May 22, 2013
THT Essentials:
And here's the full roster.
Now available
You can now purchase the Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2013, with 300 pages of great content. It's also available on Amazon and Kindle. Read more about it here.
Or you can search by:
THT E-book
Third Base: The Crossroads is THT's e-book, available for $3.99 from the Kindle store. The good news is that anyone can read a Kindle book, even on a PC. So enjoy the best from THT in a new format.
Get your very own THT merchandise from our CafePress store. We've got baseball caps, t-shirts, coffee mugs and even wall clocks with the classy THT logo prominently displayed. Also, check out the THT Bookstore. Please support your favorite baseball site by purchasing something today.

All content on this site (including text, graphs, and any other original works), unless otherwise noted, is licensed under a
Creative Commons
License.
|
Friday, November 20, 2009
Jake Fox | Chicago | CIF/OF
2009 Final Stats: .259/.311/.468
For all the things that went wrong with the 2009 Cubs, count Jake Fox among the few things that went really right. A power prospect with six years of minor-league experience, Fox started 2009 by leading Triple-A in every offensive category. Many critics pointed to his long road through the minors, his defensive inconsistency, and his whiff-tastic tendencies (479 Ks in 2,355 minor-league ABs) as reasons he'd never make it in the majors.
Despite this, his absurd .423/.503/.886 Triple-A line through the end of May, combined with a slow start by the Cubs, made Fox's call-up a no-brainer, though there was no real room for him on the field. Drafted as a catcher, Fox has since been moved to 1B, where his glove is barely competent, and where he's blocked by Derrek Lee, who had a resurgent 2009 season. Fox has played a bit of 3B and LF to give him a better avenue to the bigs, but he hasn't impressed at those positions, either.
When he did play in May and June, Fox was dynamite, hitting .320/.350/.528 in 53 ABs and just 11 starts. But even when Aramis Ramirez went down, Fox still couldn't get on the field regularly; he played a mix of 3B, DH and the corner outfield spots during those first two months. Fox continued to spot-start at 3B and the OF through July and kept hitting to the tune of .300/.339/.660, and it seemed that he'd really arrived. By the end of July, his overall slash line was .311/.345/.592, leading to ramped-up playing time in August.
At this point, however, Fox started to slide back down to more expected levels. Over the final two months of the season, he hit just .212/.280/.354 and, more significantly, his plate patience evaporated. In his 103 ABs through July 31, Fox displayed unusual patience, striking out just 14 times against six walks. But in 113 August through October ABs, he struck out 33 times, with eight walks. The seven HRs and eight 2Bs he'd clubbed before that point diminished to four HRs and four 2Bs.
This, along with an uncertain PT situation, makes his future very shaky. Neither Lee nor Ramirez is going anywhere, nor is LF Alfonso Soriano. Though Bradley has been the subject of trade rumors, the Cubs are saying they want a CF, meaning current CF Kosuke Fukudome would slide into Bradley's spot in RF.
The Cubs' new ownership has given no indication that they'll make any big lineup changes (which might make room for Fox), but they say they'll remain very active in the trade market. And that's where Fox is likely to have the most value.
His atrocious glove and roadblocked path to a starting job make him an excellent DH candidate, though he could also go to a team like the Giants, who are looking for a power-hitting first baseman. The Cubs would be foolish to hang onto Fox if they can get something in return for him; the team that might deal for him, however, would be equally foolish to assume that he's going to continue to produce at this rate.
Fox's history of hacking has followed him to the majors. His career BB/K ratio of .38 slipped to .29 in MLB, showing how little that part of his game has changed. The other knock on him has been that he can crush a fastball, but can't hit offspeed stuff. Fangraph's Pitch Type Values shows that's true—against fastballs and cutters, he scored 1.9 and 3.7 runs above average, respectively. But against sliders, curves and changes, he hit -3.8, 0.0, and -2.6, respectively.
Most likely, pitchers figured that out in the second half and started feeding him offspeed stuff. He could still learn, of course, and the right hitting coach combined with playing time could reverse those trends. But it doesn't bode well for a 27-year-old entering only his second full major-league season, and strike zone knowledge isn't a skill he can develop at that age.
Fantasy owners will want to see where he ends up in 2010; with the Cubs, he's practically worthless, barring an injury or blockbuster trade, but he could be a good power gamble as a DH or 1B with the right team. He's not as good as he seemed in the first half of 2009, but he might not be as bad as his second half indicates, either. Just don't pay too much to find out.
Jordan Zimmermann | Washington | SP
2009 Final Stats: 9.1 K/9, 3.2 K/BB, 4.63 ERA
Zimmermann rocketed through the minors as their top pitching prospect, before a visit to The Dreaded Dr. Andrews ended his season this past August. Tommy John surgery will keep him from returning to full strength until 2011, and he might not even toe the slab for all of 2010.
That's a shame, since The Other Zimmermann (note that extra "n" to distinguish him from All-Star teammate Ryan) had impressed coaches and scouts at every level. Already gifted with a sinking two-seamer and four-seam fastball in the mid-90s, Zimmermann has worked on perfecting his curve and slider, while trying to develop a changeup. Right now, just those first four pitches are above-average, but imagine if he can develop a fifth plus pitch for his repertoire.
He was drafted as the third player in the second round of the 2007 draft, and quickly served notice to the other teams who passed him by. In short-season A ball, he racked up 12.1 K/9 and 3.9 K/BB rates, en route to a 2.38 ERA and a 1.19 WHIP. He continued to average better than a strikeout per inning as he rose to Triple-A over the next two seasons, throwing just 5.1 IP in the minors in 2009 before earning his call-up.
His overall minor-league numbers were equally eye-popping, with that gaudy 9.9 K/9 leading the way, followed by a 3.2 K/BB, 0.7 HR/9, 2.81 ERA and 1.14 WHIP. With barely 195 pro innings under his belt, he got the early call from Washington, joining the pitching-hungry big-league club in time for his April 20 debut against the Atlanta Braves.
He won that start, as well as his next one against the Mets, for a 2.39 ERA, 6.4 K/9 and 2.7 K/BB. Zimmermann wouldn't win another start until June, after a rocky May when he only gave up fewer than fewer earned runs once in six starts, for a 7.27 ERA, 10.1 K/9, and 3.54 K/BB.
His control wasn't a problem, but his 1.6 HR/9 clearly was, along with the defense behind him. Overall, his FIP ERA for 2009 was .99 lower than his actual ERA, not surprising from a team that scored dead last in the NL in R/G, fielding percentage, errors (their 143 muffs led 15th-ranked Arizona by 19, or about 13%), and 15th in defensive efficiency.
Zimmermann righted the ship in June, giving up two or fewer runs in all four starts, for a 1.90 ERA, 8.4 K/9 and 3.7 K/BB. For all that Washington fans had to moan about, this was something that gave them hope for the future. That is, before July.
In that month, he started four times and gave up two or more runs in each outing. His strikeouts were still strong—9.6 K/9 brought him back over a strikeout per inning—but his walks were up, to 3.75 BB/9 to bring that K/BB down to 2.6. Worse, his elbow was bothering him, so the Nats pulled him from the rotation. A short rest and rehab didn't help, and when they sent the MRI results to Dr. James Andrews, Nats fans braced for the worst.
They got it. Zimmermann is out for the usual TJS timeframe of 12-18 months, so you can safely ignore him entirely in next year's draft and monitor him for 2011. Keeper owners will have a tough call to make, as he looked excellent, and is still just 23 years old. Whether you want to hang onto him all next year will depend on your league's depth, whether you have an open DL slot, and whether you're building for the future or the present.
TJS is more of a rite of passage these days than a cause for long-term concern, but it's got to diminish his rising star significantly, at least until 2011 or 2012. The good news is that he might return in two seasons to an improved team, sort of like waking up from cryogenic sleep to find that all the world's problems have been solved and everyone finally has those jet packs they've been promising us since the 1950s.
Hey, it could happen, and it's only slightly less likely than Zimmermann returning to a competitive Washington team. You never know.
Mat Latos | San Diego | SP
2009 Final Stats: 6.9 K/9, 1.7 K/BB, 4.62 ERA
Like Zimmermann, Latos was his team's top pitching prospect before shooting through the minors to earn a hasty promotion by a crummy team wanting a sneak peek at its future. Unlike Zimmermann, Latos is two years younger and finished the season hale and healthy. But there are other differences, too.
The Padres didn't take Latos until the 11th round, not because of his skills, but because of his reported attitude problems—according to BA, he's got a poor work ethic and "rubs teammates the wrong way with his flippant attitude." But those skills are something else. He's got a 95-plus mph heater, tight curve and hard slider, and has averaged more than a strikeout per inning throughout the minors, along with increasingly sharp control.
As a 19-year-old in short-season A-ball, Latos struck out 74 and walked 22 in 56.1 IP, giving up just pne HR. Those 22 free passes would represent the most he'd give up in the minors, and he would continue to strike batters out while keeping the baseball in the yard. At three levels in 2008, his K rate would dip slightly from 11.8 to 11.1 K/9, while his K/BB grew from 3.4 to 5.3; only his HR/9 rose to 0.6 from 0.2. His 2.57 ERA and 1.11 WHIP confirmed his dominance.
