THT Fantasy Focus

Posted by Kevin Cearnal at 2:48am (4) Comments

Approach the bench

Opportunity + skills = production

It doesn’t get much simpler than that, right?

When it comes to this equation however, many fantasy players spend the overwhelming majority of their time looking for edges to maximize the “skill” component of that equation, while ignoring some simple strategies to maximize the “opportunity” side. One of the ways you can help maximize your opportunities to produce is effectively managing your bench, and constructing your team’s bench in a way that fits your profile as a fantasy baseball player.

Some leagues have weekly rotations while others have daily rotations, and this transaction-frequency influences bench-management strategy. I plan to address daily transaction leagues most directly, but will reserve some comments for weekly leaguers at the end.

At the most fundamental level, when you think about opportunity and your bench—or more broadly, your entire roster—the first edict of effective roster management is that you want as many players as possible, on any given night, in a position to be able to accrue stats for your team. Minimizing DNPs is the primary name of the game. This is a straightforward concept, but its practical implications may be a tad nuanced. This is where you must ask yourself the question that will largely determine what your optimal bench management style will be.

Are you a micro-manager?

A bench player does no good, no matter how talented he may be, if he doesn’t make his way into your line-up. So, ask yourself whether you have the time, desire, and will to do things like check starting line-ups within the hour before game times to determine whether your regulars are sitting. Do you have the patience to look into opposing pitchers, handedness and split data to determine the best match-ups among your fringe starters and bench players?

If you are ready, willing, and able to micromanage a bit, you should have a few bats on your bench that are above replacement-level. There are a few characteristics worthy of privileging, in addition to overall skills as well, if you are going to tilt toward the micro-manager route.

Players who are multi-position eligible are very useful. It’s always disheartening when you actually dodiscover one of your starters will be getting the day off, only to realize that, even though you do have a bench player, you can’t get him in your line-up. In fact, multi-position eligibility among your starters is a great trait too, as it offers a greater likelihood that you find a way to fit your bench players in when there’s an open spot. But, these are all advantages you have to work to manifest.

Think about your starting roster and which players, or rather which positions, are given the most time off. If you start Chipper Jones at 3B, you probably should have a 3B-eligible bat on your bench. If you have players returning from injury, who project to be given the play 2 games, take 1 off treatment for a couple of weeks, make a contingency plan. If you have players who sometimes are asked to sit against lefties, you’ll need a back-up who is eligible at the same position.

Players with extreme splits can be useful as bench players. Righties who kill lefties, players with outrageous home/road splits, switch hitters with one dominant bat side are all welcome if you’re willing to put the effort into deploying them correctly. This approach isn’t exactly about maximizing opportunity in a volume sense; rather it’s about getting the most out of your players. Some mediocre players perform as elite players when placed in a defined set of circumstances. There’s no shame in using them as such.

When it comes to pitchers, your mindset should be similar but with a lesser priority and added scrutiny. The dynamics of pitcher rosters are bit difficult, limiting your opportunity for gain under this model. You can play many starting pitchers at a time; often you’re stuck playing starters who aren’t even scheduled to pitch that day because they’re too valuable to drop, and you have more players position-eligible than players playing that day. You’re most likely to have only a few roster spots to toggle, and most likely those players are going to be middle relievers, along with the occasional opportunistic spot-start.

You can still try to turn your roster over to maximize the likelihood that your middle relievers get into games, and you can try to track which closers may be in line for a day off, but this is unlikely to have major impact on the standings over the course of a season. For the most part, find some useful middle relievers who get in a lot of games, leave them there, and hope they vulture some wins and saves, which giving you sterling rate stats.

The other key distinction between batters and pitchers is that, when it comes to your offensive roster spots, you should basically be trying to max them out, because it is very unlikely that you will succeed in doing so, regardless of the strength of your efforts. Pitching, on the other hand, is a zero-sum game in this sense. If you have an innings limit, chances are you are going to try to finish the season right around that number, so while an 0-4 from an offensive bench player played is nothing more than a tiny prick on your team’s AVG, there is real opportunity cost to just racking up appearances and innings without much thought.

For those of you in leagues that differentiate SP and RP (a pet peeve of mine, many of you know), you can still take advantage of multi-position eligibility by finding a dual-eligible pitchers and pitching starters as relievers or relievers as starters when advantageous.

But, overall, for micro-managers, I feel that your bench strategy should prioritize building a high-quality, flexible offensive bench of maybe three players who you can get into your line-up with some regularity, as well as on travel days. Note for OCD-level micro-managers, west coast bench players provide a tiny extra advantage, because if your starter is playing on the west coast, it does you no good to find out he’s going to be sitting if your substitute player’s game has already started.

What do you do if you are not a micro-manager?

If you are not a micro manager, your focus should be on the skill side of the original equation, even when it comes to the bench. Offensively, you should be using your bench more to position yourself to sustain injury, cold streaks from starters, and to minimize the impact of potential future trades. If you’re not going to be able to get these players into your line-up, then utility is less important than objective value.

For non-micro-managers, it can be a good idea to spend more of your bench resources on your pitching staff. It is not all that burdensome and labor intensive to keep track of when pitchers are playing, as this is information that is available days in advance. Therefore, non-micro-managers may want to focus on building depth in their starting pitching, as it is much easier to play the match-ups with pitchers than hitters. Rotate your fringe starters by looking ahead to future match-ups, or maximize the number of starters who have two-start weeks for those in H2H leagues with weekly scoring periods.

If the micro-manger, who often uses a shorter pitching staff, suffers injuries to a key pitcher that he needs to address, you’ll be in a position to capitalize, as you can offer a pitcher while still having quality play-able options deeper on your roster.

Also, instead of chasing middle relievers who may get a rogue save opportunity based on a closer’s likely rest day, non-micro-managers should take the long view and target middle relievers behind candidates for implosion and/or trade. Basically, you’re trying to set yourself for a windfall, as opposed to running ragged committing frequent petty heists.

Weekly transaction leagues
As a final note, weekly transaction leagues lend themselves toward the non-micro-management style of bench management by their nature. Owners have to decide on rosters in advance. They need deeper starting staffs to provide more two-start starter options. Often they face uncertainty about a player’s injury status going into a week, so having a high quality option to play many games in a row is of priority.

The one facet of the micro-manager’s portfolio the weekly leaguer may want to borrow is the extreme split player. Perhaps a lefty-killer is projected to get four or five match-ups in his favor that week, or a home-park savant is playing in the friendly confines all week. Those are mid-term opportunistic plays, and can be capitalized upon in weekly transaction leagues to tremendous gain, especially when your opponent lazily trots out a cadre of marginal power hitters set for a four-game series in San Diego.

Posted by Derek Ambrosino at 5:15am (5) Comments

Thursday, June 09, 2011

I think I cheat at fantasy baseball

I run a 12-team keeper league. The specifics of the league aren't important to this article. What is important is that somewhere along the line the most peculiar thing happened—I became the default trade advisor for many of the owners in my league.

As far as I can tell, my leaguemates consult me for two reasons. The first is the same reason The Hardball Times lets me write and you clicked to open this article—I supposedly know a lot about baseball and can express that knowledge.

The second reason is that I'm honest. If someone asks me who they should pick up off the waiver wire, I'll tell them who best fits their team. If someone wants a quick cost-benefit analysis done on a trade proposal they received, I'll give it to them. There have been times where I have advised another owner to take a trade that helps my biggest rival.

Basically, I have built into the league a free fantasy baseball consulting service. I actually help my rivals field better teams and make better trades. I must be crazy.

Well, I'm not. I gain two things from consulting with most of the teams: Information and influence.

Information is probably the most important. As commissioner and czar of trade, I have up-to-date contact information for everyone in the league. I can get in touch with those hard-to-reach owners that no else seems to be able to find.

Updates on trade negotiations are the most valuable bit of information that I get. With this information, I get a sense of how an owner values different types of players and what qualities they look for in players. For example, we have one owner who is known to place a high value on youth. We have another owner who only likes proven players. I cannot overstate the value of knowing this information.

