importance is the amount that breaking pitches move in Colorado versus other stadium. In the thinner air, there are fewer particles with which a baseball can create friction, air pressure differences, and, thus, break. This has a profound affect on the ability of pitchers to throw breaking pitches. Judging by Gonzalez's pitch-type numbers, this could have been part of the reason why he was able to break out in Colorado.

Approaching this with the disclaimer that the sample size involved is small, and thus vulnerable to random fluctuations, it must be noted that Gonzalez saw some serious improvement in his ability to hit curve balls in 2009 when compared to 2008. While he was just above average against benders in 2008 (-0.22 wCB/C), he destroyed them in '09 (1.66 wCB/C). While this change could reflect an overall improvement in his ability to hit major league pitching, Coors certainly didn't hurt.

On the other hand, giving credit to the theory that Gonzalez merely became a better hitter was his improved success against fastballs and change-ups (-1.66 wFB/C in 2008, 1.86 wFB/C in 2009; -1.74 wCH/C in 2008, -0.28 wCH/C in 2009). This showed an improved ability to adjust to changes in speeds, which may mean that he's either waiting longer before making decisions on pitches, he's getting better at reading the break of pitches, or both. Either way, while the Coors air probably had something to do with his ability to hit curves, there is significant evidence that he became better at diagnosing pitch types.

Of concern, however, are Gonalez's struggles against sliders. While sliders were the only pitch he could hit with any regularity in 2008 (0.19 wSL/C), he was absolutely awful against them in 2009 (-1.84 wSL/C). Given that Gonzalez is a lefty, this may be one of the biggest challenges facing the young hitter, as lefties who struggle against sliders often end up having terrible platoon splits. This may or may not become a problem for Gonzalez, who posted a respectable line against lefties in '09 (.276/.343/.466) but was terrible against them in '08 (.188/.207/.247). However, much of Gonzalez's plate discipline struggles resurfaced when he faced left-handed pitching, as he had a 5:19 BB:K ratio, albeit in 65 plate appearances. Though he hit for good power, his BABIP was through the roof at .378. As a result, expect a hard regression next season, albeit with two caveats—there are some sample size issues involved and he could still learn to hit same-handed hurlers.

As for his overall 2009 and outlook, Gonzalez was quite the hitter. He cut down his K rate to 25.2 percent, while walking in 9.2 percent of his plate appearances. Given his plate discipline characteristics, he seems to be a bit better than his numbers indicate, as he could up his walk percentage over the 10 percent mark this year, while dropping his K rate into the low 20s. Should he do this, there would be some nice implications for his overall numbers, particularly his batting average and OPS. In addition, his Zone percentage, at 47.4 percent, is low, so if he can somehow learn to lay off pitches outside the zone (30.6 percent O-Swing), it will put serious pressure on pitchers to adjust their approach, forcing them to throw him more strikes and more hittable pitches. Either way, the Rockies would be excited at just an improvement in his walk rate to 11 percent and his strikeout rate to 22 percent. These improvements should be enough to hold his batting average in the .275-.285 range even if his BABIP (.338) drops.

And then there's the speed. Gonzalez's stolen base numbers were quite the welcome surprise to his owners this season. It is difficult to make sense of this, as he has been noted in the past as having an intriguing power/speed combination, as he stole 12 bases in 2003 and 16 bases in 2006. As the old adage goes: "Once it's part of your skill set, you own it." Therefore, maybe Gonzalez could steal 30 bases some day. Still, it would be prudent to exercise some skepticism when reviewing his stolen base numbers, though there are definite indicators as to his speed: He managed 1.1 RangeRuns above average in center field in 2009, while being caught only four times in his 20 stolen base tries. In the end, he is probably more of a 15 -base stealer than a 30-steal guy. But, if he decides to run at a high frequency, maybe he can pull it off.

With an excellent line drive rate (23.4 percent line drives), flyball tendencies, and good power, Gonzalez looks like a good outfielder for fantasy leagues in the 2010 season. He'll be just 24 next season, so there is still some considerable development left in him. As he is expected to stay in Colorado, fantasy owners should expect only good things going forward. As a result, a 27 home run, 15 stolen base, .275-.285 season in 2010 seems about right. Keep your eye on the strikeouts and his platoon splits, but have confidence that the power will be there. Since he should also toss a few swipes into the mix, he looks like an above-average major league outfielder in 12-team mixed leagues. If he makes the requisite improvements to his K and walk rate, he could turn in quite the year. Grab him next year if he's available.

VOTE ON NEXT WEEK'S PLAYER PROFILE

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Posted by Mike Silver at 3:30am (3) Comments

Thursday, October 15, 2009

The Southern League’s finest vs. the toast of the Texas League

The Southern League's Finest

Desmond Jennings has come of age and catapulted himself toward the top of many prospect boards due to his dynamic offensive prowess. A Dexter Fowler clone in many respects, Jennings was the MVP of the Southern League during his time with Montgomery. His breakout 2009 has made him the hottest leadoff-hitting blue-chipper in all of baseball.

