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The Price of Prosecuting Bonds

by Craig Calcaterra
January 30, 2009



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January 30, 2009



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Send in the scholars

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January 30, 2009



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Loose lips sink ships

by Craig Calcaterra
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Look! The first cliche of spring!

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Ooooh that smell

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Aaron Heilman, enigma

by Dave Studeman
January 30, 2009



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The Stupid Bowl

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Looking at third strikes

by Dave Studeman
January 30, 2009



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Andruw Jones still looking for work

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Could be worse

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Today at THT

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<< Return to Article The path to Cooperstown: the catchers from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The path to Cooperstown: the catchers

by Dan McLaughlin
January 30, 2009

For my fourth annual THT column on position players and the Hall of Fame, I’m taking an in-depth look at a group not represented on this year’s BBWAA ballot and with only one post-1920 representative on the Veterans’ Committee ballot (Joe Torre, who got just 29.7 percent of the vote, well short of the 75 percent of required): the catchers. This column, Part 1 of 2, will focus on the catchers with primes of eight years or more—the core of any Hall of Fame discussion—and Part 2 will deal with the rest.

As with my prior looks at slugging outfielders/first basemen, middle infielders and leadoff men, I’ll be presenting offensive statistical profiles of these players with three adjustments:

1) I focus on the block of "prime" seasons of a player’s career, rather than career totals or "peak" seasons;
2) within those seasons, I adjust batting stats for offensive context; and
3) I present those adjusted batting lines in per-162-team-games notation.

I’m also introducing something different for the catchers: context-adjusted defensive stolen base numbers for the post-1956 catchers (baseball-reference.com has data on stolen bases and caught stealing against catchers beginning only in 1956). You can examine my offensive method in detail as discussed in the column on sluggers, but I will review it here briefly before moving on to the defensive data.

Prime value


My view of the Hall of Fame is that it’s fundamentally about the stars of the game, and accordingly that the core of a player’s Hall of Fame candidacy should focus on the years he was a star. Thus, at least in evaluating non-pitchers, the key inquiry for the Hall of Fame should be neither "peak value" (how good the guy was at his very best) nor "career value" (the sum total of his career) but "prime value." Prime value is, roughly, looking at the number of years a guy had when he was a legitimate star and how good he was in those years.

In other words, when I look at a potential Hall of Famer, the first question I ask is, "How many seasons did this guy have where he was a Hall of Fame quality ballplayer?" And the second is, "How good was he in those years—just around or above the line, or way above it?"

Now, I wouldn’t argue that you should throw peak or career value entirely out the window, but both have their flaws. Peak value really doesn’t capture the way most of us think about the Hall: as a shrine to a player’s sustained accomplishments of a period of years, not his very best day. Career value, on the other hand, has two drawbacks.

One is that that looking only at career value ends up putting too much emphasis on which guy played passably well when he was 38 and playing out the string as a part-timer, rather than the years when he was doing the things we’ll remember him for. I’m a big believer that you don’t play your way out of the Hall in your old age, and neither should you get inordinate credit for padding the career totals with mediocre or part-time seasons. This is a particular issue with the catchers.

Second, baseball is played in seasons. If you look just at career totals, you miss that—you miss the fact that, at least for a star player, two seasons of 600 plate appearances really are worth more than three seasons of 400 PA at the same level of production, because the 600-PA seasons move the team closer to winning championships. In-season durability is a very important measurement of value, as it minimizes the amount of playing time that needs to be given to weak second-string catchers.

As a result, what I have tried to do here is excerpt out the consecutive series of seasons, ranging here from four to 17 years, when each guy was a star and weigh that chunk against other guys’ primes. As you will see, I do look in some cases at the years beyond the prime years, for purposes of distinguishing between the catchers who tacked on extra seasons as part-time contributors and those who just stopped hitting or stopped playing. But I zero in mainly on the prime.

The criteria


I varied slightly the criteria for picking players and seasons over the first three columns, so I’ll flag here what I did differently this time:

1. In prior columns I defined "prime" seasons—or seasons listed under the "other" column—as seasons at a certain level of OPS+ over a certain number of plate appearances. For the primes here, I gave myself more latitude with the catchers, since catching careers tend to be a little different, but essentially I tried to isolate the part that let each guy put his best foot forward. For the "other" column with the catchers, I tallied up the non-"prime" seasons when the player had 500 or more plate appearances with an OPS+ of 95 or better, or 400 PA with an OPS+ of 100 or better, or 300 PA/110 OPS+, or 250 PA/120/OPS+ (I went down as far as 250 because it’s common for older catchers to become productive half-time players).

2. Previously, I presented two separate charts for players with a prime of eight or more years and those of, say, five to seven years to avoid mixing apples and oranges. With the catchers, I ended up looking at enough guys with really short primes—so many talented backstops burn out so quickly—that I break the charts in three rather than two: the "long prime" group of guys whose primes lasted eight seasons or more (in one case as many as 17 years, but most are eight to 12), a second group of six or seven-year primes, and a "short prime" group of guys I evaluate over four or five years (unsurprisingly, nobody on the third list is a serious Hall of Fame candidate, although a few active catchers are included for the interest of the reader).

3. As with the tablesetters, I included three catchers here (Ray Schalk Wally Schang, and Steve O’Neill) whose careers straddled 1920. But catchers who played their whole primes before 1920—including Hall of Famers Buck Ewing, King Kelly, Roger Bresnahan and Wilbert Robinson—are not discussed here, as they really aren’t a useful yardstick for evaluating contemporary Hall of Fame candidates who played in the lively ball era. Regardless of the merits of comparing players from that era with sophisticated statistical analysis, the shape of their statistics is simply too different to make them meaningful yardsticks in real-world arguments about putting modern players in the Hall.

On the whole, I looked at 69 catchers, sweeping broadly precisely to give some indication both of the rarity of the players at the top of the pyramid and to give context to the relative ordinariness of the guys further down who are surrounded by people you don’t think of as immortals. The list consists of 12 Hall of Famers (one of whom, Al Lopez, is in as a manager), one guy on the Veterans Committee ballot (Torre), seven active catchers, four who recently retired and have yet to join the ballot, and 45 who are off the writers' ballot, most of whom I assume won’t be revisited by the Veterans. The last list includes Todd Hundley, who would have been on the ballot this year but didn’t make the cut under the new rules for eliminating marginal candidates who meet the minimum 10-year eligibility.

The numbers


The first caution I would emphasize here is that this is just a study of batting stats and of one quantifiable aspect of a catcher’s defense. I have scrapped my rough, seat-of-the-pants defensive grading system from the prior columns, which didn’t add anything analytical but simply congealed conventional wisdom for convenience.

The batting percentages here (batting average, slugging average, on-base percentage) are translated statistics. You can read a detailed explanation of the method in the slugging outfielders article; for consistency with the earlier pieces I used the 2005 National League as the average "season." All stats are from Baseball-Reference.com. (Unlike Baseball Reference’s own translation system, I translate based on differentials in league Avg/Slg/OBP rather than runs-per-game, thus reducing the distorting influence of variation over time in the volume of unearned runs). The essential idea of translations is to show what a player’s performance in Year X and Park X was equivalent to in Year and Park Y, not to project what a guy would have hit under other circumstances, which is unknowable.

The other offensive numbers—plate appearances, steals and caught stealing, double plays—are actual, not translated (I included base stealing and GIDP figures because they’re the two main components of offense that aren’t captured by Slugging and OBP), but are averaged per 162-game season, so as to put players whose careers were in the 154-game era or were interrupted by strikes on a common footing. (Thus, 1981 is counted as two-thirds of a season in the averaging). As you’ll see below, offensive stolen base data doesn’t add much anyway to the evaluation of the catchers, only three of whom averaged double figures in steals.

The "Rate" column in the chart is simply (translated Slg)*( translated OBP)*( translated PA). It’s not any kind of scientific formula, just a handy metric to organize the data on the table by the three main variables. I prefer multiplying rather than adding slugging and OBP (as is done with OPS), since a single point of OBP is worth more than a single point of slugging. As you can see, this metric organizes the data very strongly in favor of guys who were very durable in-season and against guys with low OBPs.

Of course, besides not counting defense, the "Rate" metric doesn’t count the baserunning and double play numbers on the chart, so don’t treat the rankings as holy writ. But they’re a good rule of thumb.

With those lengthy preliminaries out of the way, let’s run the offensive numbers, starting with the longer-prime guys as well as the seven-year peak numbers for Bench and Berra:
Catcher            Yrs  Oth  Ages  GC/Yr   PA    Avg   Slg   OBP   SB  CS   DP  Rate  Status
Mike Piazza         10   #4 24-33    135  590   .319  .572  .379    2   2   18  127.9  N/Y
Joe Torre            8   #6 22-29     80  599   .301  .503  .366    1   2   19  110.2 Vets
Ted Simmons         10   #3 21-30    136  613   .298  .497  .360    1   3   18  109.8  Off
Johnny Bench        12    1 20-31    134  603   .269  .520  .341    5   3   13  107.0  IN
Mickey Cochrane      9    1 24-32    132  581   .291  .482  .382    6   4   na  107.0  IN
Gary Carter         10   #1 23-32    144  614   .273  .506  .344    3   3   13  106.9  IN
Yogi Berra          12   #3 23-34    131  592   .286  .517  .336    2   2   10  102.9  IN
Jorge Posada         8    1 28-35    136  574   .275  .474  .377    2   2   15  102.5  Act
Bill Dickey          9    3 24-32    126  540   .294  .514  .356    2   2   *9   98.8  IN
Thurman Munson       9    0 23-31    130  601   .300  .457  .351    5   5   16   96.5  Off
Ivan Rodriguez       9    4 24-32    125  559   .303  .491  .340    9   4   18   93.3  Act
Jason Kendall        8    1 23-30    135  601   .296  .398  .368   17   8   11   88.0  Act
Bill Freehan         8    1 25-32    117  530   .274  .468  .354    1   2   11   87.9  Off
Lance Parrish        8    1 23-30    124  563   .264  .489  .319    3   4   14   87.7  Off
Carlton Fisk        14    5 24-37    114  499   .268  .488  .339    8   3   10   82.4  IN
Gabby Hartnett      14    2 23-36    113  452   .274  .505  .349    2  *4  *14   79.7  IN
Manny Sanguillen     8    0 25-32    123  541   .306  .445  .330    4   4   15   79.5  Off
Darrell Porter      11    0 21-31    116  499   .250  .440  .355    2   3    8   77.9  Off
Ernie Lombardi      11   ^3 24-34    109  443   .298  .500  .352    1  *0  *21   77.9  IN
Wally Schang         9    5 24-32     88  451   .280  .456  .379   11  *6   na   77.9  Off
Javy Lopez          10   #1 24-33    116  472   .282  .483  .326    1   2   14   74.3  N/Y
Walker Cooper       ^9    0 27/36    107  447   .288  .513  .324    2  *1   14   74.3  Off
Del Crandall         8    0 23-30    131  509   .261  .444  .318    3   2   14   71.9  Off
Tom Haller           9    0 25-33    119  453   .263  .454  .347    2   3    6   71.3  Off
Sherm Lollar        10    0 25-34    117  478   .261  .432  .343    2   1   14   70.9  Off
Rick Ferrell         8    0 25-32    129  522   .266  .386  .350    2   3   na   70.5  IN
Terry Steinbach     10    0 25-34    109  474   .278  .440  .326    2   2   14   68.1  Off
Tim McCarver         9    0 21-29    118  475   .277  .425  .334    5   4    7   67.4  Off
Ed Bailey            8    0 25-32    109  438   .254  .443  .347    2   2    8   67.4  Off
Mike Scioscia        8    0 25-32    126  465   .270  .400  .356    3   3   10   66.2  Off
Mike Lieberthal      8    0 25-32    110  453   .270  .438  .326    1   1   12   64.5  N/Y
Benito Santiago     10    1 22-31    123  491   .259  .432  .295    8   6   12   62.5  N/Y
Ray Schalk          10    0 20-29    141  521   .246  .363  .325   16  *9   na   61.5  IN
Smokey Burgess      12    0 25-36     88  371   .295  .464  .355    1   1    8   61.2  Off
Johnny Roseboro     10    0 25-34    122  459   .254  .401  .330    6   5    6   60.7  Off
Bob Boone           17    0 25-42    130  477   .251  .362  .309    2   3   11   53.4  Off

Johnny Bench         7    6 21-27    136  646   .274  .537  .344    6   3   15  119.5  IN
Yogi Berra           7   #8 25-31    149  643   .293  .532  .346    2   2   11  118.1  IN

* - Statistic not available for all seasons
^ - Includes seasons during World War II
# - Includes seasons at other positions

The defensive stats


The addition to this year’s column is defensive lines showing the number of games caught (not just played) per 162 team games (a number important enough that I run it in both the offensive and defensive charts), and averages of opposition stolen bases and opposition stolen base attempts per 162 games caught.

The number of attempts is important because a catcher’s reputation can be as important in deterring opposing running games as his arm is in stopping them. Those are first presented as raw data, since the average reader may not have seen these numbers before in this format, and you will notice a very large variation in the number of attempts faced by the catchers in the study. Some part of that is indeed individual in nature, but some is the great variation over time in the number of stolen base attempts per game in different eras.

So, I also presented translated stolen base percentages and translated attempts (technical note related to how I produced the study and not for any rational reason: for the raw numbers I used attempts per game, for the translated numbers I used per 1,458 innings caught, as innings caught was also available for post-1956 catchers). I used a 66 percent stolen base success rate and 150 steal attempts per 162 games caught as the baseline for the translations, as those are round numbers close to the historical averages for the 1956-2008 period.