I am not above inserting myself into trade negotiations when I see an opportunity. Sometimes this means entering as a third party to facilitate a trade. Other times, I've topped the previous best offer. For example, an owner asked my advice on an offer he got for Carl Crawford. I thought it was light and told him as much. A few days later, I sent Michael Pineda ($10 to keep), Kendrys Morales, and Chris Coghlan for Crawford. This was about two weeks before Morales's season went KA-PLUIE.

The other advantage to consulting with my rivals is the influence I gain. Influence comes as a result of consistently offering beneficial advice. Like with information, influence can be used in different ways. Let's classify them generally as "cold" and "hot."

Cold influence, like cold war, is indirect. When owners attach weight to my opinion, two things happen without me lifting a finger. Some owner's preferences begin to mirror my own. They evaluate using the same stats and build their rosters in a similar way.

For instance, I believe that mid-tier pitchers aren't worth rostering for the four days they are off. When other owners start carrying short rotations based on my beliefs, the result is more robust options on the waiver market for me. This works for me because I'm much better at my strategy than my opponents.

The other thing that happens is the cost of doing business goes down. If owners have similar preferences to my own, then my roster becomes more valuable on the trade market. With that in information hand, I can cherry pick good fantasy players who don't fit my profile on the cheap.

Hot influence is when I directly affect what another owner does. I occasionally receive messages that say something like, "I was offered X and Y for Z. It doesn't add up right, so what should I ask for in place of Y?" When my response is, "Try to get exciting prospect N instead of boring veteran Y—your team needs upside," I have directly influenced an opponent's team. Of course, the reason I get that influence is because I just gave him good advice.

So that's my story. I'm honestly not sure if what I'm doing is untoward. Any other owner is welcome to copy my approach. No owner is under any obligation to contact me. They can completely ignore me so long as they pay their dues on time, submit their keeper list, and show up to the draft. My leaguemates allow and encourage my behavior, so I plan to continue trading my knowledge for information and influence.

*This year, I am currently in first place in the league, part of a three-way battle that has separated itself from the field. Last year I came in second place via the infamous final day collapse. So in a small sample size, this arrangement doesn't appear to be hurting me.

Posted by Brad Johnson at 5:10am (4) Comments

Friday, June 10, 2011

NL Waiver Wire: Week 10

All statistics are current through at least Monday, June 6.

Dee Gordon | Dodgers | SS | 2 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD (AAA): .316/.363/.372
Oliver MLE: .239/.288/.284

On the first day, God created the heavens and the earth. By Day Seven, the Lord noticed his team was lacking in stolen bases, so, with the first overall waiver wire position in his league, he created Dee Gordon. That may sound ridiculous, but for owners in need of stolen bases, particularly Hanley Ramirez and Rafael Furcal owners who lost cornerstone middle infield production this/last week, Dee Gordon comes as a godsend.

Rated by Fangraphs' prospect maven Marc Hulet as the Dodgers' No. 1 overall prospect heading into the season, a far cry from the 2006 Dodgers' top 10 list, the son of ex-closer Tom Gordon could be an immediate impact player in mixed leagues. What he lacks in power (.084 minor league career ISO) and the ability to draw ball four (6.0 percent MiLB career BB rate), he makes up for with lightning speed (96 rating out of 100 per Baseball Cubes' 0-100 scale, a 7.5+ speed score in each minor league stop, and a combined 166 stolen bases over a combined 374 minor league games.

He also can hit for average (.299 minor league career hitter with a .353 OBP clip, thanks to good contact skills and foot speed). Gordon's success rate on the bases for his minor league career is north of the 75 percent mark, and he has been caught in only three of his 22 attempts at Triple-A this year.

In terms of what you can expect, think of Gordon in the mold of Eric Young Jr., only with the ability to hit for average with shortstop, rather than second base, eligibility. Another perk of Gordon over the perpetually disappointing EYJ is that Gordon has a manager who, if for no other reason than there are really no other options, will play him consistently.

Oliver's MLEs are not particularly fond of Gordon, pegging his minor league seasons to date as very Eric Young Jr.-esque with an average just north of .250 overall and no on base totals and few home runs to go with it. Stolen base MLEs are particularly unforgiving, as pretty much all young players tend to run, but even still, Oliver sees Gordon as a 30-40 stolen base machine. If you consider that Oliver forecast only a handful of players (Jacoby Ellsbury, Michael Bourn, Rajai Davis, Jose Reyes, Juan Pierre, Coco Crisp, Drew Stubbs, B.J. Upton, and Elvis Andrus) as stealing more bases than Gordon's full season MLE, then you realize what elite company this kids' wheels reside in.

Currently on pace to reach 70 again in the minors, Gordon is a must-add player for all owners in need of speed, a middle infielder, or a placeholder for Hanley Ramirez. Gordon's time may be a function of Furcal's playing time, but Furcal's perpetual inability to stay healthy seem to be written in stone.

Recommendation: Gordon is a must-add speed commodity for leagues that require its owners to deploy a middle infielder, and mixed formats with 12 or more shortstops. Ten-team leagues without middle infielder spots should closely monitor Gordon's production as well.

Ryan Vogelsong | Giants | SP, RP | 52 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD: 1.68 ERA, 1.04 WHIP, 7.04 K/9, 3.00 K/BB, 44.2% GB%
Oliver ROS: 4.46 ERA, 1.46 WHIP, 8.2 K/9, 1.8 K/BB

Much in the vein of Colby Lewis, former bust-of-a-player Ryan Vogelsong has returned from a tour of duty in Japan to wreak vengeance upon major league hitters. Not much of a prospect when the Nippon League came a-callin', he was a fifth round pick in 1998, Vogelsong owned a career ERA north of 5.25, a career strikeout rate that barely eclipsed the 6.0 mark, a K/BB ratio of 1.52, and average fastball velocity (just under 92) for a right-handed pitcher.

But he apparently learned in Japan. Like Lewis, since returning to the majors, Vogelsong has slashed his walk rate (career 4.10 BB/9 mark, 2.35 mark on the season), while whiffing more batters (19.6 percent K rate in 2011, 14.3 percent career) to become a newly minted master of the K/BB ratio (3.00 mark this season, 1.52 mark for his career before this year).

In fact, Vogelsong's season to date (3.46 xFIP, 93 xFIP-, 3.00 K/BB ratio) looks pretty darn similar to what Lewis did last year (3.74 xFIP, 90 xFIP-, 3.02 K/BB ratio), with each owning a comparably pathetic career prior to his brief departure from American baseball.

The Fantasy Focus podcast guys have gone on record saying they are all in on Vogelsong, who has allowed one or no earned runs in each of his past six starts, but should you for the rest of the season? Plugging Vogelsong's numbers into the 2011 runs environment of the latest version of my xWHIP Calculator, his numbers look legitimate, assuming that his strikeout and walk ratios remain stable (and improved over his career) heading forward. According to the xWHIP Calculator, Vogelsong's luck-neutralized line checks in at an ERA of 3.65, and a WHIP around 1.22. Those numbers are well above his current rate of production (1.68 ERA, 1.04 WHIP), but those numbers are much better than the mean data spit out by the xWHIP Calculator (4.00 expected ERA, 1.33 xWHIP).

Per sample size thresholds, for pitchers, strikeout percentage takes about 150 batters before we can draw any statistically significant conclusions from it, while K/BB and walk percentage take about 500 and 550 batters, respectively. Hence, it is too soon to say whether Vogelsong's new-found control is legitimate, but the slight uptick in strikeouts may be.

Presuming the walk rate is legitimate, Vogelsong would appear to be so as well. I hate to call players in year N+1 the next "player from year N" (e.g., this year's Jose Bautista), but Vogelsong might be best described as 2011's Colby Lewis. If he's available in your league (possible in shallower formats, as he is owned in barely half of all leagues), I would recommend a pickup, while in deeper leagues Vogelsong might make a strong, but relatively cheap, trade target.

Recommendation: Vogelsong should be owned in any format with an innings cap of or above 1,200.

Chris Volstad | Marlins | SP | 1 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD: 5.67 ERA, 1.48 WHIP, 6.41 K/9, 2.26 K/BB, 47.2% GB%
Oliver ROS: 4.66 ERA, 1.44 WHIP, 5.4 K/9, 1.68 K/BB

In a modern era of sabermetric-infused fantasy folk, I am actually pretty shocked that Volstad is owned in only one percent more fantasy leagues than I am. Despite a ghastly 5.67 ERA and a whipped WHIP of a baserunner-and-a-half per inning, Volstad's peripherals indicate that he is not nearly as bad as he has been on the surface.