Mike Stanton has more development in front of him, but it's safe to say that he has the best raw power in the minor leagues. Stanton strikes out too much, but a lot of power hitters do. It's his plate discipline that needs to be cleaned first and foremost. Everything else should fall in line, including those advantageous 2-0 and 3-1 counts. Stanton has superstar power, and that's what makes him a hot property.

Travis Wood blew through the Southern League in his nineteen starts for Carolina. In some ways Wood came out of nowhere in 2009, but he has always had solid talent. His control and confidence improved by leaps and bounds this year, leaving him right in line to join Cincinnati's rotation sooner rather than later.

Jarrod Parker had a good news/bad news season in which his powerful right arm was the talk of the town in more ways than one. Looking around the minor leagues, it is awfully hard to top Parker's pure velocity and balanced repertoire, but an elbow strain that he suffered late in the season gives one reason for pause. He has ace-like ability, but the warning flag is in full effect.

The Toast of the Texas League

Chris Carter backed up his eye-opening 2008 campaign with a monstrous, MVP follow-up season. Despite graduating to stiffer competition, his strikeouts went down, his walks went up, and, much to the chagrin of opposing pitchers, his power was every bit as devastating as advertised. His ascent is eerily similar to that of Texas' promising young slugger, Chris Davis. Oakland may have a permanent middle-of-the-order centerpiece on its hands.

Hank Conger can be a handful when healthy. He has all of the necessary catching tools to succeed at the major league level, including an offensive skill set rounded out by strong contact skills, a good amount of plate patience and a dash of power. He is a difficult guy to get out, no matter what level he's playing at. And when it comes right down to it, that is sometimes all you can ask of your catcher.

Jhoulys Chacin cemented his place in Colorado's future rotational plans with his impressive 2009 performance, which followed up a mammoth 2008 campaign. Chacin has all the makings of a well-rounded, average major league starter, but the potential is still there for a truly special career to emerge. It is hard to envision that type of career at this point, but I have a hard time doubting Chacin's always-improving control and mound presence.

Kasey Kiker, with his short stature, doesn't intimidate anyone when he takes the mound. His low-90s fastball isn't making anyone's knees shake either, but, at times, Kiker brings fearlessness and masterful control to the ballpark. If he can pitch with more consistency, his average three-pitch mix could spell middle-of-the-rotation for the young Kiker.

Posted by Matt Hagen at 6:10am (1) Comments

Friday, October 16, 2009

Waiver Wire Offseason: NL

While everyone else is done for the season and watching the playoffs, Waiver Wire keeps on going! It's time take a look at some guys who finished 2009 strong and whose 2010 value will be greatly affected by offseason moves.

Chris Coghlan | Florida | OF
2009 Final Stats: 321/.390/.460

I almost listed Chris among my Hits for 2009, since I'd given him a thumbs-up way back on May 15, noting his awesome batting eye in the minors and his 80% SB rate. "Expect doubles power and stolen bases," I said. "Good keeper pickup."

Coghlan came through for me in all ways except the SBs and only got stronger as the year went on. He had one of the best second halves in baseball—.372/.423/.543, with 21 doubles, 54 R and 32 RBI, along with 40 multi-hit games (including two separate streaks of six straight multi-hit games). He's one of my ROY faves, though he gets little chatter from the big-market focused commentators out there. Overall, his .321/.390/.460 was incredibly impressive, with 31 2B, 84 R and 47 RBI, an 85% contact rate and a .69 batting eye.

He really came alive after the Marlins put him in the leadoff spot in late May; he hit .336/.397/.473 as the No. 1 hitter, and he stuck there even when speedy (but struggling) Cameron Maybin returned in September. Coghlan profiles more as a No. 2 or No. 3 hitter, but his flexibility to hit in that difficult spot bodes well for his future.

Another bright spot in his future—as far as fantasy owners are concerned, anyway—is the fate of Dan Uggla. Widely considered trade bait, Uggla and his ever-heftier price tag shouldn't be with Florida next year, opening up a spot at 2B. Coghlan played at the keystone in the minors as well as at 3B, another question mark in the Marlins' future, and either spot should boost Coghlan's fantasy value even further.

If he doesn't win ROY, it will be because of the name on the front of the jersey, not the one on the back (it could also be because of the next guy I'm gonna write about, but hold your horses already!). Coghlan's a bright star who's only going to grow brighter, particularly if he moves out of the outfield. Keeper owners ought to have this guy rostered already, while other owners should watch the Marlins' offseason plans and keep Coghlan in mind come Draft Day.

Casey McGehee | Milwaukee | 3B/2B
2009 Final Stats: .301/.360/.499

Another ROY candidate, McGehee took advantage of the injury to Rickie Weeks and lack of production by Bill Hall and Mat Gamel to become a 2B/3B qualifier in most leagues, and a starter for Milwaukee. His .300+ BA is a teeny bit hollow, as manager Macha yanked him after his first AB in game 162 in order to preserve it (he'd been hitting .299 before the start of play).

McGehee battled knee tendinitis most of the season and took a while to work his way into the starting lineup, so he accumulated only 355 ABs, albeit productive ones. In that slightly-more-than-half-season, he cranked 16 dingers, 20 2Bs and 66 RBI, largely providing protection to the large Prince Fielder. Over 600 ABs, that projects to 34 2Bs, 27 HRs and 111 RBI—not a bad year at all, and one which would have placed him squarely in the ROY discussion.