If you are interested in looking at the chart I used for the baselines, I posted it here on my blog. The results:
Catcher             Seasons   Years      GC    GC/Year   SBA/162C   SB%   Adj Att  ADJ%
Ivan Rodriguez        9.00   1996-04    1124     125         86    50.8      94    48.7
Johnny Bench         11.95   1968-79    1598     134         95    54.6     105    55.6
Yogi Berra           11.41   1948-59    1496     131        *79   *48.9    *148   *55.6
Lance Parrish         7.67   1979-86     948     124        129      56     130    56.9
Del Crandall          7.60   1953-60     997     131        *57   *54.1    *117   *58.1
Johnny Roseboro       9.82   1958-67    1199     122         74    54.3     112    58.3
Thurman Munson        8.96   1970-78    1165     130        123    55.7     123    59.3
Bob Boone            16.66   1973-89    2171     130        133    59.9     129    59.4
Gary Carter           9.67   1977-86    1390     144        175    61.5     130    59.9
Sherm Lollar          9.51   1950-59    1116     117        *70   *53.0    *135   *60.1
Benito Santiago       9.60   1987-96    1183     123        143    63.8     118    60.6
Terry Steinbach       9.59   1987-96    1045     109        146    62.5     148    60.9
Mike Scioscia         8.00   1984-91    1008     126        164    65.1     131    61.8
Manny Sanguillen      7.96   1969-76     983     123        113    61.2     129    62.0
Darrell Porter       10.64   1973-83    1230     116        154    60.9     135    62.7
Ed Bailey             7.75   1956-63     844     109         75    59.2     124    63.5
Jason Kendall         8.00   1997-04    1076     135        130    67.3     142    64.6
Joe Torre             8.00   1963-70     638      80        115    60.4     140    65.2
Ted Simmons           9.96   1971-80    1354     136        161    65.6     155    65.6
Jorge Posada          8.00   2000-07    1087     136        134    70.6     163    66.4
Mike Lieberthal       8.00   1997-04     883     110        115    69.6     124    66.4
Bill Freehan          7.96   1967-74     929     117        134    62.8     168    67.2
Javy Lopez            9.89   1995-04    1147     116        127    70.7     137    67.7
Carlton Fisk         13.61   1972-85    1553     114         98    65.6     136    68.0
Smokey Burgess       11.51   1952-63    1016      88        *85   *64.3    *140   *68.5
Tom Haller            9.00   1962-70    1071     119        100    64.9     141    69.8
Tim McCarver          9.00   1963-71    1066     118        103    65.3     139    70.7
Mike Piazza           9.59   1993-02    1299     135        184    75.6     179    72.4

Johnny Bench          6.95   1969-75     948     136         75    50.5      91    51.5
Yogi Berra            6.65   1950-56     991     149        *60   *52.0    *118   *59.3

* - Statistic not available for all seasons

And the pre-1956 catchers:
Catcher            Seasons  Years       GC      GC/Year
Gabby Hartnett      13.31  1924-37     1502       113
Ernie Lombardi      10.46  1932-42     1138       109
Ray Schalk           9.23  1913-22     1301       141
Mickey Cochrane      8.56  1927-35     1134       132
Bill Dickey          8.56  1931-39     1078       126
Walker Cooper        8.56  1942-51      916       107
Wally Schang         8.28  1914-22      726        88
Rick Ferrell         7.60  1931-38      978       129

Individual catcher comments


Of the catchers to play in major league baseball after 1920, Mike Piazza was clearly the best with the bat in his hands, as he ranks first by a healthy margin among all the backstops I studied in batting and slugging while rating second only to Mickey Cochrane in OBP among the long-prime group.

Piazza’s defense is another story. Other aspects of his defense may have gotten a bad rap—Piazza handled balls in the dirt well enough and took his share of lumps blocking the plate—but when it came to gunning down baserunners, his record was just bad, the worst opposition stolen base percentage among the long-prime catchers. Opposing baserunners gave Piazza no respect and no quarter, as he was victimized by the most steal attempts relative to the league of any catcher in the study. Piazza ended up confounding expectations that he’d eventually move to another position—an experiment at first base went badly (Piazza’s the only first baseman I have ever seen who blocked throws in the dirt with his shins) and he broke down physically by the time he was tried as a DH.

Piazza is probably the only catcher in the game’s history who could make the Hall on the strength of the same hitting numbers even if he’d been a first baseman or corner outfielder.

Joe Torre is neither fish nor fowl in this discussion—he’s the second-best hitter among the long-prime catchers, but only over an eight-year prime, and, like Rod Carew and Robin Yount among the middle infielders, he’s hard to describe as a catcher without cutting off some of his best years with the bat. Torre spent a year as a full-time first baseman at age 28 before his last season as about a half-time catcher, but I have left out his age 30 season when he moved to third base and won the batting title and MVP award. (If you add that season, his adjusted batting line goes to .308/.514/.373 in 611 PA and his "Rate" shoots up to 117.)

Yet even in his prime, Torre never caught more than 114 games in a season; he was always squeezing in time at first base to keep his bat in the lineup. This despite the fact that, as you can see, at least in gunning down baserunners Torre was slightly better than a league-average catcher (other aspects of his defensive reputation are poor). Like most people, I tend not to give a lot of thought to Torre as a Hall of Fame candidate since everyone assumes he’ll go in as a manager anyway, but despite a relatively short prime (Torre had about three more solid years with the bat after 1971 but was never quite the same offensive force and had to move at last to settle at first) and the difficulty of classifying him defensively, he actually has a fairly decent case.

This is a little off topic, but the Cardinals catching situation in 1969-71 has a lot of interesting threads connecting four of the catchers in this study: Torre was traded to the Cards in ‘69 for Orlando Cepeda to play first base, then after Tim McCarver had his second straight off year, Torre was moved back behind the plate and McCarver was sent to Philly in a package for Dick Allen in the fateful Curt Flood trade. After a year catching, Torre was moved to third base to make room for Ted Simmons, with Torre winning the MVP and Simmons emerging as a star. Meanwhile, McCarver fared poorly in Philly and was replaced by Bob Boone.

If you don’t count Torre as a full-time catcher, Ted Simmons then comes up as the guy who, until Piazza, ranked as the most valuable bat to play the position. Geoff Young has looked favorably at Simmons’ case at greater length in these pages, using a somewhat similar methodology here, but if anything I think Geoff is underselling how rare a catcher with Simmons’ combination of offensive gifts, consistency and durability really is.

Simmons in the decade of his prime was a workhorse, averaging 136 games a year behind the plate; only Gary Carter averaged more plate appearances over that long a stretch, and only Carter and Ray Schalk caught more games. That durability and his dependable bat tend to get overlooked by analyses that focus only on career totals and percentages. And statistically, Simmons caught a little more than a league-average number of baserunners against only slightly more than a league-average number of attempts; at least in that aspect of his defense, there’s no sign that Simmons was a liability. Simmons tends to get the 1-2-3 punch of the fact that (1) he has a poor defensive reputation, (2) he played for a team that won before he got there, underachieved with a lot of talent while he was there, and won after he left, and (3) so many of the great catchers played for so many winning teams that we tend particularly to equate a catcher’s skills with his team’s success.

Perhaps he did contribute to the club’s attitude problem in the late '70s, but many of those Cardinal teams were not as strong across the board as their handful of stars would have you think, and it’s worth noting that Simmons did, outside of his prime years, contribute significantly to a pennant-winning team in Milwaukee. To truly appreciate Simmons, you need to sit back and read the rest of this list—catchers who bring as much to the table as he did, year in and year out for a decade without injuries or off years, are extremely hard to come by.

The best all-around catcher in major league history isn’t a clear-cut thing, between the great weight of Piazza’s bat and the cases one can make for Cochrane and Yogi Berra, but you can’t go far wrong with Johnny Bench.

Offensively, Bench was basically a match for Piazza in the power and walks department, lacking only in batting average; defensively, only Ivan Rodriguez compares to Bench in the combination of low opposing stolen base percentages and sheer intimidation of the running game. (When you look at the numbers for his seven-year peak, it’s even more impressive and closer to Rodriguez—runners started pushing Bench more in the late '70s). And Bench, too, was durable, although prone to occasional off years. Here’s an amazing fact: If you look at the all-time leaders in RBI through age 29, Bench ranks 10th—not among catchers but among everybody, with 1,038 RBI. For a catcher to show up anywhere on those lists in mid-career is amazingly impressive.

In terms of durability, when measured per 162 scheduled games, Cochrane is just a hair behind his more modern contemporaries, but he was way ahead of his time—in 1929 he was the first player to notch 600 plate appearances in a season while playing at least half his games at catcher (in Cochrane’s case, nearly all his games), and through the beginning of World War II the feat had been accomplished just three times, by Cochrane twice and Bill Dickey once.

Cochrane rang up 550 plate appearances four times in five years. He was basically a player without flaw—consistent and durable, hit for average and a fair amount of power (when you translate him out of the 1920s-'30s, Cochrane’s averages come down but his power goes up) with great strike zone judgment, ran well for a catcher, and was well-regarded defensively. On top of that, Cochrane was the field general of a three-pennant/two World Championship dynasty in Philadelphia and player-manager of a two-pennant/one World Championship team in Detroit.

In fact, Cochrane is historically unique: He’s the only guy to win World Championships with two franchises as a genuine everyday catcher. I’ll discuss Wally Schang below; of the two other guys besides Cochrane and Schang who could kinda sorta lay claim to having done so, Earl Smith (like Schang) played for teams that used more of a rotation than a single everyday catcher; Smith was the No. 1 catcher for the 1925 Pirates and the No. 2 for the 1921 Giants. The other, Jimmy Wilson, is even more tenuous; Wilson was the catcher for the 1931 Cardinals and came out of retirement to start (and star) in the World Series for the 1940 Reds after starting catcher Ernie Lombardi got injured and his backup, Willard Herschberger, committed suicide. But Wilson spent nearly all the regular season as a coach.

Gary Carter carried the heaviest catching workload of anybody whose prime spans eight or more years—a staggering 144 games caught per 162 team games (and this for a team, in Montreal, that often stacked up doubleheaders in August due to April snow-outs). If you watched Carter at the tail end of those years and the seasons that followed, you saw what a brutal toll the workload took on his body, as every aspect of his game unraveled. Carter is the classic guy whose numbers make more sense when you extract his prime from the wreckage that followed. Besides being a devastating power hitter, Carter was a very tough guy to run on until his last year in Montreal, and in an age when base thieving was running rampant in the National League. In New York he also mentored a talented young pitching staff, or rather shared that role with Keith Hernandez.

By contrast, for whatever reason, probably nobody had catching take as little out of him as it did to Yogi Berra. In the seven-year peak within his 12-year prime, Yogi just never came out of the lineup, averaging just shy of 150 games caught per 162 games played (not for nothing did Casey note that he never managed an important game without Yogi behind the plate). Yet he still was able to swing the bat well enough and move his legs enough to go on to a few more years as an outfielder.

Yogi was not a notably patient hitter, having the Vladimir Guerrero-like gift of being able to hit basically any ball thrown anywhere. We have stolen base data for only a four-year period of Yogi’s prime, but even adjusting for the piteous state of base stealing in the American League of the late 1950s, Yogi shows up as having been a very tough catcher to steal on. It’s another day’s debate to what extent that means he should get some credit for the high number of double plays turned by the Yankees of Casey’s era. At the same time, Yogi hit into very few double plays for a guy who was slow, batted with a ton of men on base, hit the ball hard and rarely struck out. Yogi, of course, was the starting catcher for seven World Championship teams and nine pennant winners, plus being a part-time catcher or outfielder for three other World Championship teams and four pennant winners, plus managing pennant-winning Yankees and Mets teams.

Bill Dickey is another data point for the argument that catchers, like pitchers, tend to last longer if they don’t carry as heavy a workload in their younger years—he caught 130 games for the first time at age 30. Dickey enjoyed a last hurrah at 36 in 1943, playing half time and pounding war-weakened pitching to a .351/.492/.445 Avg/Slg/OBP and leading a DiMaggio-less Yankee team to the last World Championship of that era, Dickey’s seventh as a starting catcher.

Jorge Posada may not be the most glamorous offensive player, but his high-OBP, grind-it out game has been a key element in the Yankees’ success over his career. Posada’s prime, at eight years, is a little on the light side—without his monster 2007 season, he’d clearly be an also-ran, and it doesn’t help him that his first year as a full-time starter was the last one of the Yankees’ postseason dominance, or that Posada has not put up good numbers overall in October.

But his offensive game, for a guy who was a durable catcher for eight seasons and never has a serious off year, is solid. Posada’s success against base thieves has been less than impressive (slightly worse than league average) despite a reputation as a guy with a good arm. He’ll be a legitimate contender for the Hall even if he isn’t able to have a second act behind the plate beginning in 2009.

Besides Simmons and maybe Torre, Thurman Munson is the guy whose stock went up the most in my estimation from this exercise. Munson tends to be a favorite of non-stat-oriented fans, and there’s something to the argument that his high batting averages weren’t really matched by secondary offensive skills. But (1) Munson was enormously durable, carrying very heavy workloads, (2) Munson played much of his prime in a low-scoring era in a hostile park, and (3) Munson’s batting averages, in context, are even more impressive than those of Cochrane or Dickey. I rate 1978 as Munson’s last "prime" season here; his productivity was in decline in 1978 (albeit somewhat offset by playing an awful lot in a famously tight pennant race) and accelerated in 1979. And he was very tough on opposing baserunners.