Amazingly, almost all would continue to improve in 2009. Though his strikeouts fell to 9.1, his K/BB continued to rise to 6.1, his HR/9 fell to 0.1 (1 HR in 72.1 IP), and his 1.37 ERA and 0.75 WHIP were at elite levels. The Padres could wait no longer and promoted him straight from Double-A for his July 19 start against Colorado.
He lost that first start, despite giving up only two ER in 4.1 IP, but such is the fate pitching with the Padres' offense behind you. But he won his next two starts, ending the month with 7.0 K/9, 3.3 K/BB, and a 2.70 ERA. His problem, though, was the longball, as he gave up four for the month. This trend continued through August, as he would ultimately give up at least one HR in each of his first six starts.
He also began to struggle finding the strike zone; after just four free passes in his first three starts, he walked 12 in his next four. The bottom fell out in a loss at Chicago, when it took him 92 pitches to get through just 3.2 IP, coughing up five ER on seven hits and four BBs against just five Ks.
It speaks very well of Latos' makeup and perhaps his improved maturity that he rebounded from this to pitch seven scoreless frames against the Braves, needing only 89 pitches to shut down 23 hitters (two more than his brief performance against the Cubs), striking out four, while walking none and surrendering just two hits.
The Padres shut Latos down two starts later to preserve his arm, since he'd thrown 120 IP at both levels and—lest we forget—this kid's only 21. In those two final starts, he again regressed, giving up six ER in 6.1 total IP against the Marlins and Dodgers, striking out six, walking seven and giving up seven hits. Possibly, he was getting tired, physically or mentally, but San Diego made the right call regardless.
Though his numbers don't look great for the year, Latos showed the stuff to cement his status as one of the top young pitchers in baseball. He's slotted for the Padres' rotation next year, and PETCO Park, plus the team's solid defense, should help smooth out the expected rough spots in his performance.
What those can't help, of course, is the battle that goes on between Latos' ears. It's one of the cruel ironies of baseball that a hard-working team player like Zimmermann goes down for TJS, while a reputed head case like Latos soldiers on. I couldn't find any reference to clubhouse problems with the Padres, so it might be that Latos has reformed—or it might be that he takes a while to get under his teammates' skin.
Just like the Padres, fantasy owners should be cautious about drafting Latos too highly, at least until he's got more MLB innings under his belt. But his talent is undeniable, and keeper owners should hang on to him, while everyone else should consider him a good mid- to late-round pick or moderate gamble with a decent bid.
Why am I being so cautious? Young pitchers can implode for a variety of reasons, and a pitcher with a reputation for irritating teammates and shirking a disciplined approach to the game has more red flags than most. Bid appropriately.
Keep offering your suggestions for players you'd like to see covered below. Next week is Brewerfest, with Corey Hart, Matt Gamel and Ben Sheets.
Posted by Michael Street at 2:00am
(2) Comments
Rajai Davis | Oakland | OF
2009 Final Stats: .305/.360/.423
With a batting average and on-base percentage about the equal of Carl Crawford last year, and a slugging percentage close enough to call “close” after park adjustments, Davis had a 108 OPS+ with 41 SB in just 432 PA, a very Crawford-esque two-thirds of a season all told (Crawford has a career 103 OPS+). Yet the Oakland righty was probably taken as a late-round source of steals and nothing more in 2009. What can be expected from the surprising 29-year-old-to-be? Here are some projections from various sources:
Heater/Graphical Player: 455 AB, .274-69-5-44-42 (AVG-R-HR-RBI-SB)
Bill James Handbook: 496 AB, .284-74-4-44-50
CHONE (baseballprojection.com): 341 AB, .267-48-4-30-31
Career 162-G average (baseball-reference.com): 393 AB, .280-62-3-37-45
The career line is highly warped by the fact that he was used as a pinch-runner and defensive replacement for much of his career before breaking through with a starting job in 2009.
So, the first obvious question is: “How much will he play?” With Ryan Sweeney's fielding stats belying his reputation as a just a mediocre center fielder, the A's appear to have another in-house option to roam center field, though Rajai roams a bit more of it, and certainly looks like more of a center fielder. And though the sample size is still wanting, Scott Hairston's conversion to the outfield seems to have resulted in about average defensive skills in CF. Cunningham was a center fielder in the minors but appears to be limited to side-field duty now. All this suggests that if the A's want to try to force some of their slow DH/1B types (Barton, Wallace, Carter, Doolittle, Buck, etc.) into the lineup in 2010, they may reprise the Cust-to-outfield experiment, and Rajai could end up on another team or on the wrong end of a platoon with lefty Ryan Sweeney (though the A's have been reluctant to use straight platoons in recent years). Our mindset is that Rajai gets his regular gig in CF back (he started playing almost every day about midway through the season), as Oakland has quietly turned into a pitching, speed and defense team. And you can count on Beane heating up the trade lines shopping him around, too—both Chicago teams might have a use for him, for example. In short, anything under 450 AB would be somewhat surprising, but that “surprise” would be predicated on …
“How will he do?” Almost certainly, the CHONE system balanced out his PT based on his expected offensive contributions. They have the lowest predicted OBP at .326, but nobody seems to think he'll exceed .340 OBP again since his .366 BABIP stemmed from an unlikely .305 batting average. Still, the difference between CHONE and the other predictors is fairly minute—14 points of OBP over 500 PA is just seven times on base all season. And his career average stands at a decent .280, so predicting a decline to .267 seems overly pessimistic. One thing nobody disagrees about is his game-impacting speed, which will lend itself to pinch-running opportunities even if he's not playing regularly—as it has in seasons past. For raw speed, the “extra bases taken%” (from baseball-reference.com) probably is the most indicative as he's posted 60% for his career against an MLB average of 39%. His 78% career SB% sounds decent, with 93 SB in 358 SBO, but he's also been picked off 16 times (10 in 2009 alone), so actual straight steals aren't necessarily adding as many wins as would be assumed for a guy with one steal per 10 PA. All this combines to suggest that somewhat of a downtick in his stealing attempts could happen in 2010, but he still seems a great bet to log 40-50 SB, given 500 PA.
Wrapping it all up, we have a batter who clearly had a career year in 2009, isn't terribly efficient in his copious stealing attempts (due to the pickoffs), might get traded away, and yet is still a contributor of the coveted stolen bases needed for fantasy success. There are several risks with Rajai—and some outcomes which could cause his value to crater—but the chances of him finishing at or around 450 AB, a .275 AVG and 45 SB are pretty good. It seems very likely that he'll be valued much less than that on auction/draft day in most leagues. Not a great pick for a team that is already good and is conservatively trying to protect an advantage, but the “performance over price” possibility is large.
Aaron Hill | Toronto | 2B
2009 Final Stats: .286/.330/.499
When he was first starting out with Toronto, there were many who likened Hill's approach at the plate to former Blue Jay (and WAY former second baseman) Paul Molitor. Well, in 2007, he started showing some signs of Molitorism, hitting .291/.333/.459. “Molly” would obviously have been chagrined at the lack of patience, but for a guy whose career slugging percentage was .409 entering 2009, the power was a somewhat unanticipated turn in the right direction offensively. But 2008 was a lost season for Hill, with the struggles and the concussion, and then finally being shut down. But worries about his career going the way of Corey Koskie or Ryan Church were assuaged early, as Hill started 2009 with hits in nine straight games, including three multi-hit games and two homers. And he was extremely consistent all season long, driving in 108 runs (tied for fifth in AL) with 36 HR (T-3rd). This sort of production from a Gold Glove-caliber second baseman made him one of the league's best players in 2009.
Since the three “early” projection systems are almost entirely based on mathematical results derived from past statistical patterns, it's unsurprising that all think Hill's power rampage in 2009 was mostly a fluke. CHONE, BJHB, and Heater/GP project his homers at—respectively—21, 20, 22. And all three predict a .282-.283 batting average. Well, we're here to tell you those are not to be believed!
Playing time:
Certainly, the concussive symptoms could return, but this is a guy who played 155, 160, and 158 games in the three years surrounding his concussion-impacted 2008. So, CHONE and BJHB predicting lots of missed time seems off base. The GP projection is based on the Toronto expert for the book, and is a more-reasonable 643 AB. Hill's the type of player who doesn't come out of the lineup easily, and with his combination of offense and defense, no manager is going to be in a hurry to give him an off day, though giving him “rest” when the team faces an extremely hard righty like Jered Weaver will probably happen a handful of times. If the power stays high, it will be hard for the Jays to continue to bat him second 100 percent of the time, but his opportunities for runs and RBIs should only be dampened by Scutaro's departure. Whether he'll capitalize as well on them is another question...