The question for fantasy owners, however, is whether he'll get those 600 ABs or not. Rickie Weeks should be back next year, while Mat Gamel is considered the Brewers' 3B of the future. McGehee has played at 1B, but Prince shouldn't be going anywhere anytime soon, either. McGehee played C in the minors, but Milwaukee's well-stocked there, too. It's possible that Gamel gets shifted to the OF, but otherwise it's hard imagining McGehee holding Gamel down at Triple-A for another season. This gives Milwaukee some tough decisions to make in the offseason. They've admitted that they'll trade offense for starting pitching, meaning Gamel, Corey Hart, or even Weeks or McGehee could be gone.

This is another situation to keep a close eye on, since McGehee's value is certainly tied to his playing time in 2010, as well as where he plays. It's hard to see any team benching him after this kind of debut, but anything's possible. Not a solid keeper due to these issues, but absolutely someone who could be way up or down by your draft day in 2010.

Randy Wolf | Los Angeles | SP
2009 Final Stats: 6.7 K/9, 2.8 K/BB, 3.20 ERA

Wolf put together his best overall season since 2002, when you look at his ERA, 214 IP, and 1.10 WHIP (the latter was a career high for him) and his 11-7 record is not only his second-highest win total in his career, it represents his second-best winning percentage ever.

Down the stretch, he was also one of Los Angeles' best arms in September—though both Padilla (3-0, 3.15 ERA) and Garland (3-2, 2.72 ERA) did better than Wolf's 2-1, 3.16 ERA, his 1.02 WHIP was one of the best in baseball for the last month of the season, as was the .207 BAA. Sixteen of his final 18 starts were Quality Starts, showing the groove he got into after the All-Star break, part of a year when he notched a career-high 24 QS.

Has the 32-year-old, injury-prone lefty finally put it together? Should he be on your radar screen for 2010?

Well, the injury question is only available to those with a crystal ball, but let's focus on Wolf's underlying skills. From a strikeout standpoint, his K/9 is his lowest since 2004, but so is his 2.4 BB/9, and his 7.5 H/9 (lowest since 2002) kept his ratios stable. His .227 BAA and .256 BABIP are also his best year in those categories since 2002. And his 129 ERA+ was a career high.

THT's stats will tell you he was helped by the Dodgers' defense, with a .749 DER that was his best for as long as they've been keeping that stat for him. Interestingly, however, Chavez Ravine (generally regarded as a good pitcher's park) didn't help him, as he was better on the road in virtually every area, from BA to HR surrendered. Dave Gassko's Pitcher's Runs Created tells you that his 97 was amazingly high for him, his best in PRC's recorded history (since 2004).

This all means that Wolf benefited from a team that helped him on defense in a year when his control was very good and his strikeouts were down. That's consistent with the profile of an aging pitcher playing for a good defensive team.

His wins and career-high IP tell you he's playing for a good offensive team, too, since he threw deeper in games (his 6.3 IP/G was his best since 2002) and had the offense behind him to help collect those wins. That's further emphasized by the seven losses the Dodgers erased from his ledger by coming back (the most a team's helped him since 2000) while the bullpen only lost four of his 24 QS.

What does this mean for 2010? Plenty, depending on where he ends up. The Dodgers have plenty of young arms and could re-sign Wolf as a veteran presence. If Wolf is smart, he'll take what they offer him, even if it's less than he thinks he'll find elsewhere. He could reproduce 2009 somewhere else, but those peripherals scream (1) career year, and (2) team play behind him.

Sure, Wolf could continue to mature and improve those ratios with another team, but my gut—and the stats—say to bet against it. As a Dodger starter, he becomes a Draft Day sleeper; with another team, he is downgraded to a late-round gamble. Keep watching to see which one he becomes.

Are there NL players you'd like to see written up? Let me know in your comments and I'll write 'em up for next week!

Posted by Michael Street at 2:00am (4) Comments

Waiver Wire Offseason: AL

For the most part, we will profile players individually, discussing their value in mixed leagues, AL-only leagues (or NL-only discussion from Michael Street), expectations of a player being a “sleeper” (or “value pick”), and even keeper possibilities. With the wide variety of contract rules (and roster sizes) that various leagues use, keep/no-keep decisions will be different for each setting but should be clear from the discussion. And, as always, we're here with quick answers to questions posed in the comments section.

All season long, THT has participated in a “Fantasy Baseball Roundtable” discussion, a panel which was comprised of experts from various sites, all approaching the same question simultaneously (so, it wasn't really a roundtable, not even a virtual one, as there was no interaction). Yours truly was invited to participate in two of them, following in the big shoes of Derek Carty, who was busily putting the final touches on his fantastic LABR League championship run. The first question was whether we thought Ubaldo Jimenez was a top-seven starting pitcher for 2010 and the next was the question we're going to discuss this week on Waiver Wire, in our first offseason installment: 2010 Sleepers – hitter and pitcher?