Ivan Rodriguez has claimed from Bench the distinction of setting the gold standard for stopping the running game; Rodriguez’ numbers are simply eye-popping when you adjust for the high success rates of modern base thieves. His offensive game has had enough flaws (few walks, many GIDP) to keep him south of the top tier of catchers when combined with time out of the lineup in his prime years (Pudge’s games caught don’t really live up to his reputation as an every-single-day guy due to injuries in 2000-02), but when you add the bat, the glove, the championship in Florida, the pennant in Detroit and the division titles in Texas, it’s more than enough for an easy Hall of Fame case.

Jason Kendall is about the point where I expect that the reader is joining me in saying "we draw the line here." Through age 26, Kendall was basically a dead ringer for Cochrane, batting .314/.456/.402 Avg/Slg/OBP to Cochrane’s .314/.460/.398 (all raw numbers), and in a nearly identical number of games and plate appearances; Kendall even had a higher OPS+ and nearly twice as many steals. And mind you, Cochrane had already won his first MVP by that point. But Kendall was something of a perfect storm of injury risks at that point even aside from the freak foot injury that wrecked the 1999 season that should have been a career year: catcher who rarely takes time off, steals a lot and gets hit by a ton of pitches. First the power went, then the base stealing, then his arm, and eventually the batting average. For Cooperstown purposes, Kendall is a guy who didn’t stay on top long enough.

Bill Freehan was a fine catcher who peaked as a hitter under terribly adverse offensive conditions. Freehan was, however, obviously not respected by opposing baserunners, although their success rate against him was only slightly above average.

Lance Parrish had some Hall of Fame tools—power, a great arm—but didn’t get on base, was poorly regarded as a handler of pitchers, and was completely ruined by a back injury starting at age 30. At 31, Parrish went to the Phillies, and on top of his not hitting the new league suddenly started running completely wild on him, in sharp contrast to his success in that regard in Detroit.

When you adjust for context, Carlton Fisk actually had his best offensive season as a rookie in the now little-remembered epic 1972 AL East pennant race. Fisk made up in the length of his prime what he lost in time to injuries during it, especially in his early years, plus he lasted several more years as a productive half-time player. He was never especially good against base thieves.

Gabby Hartnett was the original home-run hitting catcher; among players playing at least half their games behind the plate in a season, Hartnett was the first to hit 20 homers, the first to hit 30, the first since 1893 to hit 15 and the first since 1891 to crack double figures twice. Hartnett’s productive career was also longer by a good stretch than those of his contemporaries. (He had two more years at the end of the 14-year prime where he was almost as good as a hitter but in declining playing time). Hartnett is docked here for missing nearly the whole 1929 season; if he and Rogers Hornsby had ever both been healthy in the same year for the 1929-30 Cubs, there’s no telling how many runs that team might have scored. He still managed to start for three more pennant winners besides the 1929 team.

From the early 1920s to the mid-1980s, the Pirates accumulated a distinct type of player: an aggressive, athletic, high-average hitter who rarely hit home runs, walked or came out of the lineup. Manny Sanguillen was the best Pirates catcher in that mold, and contributed to the Pirates’ 1971 World Championship. He didn’t do a lot besides hit for average and throw, but he did those plenty well enough to be useful to his teams.

Offensively, Darrell Porter was the opposite of Sanguillen, but did some of just everything to compensate for his low batting averages while playing in big ballparks in low-scoring seasons. He was not a Hall of Famer, but a really good player for more than a decade, catching for a Cardinals team that won a World Championship in 1982 and a pennant in 1985 and for a Royals team that won a pennant and two other division titles.

Ernie Lombardi was sort of like a catcher designed by a Dungeons & Dragons power gamer: He maximized all the attributes of strength (hitting for power, drilling line drives like they were shot out of cannons, strong hands, strong arms) while being perhaps the least mobile everyday player ever over a period of years. Given his relatively low (but characteristic of his times) numbers of plate appearances, legendarily slow baserunning, huge numbers of double plays and poor defensive mobility, I’m skeptical at best that Lombardi belongs in the Hall of Fame even though he was an outstanding hitter over a relatively long prime and then some. It’s pretty well impossible to argue that Lombardi was more valuable to his teams than Simmons or Torre.

Wally Schang was a winner, and not coincidentally a high-OBP guy. As I noted above, Schang doesn’t quite match Mickey Cochrane as a full-time starter for World Championship teams for multiple franchises, but only because Schang’s teams often (as was commonly the case at the time) split time among two or more catchers. But Schang was more or less the No. 1 catcher for six pennant winners in 11 years, including the World Series-winning 1913 A’s, 1918 Red Sox and 1923 Yankees; that he was regarded as the No. 1 is shown by the fact that he appeared in 32 of 34 World Series games for those teams (Schang was also Cochrane’s backup on the 1930 A’s, but he was about finished by then).

Schang’s games caught per year for his prime is artificially depressed by the fact that Connie Mack turned him into a third baseman-outfielder in 1915-16, but that was clearly a decision driven by Mack’s need to keep Schang’s bat in the lineup after Mack sold off the stars of the 1910-14 team. Given that the A’s posted an average record of 40-113 over those two seasons while Schang’s teams won the pennant nearly every year with him behind the plate, it’s safe to conclude he wasn’t moved because he was hurting his teams by catching. Schang’s not a Hall of Famer because of the limits on his playing time, but he was clearly a Cooperstown-quality player when he was on the field.

Javy Lopez, who will probably be best remembered as the answer to the question "who holds the single-season slugging percentage record for catchers" (.687 in 2003) was like Parrish as a hitter, but less durable and without Parrish’s arm. He probably has the easiest pitching staff to catch in the game’s history.

Walker Cooper is another high slugging/low OBP catcher. Cooper had most of his best years during the war, but he missed nearly all the 1945 season in the military (I left that year out) and did have one big year in 1947 for the Giants.

Del Crandall even appearing on a list like this illustrates the paucity of good hitters in the catching profession. Crandall was a valuable player but didn’t have any one especially impressive offensive skill. His stolen base-per-game numbers are a little screwy because baseball-reference.com is missing some games for a few NL teams for 1956, but the percentage figures show that he really was the top-shelf glove man his four Gold Gloves would suggest.

Tom Haller was a fine hitter but more like a platoon player. He was one of the poorest throwing catchers in this study.

Sherm Lollar was, like several of the guys immediately above him, an ordinary hitter whose ordinariness helped his White Sox teams be a perennial contender and a pennant winner in his best year in 1959.

Rick Ferrell has, superficially, an argument for being the kind of hitter who can get elected to the Hall of Fame as a glove man—18-year career, .377 career OBP. But a closer look at Ferrell’s career leaves us with reason to doubt that he was, or should have been, regarded when active as a star of any kind.

First, Ferrell’s offensive numbers, which are not that great to begin with (he had no power, unlike his brother and batterymate Wes), are hugely inflated by the 1930s American League context he played in, including a couple of years in Fenway. Second, Ferrell played for three organizations (the Red Sox, Senators and Browns) that kept shuttling him back and forth, and while the Red Sox had good teams and the Senators a pennant winner during his prime (the Browns also won a wartime pennant late in Ferrell’s career), all three franchises were miserable when Ferrell played for them.

Ferrell’s not the first guy on this list who never played in the postseason—Joe Torre is (until this year, Torre had just one postseason appearance in 32 years in the National League as a player and manager), but he’s the first who never even sniffed a pennant race. Third, Ferrell was traded in midseason three times in his career, two of those in his 1931-38 prime years; very few of the guys on this list had that happen to them even once in their primes (most changed teams at all in their primes only due to financial issues). Ferrell was a productive player but is simply a ridiculous choice for the Hall.

Terry Steinbach was another guy in the Crandall mode, and yet another catcher who was part of the quiet backbone of a multi-year championship team.

Tim McCarver was a surprisingly poor throwing catcher, especially given the help he got from catching Steve Carlton a lot (although less in McCarver’s prime with the Cardinals than later in his career). McCarver’s offensive and defensive games went downhill pretty quickly after having a big year in 1967 at age 25, including a 1970 season lost to injury, although he managed to play another 13 years.

Ed Bailey was a similar player to Haller, and even split time with him in San Francisco despite both being left-handed hitters. Dividing the catching duties 50/50 between the two, Giants catchers batted .250/.477/.370 with 32 HR, 101 runs and 92 RBI in 1962, .262/.465/.353 with 33 HR, 108 runs and 105 RBI in 1963.

Mike Scioscia was first and foremost a contact hitter, the one trait he’s consistently preferred among his Angels teams as a manager. He also blocked the plate like he was the last man holding the pass at Thermopylae.

Mike Lieberthal had an enormous amount of air to let out of his offensive numbers. A solid performer, but never really the star his raw numbers suggested—there’s no reason to think Steinbach or Crandall wouldn’t have done the same things in the same circumstances.

Benito Santiago was an impressive athlete, but swinging at everything and throwing from your knees may be a good way to show what you can accomplish with one hand tied behind your back, but it’s not equal to using both hands.

Ray Schalk is in the Hall of Fame partly for being one of the clean Black Sox, and partly because he was the first multi-year workhorse catcher. Even with all the adjustments for context in the world, Schalk was never a guy who’d bat higher than seventh in the lineup for a .500 team.

Smokey Burgess, the catcher for the 1960 Pirates, is yet another guy who had a Cooperstown-quality bat (for a catcher) and a long career, but never played enough or was good enough defensively to be a star. Burgess’ 1956 defensive data has the same problem as Crandall’s.

Johnny Roseboro was a member of multiple championship teams (he was the starting catcher for Dodgers teams that won four pennants and two World Championships, as well as for a division winner in Minnesota), an excellent defensive catcher and a better hitter than his numbers reflect, but he was never more than an adequate hitter.

If you were making a case for Bob Boone as a Hall of Famer, it would be all defense and durability; Boone was a good hitter for maybe three years, but a defensive contributor who stayed in the lineup for nearly two decades. His record against opposing base thieves improved markedly after moving to the Angels, which is consistent with the general notion that Boone’s and Gene Mauch’s experience fed off each other and made a really good team. As a hitter over the balance of his career, Boone was the poor man’s Ray Schalk.

Dan McLaughlin is a lawyer, Mets fan, and author of the Baseball Crank blog. He welcomes comments via e-mail.

<< Return to Article The Greinke chronicles from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The Greinke chronicles

by Craig Brown
January 30, 2009

It’s difficult to look at the last three years of Zack Greinke’s career and get any kind of a feel for how he’s progressed as a pitcher. Yes, last year was a breakout for him in more ways than one. However, because over the last three seasons he’s been away from the team, a starter, a reliever and finally, a damn good starter, it’s nearly impossible to do any kind of trend-spotting.

Prior to last year, he had been away from the rotation for so long, in many ways we can say 2008 was his rookie season.

That's because last summer was his first time since his disastrous 2005 season (5.80 ERA, 5.6 K/9, 2.6 BB/9, 4.94 xFIP) in which he spent the entire year in the starting rotation. It was a long trip back to the rotation, and watching him pitch in 2008 was almost like seeing someone pulling past experiences together and becoming whole. He needed that time in the minors in 2006 to learn to love the game. He needed that time in the bullpen in 2007 to learn that pitching can be fun. And he needed that time back in the rotation at the end of ’07 to prove to himself, his teammates and the organization that he possesses the right stuff to be a frontline starter. I hesitate to project anything onto Greinke because he’s so damn difficult to figure out, but all of us are the sum of our parts.

Anyway, to paraphrase Marty DiBergi: Enough of my philosophizing. Let’s rock.

As the Royals reported to spring training at the beginning of the 2006 season, Greinke was an unhappy 22-year-old with a career 4.99 ERA covering 57 starts. He owned a strikeout rate of 5.9 K/9 and a walk rate of 2.2 BB/9 compiled over 328 innings of work. It wasn’t just his pitching that was suffering; his mind wasn’t in the game either. So he left camp (officially for undisclosed psychological reasons) and returned home. It was reported at the time that he was having difficulty adapting to the lifestyle at the big league level and was undergoing counseling in Florida to help him cope. He returned to the organization in mid-April and spent most of the year in the minors where he made 18 appearances in Double-A Wichita with a 4.33 ERA and 94 strikeouts and 27 walks in 106 innings.

After a brief cup of coffee that September, Greinke opened 2007 in the Royals starting rotation as their No. 3 starter behind Gil Meche and Odalis Perez. Greinke pitched well in his first couple of starts, but then struggled. By the time the Royals decided to remove him from the rotation following a loss to Detroit on May 6, in which he allowed six runs in four innings, his ERA stood at 5.71 and opponents were hitting .338/.390/.579 against him. Was it too much, too soon?

Whatever the answer, once in the bullpen Greinke seemed to find himself, becoming a dependable set-up man for Kansas City. He appeared in 38 games as a reliever, with 26 of them coming from the seventh inning on. The bullpen experiment was so successful, there was even some (crazy) talk of making him a closer.

Fortunately, the Royals resisted the temptation to keep him in the bullpen and moved him back to the rotation at the end of August. Because of his time spent in the bullpen, he was eased back into the starter's role, throwing 48 pitches in his first start, followed by 71 in his second and 82 in his third. Each time, he went one inning deeper in the game. Finally, it all came together for Greinke on Sept. 20 against the White Sox, when he went eight innings, allowing just two hits while striking out 10. With a Game Score of 88, it was his finest start as a major leaguer.