A walk-averse pitcher in the minors (6.5 percent walk rate, 2.5 BB/9), Volstad has seen his major league free pass rate (BB/9) fall annually fall from a below-average 3.84 mark during his rookie season in 2008 to a substantially more respectable 2.83 mark this season. Over the past two seasons combined—walk rates for pitchers have a statistically significant threshold of around 500 batters—Volstad has walked an equally admirable 3.02 batters per nine innings (3.25 MLB average).

Volstad has also upped his strikeout game. Despite a big dip in swinging strikes induced last year (career low 5.7 percent mark), Volstad's whiff rate is currently at a career high at 7.5 percent, and has a career high 6.41 K/9 and 16.1 percent strikeout rate. Strikeout rates tend to become statistically significant at the 150 batters faced mark, and Volstad has opposed 267 to date. Hence, the moderate uptick in strikeouts may be legitimate.

All this said, Volstad's current xFIP stands at a robust* 3.65 mark that is below the league average (98 xFIP-) and substantially below his ERA (5.67) and FIP (4.61) courtesy of an inflated 15.9 percent HR/FB rate. Savvy saber fans should go all in, right? Wrong
*The second "year of the pitcher" requires some mental recalibration regarding what is and is not a "good" FIP.

Plugging Volstad's numbers into the latest version of my xWHIP Calculator, his normalized batted ball numbers tell a less pretty story:

Not only does Volstad's eFIP (4.14) check in above the league average mark (4.00), but his "unlucky" WHIP (1.48) does not appear to be so unlucky (1.40 xWHIP, 1.33 major league average). Though Volstad is a neutral groundball/flyball pitcher, he lacks the ability to pop up hitters. Volstad's 3.2 percent popup rate on the season might be near half his career mark of 6.0 percent, but that average is largely inflated by Volstad's rookie season (13.2 percent). Volstad's popup rate since 2009 is 4.7 percent, and it's been declining each of those years. Popups tend to almost always result in an out, whereas outfield flies tend to produce more home runs, fewer outs, and more runs per hit.

So say what you will about Volstad's Fangraphs-reported xFIP. It's misleading. Though he's been a hot-topic for discussion lately, Volstad, like most pitchers who lack the ability to induce popups, is secretly as bad as he seems, and should be avoided.

Recommendation: Volstad is not rosterable except in deep NL-only formats.

Charlie Blackmon | Rockies | OF | 0 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD (AAA): .342/.396/.576
Oliver MLE: .278/.326/.457

With fantasy folk hero Dexter Fowler (I have never understood why people love his lack of upside and unexciting production) on the disabled list with an abdominal muscle strain, the Rockies gave the call-up to their top outfield prospect. Though he hardly stands out as either a power or stolen base machine for his career in the minors (.316/.376/.475 batting line with 30 home runs and 74 stolen bases in 345 games), Blackmon's gap power, on-base abilities, and stolen base abilities have steadily improved since he was drafted in 2008.

At Triple-A this season, Blackmon was setting career bests in power (.235 ISO, .572 SLG, 10 home runs in 58 games played) while posting a strikeout-to-walk ratio above 0.50 for the second consecutive season. With 12 stolen bases in 17 attempts (respectable 70.1 percent success rate) and 7.4 speed score this season, and a combined 31 stolen bases over his past 144 games played between Triple-A and Double-A, Blackmon could play out as a useful .280+/15+/25+ hitter for the Rockies—something Fowler could only dream of doing.

If Blackmon hits while Fowler is out, Fowler could remain the odd man out while Blackmon sticks, given the Rox' heated quest for the NL West title. Unfortunately, Blackmon is currently batting in the bottom third of the order for the Rockies, which is a death sentence in the NL for runs. Accordingly, his value must be tempered, though he could easily move up in the order if he does anything like Oliver projects.

Recommendation: Blackmon should be owned for the bench of deep mixed leagues (12+ teams, 5+ outfielder leagues) and he should be owned in all NL-only formats.

Anthony Rizzo | Padres | 1B | 11 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD (AAA): .365/.444/.715
Oliver MLE: .296/.374/.572

Hardly anything has changed since I wrote about Rizzo a couple of weeks ago other than the fact that the Padres have called up their power prospect and Adrian Gonzalez/Brad Hawpe replacement. Though Rizzo, like many players, has a platoon split (he struggles against lefties), that split is much less stark this year (he is hitting over .300 against lefties).

I have heard whispers of a platoon role for Rizzo at the get-go, but that's what the Phillies said about Domonic Brown this year, and they are letting him go against both righties and lefties. Since I last wrote about him two weeks ago, Rizzo has played 12 games and blasted two additional homers to go with a pair of doubles and seven more RBI. Petco will undoubtedly affect his major league production, but Rizzo should nonetheless produce at an elite level. If he's still available in your league, you should acquire him before it's too late.

Recommendation: Rizzo is a must own NL-only first baseman and must-own corner infield prospect in mixed leagues.

Jason Bourgeois | Astros | OF | 13 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD: .393/.422/.492
Oliver ROS: .287/.330/.385

Comparisons between Bourgeois and Rajai Davis are unavoidable. Davis (18 stolen bases in 43 games this year) is a career .279 hitter with no power and a pathetic walk rate (5.7 percent) who, despite a "league average" on-base rate, steals so often (he attempts more than a third of the time he reaches) that he posts ridiculous stolen base totals (161 in only 519 games). Bourgeois (14 stolen bases in 31 games), on the other hand, has hit .263 during his brief stint (243 plate appearances) in the majors with a slightly higher, but still below average, walk rate (7.8 percent) that gives him a comparable on base rate (.321, compared to Davis' .326 mark). At the major league level, Bourgeois has attempted to steal a base 44.9 percent of the time, while always acting as a 35+ stolen base threat in the minors.

For the rest of the year, Oliver forecasts Bourgeois capable of a .287/.330/.385 line with a substantially tempered 18.2 percent stolen base attempt rate that better mirrors his minor league career (20.2 percent). Given the Astros' struggles and commitment to Bourgeois while "rebuilding," and Bourgeois' desire to prove his limited value, it is very possible that he retains an elevated stolen base rate of the rest of the season.

Since returning from the disabled list three days ago, Bourgeois has already stolen two more bases. If given a full time job for the rest of the year, Oliver sees Bourgeois swiping 20 or so more bases (31 for Davis), but he could reasonably touch 30. Bourgeois has that special speed (7.6 speed score for his brief major league career) to make a dramatic impact on the stolen base totals of league laggards, so why is he owned in less than a quarter of the leagues that Rajai Davis (61 percent ownership) is? He certainly needs to be owned by anyone who thought they needed Tony Campana.

Recommendation: Bourgeois is an top-shelf third outfielder in NL-only, and stream/bench-worthy player for owners in need of speed in most mixed league formats.

Trade target of the week
Ryan Dempster | Cubs | SP | 66 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD: 6.32 ERA, 1.54 WHIP, 8.15 K/9, 2.39 K/BB, 45.1% GB%
Oliver ROS: 3.94 ERA, 1.30 WHIP, 8.1 K/9, 2.48 K/BB

A lot has been written about Dempster in recent weeks, including an article by Eno Sarris using my latest xWHIP Calculator, so rather than retread stale water, let me add some interesting data to the conversation. While it's true that Dempster's seasonal numbers check in as useful, but nothing special, when you plug them into my xWHIP Calculator using the 2011 runs environment (3.84 eFIP, 1.33 xWHIP), a significantly brighter picture forms if you take out his disastrous outing at Arizona on April 28 (0.1 IP, 7 ER, 0:4 K/BB ratio). Take a gander at the effect on Dempster's xWHIP Calculations:

Surprisingly, Dempster is owned in only two-thirds of Yahoo leagues. He should be universally owned. While I went on record saying the buy low window on Dempster closed after his 11-strikeout performance against the Giants, a few poor recent outings have caused many owners to reopen that window a crack. If someone's still willing to sell low on the criminally underrated Dempster (whose 2011 numbers mirror his 2009-2010 numbers), you should exploit the opportunity.