For those who don't want to go to other sites, the “sleeper” picks were: Carlos Gonzalez and Marc Rzepczynski. “Car-Go” contained the caveat “he's almost certain to be overlooked, barring a huge postseason”. Well, it was only four games long, but he's no longer a “sleeper” to anyone who watched him massacre the (mostly lefty) pitching the Phillies sent out there in the NLDS. And, since Rzepczynski was reviewed in this column late in the season, there was little to change. So, who are some other players that might be “value picks” next year (since the concept of a “sleeper” is pretty much non-existent anymore)? Is it Brett Anderson (who has been glowingly reviewed here at Waiver Wire), or Luke Hochevar (whom we were about as harsh on as possible for someone with his K/9 rates)? These were the two other AL players noted in the Roundtable. How about some other candidates instead, just for variety?

2010 “Value Picks”

Ian Kinsler | Texas | 2B
2009 Final Stats: .253/.327/.488

There's some risk here, as Rudy Jaramillo is departed from Texas, but Kinsler is one of the few players who has a legitimate shot as being a “Roto MVP” in the American League in 2010. The biggest reason to expect better stats from an established star is Kinsler's ultra-low BABIP, trailing everyone at .245. Before 2009, Kinsler's career mark was over .300. If he rebounds to his career mark, that's 25 extra hits, and even if we assume those are all singles, that's 39 points of OBP and 44 points of batting average and slugging(!) Kinsler reached first base just 141 times in 2009 and stole 31 bases. Adding 20-25 more times on first base should add another five SB to that total. That brings us to the one thing that has kept Kinsler from putting up huge roto $ values (just $23 in 2008, and $21 in 2009 in mixed-league values) ... his health. But he finished the year strong, and his four career DL stints (each just 15 days) have all been rather fluky. Consider, also, that Kinsler is hitting his peak. His “seasonal age” for 2010 will be 28, but he's about the youngest possible for that, as he will be 27 until June 22. It may seem like we're assuming the best of all worlds here, but if Kinsler plays 155 games, posts rate stats as he did in 2008 (which we think is highly likely based on the BABIP adjustment), and maybe even shows a little “Age 27” magic, he could put up a truly dominant fantasy season. And while there's some risk involved, the fact that he hasn't yet put it all together could lead to him being undervalued in auctions and drafts (or in trade for keeper leagues).

Chien-Ming Wang | New York | SP
2009 Final Stats: 6.2 K/9, 1.5 K/BB, 9.64 ERA

Okay, now here is a sleeper in Wang, and a Yankee no less. The question is whether to let a sleeping dog lie, or whether there's a fairy-tale ending to this story of sleeping royalty. Frankly, this is a really difficult call to make, either way. The “safe” play would be to invest only “mad money” on Wang, or use a late pick on him, or whatever. One might think that Wang has been trying too hard to fix something that wasn't broken, to look at his statistical tendencies. His K/9 have increased from a stupefyingly low 3.14 in his great 2006 season (19-6, 3.63), to 6.21 in 2009. Meanwhile, his GB% has declined from 63% in 2006 to 53% in 2009. But the change has been due to the various injuries, and him losing his command (i.e., location within the strike zone), in addition to losing more than 1 mph from his average fastball velocity. The new ballpark is supposedly hell on RHP, but when Wang is right, he won't be worrying too much about fly balls. Nothing is ever certain when predicting the ability of pitchers to return from injuries, but Wang's serious injuries are now another year removed, and he'll have the entire offseason to work out normally. Due to his freakish stats, no mathematically based prediction system is going to ascribe much value to Wang for 2010, and we think there's a very good chance that he will return to be a big winner with that great Yankee offense, and help WHIP as well. He's obviously the sort of pitcher who needs to be supported by others on your fantasy team to avoid finishing last in strikeouts, and he won't help ERA much, even in an AL-only league, but wins are hard to come by, and a 200-IP, low-WHIP starter for the Yankees is bound to gather a lot.

Player to Watch:

Ben Zobrist | Tampa Bay | 2B/OF/SS (13 games)
2009 Final Stats: .297/.405/.543

Clearly no longer a “sleeper," after putting up MVP-type stats (especially if you believe some of the fielding metrics that are in vogue now), we were bullish on Zobrist back in May here on Waiver Wire. But with all due respect to THT Fantasy colleague Troy Patterson, we aren't quite sure that “Clone Wars: Chase Utley and Ben Zobrist” is setting realistic expectations for our hero Zobrist. Both +/- (the Fielding Bible metric) and UZR suggest that Zobrist had a tremendous season afield in 2009 at second base. But his reputation is that of a sub-par defender, and when Iwamura returned, Zobrist moved to the outfield. As noted, he's proven he can hit like a corner guy now, and for most fantasy formats, the fact that he may not return to the infield in 2010 is of little or no concern, as he'll still be rated in the middle infield (and at SS too, in generous systems). He'll be a “young” 29 in 2010 (May 26 birthday), so expecting a lot more than his career stats of .260/.346/.459 might be optimistic. As much as he appears to have “put it all together,” players have ups and downs, and many hitters look unstoppable when they are doing well. Still, he could maintain his $21 mixed-league value (2009 stats) by adding another 10% to his playing time, a possibility given that he was used as a part-time player to start the 2009 season. He's someone to keep an eye on, though, as he could end up back at second base again if Tampa Bay signs and trades Iwamura (or, less likely, doesn't offer him arbitration).