Here’s how his 2007 looked, breaking it down in chronological order of his various roles:
   DATE       GS        IP       K/9      BB/9       HR/9      ERA       BA       OBP      SLG
 4/5-5/6      7        34.2      5.2       2.9       1.3       5.71     .338     .390     .579
5/10-8/20     0        53.1      9.3       2.5       0.5       3.54     .226     .282     .332
8/24-9/26     7         34       8.2       2.6       1.1       1.85     .238     .294     .397


Following up on his strong finish to 2007, last year may very well have been Greinke’s breakout season: He elbowed his way through the chaff and catapulted himself into the elite of the AL. Here’s how he compared among his American League peers in several rate stats:

   Stat    Greinke   AL Rank
   ERA       3.47       10
   K/9       8.1        6
   BB/9      2.5        16
   K/BB      3.3        10
   xFIP      3.88       8


His success stems from his ability to finally harness his potential and translate that into power and strikeouts. When the Royals rushed Greinke through their system and placed him on a major league mound as a 20-year-old, he was obviously still finding his way as a pitcher. At the time, he relied heavily on a combination of fastball and curve. While he seemed to be able to dial up the speed on the heater from time to time, for the most part he lived in the upper 80s/lower 90s range on the radar gun. As he matured physically, the fastball found some giddyup.

However, what seemed to seal the deal for Greinke was the time spent in the bullpen in 2007 where he was able to throw with abandon. His average fastball that year, according to data from PITCHf/x collected by our own Josh Kalk, was 95.6 mph, which represents an amazing transformation. According to the Bill James handbook, 522 of Greinke's pitches topped 95 mph on the radar gun. However any enthusiasm for his new-found power was tempered by the realization he was pitching (for the most part) from the bullpen. Without the need to pace himself for a six- or seven-inning start, Greinke was able to fire away in his shorter outings.

It turns out the move to the back to the rotation on a full time basis didn’t affect his velocity too much. His average fastball last summer was clocked at 94.2 mph.

Greinke has evolved into a true four-pitch pitcher with a curve, slider and change to complement his heat. Most of us have heard about his curve and his ability to throw it slower than an old lady driving a Cadillac to the grocery store. While the curve can be great fun, the slider has become a deadly weapon as well. Last year, while it was his third “favorite” pitch in terms of amount of times he threw it, Greinke used it as a complement to his fastball when jumping ahead in the count and with frequently positive results. The chart below illustrates his use of his slider as his "out" pitch and his success.

  Count    Fastball   Curve     Slider    Change    OPP BA
   0-2       47%       17%       34%        2%      .140
   1-2       49%       20%       28%        4%      .112
   2-2       57%       13%       21%        9%      .183
   3-2       69%       12%       14%        5%      .211


While you may feel that it’s a no-brainer (“Duh, he held opponents to a low batting average when he jumped ahead”) realize that Greinke’s numbers compare favorably with the elite starters. Guys like A.J. Burnett, C.C. Sabathia and Johan Santana all have similar opponent batting averages when pitching with two strikes. Pitchers like Brian Bannister and Daniel Cabrera do not. We shouldn’t underestimate the ability to seal the deal. It’s a large part of what makes the great ones so great.

Look at the chart above once again, this time knowing Greinke started hitters with a first pitch strike 62 percent of the time last year. It was an aggressive Greinke on the mound last summer and again, his first pitch strike rate compares favorably to other top American League starters, ranking 12th overall.

The numbers here are important because they shows that Greinke is maturing as a pitcher. In the past, when he would jump ahead, he would try to be cute, breaking off a ridiculous curve or grooving a fastball to challenge a hitter. It rarely worked. In his rookie season, opponents hit .262 against Greinke when he jumped ahead in the count 0-2.

(The exception might have been Richie Sexson. In 2005 in an early season game against the Mariners, Greinke started the first baseman off with two fastballs that were in the lower to mid 90s. Sexson looked at both for strikes. The third pitch was a looping curveball that hit about 60 mph on the gun. Sexson swung and missed, but it was like watching that Bugs Bunny cartoon when Bugs throws the slow pitch to the palooka who swings three times before the ball crosses the plate.)

Now, Greinke has junked the really slow curve in favor of a snappier breaking pitch and a sweeping slider. For the first time in his career, he stayed aggressive throughout his opponents' at-bats and the result was a positive bump in his strikeout rate.

As you can guess from his high strikeout rate, Greinke’s success stems from his ability to avoid contact. Last year according to data collected by FanGraphs, hitters made contact when swinging at Greinke pitches thrown inside the strike zone 85.8 percent of the time. That may sound high, but consider the median for AL starters is roughly 90 percent and the average major league hitter makes contact on over 88 percent of pitches swung at in the strike zone. Greinke’s contact rate was the sixth lowest among AL qualifiers.

On pitches outside of the zone, he was equally difficult to hit. Batters made contact 59.8 percent of the time when swinging at pitches that would have been called balls (with a perfect umpire calling a perfect strike zone.) Median is around 65 percent.

It all came together on Jan. 26, when the Royals and Greinke held a press conference to announce he had signed a four-year extension valued at $38 million. The deal represents a positive step for a team that has grown accustomed to seeing most of its quality, home-grown players leave at the first whiff of free agency. By agreeing to the contract, Greinke becomes the fifth current Royal locked in through at least 2011. Four of the five who signed long-term (Greinke, Gil Meche, David DeJesus and Joakim Soria) will be counted on to form the base the Royals hope will become the foundation of a contender. (The fifth guy signed through 2011 is Kyle Farnsworth. We’re not going to discuss that contract.)

It’s an important step for both Greinke and the Royals. It’s important for the Royals because general manager Dayton Moore knows he must draft well and lock in his young players at a favorable rate if his team is ever going to contend. And it’s important for Greinke because for the first time in his career, he has long-term security and an enormous obligation to perform to expectations.

The Royals have now cashed out Greinke's final two years of arbitration and also locked him in through his first two years of free agency. This has the potential to be an extremely fair deal. The Royals get four years of Greinke's prime at a fair rate while Greinke, who will be 30 by the time this deal expires, will have the opportunity to make even more money down the road. It's a good move for both a young player who is improving and an organization hopeful of eventually pulling itself into contention in the AL Central.


Craig writes about the Royals at Royals Authority. The Royals Authority 2009 Annual, featuring detailed player profiles and a complete look at the minor leagues is now on sale. He welcomes all questions and comments via e-mail. Or just follow him on Twitter.

<< Return to Article This annotated week in baseball history: Jan. 25-Jan. 31, 1891 from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

This annotated week in baseball history: Jan. 25-Jan. 31, 1891

by Richard Barbieri
January 30, 2009

On Jan. 31, 1891, Goat Cochran was born. Cochran was just one of the players born on this date who would go on to earn a memorable moniker. Richard looks at some of the more distinctively dubbed players.

Last week I wrote about the less talented brothers of some great pitchers. This allowed me the chance to both point out an interesting trend—how many outstanding hurlers have had pitching siblings—and write about said outstanding hurlers.

So naturally this week I am going to follow it up by writing about people with funny names. But you'll have to cut me a little slack. I am only human, and today features people (nick)named Goat, Steamboat, Pinky, Stuffy, Honey and Jot. Can't pass that up.

Starting from the eldest, we come to Jot Goar, who was born in 1870. His given name was Joshua, which I like because I have a cousin with that name. He doesn't know it yet, but he has just gotten a new nickname. Jot was a fairly terrible pitcher; his just over 15 innings matched his 15.85 ERA. He is the only man to play in the major leagues with that nickname.

In case you were wondering, "jot" in the sense of "write down quickly" had long-since entered the lexicon by the time Goar was playing in the majors; it dates to at least the early 18th century.

Nicknames are often awarded to the greats—"The Sultan of Swat" or "The Splendid Splinter"—but also can find themselves attached to the less successful. Take Alvah Cochran, or as he was known around baseball, Goat Cochran. Alvah is itself a pretty rare name (it comes from a Biblical figure of no special distinction). The most historically notable is Alvah Roebuck, as in Sears Roebuck.

Cochran, however, was not to baseball what was Roebuck was to retail. He pitched a grand total of two innings, giving up three runs on five hits.

Next up is Steamboat Williams, born Rees Williams, who played for the Cardinals. The obvious theme here is that odd birth names (Reese, Alvah) lead to nicknames. To my endless frustration, I can't work out why he was nicknamed Steamboat. He was the first player to reach the major leagues born in Montana, so "Big Sky" Williams would have seemed a more probable moniker than the quintessentially southern steamboat.

(I did consider that he was connected to Steamboat Willie, the first Mickey Mouse cartoon, but that was released 12 years after Williams ended his career, so that's not it.)

Steamboat is, on the other hand, a pretty awesome nickname. In some ways it is a shame it was wasted on a guy with a career 4.20 ERA. That sounds good, except he pitched in 1914 and 1916, which means the equivalent career ERA for a guy in St. Louis last year would be 5.99.

Moving on, we come to the only players to have careers of any substance while battling the apparently twin impediments of being born on Jan. 31 and having a funny nickname. The first is Stuffy Stewart, who played for St. Louis, Brooklyn, Pittsburgh and Washington over an eight-season career that stretched from 1916 through 1929.

Unfortunately for Stuffy (whose given name was the rather more routine John Franklin), those eight seasons stretched across 13 years due to a variety of circumstances. Some were Stewart's own responsibility: He was a career .238 hitter with virtually no power. On the other hand, some was out of his control: He spent two years during the World War I serving (domestically) in the Army.

Before we get to the best career of the crop, this roundup would not be complete without touching on Honey Barnes. Barnes appeared in one game for the Yankees, in 1926, drawing a walk in his only plate appearance. This puts him in rare company, as one of only 57 players who have at least one plate appearance but no at-bats. Barnes is even more rare for being one of 16 non-pitchers to have managed that.

(The all-time leader in this department is Jose Parra, who has four plate appearances resulting in two walks and two sacrifices for zero at-bats.)

Now we come to the most successful of the birthday bunch. While this day saw the birth of three elite Hall of Famers, none of the nickname crowd made the list, which is why we've come to Pinky Hargrave. (The Hall of Famers are Jackie Robinson, Ernie Banks and Nolan Ryan.)

While Pinky was not a Hall of Fame talent, he did have a lot going for him. He was born in 1896 as William McKinley Hargrave in Indiana, named to honor the man who would be elected President just 10 months later. Moreover, his older brother was the equally excellently nicknamed Bubbles Hargrave.

Just like his brother, Pinky was a catcher, but unlike his brother he was not a sometimes great hitter. While the elder Hargrave hit enough to receive MVP support in three seasons—he finished sixth in 1926—Pinky never managed such a feat. He nonetheless finished his career with a 99 OPS+, certainly a respectable total for a catcher.

Pinky began his career relatively late, not debuting in the major leagues until he was 27, but nonetheless appearing every season in the big leagues until he was 37 in 1933. Of course, being a catcher who sometimes hit and sometimes didn't meant Hargrave bounced around a fair bit. He played for five major league teams, and was part of transactions that also sent (or would have sent; things got complicated) him to the American Association and International League. Hargrave was variously traded, purchased and drafted from one to another through his career.

After his career ended, Hargrave hung on in the lower ladders of major league baseball, lasting until 1936. He later was employed as an electrical worker in his home state, and died there in 1942.

Modern nicknames are nothing like those of days past, so we are unlikely to get a collection of contemporary players with names like Honey, Steamboat or Pinky. But we can hope, and if it ever does happen, I'll be here to tell you about it.




Questions, comments and thinly veiled threats can be mailed to Richard on the back of a twenty dollar bill or e-mailed to him at RichardBarbieri@yahoo.com

<< Return to Article More Yankee Scandal from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

More Yankee Scandal

by Craig Calcaterra
January 29, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article The Wrigley Mystique from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The Wrigley Mystique

by Craig Calcaterra
January 29, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Take the high road, New York from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Take the high road, New York

by Craig Calcaterra
January 29, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article 20 Agents? from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

20 Agents?

by Craig Calcaterra
January 29, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article PEDs and the Hall from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

PEDs and the Hall

by Craig Calcaterra
January 29, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Today at THT from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Today at THT

by Craig Calcaterra
January 29, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Managing your money in Rotohog from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Managing your money in Rotohog

by Alex Zelvin
January 29, 2009

Rotohog Baseball is a fantasy baseball game with free entry, large prizes, and a unique "stock exchange" trading mechanism. Thousands of players compete in a global contest to see who can accumulate the most points. Like some "salary cap" baseball games, Rotohog gives you the opportunity to turn over your entire roster every day, greatly increasing the importance of taking factors such as opponent and park into account when determining your lineup.

When Rotohog first launched in early 2007, one of its main selling points was its unique ‘stock market’ trading mechanism. A great deal was made of the fact that the pricing algorithms had been designed by Kent Smetters, a University of Pennsylvania professor of economics, who was one of the founders of Rotohog.

During the 2007 season, building up roster value through active trading was one of the keys to success at Rotohog Baseball. From a starting roster value of $300, the top teams all spent the bulk of the season above $700, and most of them consistently had the $900 or more that they needed to acquire whatever players they wanted without any limitations. The greatest key to success was having a lotof free time, and being at the computer to instantly sell players within seconds of games starting. This led to most players not really having any chance to be competitive, and ultimately led Rotohog to adjust the rules to reduce the importance of roster value the following season.

In 2008, Rotohog used a system of transaction fees tied to roster value to limit how much Rotohog money players would be able to accumulate while actively maintaining their roster. The transaction fees escalated sharply as a team’s roster value increased past various thresholds from $350 (where fees went from $.10 to $.75) up to $450 (where fees went from $2.50 to $4.50).