Recommendation: Dempster is a must-own No. 3 starter in mixed formats, and top-flight No. 2 in NL-only

Posted by Jeffrey Gross at 3:22am (0) Comments

AL Waiver Wire: Week 10

J.J. Hardy| Baltimore| SS| 19 percent Yahoo! ownership
YTD: .276/.346/.457
Oliver ROS: .258/.318/.404

Orioles shortstop J.J. Hardy has swung the bat well since returning from the disabled list, yet still finds himself unowned in many leagues. He has been especially hot this month, and is no stranger to going on torrid stretches. At his best, Hardy is capable of mid-20s home run power, which is certainly nothing to sneeze at from a shortstop.

Playing his home games at home-run friendly Camden Yards should only accentuate his greatest fantasy asset. His run and RBI totals are likely to be held in check while the Orioles slot him in the bottom third of their lineup, but should he continue to hit at a solid clip, he may find his name penciled in a more friendly run-producing spot in the order soon enough.

Hardy's line drive, groundball and flyball rates nearly mirror his career best 2007 marks, with the biggest difference in batted balls being a crazy pop-up rate of 22 percent. Should he straighten that out, a reasonable projection for his final line would be one that is indistinguishable from his 2007 and 2008 seasons. At worst, Hardy is worth rostering while he's tearing the cover off the ball and ditched when he cools off.

Recommendation: Should be owned in all leagues using a middle infield position, and all but the shallowest of leagues that don't use a middle infield position.

Jemile Weeks| Oakland| 2B| 0 percent Yahoo! ownership
YTD: .286/.286/.429
Oliver ROS: No projection

Pacific Coast League disclaimer applies when looking at Jemile Weeks' 2011 minor league statistics, but he did hit .321/.417/.446, earning him a call-up from the A's, and warrants the attention of owners scrambling for middle infield help. Our friends at FanGraphs, namely Jack Moore, point out Jemile is not his brother Rickie Weeks, but that doesn't mean he should be dismissed as useless (not something Moore does in his article, to be clear).

The younger Weeks, like the elder, does a fantastic job of reaching base via the walk, but he doesn't strike out at nearly as high a rate as his brother. More of a doubles hitter than a threat to leave the park, Jemile is a middle infielder unlikely to make waves in shallow leagues, but one who could offer just enough batting average and stolen base success to help owners in deep mixed leagues and AL-only formats. Keep an eye on how he fares against major league pitching, and act accordingly.

Recommendation: Should be owned in some deep mixed-leagues using a middle infield position, and some AL-only leagues.

Derek Holland| Texas| SP| 27 percent Yahoo! ownership
YTD: 4.36 ERA, 1.44 WHIP, 7.26 K/9, 3.39 BB/9, 46.2 percent GB
Oliver ROS: 4.30 ERA, 1.35 WHIP, 7.1 K/9, 3.2 BB/9

For the second season in a row, Holland has seen his groundball rate increase, something that should help him immensely in his launching pad home ballpark. The above stats do not include his solid turn against the Twins on Thursday night, a game in which he threw seven and one-third innings allowing just one walk, striking out 10 and giving up four earned runs while receiving a no-decision.

Holland's strikeout rate has taken a step back this year, but remains solid, and coincides with a decrease in walks. Couple his improved walk rate with a higher groundball rate and it appears as if Holland is beginning to make strides as a pitcher. He may not be a shiny new toy, but he still possesses a great deal of upside and has a chance to be a post-hype sleeper capable of rounding out fantasy rotations. His performance on Thursday, as well as his stellar 2010 strikeouts per nine innings rate hint at the type of upside he is capable of delivering in that category.

Recommendation: Should be owned in some medium sized mixed-leagues, and all deep mixed-leagues and AL-only formats.

Scott Baker| Minnesota| SP| 32 percent Yahoo! ownership
YTD: 3.86 ERA, 1.30 WHIP, 8.56 K/9, 2.77 BB/9, 34.0 percent GB
Oliver ROS: 4.25 ERA, 1.28 WHIP, 7.6 K/9, 2.3 BB/9

Unafraid of hitters taking to the air, and perhaps the biggest fan of the Twins home digs because of that, Baker is putting together an under-appreciated 2011 fantasy campaign. Currently sporting a career best K/9, all the while pounding the strike zone, Baker has been able to strike out three times as many batters as he has walked. Continuing to maintain a strikeout rate as high as he is now is unlikely for an entire season, but Oliver expects him to continue to be helpful in the category, and his above league average swinging strike rate also lends support to that notion.

Around a league average contributor in ratios, and supported (I say supported loosely) by a Twins offense that has struggled to score runs this year, Baker will need to continue to strike hitters out to remain useful. However, on the flip side of his league average ratios contributions, he is unlikely to hurt owners while tallying a healthy number of strike threes.

Recommendation: Should be owned in some medium sized mixed-leagues, most deep mixed-leagues, and all AL-only formats.

Gordon Beckham| Chicago (American League)| 2B| 54 percent Yahoo! ownership
YTD: .239/.306/.365
Oliver ROS: .268/.326/.423

Owned in over half of Yahoo! leagues, Gordon Beckham is a player owners in most competitive leagues will have to trade for to get his services. A glance at his season line is likely to garner a disgusted look from his owners, and a quizzical expression from those wondering why I'd suggest trading for him. After a miserable April (.194/.238/.296), Beckham smoked the ball in May (.303/.379/.421) and has teetered somewhere in between in June if one only looks at his batting average. However, don't be fooled by his average in June, as he's slugged the ball fairly well, and cut back on his biggest glaring weakness in May, his strikeout rate.

April's struggles can largely be pinned on a pop-up rate of 28.6 percent (no, that's not a typo). Short of sacrificing oneself or striking out, the pop-up is the next surest way to head back to the dugout, and when one does it in more than a quarter of his at-bats, the results look something like Beckham's ghastly line.

May and June have seen Beckham's batted ball profile take on a much different look. In May, he was able to rip line drives in 29.6 percent of his at-bats, a good sign of life from a struggling hitter. Those hoping to cash in on some home runs from him should also note that he's hitting the ball in the air with great frequency this year. Owners may be willing to sell at a slightly reduced rate as opposed to running the risk that Beckham reverts to his alter-ego Beggin' once again, making now the time to kick the tires on acquiring a popular rebound candidate heading into drafts this year.

Recommendation: Should be owned in all but the shallowest of leagues.

Alex Rios| Chicago (American League)| OF| 70 percent Yahoo! ownership
YTD: .200/.253/.300
Oliver ROS: .266/.313/.416

Unlike his teammate highlighted above, Alex Rios is a player I'd suggest selling low on. While that may seem somewhat counterintuitive, sometimes selling low is the only opportunity to sell and receive any value in return at all. Oliver projects brighter days ahead for Rios, but fellow Waiver Wire author Jeffrey Gross discusses the reasons to deal him now. As opposed to rehashing what he's eloquently written about elsewhere, I'll suggest checking out his article at A Game of Inches.

Recommendation: Should be owned in all but the shallowest of leagues, but sold at a reduced rate if you currently own him.

Posted by Josh Shepardson at 6:14am (10) Comments

Monday, June 13, 2011

Fluke watch: Deciphering pitching illusions

After the discussion in the comments section of the last Fluke Watch, I thought I'd spend this next column explaining the goal of this column and the theories upon which this work is based. Consider this like a mini-primer or FAQ of sorts.

The Problem

Suppose you have pitcher X, who has the following statistics in 2009 and 2010:

2009: 6.0 K/9, 4.0 BB/9, 1 HR/9, and an ERA of 4.42, with a BABIP of .300.
2010: 6.0 K/9, 4.0 BB/9, 1 HR/9, and an ERA of 3.10, with a BABIP of .215.

If I asked you whether Pitcher X's 2012 ERA was going to be closer to his 2009 or 2010 ERA, you'd pretty quickly say 2009. This is because you can see that Pitcher X's peripherals have remained the same from one year to the other, with the ERA improvement clearly coming as a result of a greatly reduced BABIP, which is almost certain to regress.