Home runs:
Hill's HR/FB% was 3.6% in 2006, 8.6% in 2007, and 14.9% in 2009 (again, we're not treating 2008 with much gravity). In the same span, he's slightly increased his fly ball% (to 41% in 2009, compared to 39% for his career). The net result is that 15% of 41% of his 584 balls in play went for home runs, or about 6%. With his relatively high contact percentage (for a power hitter), he struck out only 14.4% of the time, which is why he was able to put almost 600 balls into play. For comparison, these numbers are quite similar to Aramis Ramirez's career rates (15.2% strikeouts, 44.5% FB%, and 13.7% HR/FB). While Hill has improved his strength, we think an Aramis Ramirez comparison is still out of reach, but many aspects of that type of power/contact hitter are likely to be repeating qualities. Expect around the same total of 584 balls in play. To fall back to 20 HR, Hill would have to reduce his HR/BIP% to just 3.5%. That's essentially what his HR/BIP% was in 2007 (3.36%). We're going to temper our enthusiasm, and use a 3:2 weighted average of 2009 and 2007 percentages of HR/FIP (which comes out at almost exactly 5%), and predict 29 HR for Hill in 2010.
Batting Average:
As we know, batting average is a tough stat to predict. For beginners, there's so much variance that a spot-on prediction can easily look terrible due to random sampling. But—as I noted in an article on Freddy Sanchez at the time of the trade—the better the contact skills, the less variance (duh!). Anyway, Hill has a .310 career BABIP. While he's hitting more fly balls than ever before and this number may drop a little, his .290 in 2009 seems overly low. We see a good chance that his batting average tops .290 with an increase in his BABIP more than making up for the decline in homers we've anticipated.
Putting together the pieces, it seems like Hill is a great buy-low candidate, in leagues where people put too much stock in the standard projection systems. He might not come up with a .290-29-90 season, but it seems very likely he'll come close to it.
Edwin Jackson | Detroit | SP
2009 Final Stats: 6.8 K/9, 2.3 K/BB, 3.62 ERA
2009 was a coming-out party of sorts for the former Dodgers phenom who has bounced around. His value was so low preseason that one well-known blogger called the trade of Matt Joyce for him “ridiculous” for the Tigers. Clearly, the trade didn't hurt the Tigers, but there are reasons for the Tigers (and E-Jax owners) to be worried that perhaps he won't repeat.
Starting with the list of accomplishments—he was just 25 years old, and had his innings bumped up to 214 in 2009, a total arrived at gradually, which should alleviate the risk of overuse. He went 13-9, 3.62, and helped the Tigers almost make the playoffs. He struck out 161 to just 70 walks. His WHIP was 1.262, just missing the top 10 in the AL.
But it really is a “what have you done for me lately?” sport, and Jackson was far better than this at the break, with a 7-4 record, 2.52 ERA, 97 K in 121.2 IP, and just 10 HR allowed with a 2.77 K:BB ratio. The second half, though, was more of “bad Edwin” (that would be the pitcher who had a career ERA of 5.15 entering 2009, with a 1.632 WHIP and 55 HR allowed in 456 IP). After the break, Jackson was over .500 (6-5), but his ERA was 5.05, and his WHIP soared to 1.527 (it had been barely over 1.0 in the first half). Possibly worst of all was the fact that he managed to allow 17 HR in just 92.1 IP.
In the final stats for the 2009 season (or two half-seasons in Jackson's case), he had a 4.34 FIP, which was an improvement over past seasons. He had a 4.58 xFIP, which—again—was an improvement. One thing that has been shown with pitchers is that second-half performance is roughly as predictive of next-year performance as using the entire season is. But what to do when the two are completely different? The conservative approach would be to assume that either a) the lucky BABIP and HR/FB% in the first half was lending him confidence, and he was pitching far over his head, or b) that he was hiding an injury in the second half. In either the (a) or the (b) case, it's prudent to stay away from him in fantasy.
The less conservative approach would be that all pitchers are unpredictable, and Edwin Jackson was downright nasty in the first half, even if his “luck” stats made him look better than he was. He has one of the fastest fastballs in the game (94.5 MPH on average), and his O-Swing% (from fangraphs.com) is 5% higher than MLB average, showing that hitters are often fooled into swinging at pitches not in the zone.
We won't suggest that predicting pitchers is easy. Bill James has declared it to be impossible in the past, and there are certainly enough examples every single season to make this declaration seem valid. But E-Jax is even less predictable than most. It's not like Daniel Cabrera was, with the “stuff” but never getting “results,” since Jackson got the results. But the concept is similar, in that he could help a team in every single SP category if he pitches like he did in the first half of 2009. Yet, he could easily be an almost complete waste of auction money if the second half (and his entire career before) is really him. He probably has the biggest difference between his likely upside (i.e. an upside which is likely to occur, not something that's more akin to dreaming, as is true of listed “upsides” for many other pitchers) and his likely downside of anyone entering the 2010 season.
Posted by Rob McQuown at 4:00am
(0) Comments
Monday, November 23, 2009
Last week’s Cy Young Award apparently sparked some controversy. A number of fans seemed to think that Chris Carpenter was robbed. The archetypal argument even played out on THT, in the comment section of a post on Shyster Ball, which then prompted another post dedicated to the controversy.
Many Carpenter supporters didn’t seem to want to acknowledge the value of the 30 additional innings pitched by Tim Lincecum. Talking heads in the baseball community often like to reference an alleged dichotomy between fantasy baseball and the real thing. But, I think this is actually a great example of the fantasy baseball experience being instructive regarding a debate about the real thing.
I can understand, or at least accept, that when somebody looks at Carpenter’s stats in comparison to Lincecum, they don’t seamlessly interpret that innings gap in terms of value over replacement player. But, if you play fantasy baseball, you know this is exactly what such a disparity means.
When one of your stud players misses time, you must replace that player. You want to make the most of your roster spots and get as much production in as you can. And, the deeper the league, the more questionable the quality of your potential replacements. We all know that when it comes to problems like this, prevention trumps cure, so ideally you would like to draft players who you will not need to replace. Surely, there is a fair share of luck involved in your players avoiding the DL, but you can certainly skew the odds. As Branch Rickey famously said, “luck is the residue of design.”
Traditionally, my pieces preach conservatism and I commonly tout “boring veterans” as often representing solid value picks. But, there is one concomitant benefit to privileging upside that is rarely talked about, and it has to do with durability. By selecting players entering what should be the prime of their careers, based upon career production arcs, you are also selecting players who are generally less injury prone. Once leagues start to get deeper, say 14 teams and up, replacement value really starts to take a hit, and the payoff of successful upside picks become that much more influential on the standings. So, by targeting players between the ages of 24 and 30, you can help to kill two birds with one stone.
Of course, the upside and replacement dynamics can work against you just as hard when they fail. Quality replacements for busted picks are harder to find, therefore taking too much risk will likely lead to teams with too many holes. But, it’s worth making a somewhat fine semantic distinction here. Drafting “upside” is not the same thing as drafting “potential.” When looking for upside, you are looking at guys with reasonably similar projections and choosing the guy who may have slightly less impressive numbers, but a far greater chance to exceed them. Say, James Loney vs. Todd Helton. Gambling highly on Matt Wieters, on the other hand, was —and still is— a "potential" pick. When you are looking for upside, you are playing the trends. When you are looking for potential, you are playing the lottery.
Over on Fantasy 411, Cory Schwartz posted a retrospective on his NFBC (15-team, mixed-league) team, which won his league and finished fifth overall out of 390 teams. Reading Cory’s thoughts, one thing struck me rather profoundly. Two of his top three picks busted, and pretty solidly at that, but he was still able to triumph. One of the main reasons why he was able to do so was that very few of his players spent time on the DL. In a 15-team league, he didn’t have to give too many at-bats to replacement-level players. Not a coincidence, 11 of his 14 starting bats were between 24 and 29 years old.
At this point, I think it’s also worth discussing how ramifications of busts and replacement value play out in shallow versus deep leagues. Cory’s first pick in this league was B.J. Upton at 13th overall, clearly a bust. Among the players over whom he chose Upton were Carlos Beltran and Josh Hamilton, both of whom missed about half the season with injuries (coming into the season, Beltran was 32 and Hamilton was 28, by the way). Cory remarks, and correctly so, that although Upton busted, neither Hamilton's nor Beltran’s seasons justified them as better picks. This is true because of the size of the league.
In a shallow, 10- or 12-team league, it’s arguable that you were better off with an injured Beltran or Hamilton than an under-producing Upton. This is because of replacement value. In a 10-team league, you could have likely found a 20-homer, 80-RBI outfielder on the wire, and cobbled together a half season’s worth of him with half a season of Beltran and still wind up with pretty nice production from that spot, more production than Upton straight up. But, in a deeper league, where replacements are of far inferior quality, you’re likely better off getting the full, but disappointing season out of Upton.
So, what are the takeaways here? First, Tim Lincecum deserved the National League Cy Young Award; Major League Baseball is not a 10-team mixed league and replacement-level starting pitching is pretty brutal. Second, breakout potential and durability often go hand-in-hand. The deeper your league, the more important it is to strategically target both. Third, a league’s depth partially determines the ramifications of busts and injuries.