It's a long offseason, but staying a step ahead is always useful. Feel free to suggest players for review in comments, or to ask questions about values or keeper decisions. We'll be reviewing some mixed-league and AL- and NL-only players over the months ahead, and are always happy to re-prioritize players per request.

Posted by Rob McQuown at 4:00am (4) Comments

Monday, October 19, 2009

Clone Wars: Chone Figgins and Denard Span

Chone Figgins became an all around multi-position player in the infield who could gain plenty of steals and most years go in at second base, shortstop or third base. He has lost his eligibility at every position now except third base, though. His value is in his speed and a sudden ability to get on base. On the other hand Denard Span is a classic one-position player. He doesn't have the value that Figgins had as a multi-position guy, but what about Figgins as just a third baseman?

                   R    RBI   HR   SB   AVG   OBP    SLG    K%     BB%    Spd
Chone Figgins      114  54    5    42   .298  .395  .393  18.5%   14.1%   6.7
Dernard Span       97   68    8    23   .311  .392  .415  15.4%   10.8%   6.6

Chone Figgins

MLB: OCT 08 ALDS - Game 1 - Red Sox at Angels
Oct. 8, 2009: Los Angeles Angels third baseman Chone Figgins during a game against the Boston Red Sox during ALDS Game One at Angels Stadium in Anaheim, CA. (Icon/SMI)

He spent two seasons working himself into the lineup only earning 282 PA in his first two seasons. Then in 2004 he reached 600 PA and totaled an impressive number of runs (83) and stolen bases (34). Getting on base wasn't one of his strong suits early on, though. He had a 7.8 percent walk rate and his OBP was only at .350 for much of his early career. This definitely limited his steals and run totals early on.

His on-base skills have gotten remarkably better as his walk rate has climbed a percentage or more each season going from the 7.8 percent in 2004 to the 14.1 percent he held this year. Many players will lose some contact skills when adding that many walks, but his contact rate has climbed right along with his walk rate.

His speed took a hit in the past few years with some injury problems. In 2007 he went to the 15-day DL for a fractured finger, but in 2008 he took two separate trips to the DL for an injured hamstring. His speed score was a career low in 2008 at 5.6 and his ability to steal as many bases was a question coming into 2009. His speed score was below career averages at 6.7 this year and his total steals were down. He stole 52 bases in 2006 before the injuries started. This loss of speed is a possible concern fantasy wise.

Denard Span

His ability to get on base is something he comes with right away. Unlike Figgins who took a few years to learn this skill, Span is already walking more than 10 percent of the time. The skill wasn't something he always had shown in the minors, though. His two seasons at Double-A resulted in walk rates around 6 percent and his first season at Triple-A also had a walk rate at 7.6 percent. He has solidified this in the majors though with a 11.5 percent rate in his two seasons so far.

While he gets on base very well, he does not seem to have the speed of a younger Figgins. He has had approximately 40 extra times at first base than Figgins did in 2004, but has only 23 steals. Figgins had 34 in that season. He was also caught stealing 10 times this year, giving him a less-than-ideal 70 percent success rate. He needs to work on his steals for 2010 to really gain value since his power is lacking.

Speaking of power, he hit eight homers this season. With 145 games played and 676 PA, his ceiling right now looks to be 10 homers. At only 25 years old, he is entering the stage of his career where he could add some power to his swing, but it might be worth a gamble in 2010 with the new stadium in Minnesota.

Conclusion

Span has a head start on Figgins by getting on base so well, but his limited position eligibility and speed make him slightly behind the younger Figgins. Moving forward, they are much closer than that. Figgins' speed has taken a step back, and third base is usually a position at which you want a power bat, and he is not that. Putting a speed guy who is limited to third base on your team can be a handcuff in building your lineup. It requires an abundance of power throughout the rest of your lineup. On the other hand a 10/30 guy in the outfield, like Span, can fit in nicely.

Posted by Troy Patterson at 2:03am (0) Comments

Fantasy snobbery and league legitimacy

Both my most recent column and Paul Singman's touched obliquely on how league settings affect the dynamic of play. Commenter, Andrew, mentioned his opinion that daily transaction leagues “lose a bit of credibility” as compared to leagues with free-agent auction budgets. I’m not going to use this column to discuss that point in depth, but the comment did get me thinking about the determinants of a competitive and credible league.

Let’s face it: Many of us here at THT are guilty of at least some degree of roto-snobbery; this goes for both writers and commenters. One of the, perhaps shortsighted, assumptions common to us roto snobs is that leagues with more advanced designs are “better,” more “legitimate/credible” or more competitive. I’m not necessarily sure this is the case though.