I knew that my edge over the competition would come from making superior decisions about which daily match-ups to exploit, which meant that I would need to turn over most of my roster each day. That virtually guaranteed that I would be stuck at $350 or below for the entire season. Luckily, I also knew that my opponents would sometimes need to trade players to ensure that they used their entire 162 game allotment at each position. With the extremely high transaction fees I was confident that no contenders would be able to maintain a roster value above $450. I felt that actively playing match-ups with a $350 team, I would probably be able to outperform anyone employing a “buy and hold” strategy using a $450 team. It turned out that I never had to determine if that was true, because none of the top teams managed to stay above $400 for long. In fact, most of us spent almost the entire season between about $330 and $380. The escalating transaction fees had virtually eliminated the stock market trading as a key part of success in the game. I completely ignored roster value for the entire season, planning my transactions entirely to maximize scoring each day, and didn’t suffer at all for it. My ability to do that was dependent on having a schedule compatible with Rotohog’s trading floor hours though. I know several skilled players who were not able to trade until shortly before games began each day, and instead of their roster almost magically hovering around $350 for the whole season (as mine did), they often found themselves at the minimum salary of $250, which made fielding a competitive team almost impossible.

Rotohog staff members have indicated that trading floor hours are likely to be one of the few areas of the game format that will be tweaked in 2009. Last year the trading floor didn’t open until noon Eastern. That was a really bad idea, since it meant that on the weekends, people had only a 50 minute window to be at the computer and make roster moves before their lineup would begin to lock in for the day. Rotohog will almost certainly have an earlier start to the trading day this year, or even allow very late night trading as they did in 2007. No matter what time they settle on, players who are able to make transactions shortly after the trading floor opens will have an advantage in maintaining a reasonable roster value. If you can’t generally make trades early in the trading day, you’ll need to start sacrificing some of your daily match-ups in order to avoid always buying your players at their most expensive and selling them at their cheapest. The key to this is not to have players in your lineup the day before their team has an off day (when you’ll get stuck holding them as their price drops), and to try to buy your starting pitchers several days ahead of time to avoid paying peak price.

Note that most of what I’ve discussed here will be affected by whether Rotohog changes the transaction fees to escalate more gradually and whether they still have a five day ‘holding period’ for starting pitchers. We won’t know for sure what adjustments they’ll make until their official launch date on February 23rd, so for now I’m assuming that there won’t be any changes.


Compete against Alex and other players in one day fantasy baseball contests at Fanduel or visit his site, Daily Baseball Data, which has daily hour by hour weather forecasts for all games on one screen and batter vs. pitcher matchup data for the full day's schedule.

<< Return to Article How to measure a player’s value (Part 2) from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

How to measure a player’s value (Part 2)

by Colin Wyers
January 29, 2009

As the title implies, there was a Part 1. It’s advisable to read it first.

But a quick little summary couldn’t hurt, and what’s quicker than a one-line summary?

A player’s value is essentially an average team’s runs or wins with that player, minus their runs or wins without that player.

But despite what you might read on the back of a bubblegum card, it’s not always simple to determine how many runs or wins an individual player is responsible for—baseball, after all, is a team sport. It’s not fruitless or impossible to try—baseball is one of the most richly documented sporting experiences, and so it’s possible for us to do a very good job of this. But it does require rolling up our sleeves a bit.

This is supposed to be a survey, not an exhaustive look at these subjects. This week we'll be long on explanation, short on technical detail. Next week there'll be all the numbers you could hope for.

Valuing runs

Just go ahead and picture this. At the start of the inning, the pitcher lets a breaking ball get away from him and hits the batter. You now have a runner on first, no outs.

The next batter strikes a solid single into left, advancing the runner to third. Runners on first and third, no outs.

The next batter skies one deep to left but easily playable; the runner tags up and scores easily. Runner on first, one out.

According to the instructions given to the official scorer, the first hitter is awarded a run scored. The third hitter is awarded a run batted in. The second hitter is not credited for the run at all—this in spite of the fact that he was clearly the most valuable player in the entire sequence of events.

It's one example, sure, and seemingly rather contrived as well. But the larger point I want to make is that Runs Scored and Runs Batted In are accounting methods; the official scorer is directed to assign (almost) every run to two batters, and he does so. You will sometimes hear people refer to a player's R/RBI as "real runs," compared to those fake runs that we sabermetricians apparently are discussing. But there's nothing particularly compelling or persuasive about the methods used to assign runs to players by the official scorer.

Or, to put it another way: if a batter hits a triple, followed by a batter who hits a single, they each get equal credit for the run that results. Same holds true if a batter hits a single, followed by a batter who hits a triple. But it's patently obvious that the triple is more valuable than the single.

In short, the simple assertion of responsibility of a run by the official scorer is a very poor model for the way teams actually score runs. It doesn't tell us as much as it purports about a player's hitting value—just because some people mistake these runs for actual team runs doesn't make it so.

So if we truly want to develop an estimate of how to apportion team runs among players, we want a better model than the two-base cricket model that governs Runs Scored and Runs Batted In. This is also useful in comparing two hitters from different teams on an even playing field; we know that the same hitter will have much different R/RBI if he plays for a team like the 2005 Yankees than if he plays for the 2008 Nationals, even if he performs exactly the same at the plate—there will be more runners ahead of him to knock in on the Yankees and more players behind him driving him in.

We have two kinds of models: dynamic and linear. Dynamic models work very well on entire contexts, like a team's overall performance or a pitcher's performance. They do not work very well on individual hitters, because a single hitter only controls one ninth of his context. (And a hitters' performance does not interact with itself: if a hitter walks, he cannot then go to the plate and hit a home run to drive himself in.) Linear models hold the envioronment context, and thus work well in estimating a hitter's contribution to a certain context. They work less well for evaluating pitchers—a home run against C.C. Sabathia results in fewer runs on average than a home run against Jason Marquis—a pitcher like Marquis is simply more likely to have runners on base when a home run occurs.

For a dynamic run estimator, BaseRuns is the most accurate (and most versatile). The formula for BaseRuns is:

A*B/(B + C) + D

Where A is the number of baserunners, B is the "advancement factor," C is the number of outs, and D is the number of home runs. A simple version of BaseRuns would use the following:

A = H + W - HR

B = (1.4*TB - .6*H - 3*HR + .1*W)*1.02

C = AB - H

More complicated (and thus more accurate) BaseRuns formulas are available.

When it comes to linear run estimators, there are many, many linear weights formulas, nearly too many to name (and many that have no name at all). For a player value system, it's probably best to use custom linear weights based upon the season. The key thing to pay attention to is baseline—all dynamic run estimators give you absolute runs, but some linear run estimators will give you runs above average instead.

You do not have to use the most complicated or most accurate run estimator available to you—at the extremes of accuracy you are fighting over very miniscule differences, probably well within the level of uncertainty you should have about these models. It is, however, important to use the least biased run estimator you have available. Runs Created, for instance, will typically produce a low run value for the walk and an inflated run value for the home run. This will overvalue hitters with high home run rates and low walk rates.

If we have more detailed data, we can also look at baserunning; not just basestealing, but baserunning. Who goes first to third on a single? Who goes first to home on a double? This is a secondary skill—the best baserunner is not better than the worst baserunner to nearly the same extent as the best hitter is better than the worst hitter. But if we have that data, it helps give a better picture of a player's contribution to team wins.

Measuring playing time

Measuring playing time is one of those things that can sometimes sound simpler than it really is. When looking at a total value metric, it’s very important for us to understand what the unit of playing time is.

Let’s start off by looking at playing time at the team level. At the team level, we find that the fundamental measure of time is the out. So long as a team has outs remaining on offense, they can still score runs; so long as a team has outs remaining on defense, they still are responsible for preventing runs.

We seem to understand this when it comes to pitchers and fielders, although sometimes instead of outs we use games or innings, both of which are functionally equivalent to outs. (One game equals nine innings equals 27 outs.)

But when it comes to batting, we have a tendency to instead measure playing time in plate appearances or (shudder) at-bats. The trouble is that plate appearances are not fixed—every time a player makes an out, he is denying a plate appearance to one of his teammates. Two players with otherwise equivelent production in the same number of plate appearances are not equally as valuable if the two of them used different number of outs during the course of their PAs.

Most run estimators provide results per out, not per plate appearance. A linear run estimator baselined to runs above average uses plate appearances at the rate of playing time. This really, truly does not matter, so long as you use the correct unit of playing time. If your run estimator is giving you runs per out, the appropriate playing time comparison is to players with the same number of batting outs, not the same number of plate appearances.

Since many people have a hard time making the adjustment to considering outs as a unit of playing time for hitters, you can instead convert runs per out into runs per plate appearance. The exact method depends upon the run estimator used.

Park factors

It's one of the more conventional pieces of sabermetric wisdom: a player's contribution in runs should be separated from the effect of his home park.

Where it gets sticky is the level of detail one is willing to go to in order to do so. The basic arguement is between simple, run-based park factors and more detailed component park factors.

For a value metric, the run-based park factor is probably more appropriate. The reason we want to park adjust a player's performance in a value metric is because the value of a run is distorted based upon the environment; a run in Coors is simply less valuable than a run in Petco. But if a player is hitting more doubles than the typical hitter because he is especially well-suited to his particular home park, those extra doubles are providing real value to his team.

Now, in some contexts, it may be appropriate to use component park factors, but this doesn't make the component park factors "more accurate" in assessing a player's value, at least when it comes to explaining team wins.

Fielding: Measuring a position player's offensive value only gives you half a picture; the other half is his fielding prowess.

Fielding value is more difficult to measure, because while there is only one batter, there are nine fielders for the defense on every play. It is pretty easy to discern who made a specific play, but often difficult to discern who should be responsible for a ball when no play is made. Various defensive metrics attempt to assign responsibility for who is responsible for a ball in play. Generally speaking, the more detailed the underlying dataset, the better the results.

It should be noted here that the primary defensive skill is fielding a batted ball for an out. That is by far the most important thing a fielder does, and it's also the skill with the largest differention in talent between fielders. And so this is the skill that most fielding metrics measure. Other things, such as turning the double play, catching balls at first base, throwing arms for outfielders, are of secondary importance.

(The great, shining exception is catcher defense, where skill at converting a batted ball into an out is a secondary concern at most.)

There are two presentations of defensive metrics: skill, which is generally represented as plays per chances; and value, generally represented as plays or runs saved above the average player at the position. Be careful to know whether your defensive metric comes in plays or runs—the Fielding Bible, for instance, uses plays, while UZR uses runs. Runs is more useful for our purposes, because then it can be directly compared to offensive production.

Now here's the tricky part. Some folks are naturally inclined to ask, "Isn't a player who is +10 on offense and +10 on defense equally valuable from a team perspective, regardless of position? They both create the same number of runs for the team, after all."

This is entirely wrong, and it comes from the simple error of mistaking a model of reality with actual reality.

Remember: average in anything, whether it's hits, plays, runs, or wins, is simply a statement of central tendency. Typically we use average—and to be clear here I really should be saying mean—because it's simple to compute, convenient to use and is commonly understood.

But that doesn't make it particularly meaningful. If instead we used the median or the mode we'd get different results, and no one would be more right than the other.

More to the point, we shouldn't misconstrue certain features of our mathematical models as having a particular meaning when they are a product not of the data (or the underlying truth) but of the tools we used to build the model. To assert that the average defensive shortstop and the average defensive first baseman are equally valuable on defense means favoring math over truth.

Or, to illustrate: Does it make sense to only compare a hitter to other hitters in his batting order spot? If one hitter is +10 relative to guys who bat fourth, and another is +10 relative to guys who bat eighth, are they equally as valuable?

In order to appropriately compare two players, we want to know their fielding contributions relative to all players, not just to players who play the same positions. This means that we want to adjust their value based upon their fielding position. We do this by figuring out the relative difference in value between positions.

Once we've done this, there is absolutely no need to adjust offensive performance based upon position. After all, a home run by a first baseman isn't any less valuable than a home run by a shortstop—given the same base-out situations either player will drive in the same number of runs by batting a homer.

Pitching

If we've assigned credit for fielding batted balls for outs, then we have an issue when it comes to assessing the value of a pitcher. We've already handed out credit for a large portion of "his" outs. This raises the question of whether or not we should be assigning credit for fielding outs to pitchers at all. It is generally (but by no means universally) accepted among the analytic community that in fact we shouldn't.

In that event, what is needed is a model for producing an estimation of a pitcher's run prevention ability given a league average defense. These are generally called Defense Independent Pitching Statistics, or DIPS.

One word of caution - most DIPS and DIPS-like formulas are based upon a linear model of run scoring. Take FIP, for instance. The basic formula:

(HR*13+(BB+HBP-IBB)*3-K*2)/IP+3.2

Remember what we said about pitchers earlier: a walk is less valuable againt a better pitcher because the batter is more likely to be stranded on base. A linear formula like FIP is not modeling that reality. It is usally a small difference, but one worth noting.

Up next

Please to ignore last week's schedule - next week, plan to actually go step-by-step in applying these ideas to some actual baseball players.



References and Resources

Almost everything of note I've had to say on the topic of run estimation, at least as it relates to this discussion, appears in the Hardball Times 2009 Annual. If you have a further interest in the topic, please, go there.

For further reading on a lot of topics, check out either Patriot's website or Tango's wiki.

Here's an overview of THT's fielding metrics. You can also take a look at Sean Smith's fantastic TotalZone system, which covers the entire Retrosheet era.

DIPS is the rather brilliant brainchild of Voros McCracken. It's probably the most controversial - and in my mind, the most important - finding of sabermetrics in the past decade. For a non-linear DIPS model, look at David Gassko's LIPS, my BsRA or McCracken's DIPS Base Runs.

Colin Wyers knows exactly how much of a nerd he is. He is very interested in hearing about any other concerns you may have; you can reach him by e-mail, and he will try his best to respond in a timely fashion. He also blogs at Statistically Speaking.