Posted by Derek Ambrosino at 4:00am
(4) Comments
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
When it comes to fantasy leagues, I am a weathered man. I've played in deep leagues, shallow leagues, mixed leagues, keeper leagues, dynasty leagues; leagues with drafts, leagues with auctions, leagues with free agents, waivers, FAABs, and so forth.
With most of these league settings I have a preference on the ones I like and the ones I feel subtract from a league. For example, I have always preferred mixed leagues that are toward the deeper end of the spectrum. There is one league setting, however, that I have always been on the fence about and that is bench depth.
It may seem like a fairly unimportant league setting on the surface, but in fact it is one that can have a large impact on the way you should approach a league. Even in MLB, bench depth plays a big role in the form of the 25 and 40-man rosters. For example Johan Santana might have never been a Twin were it not for the restrictions on bench size that led to the Astros making him Rule 5 eligible.
Impact on fantasy leagues
Generally speaking a league with deeper benches allows for more risky picks to be taken for two reasons. First, since better replacement players are more easily secured, the negative impact of having one of those risky players bust is reduced. And second, since there are more bench spots available, the cost of having one of them occupied by an insurance player is marginalized. It is important to understand that although the replacement level for starting players is unaffected by bench size, the ability to acquire replacement players is impacted.
In a league with deep benches, the players that would replace your starters in the case of injury or ineffectiveness are secured on your bench and can easily step into a starting role at a moment's notice. In a league with shallow benches, on the other hand, not every starting position can be backed by a bench spot, and in the case of certain starters needing replacing, heading to free agency or waivers is the only option. In two identical leagues save for bench size, the same caliber of player will spell starters, except in the league with deeper benches you will have more control over which players will be your replacement players.
What is considered a long or short bench is subjective, but I will say that the number of bench spots should be proportional to the number of roster spots per team. This implies that a league with more starting players than another can have a greater number of bench spots, yet the two leagues can have the same degree of bench depth. In general, though, I would say that one or two bench spots is shallow, three-to-five is medium sized, and six or more is a deep-benched league.
Transitioning from the theoretical discussion on how replacement level is affected and opportunity cost marginalized, let's move to the more concrete and list some specific types of players whose value is increased by an increase in bench size. Remember that the reason the following types of players have increased value in leagues with deeper benches is due to one or both of the bolded reasons above.
{exp:list_maker}First and most obvious are the injury risks, the Rich Hardens and Chipper Joneses of the baseball world. You can count on having to delegate one of your bench spots to keeping a backup for these players, a backup you feel reasonably comfortable giving potentially significant amounts of playing time to.
The next type of player whose value is increased by deeper benches is the phenom rookie not yet in the majors that is prematurely owned in fantasy leagues—the paradigm of which was Matt Wieters in 2009. The annoying thing about these players is that you cannot place them on the DL like you can with injured players, instead they suck up a bench spot without offering up any form of production.
Another type of player is the one with the large handedness split, a good example of which is Jack Cust who has averaged an OPS that is .145 points higher against righties over the past three seasons. The argument of whether platoon splits are worth accounting for is one that can be made another time and another place. All I am saying is that deeper benches give you greater value in platooning two players with complementary splits, say Cust and Jonny Gomes. {/exp:list_maker}
The common theme among these players is that they all require you to own two players for one starting spot, something deeper benches allows you to handle more easily.
Conversely, you could say that safer players are given a slight boost in value in leagues with short benches, though I believe the depth of the league itself (as opposed to the benches) dwarfs the impact bench size will have. The players most positively affected by shallower bench leagues are the multi-position eligible players like Mark DeRosa whose positional flexibility counteract the lack of flexibility working with few bench spots offers.
Which do you prefer?
Now that we have covered in-depth the ways bench depth impacts leagues, it is time to ask yourself which one you prefer, and remember, I truly am not sure where I stand.
On one side I like deeper benches because they allow for more roster creativity and flexibility and also seem to strip some of the luck that waiver priority or free agent races contribute to leagues. Instead that luck is replaced with the skill owners need to have in picking the best players to fill out their bench.
On the other side, you could argue that shallower benches force owners to have more roster discipline in selecting the players that can stay and those that can go. Everyone hates making that decision of who to drop when there is no one you feel comfortable allowing to be added by another team for free, but making the correct decision in those instances is certainly a valuable skill in fantasy baseball. You could also make the point that no reasonable amount of bench depth would have led to players such as Ben Zobrist, Garrett Jones, or most of the other great pickups of 2009 being owned on teams before their skills became apparent.
After making cases on both sides of the issue, I suppose my argument for shallow benches is a bit more convincing though I still feel on the fence. Enough of what I have to say though, I am interested to see what others think. What say you?
Posted by Paul Singman at 4:34am
(8) Comments
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Cleveland Indians
1. Carlos Santana: One of the Top 10 prospects in all of baseball, Santana brings solid defense to the catcher position and the type of power bat and middle-of-the-order mentality that could make Cleveland fans quickly forget about Victor Martinez.
2. Hector Rondon: Rondon's electric four-pitch arsenal is the envy of minor league baseball, but his tendency to lose focus and leave pitches up and over the plate will need to be remedied if he is going to succeed against major league hitting. His questionable endurance could be to blame in late innings. He is very good, but not a perfect prospect.
3. Lonnie Chisenhall: Sporting the swing and approach of a true professional hitter, Chisenhall impressed in 2009. He has a developing blend of power, patience, and contact skills that make me think he has a good chance to be an above average major league third baseman. An All-Star, though, may be stretching it.
4. Jason Knapp: Knapp has the ceiling of an ace, and the work ethic and smarts to get to that point. His high-90s fastball is his meal ticket, but the rest of his game lags behind. Watch for his secondary stuff to take a step forward in 2010.
5. Alex White: White is expected to make an immediate farm system impact in 2010. His tremendous repertoire will keep hitters off-balance from the get go, but Cleveland will surely be keeping an eye on his mechanics and control.
6. Michael Brantley: The plate patience, contact skills, and speed equal up to an underrated lead-off prospect. It may take some time for Brantley to produce like a lead-off hitter at the major league level, though, as I think he is destined for an up and down early career. Stay patient.
7. Alexander Perez: As a 20-year-old, Perez made a seamless transition from the Low-A Sally League to the High-A Carolina League. The key to his future success will be how his repertoire and talented right arm react to the added muscle that Cleveland will insist he put on. This is a key off-season, as Double-A competition awaits.
8. Nick Weglarz: Weglarz has his fair share of fans, and I know why they are attracted to him. He is a well-built power hitter with demonstrated plate patience to back it up. But his bat still has plenty of holes in it, and they will be exposed even further as he continues to face better competition. He often looks uneasy when facing top-notch pitching, which is not a good sign headed forward. He still has upside, but I'm more skeptical than most.
9. T.J. House: House is a likable lefty with developing secondary stuff. But, despite his youth, I don't think he has a whole lot of upside. I do like his odds to become a solid mid-rotation starter, though.
10. Carlos Rivero: It's easy to dismiss Rivero at this point, as it seems like he has been on Cleveland's prospect radar screen forever. Yet, he is just 21-years-old and has a clean swing that still has power projection left in it. Cleveland hasn't given up, and neither should you.
Minnesota Twins
1. Aaron Hicks: 2009 brought about a disappointing full season debut from Hicks. But he has a full tool shed to work with and there is every reason to think that he will bounce back in 2010. Perhaps even to the point that he is considered one of the game's best outfield prospects by this time next year.
2. Ben Revere: Hicks gets most of the outfield attention due to his enormous power potential, but Minnesota's plan for Revere is just as prominent. Revere has every tool necessary to become an elite lead-off man. His patience at the plate is still lacking, but he is a hard-worker who realizes the importance of doing whatever is necessary to get on base.
3. Kyle Gibson: Gibson has a tremendous amount of polish, but the injury concern is very real and is the reason why he fell to Minnesota in the 2009 draft. He doesn't have ace-like upside, but if he can put the injury concerns to bed he has a great shot at being a #2 starter.
4. Miguel Sano: Another hyped, raw bat has been plucked from the Dominican Republic. Sano's signing bonus was reportedly in record setting territory, which is notable considering it is the small market Twins that shelled out the bucks. They must see something special. When it comes to a 16-year-old project with a seven-figure signing bonus, as always, I am cautiously optimistic.
5. Adrian Salcedo: Scouting reports are tough to find on Salcedo, but anyone who puts up a nearly 20:1 strikeout to walk ratio over any extended period of time deserves attention. Add in the fact that he is just 18-years-old with an athletic, wiry frame and you have a promising prospect that any team would love to have.
6. Wilson Ramos: Unlike some catchers, who are all offense, Ramos also brings promising defense to the table. But I don't think his bat has as much upside as others do. His swing has obvious holes, his patience hasn't developed, and his power potential seems limited.
7. Angel Morales: Morales is an impressive athlete with enviable power potential. His discipline, plate coverage, and swing mechanics are still raw and inconsistent. Unless his overall bat takes the nest step, he will get exposed badly as he faces tougher competition.