Now Suppose instead we have the following Pitcher Y, who has pitched a full season in 2010 and one month in 2011 with the following statistics:

2010: 6.0 K/9, 4.0 BB/9, 1 HR/9, and an ERA of 4.42, with a BABIP of .300.
2011: 8.0 K/9, 4.0 BB/9, 0.8 HR/9, and an ERA of 3.46, with a BABIP of .300.

Now, what performance would you expect to see out of Pitcher Y for the rest of 2011? Unlike Pitcher X, whose performance "improvement" was pretty clearly the result of just random variance (luck), Pitcher Y's improvement seems to stem from an improvement in his peripherals. Thus, we're more inclined to believe that this improvement is real and Pitcher Y can continue to do well the rest of the year.

But this belief relies upon a key point, one which is definitely not so clear, that Pitcher Y can keep up his improved peripherals for the rest of the year. How can we be certain of this? After all, random variance in a small sample size (one month) can certainly account for improved peripherals. His improvement STILL could be an illusion, after all.

The Pitch-f/x solution

It's here that Pitch-f/x can be of some use. Improvements in a pitcher's peripherals (or, really, any improvements, including BABIP), can stem from three things: A change in how the pitcher is pitching, external factors, or luck.

External factors are the easiest of the three to explain. Perhaps a pitcher has issues pitching at home (let's say in Colorado) and has thrown two-thirds of his starts or more at home. Perhaps he's faced a whole bunch of weak-hitting teams, or teams who have a lot of lefties or righties. We can easily adjust for such factors to make our future projections.

Then there's luck, or really, random variation: Sometimes a change in results is simply luck or random variation. A pitcher could be throwing the same exact pitches to the same exact locations to the same exact batters 100 times* and the results will NOT be the same each time.

*Presume for this example that the batters don't gain any experience from each of these at-bats.

What will be the same in general, over the long run, is that if a pitcher pitches the same exact way and there are no special external factors, the pitcher's overall peripherals will remain the same. This shouldn't be surprising to anyone.

But a lot of the time, improvement in pitcher results is due to a change in how the pitcher makes his pitches. This can happen in many different ways:
{exp:list_maker}The pitcher could add a new pitch
The pitcher could eliminate a pitch
The pitcher could adjust his distribution of pitches
The pitcher could adjust where he aims the pitches {/exp:list_maker}
These things, and others, are completely within the purview of Pitch-f/x. If you look at the Pitch-f/x data, or just take a rough look at the graphical displays provided by Texas Leaguers, FanGraphs, or Joe Lefkowitz's site, you can spot such changes in how a pitcher pitches, and in many cases this is pretty easy to do. Some changes of course are subtle and can only be seen by looking at the data itself, which is what this column aims to do.

Obviously, not every change in a pitcher's pitches will explain the change in a pitcher's results. But when there is a change in results, particularly in the peripherals, we would expect there to be one of these visible-with-Pitch-f/x changes. And, indeed, we do see such shifts (a change in pitch usage, such as a switch from a four-seamer to a two-seam fastball, is a common explanation for a real change in results).

Of course, not all aspects of pitching are captured by Pitch-f/x. For example, a pitcher could learn to deliver his pitches in a more deceptive way, and Pitch-f/x would not be able to detect it (Pitch-f/x can detect roughly the pitch's release point—sort of—but not the pitcher's actual method of delivery). Similarly, a pitcher's tipping of his pitches through his actions prior to his delivery will not be seen in Pitch-f/x data.

There are, of course, other things Pitch-f/x doesn't pick up that I'm not listing here, but the system captures a bunch of things that could change in a pitcher's motion so as to cause a real noticable change in his results.

So when a pitcher seems to improve or get worse but hasn't changed his pitching at all according to Pitch-f/x, the logical conclusion is that the cause of such improvement (or the cause of the worse results) is the result of luck or random variation. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the pitcher's results will regress to his career numbers (or to the numbers from previous years if career numbers aren't usable for some reason).

Which year is the outlier?

"If there is no change in a pitcher's pitches this year, why couldn't last year be the outlier and this year's numbers be the real thing?"

This is a frequent comment on Fluke Watch posts. The answer is simple: sample size. If you have two sample sizes that are the result of the same exact pitches but have different results, generally the larger sample is more likely to be indicative of the true numbers. In other words, if a pitcher hasn't changed anything, it's more likely his numbers will regress to what he did over a whole season last year than for him to continue what he's been doing for 1-2 months of the season.

Really, when a pitcher doesn't change anything and has better or worse results, we should expect, long-term, for the pitcher's results to regress to the total average results of his pitches.

So for Jhoulys Chacin, as talked about last article, we should expect his groundball rate to regress to his average groundball rate over the last year and two months (essentially his career rate) rather than simply his groundball rate from last year. Due to the sample sizes involved, of course, this means that he'll be expected to regress to much closer to his previous year's rate than his rate for this season.

I hope this answers the standard comments and questions that we see in Fluke Watch Posts. If there are any other questions, please comment. Next time, we'll be back looking at pitchers.

Posted by Josh Smolow at 5:11am (1) Comments

No hitch, no ditch, only pitch

My rule for trading is to target the biggest names that I can who have been under-performing. If I can’t get the names I want, I will shift my focus to need. If I can’t get the need, I will focus on prospects. If I can’t get the prospects then you won’t get a deal out of me. I don’t take junk, especially players who are playing well beyond their actual talent level (cough Matt Joyce cough). My goal in this week’s column is to focus some attention on some under-achievers who still have big Hollywood-size names. No hitch or ditch this week; let’s dive into my favorite part of fantasy baseball, the trade.

Pitch for

Hanley Ramirez SS FLA- When I recommended that you go hard after Carl Crawford, little did I know that it would mark the last chance to steal him away from his owners at a discount. I am now advising any and all with the means or need to secure the top shortstop in baseball.

So far we have seen Hanley put together the worst season of his career, but there are some encouraging signs. Sometimes an injury gives a player a chance to gather his thoughts, talents, and training and graft them into a resurgence to former glories, as with 2009's Joe Mauer.

Before Hanley’s injury he was hitting an awful .210, mired by his .236 BABIP. As he's a career .350+ BABIP guy, there’s little reason to think that this trend will continue. Look for his line drive rate to normalize to career norms and his ground balls to turn into home runs. The only question I have about Ramirez is his strikingly bad stolen base success rate (11 out of 17 attempts). As a healing player with a tremendous amount of value to his team, he may not be allowed to steal many bases.

I don’t think there will be any more value to be had from the shortstop position going forward than Hanley Ramirfez. Derek Jeter and Joe Mauer for Hanley would be exactly the kind of deal I’d be looking to get done. I am assuming of course you have found a replacement for Mauer already.

Evan Longoria 3B TB- He’s starting to heat back up. So far in June he has a .300+ average and even an inside-the-park homer. Longo is one of those guys that will still have great value in his name and history of success. His owners are frustrated. With the trip to the disabled list and the relatively disappearing statistics, now is the time to jump. His owners may be having a going-out-of-business sale and the time is truly running out on getting Longoria on the cheap.

Going into the season, there weren’t any other third baseman with more value than Longoria. Today, there are a few that you might think are better, but I am going to say you are wrong. You might say Kevin Youkilis. I say I would trade Youk straight up for Longoria today if I could. What about Alex Rodriguez? I’m still buying Longoria. The only third base Yahoo-eligible player I would consider rostering over Longoria would be Jose Bautista. That means no to Adrian Beltre, David Wright and Ryan Zimmerman.

I point to all these players to emphasize your power as a dealing manager to wrestle away a top fantasy talent for a much cheaper price. I guarantee that most managers in your league do not still value Longoria as highly as I just proclaimed. So take advantage of them.

Troy Tulowitzki SS COL- It’s time for the Tulo discussion. I was not a huge fan of his going into 2011. I was actually ridiculed for ranking him outside of the top 10. I’m not going to gloat because there’s still a lot of baseball to be played.

I’ve gotten the chance to watch a few of the Rockies games over the couple of weeks, and I’ve noticed that Tulowizki hasn’t necessarily been having mechanics problems as much as it seems like he’s pressing. That’s remarkable to me considering this guy put up one of the greatest months in baseball history. I think only Babe Ruth was better in any single month. He’s seeing a significant more amount of breaking balls, particularly curveballs, and that seems to be causing him to not be as successful with getting around cleanly on the fastballs.