<< Return to Article A league divided: Part 4 (1969-81) from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

A league divided: Part 4 (1969-81)

by Brandon Isleib
January 29, 2009

In three previous articles, the AL and NL have been divided up into Easts and Wests, given an unbalanced schedule, and discussed as the results warrant. Now that we're up to 1969, when leagues got real-life divisions, we'll re-alignh from the two division playoff format to three divisions and one wild card to see what will happen.

This is the setup from 1969-71:

AL East    AL Central AL West     NL East      NL Central NL West
Baltimore  Chicago    California  Atlanta      Chicago    Houston
Boston     Cleveland  Kansas City Montreal     Cincinnati Los Angeles
New York   Detroit    Oakland     New York     Pittsburgh San Diego
Washington Minnesota  Sea./Milw.  Philadelphia St. Louis  San Francisco

In real life, the Senators became the Rangers in 1972, moved to the West, and sent the Brewers to the East (yes, the Brew Crew have been in the West, Central, East, AL, and NL). Here, the Rangers will move to the West, the Brewers will move to the Central, and the Tigers will move to the East,
like this:

AL East    AL Central AL West     NL East      NL Central NL West
Baltimore  Chicago    California  Atlanta      Chicago    Houston
Boston     Cleveland  Kansas City Montreal     Cincinnati Los Angeles
Detroit    Milwaukee  Oakland     New York     Pittsburgh San Diego
New York   Minnesota  Texas       Philadelphia St. Louis  San Francisco

The AL's expansion in 1977 bumps the Royals to the Central, giving the league the same setup it had from 1994-97.

In each season from 1969-76, teams play 58 games against its own division and 52 each against the other two. From 1977-81 for the AL, the East and Central will play 63 against its own teams, 44 against the West, and 55 against other division, while the West will play 52 against its own and 55 each against the other divisions. Last but not least, we have to deal with the shortening of seasons twice: in '72 and '81. The 58/52/52 split in 1972 goes to 54/50/50, and 1981 has all the numbers multiplied by 0.7. With four playoff teams in each league in 1981 and in this hypothetical, I assume that the season wouldn't have been split; it's just a lot easier to figure out and to understand.

The results of all this are:

     AL East AL Central AL West AL Wild  NL East  NL Central NL West NL Wild
1969 Orioles Twins      A's     Tigers   Mets     Cubs       Giants  Braves
1970 Orioles Twins      A's     Yankees  Mets     Reds       Dodgers Pirates
1971 Orioles Tigers     A's     Royals   Braves   Pirates    Dodgers Giants

[AL: Senators/Rangers go West, with Brewers to Central and Tigers to East]
1972 Tigers  White Sox  A's     Red Sox  Mets     Reds       Astros  Pirates
1973 Orioles Brewers    A's     Red Sox  Mets     Reds       Dodgers Giants
1974 Orioles Twins      A's     Yankees  Braves   Reds       Dodgers Cardinals
1975 Red Sox Twins      A's     BAL/KC   Phillies Reds       Dodgers Pirates
1976 Yankees Twins      A's     BAL/KC   Phillies Reds       Dodgers Pirates

[AL: Blue Jays in East, Royals move to Central, Mariners in West]
1977 Yankees Royals     Rangers Red Sox  Phillies Pirates    Dodgers Reds
1978 Yankees Royals     Rangers Red Sox  Phillies Reds       Dodgers Giants
1979 Orioles Brewers    Angels  BOS/NY   Expos    Pirates    Astros  Reds
1980 Yankees Royals     A's     Orioles  Phillies Reds       Astros  Dodgers
1981 Red Sox Brewers    A's     Orioles  MON/PHI  Reds       Dodgers Cardinals

With very little changing via unbalancing (see part three for my thoughts as to why), most of these results are a straight sorting, with the differences discussed below usually being only a game or two.

There are five instances where the best record in the league would go to a different playoff team: 1971, 1973, and 1974 with A's triumphing over the Orioles (partly because they got to play the Orioles less); 1972 Reds over Pirates; and 1979 Expos over Pirates. These instances are ridiculously close and involve well-known teams, so little needs to be said.

There are also two White Sox '08 situations in here, where in a balanced schedule a team would have played a 162nd game to see if a 163rd was needed: the '76 A's for a wild card tie with the Orioles and the '78 Pirates for a wild card tie with the Giants. (In this exercise, the A's win the division and the Pirates wind up one game behind the Giants.)

Of course, there are also a number of teams above that get dynasties out of nowhere, like the Mets, the Twins (though they were a mediocre team), and the Reds and Dodgers, once they're not direct competitors. The 1969 Cubs would win by three games over the Pirates and there would have been far
less choking. If length considerations permitted (and they rarely do with my articles, largely because of parentheticals just like the one you're reading right this second), I'd discuss the 1973 Brewers, the 1978 Giants, and all the very random teams that show up in that list, but there's so much to cover from the unbalancing anomalies that I have to leave them out.

1971 Braves


By one game over the Mets, who would have won it in real life, the Braves move from 82-win mediocrity to 85-win mediocrity in this exercise. Their Pythagorean record was 75-87, so this probably wasn't a team of destiny or anything. At age 37, Hank Aaron posted an insane OPS+ of 194 off 47 homers (led the team by 14) and 71 walks (led the team by 24). Rookie of the Year Earl Williams (123) hit only .260, but had 33 home runs; Ralph Garr (125) would be productive the opposite way by hitting .343 with little power. This was also Darrell Evans' rookie year, and he wasn't too bad either.

The pitching was average, masked by an unforgiving stadium; Atlanta's R/G differential between home and road was .74, the largest in the league aside from the Reds', who gave up .97 more runs on the road than at home. Phil Niekro (15-14, 125) was solid, and Ron Reed and George Stone were competent placeholders. The secret boost for the team, though, was Tom Kelley (9-5, 126 in 20 starts), who hadn't appeared in the majors since 1967 with the Indians. After a few mopup relief games, Kelley started against the Expos on May 27. He four-hit them for the win, striking out nine, and stayed in the rotation to reasonable effectiveness. He was out of the bigs two years later and forgotten, but in a three-division setup, he could have been an Aaron Small-type savior.

Yeah, this team wasn't that good.

1972 Astros


The real-life version had one fewer win and one fewer loss than the Dodgers, so they would have to play two more games to see if they'd play L.A. for the wild card (and you thought 2008 was complex). Here, they win outright by a game over the Dodgers. This was their first contending team they had for awhile, and the only one for awhile afterwards, so it's a unique one. Managed by Harry Walker before being replaced by Leo Durocher fresh off his Cubs stint, the team had some curious traits. They led the league in R/G but had bad pitching. Contrary to most Astrodome-era 'Stros, however, they both scored and gave up more runs at home (to be fair, the fences were moved in about 10 feet everywhere); the pitching was 4.61 R/G bad at home and 3.70 R/G good elsewhere. Really, the only solid pitching was from Don Wilson (15-10, 125) and aged closer Fred Gladding (14 SV, 121). That offense flowed freely showed up in Jim Ray's curious relief line: 10-9 with 8 saves in 54 games...with an ERA+ of 78 and a K/BB ratio of essentially 1. No other pitcher has won at least 10 and saved at least eight with that bad an ERA+, and it's not even close; Firpo Marberry checks in with an 87 from 1927.

Ah, but that offense...young veteran 1B Lee May (137) and old veteran C Johnny Edwards (111, his only OPS+ above 85 in the last nine years of his career) were great complements to one of the best single-season outfields of all time: Bob Watson, Cesar Cedeno, and Jimmy Wynn left to right.

Betcha wouldn't have guessed the teams on this list:

Teams where 3 OFs had 140+ OPS or better (min. 400 PA)

1908 Tigers          McIntyre/Crawford/Cobb
1925 Tigers          Wingo/Cobb/Heilmann
1926 Tigers          Fothergill/Manush/Heilmann
1939 Yankees         Selkirk/DiMaggio/Keller
1971 Orioles         Buford/Rettenmund/Robinson
1972 Astros          Watson/Cedeno/Wynn
1978 Brewers         Hisle/Thomas/Oglivie

The Orioles and Brewers get asterisks for having some players get significant time at other positions (though Milwaukee gets extra credit for having their fourth outfielder, Sixto Lezcano, clock in at a 135 mark), but aside from old Tigers teams there's not much, and only one NL team. While playing in the Astrodome and unable to get far with it.

Baseball is strange and I love it.

1974 Cardinals


The Astros from two years prior share some similarities with this team that finished 1.5 behind the Pirates in real life but are 1 ahead of them here. (The Bucs real-life intradivisional matchups were best with the Eastern seaboard, while the Cardinals were much better against the Midwestern teams; funny what division splits will do sometimes.) Neither team did well again until the end of the decade. Both had criminally underrated outfielders, though two here were quite rated. 4 batters were in between 110 and 117 on OPS+, including MVP runner-up Lou Brock (110, but 118 stolen bases) and Rookie of the Year Bake McBride (114). But it was the newly acquired Reggie Smith (155) who made the offense work, and it's Smith who went home without hardware or serious consideration.

The pitching was bullpen-led, as rookie Bob Forsch (122) and near-rookie Lynn McGlothen (135) had to compensate in the rotation for Bob Gibson's surprising decline (95 after years of greatness) and three other starters between 94 and 96. The 'pen, though, was another story, with four relievers with 121 or better (in this case 3.00 ERA and under). Al Hrabosky was in his second full year, but he got surprising contributions from youngsters Mike Garman and Rich Folkers and 40-year-old Orlando Pena in his last — and best — full season.

The team would have had zero chance against its theoretical LDS opponent, the Dodgers Juggernaut (TM), but it would have been nice to see Gibson and Brock get a last hurrah in October, as well as getting Ted Simmons and Smith a bit more recognition.

1975-6 Orioles/Royals


With a balanced schedule the Orioles would have won the wild card outright; here, they tie with the Royals both times, and the Royals don't win the division because the A's do. All this would really do is start the Royals a year earlier in their quest for domination and extend the shelf life of the aging O's and A's. The '76 O's, of course, had the one year of Reggie Jackson (155), and Wayne Garland's random and lucrative 20-win season was that year too. The '76 A's had the one year of Chuck Tanner managing before they traded him for Manny Sanguillen; I guess if he had made the playoffs that year, they could have gotten more for him on the trade market...or something. Then again, everything was for trade after the season; Billy North was the only member of the 1976 lineup back the next year.

It's easy to forget amidst the colorful nature of Charlie Finley and the whole team, but nobody was coming out to see this team even when they were winning. Attendance only went up by 100,000 from their last year in Kansas City to their first in Oakland, and their yearly ranks in league attendance from 1969-76 were eighth, ninth, seventh, fifth, eighth, eleventh (this was their third straight World Series championship year, mind you), sixth, and eleventh, respectively. The franchise attendance record of 1,393,054 was set in 1955, their first year in Kansas City; the team would not top 1.1 million until 1981. Yes, that's right; the A's set their Oakland attendance record in a strike year. I guess that says something about Mr. Finley's relationship with his fans, but it's completely strange. He could build a team like nobody's business, but he couldn't get along with it or the people watching it. Charlie Finley is the idiot savant of MLB front office history.

1977-79: Three ties


More fighting for the AL slots would break out, as the 1977 Red Sox would beat the Orioles outright in an unbalanced schedule for the wild card instead of a tie, the 1978 Rangers would win the West outright instead of tying with the Angels, and the Red Sox and Yankees would tie in 1979 for the wild card instead of the Red Sox winning outright. All of these except the Rangers would make the playoffs in or around these years, so there's not much to report on them, but go to the Rangers page before you read the rest of this article.

There are three things that strike me about this team. First, they easily could have won the division in real life if Bert Campaneris (37 OPS+ off a .186/.245/.238 line) hadn't played shortstop for the season, and...how to put this...this is one of the most imported teams of all time. I associate maybe five of these guys with the Rangers; the rest are all better known for playing elsewhere. I've never seen anything like it.

And third, this was Danny Darwin's first team and season in the major leagues. As I became a fan of baseball in the early '90s, I'm surprised to find out Danny Darwin even had a first season. He was always kinda just around. It's like imagining a young Bobby Cox or a thin David "Snack" Wells...I guess you could do it, but what good what it would do, and how accurate would your imagination be?

1981


The split season obscures everything about the year, but these standings aren't changed drastically from the balanced schedule three-division setup. The only difference is that the Yankees and Tigers would have tied for the wild card with the Red Sox a half-game out pre-unbalancing. Here's my favorite storyline from each of the three potentially tying teams, Boston, Detroit, and New York:

1) This was Dwight Evans' breakout year, the one that set the course for his '80s self. He was third in MVP voting that year, so it didn't go unnoticed then, but what's the tendency in a smaller sample size? Of course a guy who's 29 and cleared his previous best OPS+ (128) by 34 points isn't going to do that again. Well, of his remaining 10 years in the bigs, he cleared that figure six times. If Evans had that third of a season back, he would likely have cleared 1500 Rs, 1400 RBIs, 2500 H, and just possibly 400 HRs. Would those round numbers have helped his Hall chances? With that many at stake, maybe.

2) Tigers closer Kevin Saucier broke a strange record: for any pitcher with at least 40 innings pitched and at least 3.8 BB/9, Saucier's .959 WHIP was by far the lowest. This record was broken by Carlos Marmol in 2008, with a .927 WHIP with an astonshing 4.23 BB/9 (he walked one more than got a hit off him). Unlike Marmol, however, Saucier was not a strikeout pitcher, with only 4.22 K/9. In his 49 IP, he gave up 26 hits, 21 walks, and struck out 23. And his era was 1.65. There's so much cognitive dissonance that I have to move on to number 3.