8. Joe Benson: Sporting a bit of that power / speed combination that we all look for, Benson is a likable prospect, but he isn't a star in the making. Yet, with increased plate coverage and a more consistent swing will come better contact skills to go with his impressive patience. He could be a future fixture in the Twins' outfield.
9. David Bromberg: His control and movement are not where they need to be right now, but Bromberg has big league quality stuff. Everyone is waiting to see if his weaknesses will get ironed out or taken advantage of as he makes the move to Double-A. His ceiling is as a #3 starter.
10. B.J. Hermsen: Hermsen has the look of a bulldog, but his game in the early going has been all about the control of his low-90s fastball. His upside isn't ace-like, but I can't help but be impressed by his pinpoint control at this point. We will certainly know more next year when he faces A-ball competition.
Posted by Matt Hagen at 10:06pm
(3) Comments
Friday, November 27, 2009
Mat Gamel | Milwaukee | 3B
2009 Final Stats: .242/.338/.422
Brewers fans have been itching for a long look at Gamel, the team's top hitting prospect, at the major-league level, and they finally got their wishes in 2009. Unfortunately, by the time he got to the bigs, his way was blocked by a guy named Casey McGehee, and hampered by his own performance at the plate.
Gamel was mashing AAA pitching in April, with a .403/.483/.806 line that included 7 HRs and 8 2Bs, and got his first callup in mid-May as interleague play approached and the Crew figured they could use him at DH. Then Rickie Weeks went down for the season, and Milwaukee had the perfect opportunity to give him more PT; Craig Counsell and McGehee could both play 2B or 3B and Gamel could slide into the 3B rotation.
Even though he stayed with the big league club, that's not how things worked out, which speaks volumes about how Milwaukee regards Gamel. His biggest liability at this point is his glove—he has an .883 career fielding percentage in the minors, with 156 errors in 1334 chances. That he booted 7 balls in 61 chances in the majors (with an .885 fielding percentage) shows those struggles are continuing. Milwaukee really doesn't think the merits of his bat overcomes the deficits of his glove.
And his bat wasn't all that meritorious in the majors, either. He started out hot, hitting .308/.438/.692 in his first 13 ABs (mostly as a pinch-hitter) then cooled off dramatically, hitting just .224/.322/.329 over his next 76 ABs through the end of June, with 11 BBs and 30 Ks. After he only started 6 of 14 games through mid-July, the team decided to give him more seasoning in AAA, instead of sporadic PT in the bigs.
Gamel's funk carried over into the minors, where he hit .118/.225/.147 to close out July, then had OPSes of .751 and .669 in August and September. Despite this, the Brewers brought him back up to the big-league club in September, where he continued to collect splinters on the bench, even after Milwaukee was out of the pennant chase entirely. He collected just one start in 24 team games, though he hit .267/.353/533. Why they didn't give him a longer look at this point in the season, with the pennant out of reach and both Counsell and McGehee nursing knee injuries, is a mystery.
In the long run, the extra time in AAA should prove beneficial to Gamel, since he'd only had 21 ABs at that level before this season. He did improve his defense there somewhat, booting just 18 balls in 201 chances for a fielding percentage of .901. But even that may not be enough for him to occupy the 3B position the Brewers have been holding open for him, especially with the emergence of Casey McGehee. And before you suggest a platoon between RH McGehee and LH Gamel (or even Counsell, if he's re-signed), realize that Gamel's platoon splits have been almost even in his minor-league career, and turning this 23-year-old into half a player at this point in his career would be a waste.
The other possible position for him, 1B, is of course blocked by the formidable presence of Prince Fielder. Barring a trade of either Gamel or McGehee (or, even less likely, Fielder), it looks like his best fit will be as a corner outfielder. But there, too, he's blocked by Ryan Braun and Corey Hart. So you should expect a trade of Hart, McGehee or Gamel, in that order, before the 2010 season opens to resolve that logjam and to bolster their starting pitching, worst in the NL in 2009.
The Brewers have already indicated that they won't part with Gamel for anything less than "his equivalent in pitching," something most teams are unlikely to do at this stage of Gamel's career. A trade to an AL team would allow Gamel to slide into what might be his best position, DH, but there's not many teams willing to pay such a steep price for a guy who never wears a glove. So I'd expect to see Gamel in Milwaukee spring training, ready to prove himself at 3B or RF.
How will he perform? No matter where he ends up, he's going to need to improve his batting eye and contact rate. His .50 minor-league BB/K rate has actually dropped as he ascended each level, as has his .77 contact rate. Scouts say he has the skills, with great batspeed and a good batting eye, so these ratios suggest he's pressing, adjusting, or both. That's not quite the trend you want to see from a talent like this, but he's still only 23, so there's plenty of time to turn it around, even if progress might be slow.
Keeper owners will want to keep this in mind—don't expect him to be your 3B of the future, and don't expect him to reach his full potential in 2010. He'll be a very good hitter one day, wherever he ends up fitting into the lineup, though he profiles as an excellent #5 hitter behind Braun and Fielder. But moderate your expectations heading into 2010, particularly if he goes into Spring Training still blocked by both Hart and McGehee.
Corey Hart | Milwaukee | RF
2009 Final Stats: .260/.335/.418
Brewers fans and fantasy owners sat up and took notice when Hart burst onto the scene in 2007 with a .295/.353/.539 in his first full season at the majors. When he followed that up with two straight seasons of decline, the same fans and owners have turned their backs on him. 2008 saw him slip to .268/.300/.459, and 2009 saw that fall even farther, and his HR and RBI totals have also dropped in corresponding fashion.
There's some explanation for these statistics, however. In 2008 it looked like he was pressing to return to his 2007 heights, as his batting eye fell from .36 to .25. Luck was a factor, too—his BABIP also dropped from .321 to .293 and his HR/FB% fell from 13 to 9.8 over the same span. In 2009, he returned his BB/K ratio to .47, and his BABIP rose to a more expected .305. His HR rate dropped again to 8.7%, despite continuing to hit fly balls at the same rate.
An emergency appendectomy cut his 2009 season short, making his one awful month weigh even more heavily against his overall numbers. May 2009, he hit .232/.283/.343, one of his worst months ever, but he'd improved in June (typically a strong month for him) and July, before losing a month to the appendectomy.
He returned in September and finished the season with an eight-game hit streak, but the operation had clearly sapped his power, not surprising, since it sliced open and weakened his trunk muscles. Only 3 of his 14 hits went for extra bases, and he hit .237/.338/.322 in September, another month among his worst ever. So you could argue that 2009 was the Tale of Two Months, while 2008 was a lot of bad luck. He's definitely undervalued going into 2010, and represents a good bounceback candidate.
With Gamel looking for a position and both Braun and Fielder ready to launch the Brewers into the stratosphere, the front office may not wait until 2010 to see if Hart does. In Milwaukee's quest for more pitching, Hart is their best trading chip. Though his value is obviously diminished by his past two seasons, he's still a guy with enough speed to swipe bases (23 each in '07 and '08) with the contact skills (.80 career) to suggest that a rebound is likely, though probably not to the luck-induced levels of 2007. He shouldn't become a free agent until 2012, and his arbitration value should make negotiations with him cheap and easy.
Watch the Brewers' offseason moves; their swap of J.J. Hardy shows they have no sentimental attachments to a slumping farm system product if they need to make room for another one they think is better, and that's precisely the small-market model they should be following. He's not a lock to be traded, since he could still be re-signed cheaply, but I'd put the probability at 80% that he'll be playing with another team in 2010.
As for what you should look for, I'd anticipate a rebound into the .825 OPS range with 20+ SBs, 20+ HRs and RBIs approaching 100, with an average pushing .300. That's not elite level, but that's a really nice corner outfielder for a team willing to gamble that he's going to finally live up to his promise. Fantasy owners should find him a buy-low candidate as well, even if he's not going to see that 900 OPS level again.
Ben Sheets | Milwaukee | SP
2008 Final Stats: 7.2 K/9, 3.4 K/BB, 3.09 ERA
Brewers fans had to see this coming: in his first (supposedly) healthy season since 2004, Ben Sheets ended 2008 early with a tear in his elbow. It didn't seem bad at first, so Sheets declined Milwaukee's offer of arbitration, figuring on greener pastures elsewhere. It didn't quite work out that way, though. A deal with the Rangers was killed after the elbow injury turned out to be a torn flexor tendon, which shut Sheets down for all of 2009.
This isn't a serious injury by baseball standards; it's a severe form of tennis elbow (which is why they didn't think it was so bad at first), and players from Andy Pettitte to Victor Zambrano have gone under the knife for it, with clearly mixed results. Pettite underwent this surgery in 2004, and came back to pitch a 17-9 year in Houston, with a 2.39 ERA and a 1.03 WHIP, one of his best seasons ever. His elbow's been healthy ever since. Zambrano, on the other hand, had the surgery midway through the 2006 season then returned in 2007, his last season in the majors, to post a 10.17 ERA in just 23 IP; he was likely on the downslope of his career at this point anyway, but this surgery didn't help.