Let me digress briefly to state for the record that I don’t mean to use the term “roto-snob” as an insult. I think it is important that there are those out there who take fantasy sports seriously and treat it as a discipline worthy of study and analysis. Although fantasy sports comprise an extremely lucrative industry and are undoubtedly good for the corresponding leagues, fantasy sports is still treated as a frivolous and naïve endeavor. This is evidenced by the way the term is used as a de facto pejorative in the mainstream sports lexicon, i.e. “[Player X] put up great numbers, but this isn’t a fantasy league.” Us fantasy snobs represent a voice to refute these misguided ad hominems.

Getting back to the question of fielding a competitive and legitimate league however, I think the most important determinant of such a dynamic is an evenly matched and consistently engaged group of participants. In fact, when considering competitiveness this is even more important than the particular level of skill or knowledge the body of the league shares. To make a simple baseball analogy, the various levels of minor league baseball are not necessarily any less competitive than MLB, in terms of games themselves. And, while the overall quality of play may be inferior, that does not make the sport that is being played any less legitimate than that sport being played at higher levels.

I don’t think the above paragraph is particularly controversial, by any means. But, I’d like to dig a little deeper into the perceived connection between how advanced or difficult a league is, and how “pure,” “legitimate” or “good” it is. This may get a little messy because we’re often dealing with terms that are more value judgments than empirical observations, but it should be a fun, if pedantic, ride.

Theoretically, it is harder to build a high quality team in a (perhaps AL- or NL-only) league that involves auction dollars, keepers, pay-scales and minor league rosters. Such a league requires higher competency in additional skill sets, as compared to a simple mixed league that utilizes a draft. So, depending on the subjective criteria one uses to judge the “quality” of a league, such a league may be “better.” However, that does not mean that your experience participating in such a league will be better or more competitive than in a more simply designed league—and that, I believe, to be a very important point.

It seems that before going any further, it is a good idea to try approximate what is meant when people use terms like “legitimate,” or “credible” when referring to a fantasy league. I think there are two primary meanings of these somewhat subjective terms. The first refers to leagues being designed with characteristics that increase the likelihood of the most knowledgeable and skilled managers triumphing. Of course, even this definition is somewhat existential as it begs the questions of what kinds of knowledge and which particular skills should be privileged. Further, it prompts questions as to whether certain advantageous behaviors are even to be considered “skills” in the first place. Is getting to the wire quickly a skill? Depends on how you define “skill,” I presume.

The second is more straightforward; are the categories representative of the breath of skills baseball players have and are they weighted sensibly? For example, I’ve played in a number of leagues that use both OPS and batting average as categories and that doesn’t make sense to me. Everything that counts toward batting average counts toward OPS as well; OPS is ostensibly a more comprehensive way of measuring offensive prowess. Why not just choose the more accurate metric attempting to measure the same general principle? I’m not as heavily concerned with this second point for the purposes of this article though.

Considering the first principle underlying legitimacy, we arrive at a fundamental question:

Do deeper and more advanced leagues, by virtue of their design, lead to results that more accurately reflect the relative skills and knowledge of the league participants than simpler leagues do?

I think the instinctive answer is yes, but I’m not so sure it’s correct. I think many people may confuse the selection bias of these league designs with a perceived meritocracy inherent in the design of such a league. That is to say, the complexity of the design attracts more seasoned and knowledgeable participants as opposed to the league design itself doing anything tangible to promote meritocratic results.

For the sake of discussion, I would just like to mention a few reasons why a more advanced league may actually be less conducive to meritocracy. Many of these points deal primarily with league depth and one may also be able to argue that some of these dynamics, for reasons not unrelated to those I discuss, indeed help to separate the wheat from the chaff.

More shallow leagues magnify the smaller differences in production among players. If you play in a 12-team mixed league, having Albert Pujols guarantees you almost nothing; you need to build quality at every single roster spot. In a 10 team NL-only league, having Pujols is a tremendous relative advantage. One player can profoundly swing the outcome of these leagues.
As a corollary to the above point, injuries to key players can absolutely decimate teams in very deep leagues. We can debate the extent to which injuries can be predicted, and how much of a skill it is to draft a healthy team, but beyond the Chipper Jones-es of the world, injuries are rather difficult, and somewhat unrealistic to be able to account for on draft day.
Simply getting at-bats often becomes something of high value. Some advanced leagues are deep enough that anybody receiving regular playing time is given value. It’s debatable whether this is in “the spirit” of fantasy baseball. The fantasy snob in me cringes when I see the players available on some shallow league wires, but at the same time one could argue that any league in which the participants rushed to pick up Ronny Cedeno after Jack Wilson was traded is also somewhat ridiculous.
While the expanded skill sets required to succeed in advanced leagues can potentially even gaps in skills among players (participant A is weaker at budgeting, but more astute at trading, for example), the same dynamic magnifies gaps in overall proficiency among the league. Advanced leagues offer more ways to take advantage of weaker participants, and present more opportunities for participants to expose their weaknesses. While this is a good thing in many respects, large enough gaps in competency even among one or two participants can quickly manifest into a competition of who can most blatantly exploit the lesser players. The strict fantasy Darwinist may not see a problem with this, but I hardly find it far from ideal, and such a dynamic is not conducive to the long-term health of such a league. The bottom line is that the competitive dynamic may be more fragile in advanced leagues. Minor league rostering may be the derivative market of fantasy baseball…or something. Sorry, I just wanted to sound wise and worldly there.