My point in having him in the “pitch for” section is that his talent will overcome a marginal start. It’s actually not been that bad. He’s hit 12 homers with a .270 average. We’ve been numbed to a line like that from him, and rightfully so. To give you some perspective, at this point in 2010 Tulowitzki had only nine homers with a slightly better than .300 average.

I believe that he will relax as the season progresses, and we’ll see greater things from him and the rest of the Rockies.

Ian Kinsler 2B TEX- I struggled with whether to include Kinsler on this list. I’m a huge fan of him as a bargain going forward, but I didn’t have the stones to recommend him to you until now.

Sure, Kinsler is a health risk who has sickening streaks of feast and famine. His WAR is a solid 2.3. He’s walking at the highest rate of his career. He’s got that low BABIP that points to a rebound of sorts for his batting average. Likewise, his speed looks fine. He’s still a second baseman with a huge upside.

With Josh Hamilton back in the lineup, look for Kinsler to continue to excel in the runs category. I see his numbers rebounding to a season ending line of .260+ AVG/ 100+ R/ 20+ HR/ 30+ SB. I would be all over that if I’m looking to upgrade my middle infield. He’ll cost you a guy like Shane Victorino. They are generally the same player, but Kinsler’s positional eligibility and slightly better power swing gives him more value.

Mark Teixeira 1B NYY- Folks, he is a second half player, struck in the same mold as Ryan Howard. As the temperature heats up so will his bat. What’s been amazing about Tex’s season so far is the dramatic batting average success he’s having without much help from his BABIP. I could speculate investors could see a .300+ average from this point through the remainder of the season.

My favorite part of what Teixeira has done in 2011 has been his tremendous power surge. He is on pace for 40 or more home runs. If he indeed sees a second half correction, then look for that power to flow nicely with a .300+ AVG. If you need a miracle, Tex might be the perfect target for a stretch run.

Carlos Quentin OF CHW- Speaking of power, I was talking with a competitor the other day and we joked about Quentin's propensity for multi-homer games. He’s developed a reputation as a guy who, when he goes big, goes really big. He has a lot of value for the daily fantasy gamers, but he can also have success for the roto and H2H players if used properly.

I think we are witnessing the 2008 Quentin who finished the season with a respectable .283 average and 38 jacks. I’d trade Jason Heyward, Jimmy Rollins or Andre Ethier for him. He’s going to finish as strong as he’s started. I just hope you take advantage of a semi-low batting average. I think he could actually be a top 10 outfielder.

Pitch away

Justin Morneau 1B MIN- This guy is my favorite player on this entire list in both the pitch for and pitch away categories. He’s always held a special place in my heart even when he stole the home run derby from Josh Hamilton.

Morneau has struggled with his BABIP a little, but I’m more concerned with the power outage. He has only four home runs to this point. He's struggled with a wrist injury, but I must look to other reasons why he has his career worst ISOP of .113. My first reaction is to blame his fall-off to the Twins' anemic roster. This roster is laden with the Luke Hughes and Drew Buteras of baseball. Without Mauer for any kind of protection and Delmon Young falling off the planet, there are valid concerns about his protection in the lineup.

But you can’t blame it all on the roster. He’s turned 30, and his season-ending concussion from 2010 might still be plaguing his bat this year even if it’s just a timing issue. As an owner of Morneau, I’ve grown tired of waiting for a rebound. I just started testing the trade waters so I’ll have to get back to you on the true market value. If you can two-for-one Morneau with another player to land a guy like Teixeira that should be considered a huge success.

Adam Dunn OF CHW- Before the season I heard Dunn say something I’ve never heard a hitter say to a reporter: He was still working on his timing because he didn’t pick up a bat the whole offseason. The reporter, somewhat taken off guard, made Dunn reiterate that he literally did not touch a bat from the end of the season in 2010 to beginning of spring training. At first I was dumbfounded. I didn’t think any major league player would go that much time without honing his trade, especially a guy like Dunn in a new city with huge expectations for him. Dunn went on to explain that he’d done that technique before, and I felt understanding come over me.

That understanding is gone now. With his having only six home runs so far and a sub-.180 batting average, one is forced to examine whether taking the offseason off was a good move for Dunn. Since he was one of the more consistent power hitters in the game, most of Dunn’s owners were banking on that 40-home run bat. Dunn will struggle to hit 30 home runs by season’s end. If his average hovers around the Mendoza line, then he’s not anywhere near a viable fantasy player. If you don’t move him now, you will be scouring the waiver wire before too long.

Adrian Beltre 3B TEX- See my Aversion All Stars(the hate list) prior to this season. I was not a fan to say the least. I felt he was the product of a situation in Boston, one actually similar to the monster season he had in Seattle. The Ballpark at Arlington wasn’t as friendly to right-handed hitters as most thought, and Beltre has seen his numbers plummet in Texas.

Ichiro Suzuki OF SEA- He’s one of the greatest hitters in baseball history. He was the greatest fielders my generation had to watch. He’s set the bar for all future Japanese baseball players. Most fantasy drafters have always under-valued him. His numbers were never sexy enough to garner more than an average guy with speed. He embodied the perfect real life baseball player who could encompass great real life value and fantasy value.

The value is gone. Ichiro does not have the bat he once did. He still has the name that cannot be ignored, but he lacks the same skill set. I don’t know if you can get them, but I’d make a play for Logan Morrison or Jason Bourgeios if you need speed. I just don’t see Ichiro breaking out of this funk.

Alex Rios OF CHW- During 2010 I couldn’t believe that Rios was able to resurrect his career. I know now that 2010 was an outlier performance. He’s not showing the power, average or speed that he displayed for the White Sox last year. I’m not seeing anything that says that 2010 is the real Rios and that 2011 is the outlier.

My gut says he’s done, and you need to try your hardest to move him along to another manager in your league. I’m afraid that he’ll just be a roster nuisance and you will constantly struggle over whether to start him or a Michael Morse. If it’s me, I’m moving Rios for a lower tier closer, mid-level pitcher, or another hitter of better value with a lesser name.

Jimmy Rollins SS PHI In my 14 years of playing fantasy baseball I’ve never owned Rollins. That’s hundreds of fantasy baseball teams with no Jimmy manning the shortstop position.

I don’t know why that is. I’ve always placed a lower importance on the shortstop position, I guess. As I highlighted Ramirez and Tulo earlier, I’m going to try to lowlight Rollins. The only statistic that Rollins is performing anywhere near career averages is in the stolen base category. His power is okay, but not 25+ home run level. His runs don’t look like they’ll eclipse the 100 mark even though he’s finally healthy for now. I buy his .257 average as what he’ll probably maintain the rest of the year.

If he can hit .257/18/35 SB/100 runs he’ll have value as a shortstop, so he’s not a guy that you want to sell low. I like the idea of starting Dee Gordon and moving Rollins for a bigger bat with a better average. In the end that strategy will prove safer with Rollins’ ever-present injury risk and will give you flexibility with filling other holes in your roster.

Pritch slap: “Don’t make your teams into shopping lists. Immerse yourself in your roster, and the right moves will find you.”

Posted by Ben Pritchett at 6:47am (15) Comments

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

Introducing HR/OFFB Park Factors

A couple of years ago, former THT writer Dan Turkenkopf tabulated an index of single-season (2009) and four-year home run per fly ball (HR/FB) park factors. I have griped plenty about using HR/FB rates over home run per outfield fly ball (HR/OFFB) rates in tabulating xFIP many times in the past, most recently last week, because HR/FB rates include pop-ups (IFFB), which can never be home runs. The data, over large samples, may be insignificant in difference overall, but why use bad data and skew the margins? It's like Fangraphs' incomprehensible decision to use strikeouts per at-bat (K/AB) instead of strikeouts per plate appearance (K/PA) to calculate strikeout percentage*. (Dave Cameron has indicated that recalibrating Fangraphs' database would likely be a cumbersome process.)