That gives you the spectrum of possibilities on this surgery, and makes Sheets so hard to predict—and sign. When he's healthy, Sheets has been awesome. In his best season, 2004, he ended with a 2.70 ERA and 0.98 WHIP , with a 8.25 K/BB rate that led the majors, thanks in part to a 10.0 K/9 that was the best in his career. But he also threw 237 IP, his third straight season of 200+ IP—and the beginning of his injury trouble.
Since then, he's shown occasional brilliance, with excellent control, great strikeout numbers and an ability to keep the ball in the yard. In 2006, his 9.8 K/9 and 0.9 BB/9 gave him a career-best 10.6 K/BB, though his 106.1 IP were his fewest since that 2004 IP spike. In 2009, he threw 198.1 IP, his highest total since 2004, with a 7.2 K/9, 2.1 BB/9 and 0.8 HR/9 that all contributed to a 3.09 ERA, 1.19 WHIP, and a 13-9 record that represented the most wins since 2004.
That injury flag, however, may overshadow all his other accomplishments. Pitching is scarce enough that Sheets will get signed somewhere, probably at a discount because of that injury history. That's the same discount that you should apply to him as a fantasy owner. He could approach 200 IP again, with good strikeout rates, or he could struggle to regain his control and/or get injured again.
Where he pitches will also be a consideration. A shift to the AL will clearly make a difference to a guy who's only pitched in the NL (the Rangers are one of his rumored destinations). He's also a fly ball pitcher, with a career 0.74 GB/FB ratio, one that has been closer to 0.70 of late. Miller Park is fairly forgiving, and a home run park like Great American or Citizen's Bank wouldn't be the best place for him to end up, either. That would make Texas an awful place for him to end up.
So watch Sheets to see where he lands and how he does in Spring Training before deciding how much to bid for him, but he becomes a moderate gamble in any park, with the odds for a good season decreasing, depending on his home team. He's a mid-round pick in a straight draft, and a mid-dollar gamble in an auction draft.
Don't ignore him, but don't chase 2004, or even 2009, numbers, either. Personally, I'd only take him in the late rounds or for a $2-5 bid. The chances of him exceeding those values is much lower than the chances of him imploding entirely, and I'm going to let someone else gloat that they got him for a buck.
That's all for this week--leave me your suggestions in the comments for other players you'd like me to cover. Next week, we'll look at Chris Ianetta, Geovany Soto and Joe Blanton.
ANNOUNCEMENT:
In December, Acta Sports will publish the 2010 GRAPHICAL PLAYER. Besides covering a pair of teams apiece, Rob and I are Associate Editors of this edition. If you enjoy Waiver Wire—if you want the edge that you get here at THT Fantasy—then the 2010 GRAPHICAL PLAYER is your book. It'll be like going into your draft with Rob and me looking over your shoulder. (THTF's minor-league maven Matt Hagen is also a contributor.)
Next week, we'll begin incorporating GP profiles into our Waiver Wire columns. Until then, here is a 16-page preview of the book. You can order the book from Acta Sports here.
Posted by Michael Street at 2:00am
(9) Comments
Before launching into the players for this week, here is a 16-page preview of Graphical Player '10, available in December. Using “team experts” as Heater does, the writers are quite knowledgeable about their specific teams, and – lest you worry about hometown bias – they had better success (measured by RMSE) predicting win-loss totals for 2009 than any expert or “system” (or Vegas betting lines). When you consider that the popular “graphical” format conveys such a high volume of information in a glance, there's really no excuse to enter the 2010 season without arming yourself with this resource!
Robinson Cano | New York | 2B
2009 Final Stats: .320/.352/.520
Robinson Cano reminded us why “body of work” is so important when evaluating ballplayers, despite the strong emotional drive to judge ballplayers based on “what have you done for me lately?” Entering 2009, he had a career batting line (through age 25) of .303/.335/.468, yet few would have given him much chance to hit .320/.352/.520, a somewhat normal expectation for a young ballplayer with such a great career line to that point. The reason, of course, was his disappointing 2008 stat line (.271/.305/.410), and the much higher weight placed on recent seasons by most forecasting systems. THT's projections suggested he'd hit .299/.339/.457, which was wildly optimistic by other standards (for comparison, his 75th-percentile PECOTA was .298/.339/.449, and his 90th-percentile PECOTA wasn't even close to his actual stats).
But here's the thing with Cano's season... it wasn't “lucky” in any easily-definable sense, unless you consider playing his home games in MLB's best home-run park in 2009 as “lucky” (somehow, the stadium managed to suppress run scoring in spite of the taters, which is borderline unbelievable). His BABIP was .326, right in line with his .324 career line. His FB% was 33%, just like in 2008, and up from earlier in his career. His LD% was 19.9%, compared to 19.3% for his career. His FB/HR% was a career-best 12.6%, but that's hardly surprising given the homerific tendencies of the new park, his physical maturation, and the fact that the rate was nearly that high in 2006 as well (12.3%). In fact, his awful 7.6% HR/FB% in 2008 appears to be the outlier on his career ledger. All-in-all, the biggest chance in Cano's stat line was a slight improvement in his already-great contact percentage (up to 90% now!)
We do need to note something Yankees fans are well aware of, and that's the anti-Clutch tendencies of Mr. Cano. Due to his excellent overall stats, compared with his terrible clutch performance in 2009, he managed to earn a clutch score of -23.5 in 2009. While there have been numerous studies showing that “clutch ability” for a population is essentially no more significant than statistical “noise”, there are obviously a few players for whom it's a factor. And Cano had averaged worse than -6 “Clutch” runs per season before 2009, so while the magnitude of the 2009 choke was a surprise, the poor performance certainly was not.
Anyway, onward to 2010, and Cano's age-27 season... If he wasn't expected to decline in the clutch, Cano could be in line for 120+ RBI batting behind the Yankees' core, who all get on base a lot. He doesn't walk much, while averaging over 650 PA the past three seasons. He hits lefties about as well as righties, and his batting average and power gains in 2009 seem completely legit. It's always risky to predict a .320 batting average, since it requires so many things to go right, including suppport for his .324 career BABIP. But Cano is a great bet to bat .300+ with a .500 slugging and 20+ HR. With his low walk totals and great contact percentage, Cano is one of the safest sources of batting average in the league.
Alex Rodriguez | New York | 3B
2009 Final Stats: .286/.402/.532
Game #162 for the Yankees encapsulated the season in a nutshell. The Yankees won easily, A-Rod was spectacular, but didn't play the entire game. Virtually willing himself to the 30/100 threshhold with 2 homers and 7 RBI to end with exactly 30/100, A-Rod has now topped those marks in all but one of his 14 full seasons, and he was just 33 in 2009. Now that he has a ring, and got some timely postseason hits as a Yankee, it has to be assumed that he's now a “lifer”, as the Bronx Bombers have always been loyal to “their own”, one they prove themselves in NY. And that's great news for fantasy owners.
There may not be anything original to write about A-Rod anymore, and – assuming a reasonably moderate view is taken on his defensive skills – he seems clearly poised to go down in history as one of the 5 best players of all time. And – largely due to his agent's ability to negotiate contracts – he'll almost certainly be among the least-appreciated. The days of being a rangy shortstop with a .600 slugging are gone, and the playing time and batting average can be expected to deteriorate with the years, but as infield-mate Derek Jeter showed this year, it should never be surprising for an all-time great player to have an MVP-type season, even into his late 30's.
It's hard to predict how much of A-Rod's fielding ability will return as his hip heals further, but his batting didn't take long to rebound. He struggled through his first week back, hitting .136, with a sub-.300 slugging, before hammering 6 HR and a double in his next 8 games to remind people that he'd led the league in slugging each of the previous 2 years. Expect him to get about 10 days of rest in 2010, more if there are any lingering effects from the hip, and expect him to be in the MVP discussion at the end of the year (unless Mauer runs away and hides again). That should mean 40/120 with 100+ runs for fantasy purposes.
Johnny Damon | New York | OF
2009 Final Stats: .282/.365/.489
Who is Johnny Damon? No, we aren't still wondering where the “Idiot” who helped break Boston's “Curse” has gone, that's almost ancient history now. And his “Royal upbringing” or “rental” season leading the A's to the playoffs may as well have been in a different era. But Damon authored the second-most-surprising season by a 35-year-old Yankee in 2009, posting easily his best career ISO, and topping his career mark, .207 to .150. At age 33 (2007), he was down to a .270/.351/.396 batting line, making his value suspect, as a should-be-corner outfielder with a popgun arm. But he showed he could be a “for-real” corner outfielder in 2008, crushing all his career rate stats at .303/.375/.461. And he added even more power in 2009.
Damon could have been the poster boy for New Yankee Stadium, hammering 17 of his 24 homers at home, and not getting any of his 3 triples there (the park cut down triples a lot, showing a “triples factor” of .500, per ESPN.com's park factor report). And part of his changing stats were due to his new role as a #2 hitter behind Jeter. With Jeter being held on first base so frequently, one would have anticipated more doubles from the lefty-swinging Damon, but the reduced SB total (12, after topping 25 3 straight seasons), and improved power both are consistent with no longer leading off. That Damon was able to draw 71 walks batting in front of Teixeira and A-Rod is testament to his great batting eye and ability to foul off pitches, but getting on base in front of MVP-candidate hitters is hardly new for Damon.