3) They say that pitching and defense win championships. Tell it to the Yankees...the team gave up only 3.21 R/G; this is the only team total under 3.5 in the AL from 1976 onward, and the three in 1973-75 are barely under. The DH league hasn't seen pitching like this since and probably won't for a long time...and with an unbalanced schedule and three divisions they wouldn't even have gotten the chance to blow the World Series.

Next time


Wrapping up the divisions with 1982-93...there's a rather big surprise in 1986, and Pete Rose was an all right manager.


References and Resources
Ballparks.com gives Astrodome fence information. Thanks, ballparks.com!

Baseball-reference.com gives lots of information. Thanks, B-ref!

Brandon Isleib is a lawyer and writes about stuff sometimes. He can be reached via the electronic mails.

<< Return to Article Forecasting from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Forecasting

by Jonathan Halket
January 29, 2009

There are lots of fantasy baseball writers offering advice out there. Is it useful to listen to more than one? Some websites charge money for access and all of them use up some of your limited time, so you definitely want to pick your advisors carefully. Advice generally falls into one of two categories: strategy (example: “Don’t pay for saves”) or forecasts (example: “Albert Pujols’ injury concerns are overblown”). In this article, I will write a bit about forecasting and whether it is better to listen to the best, to the stupid or to the many.

Forecasts are predictions of the future, a process which harbors two complications: life is random, so forecasts will never be exact (God does play dice with the universe), and we do not know the exact nature of this randomness (We don’t know what kind of dice God uses). Science is the search for truth: scientists want to know why things are the way they are, so they spend their time trying to figure out which dice God is playing with. Forecasters mostly care about their prediction being close to the eventual realization as possible; they don’t care about why (if they are going to make many more predictions in the future, they may want to learn why so that they can do better in the future. But for just a one shot prediction, forecasters don’t care about science).

To see why this distinction matters, consider the following two baseball experts:

Enlightened Stathead has a huge statistical model, years and years worth of data, and a supercomputer on loan from NASA which he uses to figure out which variables are statistically significantly correlated to other variables. However, Enlightened Stathead’s model is mis-specified—he’s missing a variable that adjusts for the fact that power has dropped in the league in the post-steroid era. This isn’t a mortal sin, all models are mis-specified in one way or another. If Enlightened Stathead forecasts using his NASA model, he’s on average wrong (this is called Biased in statistics), but, depending on the type of model mis-specification, on average he won’t be “very wrong” (he has a low forecast standard error).

Opinionated Idiot has a rather simpler way of forecasting. He watches each player play once in Spring Training and, based on only that data, forecasts. If a pitcher strikes out the side against the Marlins B-squad, he’s projected to be a superstar for the rest of the year. Note that Opinionated Idiot will likely have a very high forecast standard error but very little bias.

What’s the tension? The Stathead uses lots and lots of data—indeed he needs a lot of data in order to figure out what’s statistically important. This data is by definition historical; maybe he uses a century’s worth of data. The Idiot uses very little data and it is mostly of a recent vintage. With so little data, he can’t figure out much about the world he’s living in. But suppose the world he’s living in changes from time to time (God picks up a different set of dice), making old data potential much less useful in understanding a new world. Like the Stathead, the Idiot doesn’t know that God has switched dice, but since he doesn’t use old data, he doesn’t care much anyway. In baseball terms, the Idiot might adjust much faster to changes in league-wide steroid use, or at the individual level, his forecasts might adjust much faster to the fact that a pitcher has added a splitter to his arsenal than the Stathead’s would.

So whom should you listen to? Depends on the type of baseball gods we have (and I don’t know). If the baseball gods are the type to pick up new sets of dice very often, then the Idiot may be better. If not, the Stathead will be better.

And how many of them should you listen to? This is an incredibly complex question. Here’s a rule of thumb:

If we live in a Stathead’s world (not many new dice), then it will usually be better to listen to lots of different experts and form some sort of prediction based on the average of their opinions. This is the case even if you know that some of the Statheads are better (lower forecast standard error) than others—it is wise to include all of them in your average.

If we live in an Idiot’s world, then you’re kinda up the river without a paddle.




If you have a question for the Roster Doctor email here. Emails in simple text with players' full names properly spelled are much more likely to get responses. Also be sure to include your league's player pool (mixed, AL-only, NL-only), number of teams, scoring format (roto, head-to-head, points, etc.), categories, whether or not it's a keeper league, and any other pertinent information.

<< Return to Article Torre talks of tears from The Hardball Times

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Torre talks of tears

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Heilman to the Mariners and then the Cubs from The Hardball Times

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Heilman to the Mariners and then the Cubs

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Will Clark to the Giants from The Hardball Times

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Will Clark to the Giants

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Well, at least he’s rested . . . from The Hardball Times

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Well, at least he’s rested . . .

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article The Marlins’ moment of truth from The Hardball Times

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The Marlins’ moment of truth

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Mitchell and the Middle East from The Hardball Times

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Mitchell and the Middle East

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Bidding John Updike Adieu from The Hardball Times

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Bidding John Updike Adieu

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Mascots from The Hardball Times

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Mascots

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Today at THT from The Hardball Times

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Today at THT

by Craig Calcaterra
January 28, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article BOB: Cubs Sold from The Hardball Times

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BOB: Cubs Sold

by Brian Borawski
January 28, 2009

Tribune and Ricketts family enter into exclusive negotiations


There are still a lot of details to get through, but it looks like the future owner of the Chicago Cubs will be Tom Ricketts and his family. Ricketts is best known as the founder of the online discount brokerage firm called TD Ameritrade and he’s also the chief executive at Incapital, an investment bank in Chicago.

The final price is right around $900 million, which is less than the $1 billion number that was being thrown around earlier in the year. The purchase includes Wrigley Field as well a 25 percent interest in Comcast SportsNet, a regional sports network. Already, there’s talk about adding more seats to the Cubs’ ballpark as well as adding a stadium club. One thing it appears that the Ricketts won’t do is sell the naming rights to Wrigley.

Not that there isn’t enough Cubs news, but the team has sued Under Armour over its advertisements in Wrigley’s outfield. The Cubs sued the apparel maker for going back on its five-year, $10.8 million sponsorship deal that consists of having the Under Armour logo plastered on the outfield doors. Under Armour has responded by saying that it was the Cubs who backed out of the deal and then neither side could agree on something new.

Reds extend Triple-A deal with Louisville


The Cincinnati Reds and Louisville Bats recently announced an extension of their player development contract through the 2012 season. The original deal had the Bats as the Reds' Triple-A affiliate through the 2010 season. Louisville has been the Reds' affiliate since 2000 when the team opened up Louisville Slugger Field.

Louisville is one of those forgotten towns when it comes to baseball, but what a lot of people forget is that at one time, Louisville sported a major league team. The Louisville Colonels were part of the National League up through 1899; it was the first major league team for which Hall of Famer Honus Wagner played. Louisville's also at or near the top every year in minor league attendance, so it's quite the baseball town.

Commerce Bank Park gets a roof


Mayflies have caused quite a few complaints over the years at Commerce Bank Park in Harrisburg, Penn. The bugs have been a constant nuisance since the stadium opened in 1987. Now, with the help of a combined city- and state-funded renovation project, a roof is set to be added to the stadium for the start of the 2010 season.

Another big improvement to the home of the Harrisburg Senators is that the old bleacher seats will be replaced by individual chair-back seats. Both of these items will be in the second stage of the renovations and in 2009, fans will get to enjoy a boardwalk along the perimeter of the outfield as well as a new box office and retail stores.

Rangers, Kevin Millwood to build youth ballpark


Texas Rangers pitcher Kevin Millwood, in conjunction with the Texas Rangers Baseball Foundation, recently announced plans for the construction of the Kevin Millwood Texas Rangers Ballpark. The park will be part of the Boys and Girls Clubs of Arlington’s new National Semiconductor Sports Complex; it’s the 10th youth ballpark built by the Rangers Foundation. Construction is set to begin in February and finish in May at a cost of $101,250.

Brian Borawski is a member of SABR's Business of Baseball Committee and writes about the Detroit Tigers at his own website, TigerBlog. He welcomes comments, questions and suggestions via e-mail.

<< Return to Article Introducing: CAPS Road Park Factors from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Introducing: CAPS Road Park Factors

by Derek Carty
January 28, 2009

image
Everyone knows Dan Haren is a great pitcher, but could he be even better than we think?
(Icon/SMI)

As I'm sure all of our regular readers know (and all the ones Rob Neyer sent over here), a couple of weeks ago I unveiled a new stat that I called CAPS (Context Adjusted Pitching Statistics). If you aren't familiar, I'd definitely suggest checking out that article, but to briefly summarize, CAPS adjusts a pitcher's peripheral numbers based on a number of different contexts to give us a better idea about what that pitcher should be expected to do going forward.

Up until now, CAPS adjusted for home ballpark, quality of batters faced, and any league change. Today, I'd like to add one more adjustment to the mix: road ballpark factors.

As we know (and as David Gassko covered thoroughly in this article) ballparks can have a significant effect on just about every stat we fantasy players look at: everything from runs and home runs to strikeouts, walks and ground balls. For the majority of baseball players, we tend to ignore these effects because they remain on the same team from one year to the next. The context remains exactly the same, so it has no bearing on our expectations.

Have you ever considered, though, what the effects might be of all of the games that are played on the road? While a player may play all of his home games in the same environment, his mix of road stadiums will undoubtedly differ from year to year. When most everyone talks about ballpark factors, they talk about the home ballpark impacting the numbers, working under the assumption that the road side is completely neutral. This, however, is simply not true.

A pitcher who happens to throw a disproportionate number of times in PETCO and AT&T Park will be helped in the home run department simply as a matter of context, the same as a pitcher who throws too often in Coors and Chase Field will be hurt. So with the help of Retrosheet, I've calculated an individualized "Road Park Factor" for each pitcher using his exact blend of road ballparks (and the time spent in each) for every year back to 2004 and for every stat we care about, neutralized it, and then applied a 2009 factor based on the exact 2009 road schedule for every team.

Method


Only read this if you're interested in hearing a little more about exactly what I did. If you're not interested, you know all you need to and can skip to the next section.

The method used is pretty intuitive, but to elaborate just a bit further, I calculated each pitcher's road park factor by weighting each park he played in depending on the number of opportunities he had to accumulate each stat. To come up with the strikeout factor, for instance, I looked at every non-HBP batter faced. For all types of hits and batted balls, I looked at all fair, contacted balls. (If it makes it easier, think about it in terms of Pizza Cutter's flow chart.) Once I arrived at the factor, I simply applied it to each pitcher's road stat line.

The one other note I need to make deals with batted-ball types (ground balls, infield flies, etc.). Because Retrosheet classifies these differently than Baseball Info Solutions does, I wasn't able to apply these factors to the pitcher's road stat line. Instead, for batted balls, I had to cut the pitcher's full-year line in half, applying the road factors to one half and the home factors to the other half. It shouldn't make that much difference, but it does need to be noted.

After coming up with these factors and neutralizing the player's line for each year, I then took each team's 2009 road schedule and combined the ballparks appropriately. I then applied this factor to every year we'll look at to put all of the numbers into the context of 2009, which is what we care about.

CAPS: Where we're at


To summarize, the CAPS numbers you'll be seeing going forward take all of the following into account:
  • Past home ballpark
  • 2009 home ballpark
  • Past road ballparks
  • 2009 road ballparks
  • Past quality of opponents (neutralized)
  • League switch adjustments
  • Ground balls adjusted for league average line drive rate (called xGB)

How large is the road ballpark impact?


As I noted earlier, baseball analysts have long ignored road park factors, assuming these things are neutral. While logically we know this isn't true, could it just be that the effects are so small that this is a fair assumption to make? Let's take a look at the leaders and trailers for 2008 and find out.