*Here are two examples why Fangraphs' K% calculations, done as K/AB, make no sense. First, assume player X has a particular K/PA in year N. In year N+1, he maintains the same K/PA rate, but increases his walk rate. Though his K/PA remains stable, Fangraphs would report his K% as having "increased," imparting negative stigma and poor analysis by persons who are not aware that K%, not on the same scale as BB% (calculated as BB/PA), does not per se indicate actual strikeout skill. Likewise, players with higher walk rates exhibit disproportionately high strikeout rates.

Ryan Howard, for example, has a career K% of 31.9 percent on Fangraphs, but has only struck out in 27.5 percent of his total plate appearances. For Howard, who strikes out a lot, this may not matter or make much of a difference if you analyze him, but for a player like Prince Fielder (career 22.1 percent K%), it does. Fielder has struck out in only 18.6 percent of his total plate appearances. On the surface, it would seem as though Brennan Boesch (20.4 percent K%) and Ryan Braun (20.5 percent K%) are "noticeably" better at avoiding strike three, but are in reality substantially the same, owning respective K/PA rates of 18.1 and 18.4 percent for their careers.

Other high walk "strikeout" sluggers, such as Geovany Soto, have K/PA rates that are lower than low-walk players with lower K% rates. Some say "well you can't strike out in a walk, so why use plate appearances in the denominator," but you also can't strike out in a hit or walk in a strikeout, and yet we accept plate appearances as the denominator for walk rate (BB%). Plus, just logically, shouldn't K% represent how likely a player is to strike out when he comes to the plate? Why make Shin-Shoo Choo's year-to-year K% like comparing apples to oranges because of a fluctuating walk rate?

Particularly where your data has an abnormal pop-up rate, HR/FB-tabulated xFIP loses a lot of its value. In fields like Oakland where there is a lot of foul territory, and in parks like Wrigley, where there is practically none, the differences in HR/FB and HR/OFFB rates might make a difference. The difference may be a couple of home runs at most (park factors only apply, in theory, in a half-step, as a player's expected number of home games is just 50 percent), but in a game of inches, such could affect Z-Scores, data distribution, etc. If memory served, HR/OFFB has also shown to be less volatile year-to-year than HR/FB.

Because I have such a penchant for HR/OFFB-based calculations, including them as a data point in my xWHIP Calculator, I asked a favor of Dan, who has in turn tabulated an index of HR/OFFB rates by ballpark using data from 2006-2009. We did not have the necessary 2010 data offhand to tabulate 2007-2010 rates, but hopefully this offseason we will be able to plug in 2008-2011 data for a fresher version of these numbers.

As with Dan's 2009 post on HR/FB park factors, certain parks have less data, are weighted similarly (but without the same old data to affect the weights), and may not be as reliable. The data below regards old Twins Stadium (the Metrodome), while the Mets' and the Yankees' Park Factors are from one season only. The Nationals' Park Factor also only uses two seasons worth of data, and is weighted at 5 and 3. All other parks feature four-year weighed factors of 5,3,2,1.

Without further ado, here is the goldmine of data you've probably always wanted, but never had (at least not that I was aware of) until now:

Team              Park                         LG    4-Year HR/OFFB  4-Year HR/FB  2009 HR/OFFB    2009 HR/FB
Angels            Angel Stadium                AL               102           124            96           110
Astros            Minute Maid Park             NL               110           111           108           104
Athletics         McAfee Colisuem              AL                92            91            92            95
Blue Jays         Rogers Centre                AL               107           110           108           105
Braves            Turner Field                 NL                91            86            95            90
Brewers           Miller Park                  NL               108           120           106           108
Cardinals         Busch Stadium                NL                76            68            84            86
Cubs              Wrigley Field                NL               104           102           103            97
Diamondbacks      Chase Field                  NL               100            91           106            99
Dodgers           Dodger Stadium               NL                92            72            95            89
Giants            Pacific Bell Park            NL                97           102            95           104
Indians           Jacobs Field                 AL                87            72            88            75
Mariners          Safeco Park                  AL                92            83            96            95
Marlins           Dolphins Stadium             NL               108           126            99           109
Mets              Citi Field                   NL               104           104            98            98
Nationals         Nationals Stadium            NL                91            95            92            91
Orioles           Oriole Park at Camden Yards  AL               113           108           115           109
Padres            PETCO Park                   NL                79            79            75            73
Phillies          Citizens Bank Park           NL                93           111            94           109
Pirates           PNC Park                     NL                93           100            94           105
Rays              Tropicana Field              AL               114           121           111           110
Rangers           The Ballpark at Arlington    AL                98            97            97            98
Red Sox           Fenway Park                  AL                97           108            90            98
Reds              Great American Ballpark      NL               116           123           114           121
Rockies           Coors Field                  NL               111           101           112           103
Royals            Kaufman Stadium              AL                86            84            78            73
Tigers            Comerica Park                AL                96            86           101            94
Twins (old)       Metrodome                    AL                88           101            96           109
White Sox         US Cellular Field            AL               113           108           118           115
Yankees           New Yankee Stadium           AL               120           120           130           130

Or, alternatively, the parks ranked from most-to-least home run inflating per outfield fly:

Team              Park                         LG    4-Year HR/OFFB
Yankees           New Yankee Stadium           AL               120
Reds              Great American Ballpark      NL               116
Rays              Tropicana Field              AL               114
Orioles           Oriole Park at Camden Yards  AL               113
White Sox         US Cellular Field            AL               113
Rockies           Coors Field                  NL               111
Astros            Minute Maid Park             NL               110
Brewers           Miller Park                  NL               108
Marlins           Dolphins Stadium             NL               108
Blue Jays         Rogers Centre                AL               107
Cubs              Wrigley Field                NL               104
Mets              Citi Field                   NL               104
Angels            Angel Stadium                AL               102
Diamondbacks      Chase Field                  NL               100
Rangers           The Ballpark at Arlington    AL                98
Giants            Pacific Bell Park            NL                97
Red Sox           Fenway Park                  AL                97
Tigers            Comerica Park                AL                96
Phillies          Citizens Bank Park           NL                93
Pirates           PNC Park                     NL                93
Athletics         McAfee Colisuem              AL                92
Dodgers           Dodger Stadium               NL                92
Mariners          Safeco Park                  AL                92
Braves            Turner Field                 NL                91
Nationals         Nationals Stadium            NL                91
Twins             Metrodome                    AL                88
Indians           Jacobs Field                 AL                87
Royals            Kaufman Stadium              AL                86
Padres            PETCO Park                   NL                79
Cardinals         Busch Stadium                NL                76

Thanks again to Dan Turkenkopf for crunching the numbers for me. As always, leave the love/hate in the comments below.

Posted by Jeffrey Gross at 1:03am (11) Comments

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Regressing or reverting?

Here’s the punchline: “Regressing to the mean” is different than “Mean reversion”. Lots of experts say “regression” when they should say “reversion”. Does it matter? Well, lots of experts aren’t very clear about the numbers either, so, yeah, I’d worry that they’re messing up the whole thing.

“Regressing to the mean” is a handy thing for accounting for small sample sizes and uncertainty. If you’re just listening and not doing your own projections, you hardly need to bother with this concept (but I’ll get back to it at the end).

“Mean reversion” is an absolutely essential idea to grasp. One way to think about it is “Luck fades”.

Consider these questions about Michael Morse, who’s current batting average is .300:

A) Suppose you know his true talent indicates that he’s a .280 hitter. What would you expect him to bat for the rest of the year?

Answer: You expect him to bat .280. Morse has gotten lucky with his .300 average. By definition, luck is unpredictable (for those statisticians out there: higher order statistics are predictable). Therefore what you expect, .280, is what you expect.

B) Suppose you know his true talent indicates that he’s a .280 hitter. What average would you expect him to have at the end of the year?

Answer: Morse should probably finish with about a .290 average: half a season at .300 and half a season at .280.

What get’s my goat is that I often hear experts say something like “There’s no way Morse is a .300 hitter. He’s getting lucky with his BABIP. He’s gonna regress to the mean and be batting .280 at the end of the season.”

The meaningful problem with this statement is that I have no idea what this expert thinks Morse is going to bat from this point forward. Does he thing Morse will bat .280 from today until the end of the season? Or does he think Morse will bat about .260 (so that his average at the end of the season will be .280)? If you’re looking for expert opinions, there’s a big difference here.