For the most part, projection systems take the following steps:
1.“Neutralize” stats for a player from each season, removing “luck” factors and park effect and opponent strength.
2.Take a weighted average of the previous few seasons, usually something like 3-2-1.
3.Apply an “aging algorithm” of some sort, often dependent upon the type of player. This is combined with #2 in a variety of ways, depending on the system. My MLP system, for example, applies the “aging algorithm” to each season before weighting and combining, but the goal of MLP is to project prospects into their “prime seasons”, though someday I'll have to adapt it to MLB players as well.
4.Un-neutralize the projection for the environment the player will play in, including things such as park factor and opponent strength.
In any system that follows this basic projection methodology, Damon's age is going to be struggling with his recent tendency for improvement, and the unknown park and league and team factors will provide further randomizing factors. We think that either the Yankees or an NL team would provide fantasy value around 90% of Damon's 2009 total, with the boost in offense from the NL being mitigated by losing his teammates in New York, who are a great supply of runs and RBI. So, if he stays in NY, expect him to approach .280/.360 for average/OBP, and exceed .450 slugging. Don't expect any rebound in speed if he's not leading off.
Mariano Rivera | New York | RP
2009 Final Stats: 9.8 K/9, 6.0 K/BB, 1.76 ERA
FIVE MORE YEARS?! Does he figure he'll just be bored with collecting rings at that point, or is he actually human? Anyway, that should be good for another 10-15 blown saves... maybe. And, what with his WHIP going up 36% (.905 from .665 in 2008) and his blown saves doubling (2 from 1 in 2008), and his K:BB ratio dropping to less than HALF (6.00 from 12.83), perhaps the old guy is losing it?
NOT!
Aging curves for pitchers are little more than a suggestion these days, with guys pitching at age 40 like they did when they were 25. But Rivera's lost a little zip off his cutter, as it averaged 91.3 in 2009, down from over 93 in recent years. He's still generating a lot of swings outside the zone (over 36%), and that's the key for him. So, maybe the “suggestion” of an aging curve should be considered, but he has a long way to go down before he'd fall out of the elite closers in baseball, so he really may be able to keep closing for New York until he bores of it. We're not going all the way out on that limb, but expect 2010 to look a lot like 2009, with a slight degradation. We'd call it “regression”, but we're not fully sure that human norms apply in this case.
CC Sabathia | New York | SP
2009 Final Stats: 7.7 K/9, 2.9 K/BB, 3.37 ERA
Just like Roy Oswalt after he pitched 525 innings over two seasons we can see the possible impact of fatigue on CC Sabathia. CC has now racked up an amazing 779.1 IP over the past three seasons (almost 260 IP/yr). Of course, unlike Oswalt, CC moved to a park which inflated his home run totals, and into the league's toughest division (though missing the Yankees as opponents helps a lot). And his “decline” certainly didn't show up in the postseason, where he pitched scintillating ball against his AL opponents before holding his own against the powerful Phillies lineup. So, was there really any fatigue factor at all?
One thing is certain – even if 2009 was “fatigue impacted”, it was still plenty good. He led the league in wins, as one would expect from an effective high-inning pitcher on a team with a great offense. And he was 3rd in win%, so it wasn't just about staying in the game. He was 4th in ERA and WHIP and IP. He was 3rd in hits/9 allowed, and 9th in K/9 (7th in K's).
But there really is reason to be concerned here, despite his seeming invincibility. With the K:BB dropping from 5.7 in 2007 to 4.3 in 2008 to 2.9 in 2009, his xFIP has gone up from 3.63 (in 2007) to 3.94. His BABIP and HR/FB% were both in the “lucky” range in 2009 (.284 BABIP, 7.8% HR/FB). To his credit, though, most of his metrics picked up in the 2nd half, as he went 11-2, 2.74, with 9 K/9, so perhaps it was just acclimation to a new team. Sabathia's usage patter will be interesting to monitor. He's no longer a “young arm”, but pitchers in this era aren't acclimated to going as many innings as he has been the past few years. Perhaps now that he is, there won't be any ill effects, and Girardi is known for pushing his starters, so don't expect much coddling to keep him “fresh” for the playoffs.
Just a reminder about GP10:
In December, Acta Sports will publish the 2010 GRAPHICAL PLAYER. Besides covering a pair of teams apiece, Rob and I are Associate Editors of this edition. If you enjoy Waiver Wire—if you want the edge that you get here at THT Fantasy—then the 2010 GRAPHICAL PLAYER is your book. It'll be like going into your draft with Rob and me looking over your shoulder. (THTF's minor-league maven Matt Hagen is also a contributor.)
Next week, we'll begin incorporating GP profiles into our Waiver Wire columns. Until then, here is a 16-page preview of the book. You can order the book from Acta Sports here.
Posted by Rob McQuown at 4:00am
(0) Comments
Monday, November 30, 2009
There is often a bit of hype that comes with players who are big free agent signings, as John Lackey is likely to be. But should you move him up your board when there are better options later? Jason Hammel has a career ERA of 5.18 and pitches in Coors, but has skills and is getting better. Lackey has 85 more career wins, but let's see what they did in 2009.
2009
W ERA K BB WHIP K/9 BB/9 GB% HR/FB% FIP BABIP
John Lackey 11 3.83 139 47 1.27 7.09 2.40 44.9% 9.1% 3.73 0.309
Jason Hammel 10 4.33 133 42 1.39 6.78 2.14 46.2% 9.7% 3.71 0.337
So we have a pitcher with a reputation, but also has some questions with his health and is presumably on his way to a new team. I'm sure his name will get a lot of press, and depending on what team he signs with he could move way up in drafts. Right now he is currently going around the 125th pick in MockDraftCentral.com drafts. At the same time Hammel is not getting drafted.
 | MLB: OCT 11 NLDS - Game 3 - Phillies at Rockies
11 October 2009: Rockies starting pitcher Jason Hammel went 3.2 innings giving up four runs on four hits, striking out five during a National League Division Series game between the Philadelphia Phillies and the Colorado Rockies at Coors Field in Denver, Colorado. The Phillies beat the Rockies 6-5 as the temperature dipped into the 20's.(Icon/SMI) |
Both Lackey and Hammel have a four pitch approach with fastballs just a tick above 90 mph, a slider, a curveball and a changeup. However, their pitches are much different in effectiveness. Pitch values may not be the best measure, but you can see Lackey has three solid pitches and a below average changeup. Hammel on the other hand has three below average pitches and what was in 2009 an elite curveball. It only ranked behind Edwin Jackson's with a value of 3.53 runs per 100 pitches.
That might be a concern for Hammel going forward in 2010 as he is counting on the success of one pitch instead of Lackey who can rely on three. This is also the first time that Hammel has maintained a BB/9 under 3.0. If his walk rate climbs in 2010 he will fall behind Lackey in ERA and WHIP. It is likely he does see this climb since his largest gains were in O-swing% and O-contact%.
This shouldn't just be ignored though as their is some evidence in his PITCHf/x that his curve has changed. It is up two mph on average and is moving down only 6.4 when it used to move over eight inches down. This would make his pitches closer to the zone and tougher to lay off. He maintained this movement all year and hence his walk rate was near 2.0 per nine innings almost all season.
BABIP effects contributed to their final ERAs, but some of it was the result of a lesser defense in Colorado. We don't know what Lackey will have behind him in 2010, but that would play a large part in his BABIP and his ERA. Even with a huge split in team defenses I wouldn't recommend one over the other based on that alone.
Lackey hasn't topped 200 innings since 2007 and with his arm's injury history you have to start wondering how healthy he will be each year. He won't be your team ace in fantasy, but losing him for an extended time would still hurt. Hammel has yet to be placed the DL, but has also dealt with tendinitis as recently as 2007.
Lackey and Hammel are very differently valued by fantasy players, but with his first season over 170 innings Hammel showed he could be a surprise in fantasy. Based on the current draft positions I would say you are much better served by passing on Lackey and waiting for Hammel. You could also draft Hammel along with Lackey to ensure you have production regardless of injuries to Lackey.
Posted by Troy Patterson at 3:58am
(2) Comments
A couple of weeks ago, in the comment section of my Approaching unconscious competence article, a discussion sprang up regarding the way a player’s value against replacement is dispersed across categories and how it affects the perceived and real value of that player and his tradability. I touted the trade value of one-trick ponies while reader, Andrew P. advocated the all-around marginally better-than-average-type of player as being easier to trade.
I decided to try to explore this in a very unscientific way, basically for food for thought purposes. This is not going to be a fully in-depth study with peer-review level mathematical rigor. The most honest reason why I’m omitting the heaviest mathematical lifting is that I’m not great at it, and doing so might just devolve the discussion into an argument over methodology. But, also important is the fact that when discussing things like trade-ability we are talking about perception. And, since you are likely not in a fantasy league with 11 Tom Tangos, the way other owners perceive value of [your] players is important, and not necessarily congruent with their actual values.