At the end of the day, I think the overall competitive dynamic of a league is largely determined by the relative skill level of the participants. As for a league’s quality, credibility or legitimacy, I might offer an alternative, though still subjective, barometer by which to measure these subjective qualities.

There are different philosophies regarding the overall aim of designing a league. Should it most accurately reflect actually running a baseball team? Is fantasy baseball an entirely different animal from real baseball, with its own rules, dynamics and view of long- and short-term returns? Should the league aim to neutralize individual circumstance of each participant’s life that may lead to advantages or disadvantages?

I think it’s important for the body of a league to discuss these issues from a philosophical perspective and agree on the type of league they want to create. For example, what are the relative merits of using more advanced statistical categories—increased accuracy in terms of reflecting what actually wins baseball games, but an introduction of more esoteric principles, which may further stratify the participants. Perhaps a league’s legitimacy, credibility or overall quality is largely determined by how accurately it mirros its collectively agreed upon vision. In some respects, this is a $10 way of saying that a league’s overall quality can be largely approximated by how much fun the league participants have playing it out.

What does your ideal league look like, and what are your anecdotal experiences regarding the overall “quality” of advanced and simpler leagues?

Posted by Derek Ambrosino at 2:10pm (8) Comments

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

A question for discussion on rankings

Everybody prepares for drafts differently in the offseason. On one extreme there are the people who go all-out, creating models to predict player performance or using some other mathematically involved method to create their rankings. And on the other extreme there are the people who do very little to prepare, at most maybe purchase a magazine and have it open next to them while they draft.

In the middle of those two extremes are the people who spend some time creating personal rankings, probably from looking at last year's stats—making adjustments based on age, playing time, and luck—and then creating a rough prediction for each player's stats for the upcoming season. Today, I have a question for those people in the middle about how they come up with their rankings.

Do you think that when making your rankings if you looked solely at the players' stats without any names attached, your rankings would look different than if you made them as you usually do, with names?

My feeling is that most people would answer yes to the above question. Some people at the beginning of 2009 just had this feeling about Matt Kemp and they knew that he would have a good year. Obviously these people were rewarded for bumping up Kemp in their rankings in this example, but had they felt the same way about Chris Iannetta then it would not have worked out so well. This leads me to my next question:

Do you think it is harmful to allow your instinctive feelings about certain players affect your player rankings?

Some will say "No, that is not such a bad thing" while others will argue vehemently against allowing irrational feelings on certain players take effect. Personally, I suggest that you use player names along with their stats to make rankings, despite knowing they would look different if the names were not attached.

Some people might call allowing a player's name to affect your opinion of him an irrational bias, but I do not believe it necessarily is. There are many subtleties that are unique to each player's situation—such as playing time or contract situation—that the numbers do not capture. By associating a player's name with his situation and then adjusting your projections slightly based on feelings, I do not believe you are hurting your team's chances of winning by any significant degree. You might even be helping.

So do not feel guilty about sliding James Loney up a few slots in your rankings if you feel he is in for a breakout 2010 campaign. For the most part you should have statistical backing to your rankings, but there is no problem in indulging in a few of those feelings of yours while making them.

Posted by Paul Singman at 5:00am (10) Comments

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

The Kemp Speed Theory: Do bigger players slow down earlier?

Will Matt Kemp's size cause him to lose his effectiveness on the basepaths in 2010? (Icon/SMI)

A few weeks ago, Eriq Gardner noted how many fantasy analysts are already penciling Matt Kemp in as a top-five pick for 2010. Eriq played devil's advocate a bit and discussed some of the reasons why Kemp might not be such a slam dunk. One such reason was his speed. To quote:

Speed: As mentioned above, Kemp is on a path toward surpassing 35 SB this season, an extraordinary achievement for a player who is 6-foot-3 and approximately 225 pounds. Players measuring those dimensions aren’t typically speed demons and when they do surpass 30 SB, as Alex Rodriguez did in 1998, it tends to be followed by a few years of more moderate steals production. In 2006, Baseball Prospectus writer Kevin Goldstein wrote this about the then-prospect outfielder: “At 230 pounds, Kemp’s plus speed could dissipate quickly.” Reportedly, Kemp showed up to spring training this year in excellent condition, and his success rate on the base-paths this year (81%) shows no cause for concern, yet we’ve likely seen the best from Kemp in the steals department.

This theory intrigued me, and I wanted to take a deeper look into it. Is this actually the case? And if it is, what's the extent of it?

Age curves

To start, let's look at an age curve for three groups of players: league average (all players), players 6-3 or taller, and players 5-10 or shorter. These groups will be known as "average," "tall," and "short," respectively, from this point forward. The stat we'll examine will be SB/SBO (steals divided by opportunities to steal), or the rate at which a player both attempts a steal and succeeds given that he reaches first base. We'll use data from 1919 to 2008. To form the graph, we'll look at year-to-year changes and display them as a percentage of Year 1 so that all three groups of players will start at the same place and will be easier to compare.