The semantic mistake, using “regression to the mean” when he should be using “mean reversion” isn’t substantive. But combined the expert’s statistical ambiguity, it should raise serious red flags.

Lastly consider this question:

C) You have no idea what Michael Morse’s true talent is. But in about 1,000 plate appearances, he’s batted just above .290. What is a good guess for his true talent?

Answer: Now you’d use “regression to the mean,” which discounts Morse’s personal performance according to how much we’ve seen him play. With few plate appearances, our best guess would be that he’s something like “league average” and we’d care very little about he numbers he has personally put up. With lots of plate appearances, we’d have a lot of faith that his personal numbers were more indicative of his talent than a league average player’s numbers. If he’s somewhere in between on appearances, we’d weigh the two (his versus the league average) by regressing to the mean.

Posted by Jonathan Halket at 5:27am (4) Comments

Hybrid league update

A while back, I wrote about some half-baked ideas for alternative leagues designs, one of which was a classic H2H league with a hybrid payout structure using weekly roto totals throughout the season. A couple of readers contacted me, or made comments in that (or subsequent articles), that indicated they found this idea intriguing. Well, it just so happens that this year I actually tried this idea, so I thought I’d give the readers a quick update and offer my thoughts as to how it was working out.

I took advantage of a bad situation to launch this experiment. Shortly before the season, a few people dropped out of a league we thought was organized. We were left with only 10 teams and people were losing interest. I suggested turning the league AL- or NL-only, but some of the owners, due to inexperience with that type of league, were wary. Instead, we decided to offer other wrinkles to keep interest. We expanded the rosters so the player pool was more along the size of a 12- or 14-team league, and we jacked up the weekly innings minimum to 50. We also took the opportunity to move the categories a bit toward more true indicators of production. We kept R, HR, RBI, and SB, but replaced AVG with OBP and added total bases. On the pitching side, we kept saves, ERA and WHIP, and added K/BB, quality starts, and home runs against. Most importantly, we split the league fees almost evenly between weekly roto payouts and the classic style best regular season record playoff winner, and playoff runner-up prize pools.

Every week, in addition to the H2H scoring that determines the standings, I take the weekly team totals, dump them into a spreadsheet, and manually calculate categorical roto totals. We sum the offensive category totals for each team and do the same for pitching, and award weekly prizes for the team with the highest overall offensive and pitching roto totals. The first revelation I had—and I can’t really fathom how this didn’t occur to be right off the bat—was that this would have been easier had I made this a points-based league. But that would have also been a radical departure from the past and might have provoked the ire of some of the league members. I’m happy with the amount of change we ushered in this year and I don’t mind doing the weekly stats. It doesn’t take long and it makes me feel connected to the history of fantasy baseball; a sort of brief simulacrum of the days of combing box scores in the newspapers and tabulating stats with a pen and a marble composition book.

I had a couple of expectations for the league and a few questions that I wanted to see answered, which I’ll discuss here right now.

Would this payout structure provide extra incentive not to deadbeat?

So far, I don’t think the weekly payout incentives are enough. Perhaps if the overall stakes were higher, the sheer financial incentive would be more powerful (absolutely, though not relatively), but right now I don’t feel as if the weekly prizes are high enough to ostensibly buy an owner’s engagement. Further, poor performance is a common cause of dead-beating, and teams that perform poorly enough to tempt an owner to write the whole endeavor off aren’t particularly likely to dominate in offense or pitching for a week either. True, they’re more likely to win a random week or two in this format instead of climbing out of a deep hole in the standings (roto or H2H) with a sustained push over many weeks. Still, it's a longshot and any success in that vein is most likely a fluke and not the result of added effort. In fact, we have one team who is dead-beating and he won the overall pitching prize last week. I think there’s push in the right direction, but in this particular instance I’m not sensing it’s strong enough to disrupt what would otherwise be the natural order of things.

Would this structure distribute money more equally among a larger number of teams; will everybody win something back?

In a traditional payout structure, at best four teams would win money. Perhaps you award first place regular season, regular season runner-up, and then playoff champ and runner-up. So, yes, at least at a minimal level this design improves the egalitarian quotient of the league. But, what about meaningful money?

We had to delay the draft, so we missed the first week of the season. Through nine weeks of payouts, with two payouts per week, here’s how many times each team, by place in the standings, has won a weekly payout.

1. 4 (Me!)
2. 5.5
3. 2
4. 2.5
5. 0
6. 2
7. 0
8. 0
9. 1
10. 1

We still see a top-heavy payout board—which is no surprise—but the payouts don’t exactly correlate to the standings. The payouts are structured such that you would need to win 10 times during the regular season to recoup your league fees through this avenue alone. I don’t see any more than two teams doing that this year. I suppose this structure is making the system of rewards a bit more fair, and I suppose everybody could win something at some point, but the team with best chance of getting something potentially meaningful that they wouldn’t otherwise get is probably the third or fourth place team.

More broadly however, the whole egalitarian idea wasn’t rooted in a hope for such outcome, but rather in the faith that the notion of egalitarian opportunity would function as a driver of engagement and a disincentive for dead-beating. So, in a sense, tracking payouts may be an act of drawing maps and not of surveying territory.

Would anybody try to “game the system” and attempt to build the .500 team that wins half the weekly payout but misses the playoffs?

When I think about these league formation ideas, the first thing I try to do is poke holes in them—find ways to exploit them—which I’m good at because I‘m a conniving little weasel when it comes to trying to outsmart systems. It did occur to me that an owner could skew his team so extremely on the pitching or hitting side that he’d set himself up to win nearly every week’s pot on one side of the ledger, while dooming his team to hover around .500 in the overall standings and likely miss the playoffs. It would be easy enough to realistically conceive of profiting from this strategy. Nobody tried this though—and I wasn’t really too concerned anyone would; the only two owners in the league skeevy enough to really consider the strategy are me and one other guy, and we’re both too cocky to actually go for it; I assume we both figured we’d just win the whole thing if we played straight up. I’m in first (having one of the best H2H seasons I can recall), and he’s in second, 25 games over .500, but still more than a dozen behind me.

The more likely way this strategy would be enacted would be if an owner decided mid-season, like around now, that his team was too flawed to compete on both fronts and already in a fairly deep hole, and went into minimizing losses mode, trading all pitching for hitting or vice versa and adopting this strategy in an attempt to salvage league fees.

Would owners actively chase the weekly payouts, and put their week to week H2H match-ups on the line to do so?

It doesn’t look like people are doing this. On a few occasions, I’ve been faced with the decision of benching my starters on Sunday to protect my H2H leads in the rate categories, or chasing another quality start or two that might help notch me a weekly pitching crown. Sometimes I’ve gone for it, but for the most part I’ve kept my eye on the big prize, treating the weekly payouts as a bonus and as an indicator of whether I’m on the right track.

Would I do this again?

Yes, I think I would. This season has been fun.

Have I noticed any unexpected benefits of this set-up?

Yes. Sometimes in a H2H league it’s hard to get a reading on your team’s actual needs. Sample sizes are small from week to week, and it’s not always fully obvious whether your team has real needs or is just catching some bad breaks and unlucky match-ups. In a category like stolen bases, 20 bags over the course of a full season could be the difference between the 75th and 25th percentile of a league, in roto standings. So, how are you supposed to sense this week to week, if you just so happen to continually lose the category by one or two bases?

In this format, I send the league the season’s spreadsheet with the weekly totals in their own tab every week, so it’s easy to see your team’s strengths relative to the whole league. You may be two-for-seven in the SB category over the course of the season, but if you find you’re usually in the middle of roto standings, you know this isn’t a true weakness for your team and you can just hope distributions fall more in your favor going forward. Or, you can find out that your WHIP really is a problem, not only do you rarely beat the team you’re matched up against, but you rarely beat anybody! Given this format, this info is thrust in your face a little more forcefully, and therefore harder to ignore.

Posted by Derek Ambrosino at 5:03am (2) Comments

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Wednesday, June 08, 2011

Daily fantasy: splits decisions

Lefty/Righty

Home/Away

Stadium-specific hitting statistics