My argument is that when it comes to players with overall marginal value (i.e. last roster spot, bench depth, trade bait, etc.) the player whose value is highly concentrated in fewer categories is the more attractive commodity.
Before we get into looking at some players and where their value comes from, let me make two semi-tangential points. First, when it comes to player production throughout the season, studies show that streakier players, that is players whose positive value is packed tighter into a smaller bunch of games, are actually worth more wins over time than those who display consistent, but non-dominating success. This is logical when you think about it, as a player who goes 4-for-4 in a game will likely influence that game much more than his composite influence on four consecutive games in which he goes 1-for-4 in each.
Second, if any of you out there play fantasy basketball, you are probably familiar with the legend of Zach Randolph (and, to a lesser extent, Tony Parker). Every year, one of two things happens to Randolph. Either some naïve owner sees the 20-10 and drafts him a good 40 picks too early, or some astute owner drafts him, and then packages him with a top-40 player and trades the two for a naïve owner’s first-round stud. Randolph is a liability of epic proportions in most categories, but puts up such attractive numbers in the glamor categories, that his perceived value is light years beyond his actual value. Ditto Parker, by the way, a 20-8 point guard who is not worth a top-70 pick.
In different ways, both of these points are illustrative of both the real and perceived value of tightly concentrated production.
With that in mind, let’s get to some fantasy baseball. To start this investigation, I wanted to establish the replacement level in all the five standard categories. I took a standard 12-team mixed league with expanded rosters, totaling 12 starting bats per team. At 12 teams, and 12 roster spots, that makes 144 starting offensive roster spots. So, I simply went down the line and cut off the 144th most productive season in each of the counting stats. For, batting average, I just took the average of the team batting averages that earned six points in all 12-team mixed leagues I played. So, let’s take a look at what a player’s line would be had he produced at the 144-cut-off in all categories.
Now, it was difficult to find players who fit this model, but here are some players who were roughly similar across the board, with no large chunk of their value coming from a single category. Their overall Yahoo ranks are in parenthesis.
Now, let’s take a look at what the marginal five-category contributor might look like. My first inclination was to just bump up each category by 10 percent. But I nixed that idea because runs and stolen bases, for example, are economies of two different scales, and proportions would be misleading. (See, I’m not totally mathematically naïve/illiterate). So, instead, I chose to redo the cut-off to determine what the 10th percentile of the roster-able players looks like, meaning the cut-off now comes at 130 as opposed to 144. So, here’s what the five-category 10 percent above-replacement player looks like. (I just moved up the batting average to the average of the “7”s in my 12-team leagues.)
The best comparison I found for this line was Melky Cabrera, who was ranked 230th overall.
The first thing that we should notice here is that none of these players played entire seasons. Cabrera logged 485 ABs, while Murphy logged the most ABs of the player on the replacement-level list, with 432. Melky Cabrera was no fantasy world beater, and apparently being slightly better than 12-team fantasy replacement value doesn’t earn you a full season of ABs on the New York Yankees either.
Let’s take a quick break for pro-active disclaimer/friendly reminder. Now, of course Kendrick and Beckham helped fantasy teams because they are both very talented players with high ceilings who produced their value in less than full seasons, and their owners got production from other players in their absences. The seeming irony is that both of these players were more helpful than Cabrera (because of that concentrated production). In reality, we know that when it comes to the last few roster spots, good owners cobble together composite production from a variety of players. But, again, for our purposes here we are just looking at where individual production cut-offs are at certain levels against replacement. So, let’s try to keep in mind that we are looking at seasonal production for the players in question with minimal concern for how many games or ABs it took them to put up those numbers (the obvious exception being batting average, because the “weight” of individuals’ rate stats is important in terms of determining your team’s whole).
Back to the issue at hand, is Cabrera a tradable commodity in a 12-team, mixed league? I don’t think so. Did anybody out there who owned Melky in a similar league receive one-for-one trade offers involving Melky? If you owned him, is there anybody who would have been able to help your team that you think you could have gotten for Cabrera? When it comes to trade returns, to paraphrase John Sterling, the Melk Man doesn’t deliver. If I wanted to trade Melky Cabrera in a 12-team league, here are the situations in which I would think it might be possible.
I might be able to land either an elite set-up man, or a set-up man behind a troubled closer and get some value out of it. If I was Ryan Madson’s owner and was having health issues with my outfield, I could see making a Madson-for-Melky deal. But, more likely, I’d try to take a couple of swings for the fences on the waiver wire.
I could maybe see the Melk Man involved in a two-for-one. If, for example, I was trading a high quality all-around OF, say Nick Markakis, for high level starter or closer, I’d consider asking for Melky as well, as a throw-in, if he would be a better replacement for Markakis than anybody on the wire. Of course, I have to be willing to drop another player (most likely a pitcher) on my roster to make room for Melky. (There really are no such things as two-for-ones, because of roster constraints, which is what makes it difficult to add a marginal player in a two-for-one deal, as the owner receiving that player still has to judge that player against his own marginal players.)
So, Melky Cabrera, who is all-around above replacement value is pretty much worthless on the open market in a 12-team league. This is because of the motivations behind trades. Teams make trades, usually from a surplus, to make up ground in categories. A player who 10 percent better than replacement across the board will have no profound impact on the standings in any individual category, and is therefore unappealing as a potential acquisition by a team looking to trade.
Now, let’s look at a few players whose value in most categories was pretty close to the replacement margin, but who produced particularly well in a single category. Overall rank in parenthesis again, as are deviation for the replacement level in each category.
| Player | R | HR | RBI | SB | AVG |
|---|
| Marco Scutaro (112) | 100 (+61%) | 12 (-8%) | 60 (+2%) | 14 (+8) SB | .282 (+.003) |
|---|
| Adam Kennedy (166) | 65 (+5%) | 11(-15%) | 63 (+7%) | 20 (+14 SB) | .289 (+.012) |
|---|
| > |
|---|
Kennedy’s production is virtually even in the R, HR and RBI departments, taking into consideration overs and unders, while sporting considerable advantages in batting average and steals. Both of those categories are clear, actual assets that Kennedy offers.
Scutaro’s batting average advantage is negligible, and while he does provide speed that will contribute to your team, his big difference comes from the fact that he is actually elite at one category (runs), even though he is virtually a replacement level in three of them (HR, RBI, AVG.)
Once again, let’s look at our fictitious +10 percent all around player.
I know that the absolute values versus the relative rank dynamics of the stolen base category throws things off a bit, and that Scutaro especially has a bit more value than our hypothetical player regardless of how it is distributed, but don’t both Scutaro and Kennedy’s lines look more trade-able?
Before I try to summarize some of the takeaways of this somewhat unfocused and non-scientific column, let’s take a look at one more player, Franklin Gutierrez. Gutierrez had a very good year and turned out to be a surprising source of five-category contribution. Without putting up staggering numbers in any one category, Gutierrez was clearly a valuable asset to fantasy teams last season, and he did so in one of the most under-the-radar ways possible.
| R | HR | RBI | SB | AVG |
|---|
| 68 | 15 | 63 | 9 | .283 |
|---|
| +37% | +38% | +19% | +10 SB | +.006 |
Gutierrez didn’t reach any notable categorical milestones. While he achieved 34 combined homers and steals, he didn’t accumulate as many as 20 of either. He didn’t score 100 runs, or drive in 80 runs. But he did provide meaningful value above replacement in all other counting categories. I don’t think people realize how much marginal value players like Gutierrez provide across the board.
I say this by no means to attack Andrew P., but I think that when he argued for the plus-10 percent across-the-board player, he was thinking of a player like Gutierrez, who was more like plus-30 percent across multiple categories. That’s why five-category studs are so few and far between; they have to be more than just a little better than average at everything to really make their impact. They have to be a lot better at several things. A player who puts up a line of 90-20-90-20 is basically providing approximately 150 percent of replacement value in four categories.
Let’s try to make some sense of what we’ve talked about here and draw some conclusions.
- When it comes to trades, the way others perceive the value of your players is even more important than how objectively valuable they actually are. And the way that value is distributed across categories affects the perception.
- Other owners target players whose skill sets are likely to affect the standings. This consideration is, to varying degrees, disassociated from the overall marginal value a player offers. In some cases, this is rational, and in some cases it isn’t. A player’s value to my team may be different than it is to your team, because we are not competing against replacement level; we are competing against each other in team-wide category totals.
- Milestones are arbitrary and elevate the price of a player more than they actually reflect his value. If Franklin Gutierrez went 20-20 this past year, his ADP would rise some obscene number of spots this year. His 18-16 is certainly helpful, and you can likely grab him for peanuts again next year.
- I am no mathematical savant.
Posted by Derek Ambrosino at 5:06am
(5) Comments
This is Page 3 of 3 THT Fantasy Focus pages < 1 2 3
|