The main takeaway here is that "tall" and "average" players maintain the speed they had at age 21 longer than "short" players, who start trending downward at age 23. Tall players start that downward trend at age 24, but it's much less pronounced as they're able to keep at least 93 percent of their Year 1 speed all the way until age 28. Once those tall players start their decline, however, they face a steeper drop than the short players.

To illustrate this a bit better, here's a chart showing raw year-to-year changes as opposed to the gradual aging approach we just took. We'll also condense our age range to 24-37 to use ages with a little bit larger sample and to hone in a little bit more on what we're looking at.

In this light, we see that short and average players behave very similarly. The short players show some wider swings, but that's simply a sample size issue. The pattern is essentially the same. Tall players, however, follow a much different pattern, as we started to see in the initial age curve. Hopefully this graph makes it a little clearer. Each year from age 27 through 32, tall players unfailingly see a drop in their speed. Then there's a bit of a resurgence at age 34 (almost certainly a sample-size issue—in all likelihood, there is probably a plateau for ages 33 to 35) and then some more decline.

To circle back on the short players for a moment, there is one noticeable difference between them and average players. At age 33, notice that their line begins to slope upward. This doesn't mean that they gain speed, but rather they lose it at an increasingly smaller rate. In fact, from age 33 to 37, short players lose a total of just 6 percent of their speed. After that, of course, they decline.

Summing it all up

Essentially, short and average players see their skills decline at a pretty steady rate, short players easing up a bit from 33 to 37. They seem to lose roughly 5 percent of their speed per year until they reach 33. Tall players behave differently, seeing little overall change from 21 to 25, dropping a bit and leveling off until 27, then taking a nosedive until 33. They level off again from 33 to 35, then plummet until the end of their careers.

Application to Matt Kemp

It looks like Kemp's big body won't hinder his speed much, at least in 2010. (Icon/SMI)

Now let's turn our attention back to Kemp. The poster boy for Eriq's theory has fit our age curve pretty well up to this point in his career. He's posted SB/SBO rates (including MLEs) of 18%, 14%, 22% and 20% at ages 21, 22, 23 and 24. Aside from that outlier at age 22 (which was accumulated during a somewhat small sample of 455 at-bats), he's been pretty consistent, just as the age curve tells us (especially if we were to regress each of his rates to the mean).

So what can we deduce about Kemp (who turned 25 at the end of last month) going forward? Well, I think it's relatively safe to say that his speed will stay in tact, for the most part, next year. Unless he puts on some weight, he should remain in that "initial plateau" area for tall players (lasting from age 21 through 25). After 2010, these age curves tell us to expect a small dip until age 27, then a precipitous fall off.

Overall, the Kemp Speed Theory seems to hold some real credence, it's just that Kemp himself hasn't reached the point where he's likely to be affected.

Side-note on caveats and bias

You probably noticed that I didn't use weight as a parameter, as Eriq's theory suggested. While I think this would be an important variable, unfortunately the data we have available to us doesn't allow it. You see, a database doesn't seem to exist (at least publicly) that assigns a weight to a player for each individual season. Instead, we only get something like career-to-date or end-of-career weight data. This will create problems if we try to use it for age curves.

For example, when Barry Bonds was 25 years old and stealing 40 or 50 bases per year, he probably weighed around 150 pounds. At the end of his career, he weighed around 240 pounds. If we were to create a weight parameter in our age curve, Bonds would not be lumped in with the 6-2, 150-pound guys at the age when he actually was 6-2, 150 pounds. Instead, he would fall into the 6-2, 240-pound bucket at every age—even though that's not who he was at age 24. This creates lots of problems and bias.

Using only height does introduce some problems, but not nearly as many, and it's mostly just an offshoot of not having weight. For example, we have no idea which players are gaining weight and slowing as a result. If we're predicting the future for a modern-day player, we'll know that he's maintained his weight, so ideally we'd want to eliminate guys who added weight from our study, but we simply aren't able to do that. Instead, we'll have "tall players who gain weight" and "tall players who maintain weight" all lumped together, despite the fact that "tall players who gain weight" will likely be skewing our results a bit. Overall, though, using just height is much sounder than including weight.

At some point I may run these age curves again, including a weight parameter, using data from just the past four years or so to eliminate some of the issues with weight, although that might just lead to a small-sample-size issue.

There's also some selection bias inherent with age curves in general, and I've taken some precautions to avoid them, but some just can't be completely eliminated, so I wanted to make note of it.

Finally, because we're using stolen base opportunities as our denominator, our sample is much smaller than if we were using something like at-bats or plate appearances. I included 90 years worth of data to compensate, but the sample sizes are still less than ideal, especially for ages on the extremes. The general points should probably hold, though.

Concluding thoughts

I'm not yet ready to say that I'm drafting Kemp in the top five, but I'm not nearly as worried about his speed as I might have been a few weeks ago.

If you guys have any questions, feel free to ask away.

Posted by Derek Carty at 5:36am (10) Comments

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Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Internet-capable phones and fantasy sports: A love story

Hypothetically speaking

League types

Rough quantification

Final thoughts