Note: The "a" before each stat in the third column stands for "adjusted." This is what the player's stat would look like if it was neutralized for road park. Also, because more strikeouts are good and fewer walks, homers, and hits are bad, the tables are arranged so that the five unluckiest are always on top and the five luckiest are always on the bottom, regardless of stat.
+------------------+-----+-------+------+      +-----------------+-----+------+------+
| PLAYER           | K   | aK    | DIFF |      | PLAYER          | BB  | aBB  | DIFF |
+------------------+-----+-------+------+      +-----------------+-----+------+------+
| Gil Meche        | 104 | 108.5 |  4.5 |      | Miguel Batista  |  34 | 33.0 |  1.0 |
| Ubaldo Jimenez   | 100 | 104.5 |  4.5 |      | Jeff Suppan     |  33 | 32.1 |  0.9 |
| Jorge de la Rosa |  62 |  65.9 |  3.9 |      | Manny Parra     |  30 | 29.1 |  0.9 |
| Zack Greinke     |  93 |  96.8 |  3.8 |      | Felix Hernandez |  32 | 31.1 |  0.9 |
| Josh Beckett     | 105 | 108.2 |  3.2 |      | Dave Bush       |  24 | 23.1 |  0.9 |
| ..................................... |      | ................................... |
| Chad Billingsley |  89 |  86.3 |  2.7 |      | Zach Duke       |  21 | 21.6 |  0.6 |
| Felix Hernandez  |  78 |  75.3 |  2.7 |      | Phil Dumatrait  |  24 | 24.7 |  0.7 |
| Jake Peavy       |  67 |  64.2 |  2.8 |      | Paul Maholm     |  29 | 29.8 |  0.8 |
| Cole Hamels      | 106 | 102.7 |  3.3 |      | Tom Gorzelanny  |  34 | 34.9 |  0.9 |
| Ricky Nolasco    | 106 | 101.5 |  4.5 |      | Ian Snell       |  44 | 45.3 |  1.3 |
+------------------+-----+-------+------+      +-----------------+-----+------+------+

+----------------+------+--------+------+       +-----------------+-----+------+------+
| PLAYER         | H-HR | aH-aHR | DIFF |       | PLAYER          | HR  | aHR  | DIFF |
+----------------+------+--------+------+       +-----------------+-----+------+------+
| Jon Lester     |   93 |   90.1 |  2.9 |       | Javier Vazquez  |  14 | 12.6 |  1.4 |
| Jon Garland    |   99 |   96.3 |  2.7 |       | Shaun Marcum    |  14 | 12.6 |  1.4 |
| Josh Beckett   |   78 |   75.8 |  2.2 |       | Brett Myers     |  16 | 14.6 |  1.4 |
| Joe Saunders   |   75 |   72.9 |  2.1 |       | Aaron Harang    |  16 | 14.7 |  1.3 |
| Jeff Weaver    |   88 |   86.0 |  2.1 |       | Gavin Floyd     |  12 | 10.7 |  1.3 |
| ..................................... |       | ................................... |
| Kyle Kendrick  |   97 |   99.6 |  2.6 |       | Scott Olsen     |  18 | 19.0 |  1.0 |
| Mike Mussina   |   87 |   89.8 |  2.8 |       | Jon Garland     |  12 | 13.0 |  1.0 |
| Andy Pettitte  |  103 |  106.0 |  3.0 |       | Nate Robertson  |  16 | 17.0 |  1.0 |
| Cliff Lee      |  113 |  116.4 |  3.4 |       | Todd Wellemeyer |  13 | 14.0 |  1.0 |
| Carlos Silva   |  121 |  124.8 |  3.8 |       | Brian Bannister |  14 | 15.0 |  1.0 |
+----------------+------+--------+------+       +-----------------+-----+------+------+

Looking at our four leaderboards (the one on the bottom left represents all singles, doubles and triples, if it isn't clear), we can see that the effects aren't huge, but they are there. Obviously the biggest raw differences are seen with strikeouts and hits because they are more numerous to begin with, but these effects are pretty large even in a relative sense.

With 4.5 more strikeouts, Gil Meche's K/9 would have jumped 0.2 points from 7.8 to 8.0. Twenty previously unaccounted for points of K/9 is huge. In terms of walks, the effects are much smaller, with Felix Hernandez's BB/9 falling from 3.59 to just 3.55 and Miguel Batista's from 6.18 to 6.11. Even Ian Snell's would only have risen 0.08 points.

Looking at home runs, though, we see some big changes. Aaron Harang's HR/FB would have fallen from 15.3 to 14.7, which explains a sizable portion of his unlucky-looking HR/FB this year. It's very nice to be able to write it off to a specific cause instead of simply to "bad luck" (although it wouldn't really be wrong to do).

Of course, we're dealing with the extremes, but you can see that the assumption that road effects are neutral is simply not true. Also, while these effects won't be very large for many players, the whole point is to add this onto our current CAPS system. When we combine all of the different effects—even if any one is small in isolation—we can see some big differences in value. And that, I believe, is what fantasy leaguers care about. If this can highlight for us just a few undervalued players or help us to avoid a few overvalued ones, this becomes a powerful, powerful tool.

Also of interest (albeit perhaps more to the non-fantasy crowd) is the groupings, which some of you may have picked up on. If you notice, all five of the luckiest in walks are Pirates. Three of the unluckiest with walks are Brewers. The unluckiest with hits are all Red Sox and Angels. Two of the unluckiest with strikeouts are Royals and two are Rockies. As this started as an exercise to determine "divisional park effects" (the inspiration for which came from commenter Nick on the original CAPS article), it's not surprising to see players of the same team appear on the lists together.

Derek Lowe


I didn't get a chance to post a full article about Lowe when he signed with the Braves, so we'll take a quick look at him now.
+------+------+-------+---------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| YEAR | LAST | FIRST | TEAM    | IP    | QERA | K/9  | BB/9 | K/BB RI | xGB% | BABIP | HR/FB |
+------+------+-------+---------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2005 | Lowe | Derek | Dodgers | 222.0 | 3.88 | 5.92 | 2.23 |    0.04 | 59.4 | 0.286 |  21.4 |
| 2005 | Lowe | Derek | Braves* | 222.0 | 3.91 | 6.06 | 2.16 |    0.05 | 59.2 | 0.276 |  20.0 |
+------+------+-------+---------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2006 | Lowe | Derek | Dodgers | 218.0 | 4.09 | 5.08 | 2.27 |   -0.19 | 63.8 | 0.293 |  12.3 |
| 2006 | Lowe | Derek | Braves* | 218.0 | 4.15 | 5.05 | 2.17 |   -0.22 | 63.6 | 0.281 |  11.0 |
+------+------+-------+---------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2007 | Lowe | Derek | Dodgers | 199.3 | 3.75 | 6.64 | 2.66 |    0.13 | 62.8 | 0.292 |  17.9 |
| 2007 | Lowe | Derek | Braves* | 199.3 | 3.76 | 6.62 | 2.54 |    0.11 | 62.6 | 0.281 |  15.8 |
+------+------+-------+---------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2008 | Lowe | Derek | Dodgers | 211.0 | 3.65 | 6.27 | 1.92 |    0.15 | 57.8 | 0.286 |  10.1 |
| 2008 | Lowe | Derek | Braves* | 211.0 | 3.62 | 6.16 | 1.62 |    0.18 | 58.3 | 0.276 |   9.0 |
+------+------+-------+---------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+

Nothing of much interest here. Lowe's adjustments are minimal, as will be the case with a lot of players. I normally try writing about the players who are more interesting, but as Lowe is a guy I'm sure many of you have been wondering about ... ta-da! As I said earlier, though, the value in the CAPS system won't be the guys that it values the same, but rather the guys who it sees a big difference in. Check out our next player for a case like that.

Lowe is obviously an extreme groundball pitcher, though he does manage to strike out about as many batters as a league-average pitcher. This has value in fantasy leagues, as does his mid-3.00s ERA. Overall, taking Lowe in the round 12-to-15-area of a traditional, 12-team mixed league should get you a fine player. He seems to struggle a little with home runs, but he keeps his BABIP pretty low, and the move from the Dodgers to the Braves could help. The UZR difference between the two was 4.8 per 150 last year.

Dan Haren


We covered Haren in the original CAPS article, but he seems to have also caught a string of bad luck on the road—particularly with strikeouts—and we didn't look at all of his numbers last time.
+------+-------+----------+-------+------+-----+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| YEAR | LAST  | TEAM     | IP    | QERA | K/9 | BB/9 | K/BB RI | xGB% | BABIP | HR/FB |
+------+-------+----------+-------+------+-----+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2006 | Haren | A's      | 223.0 | 3.75 | 7.1 |  1.8 |    0.44 |   45 | 0.292 |  14.2 |
| 2006 | Haren | D'Backs* | 223.0 | 3.49 | 7.6 |  1.6 |    0.57 |   45 | 0.299 |  16.0 |
+------+-------+----------+-------+------+-----+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2007 | Haren | A's      | 222.7 | 3.71 | 7.8 |  2.2 |    0.52 |   44 | 0.292 |  10.5 |
| 2007 | Haren | D'Backs* | 222.7 | 3.54 | 8.4 |  2.3 |    0.63 |   43 | 0.301 |  11.9 |
+------+-------+----------+-------+------+-----+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2008 | Haren | A's      | 216.0 | 3.17 | 8.6 |  1.7 |    0.81 |   45 | 0.308 |   9.7 |
| 2008 | Haren | D'Backs* | 216.0 | 2.76 | 9.5 |  1.4 |    1.09 |   46 | 0.310 |   9.3 |
+------+-------+----------+-------+------+-----+------+---------+------+-------+-------+

As you can see, Haren has had some terrible luck for a few years now. In terms of his strikeout rate, he's probably the unluckiest pitcher in baseball over the past three years.

This bad luck wasn't quite as pronounced in past years (and part of those past years' numbers are due to the league change, so he really shouldn't have been expected to post them with the A's), but in 2008 Haren really deserved much better. His strikeout rate was almost a point too low, and his QERA was a ridiculous 2.76. 2008's actual QERA leader was C.C. Sabathia's Brewers stint at 2.89, to put things into perspective.

We shouldn't expect him to post identical numbers in 2009, but he has steadily risen four years in a row, will be 28 years old, and should have a good deal of luck catching up with him. His current Mock Draft Central ADP is 57.39, which would put him at the end of the fourth round in a 12-team league, though I have seen him go in the sixth. I'm not a fan of taking pitchers that early, but if Haren falls into the eighth or ninth round, I don't imagine I'll be passing him up. If the strategy you're employing allows you to take starters earlier than that, Haren seems like a very good choice.

Concluding thoughts


As I said in the original CAPS article, if you guys have any ideas for further things we could adjust for, feel free to contact me. If you have any questions about CAPS or anything fantasy baseball related, also don't hesitate.

Errata


In the original CAPS article, I accidentally applied the home ballpark factors to Javier Vazquez's entire line instead of just the home side. This has been fixed, and the new CAPS numbers (with road ballpark adjustments included) are displayed below. As you can tell, very little changes, and my evaluation remains the same; Vazquez makes a great fantasy pick this year.

Javier Vazquez
+------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| YEAR | IP    | QERA | K/9  | BB/9 | K/BB RI | xGB% | BABIP | HR/FB |
+------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2006 | 202.7 | 3.84 |  8.2 |  2.5 |    0.59 |   40 | 0.311 |  10.7 |
| 2006 | 202.7 | 3.37 |  9.4 |  2.3 |    0.87 |   40 | 0.311 |   9.0 |
+------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2007 | 216.7 | 3.34 |  8.8 |  2.1 |    0.84 |   38 | 0.294 |  12.1 |
| 2007 | 216.7 | 2.89 | 10.1 |  2.0 |    1.15 |   39 | 0.298 |  10.1 |
+------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+
| 2008 | 208.3 | 3.76 |  8.6 |  2.6 |    0.62 |   39 | 0.320 |  11.3 |
| 2008 | 208.3 | 3.30 |  9.7 |  2.4 |    0.95 |   39 | 0.319 |   9.6 |
+------+-------+------+------+------+---------+------+-------+-------+


Derek Carty, 23, has also been published by NBC's Rotoworld, Sports Illustrated, FOX Sports, and USA Today. This season, he'll be contributing to FanDuel and will be linking to all of his work at DerekCarty.com. In his three years competing in expert leagues, he has won 2 titles with 4 top three finishes, including a LABR NL title in 2009, making him the youngest person to ever win a major expert league title. Derek is a proud graduate of the MLB Scouting Bureau's Scout Development Program and is a firm believer in the importance of combining stats and scouting. He welcomes questions via e-mail, Facebook, or Twitter.

<< Return to Article The truth about Scott Boras from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The truth about Scott Boras

by Jack Marshall
January 28, 2009

The ethics of player agent Scott Boras have been a topic of debate before, but never more than during the Hot Stove season of 2008. As in earlier seasons, however, most of the discussion has focused on how "tough" Boras is on behalf of his clients, and how he ruthlessly squeezes every last cent of remuneration out of teams wishing to employ them. Being a tough negotiator, of course, is not unethical, and neither is seeking the best contract possible, even at the risk of eroding a player’s popularity and incurring the wrath of team executives. Still, Scott Boras is demonstrably unethical in his professional practices in one important respect, beyond any reasonable argument, but not in the ways most people think he is.

Much of the criticism of Boras as unethical is, in fact, misdirected. He is an agent, which means that he acts on behalf of his clients, after consultation with his clients, in their employ and at their pleasure. It was not Scott Boras who executed the escape provisions of J.D. Drew’s Dodger contract; it was J.D. Drew. Boras certainly told Drew that he thought the injury-prone outfielder could better his financial status by truncating his commitment, but it was up to Drew whether to do it or not.

Similarly, it was Alex Rodriquez, not Boras, who ultimately was responsible for exercising his option to become (for however short a time) a free agent to express his need for a contract greater than $25 million a year. The media like to portray Boras as the puppeteer figure in the original logo of "The Godfather," but his puppets have complete power over the strings. They can also fire the puppeteer. They can refuse to do as he advises. If you don’t like the way Boras is negotiating for a player, blame the player. Legally, logically and ethically, the client, not the agent, is responsible.

There is nothing stopping a Boras client, say, Jason Varitek, from telling his agent, "I want to stay in Boston. Get the best deal you can, but get me a deal with the Red Sox. Posture, threaten, beg: I don’t care. I want the most years, at the most money, that team will pay me. That’s your assignment." If Boras comes back to Varitek and says, "Sorry, Jason, they didn’t offer what I thought was a good enough deal, so you’re going to play in Pittsburgh!", he’s guilty of professional malpractice. Varitek could fire him and should sue him: he’s violated his duties to his client. Boras literally cannot call the shots.

Negotiating to accomplish the client’s objectives, however, is Boras’ domain, and here he has a lot of latitude. Again, a client could order him not to use especially obnoxious or aggressive bargaining methods on his behalf, and perhaps some have done that—if they did, Boras would be bound to comply. But even without such orders, Boras must stay within certain ethical lines, fuzzy though they may be, or be regarded as an unethical negotiator. If he crossed those lines with any regularity, Boras would be jeopardizing his clients’ welfare and his own career, so we must presume that he does not habitually cross them. Tough negotiation is effective negotiation. But unethical negotiation is neither acceptable nor effective.

Whatever that is. Despite scores of seminars, treatises, court cases and books, negotiation remains securely in an ethical gray area, where even professionals who have spent their careers making careful distinctions cannot agree what is and what is not ethical negotiation technique. Many of Boras’ signature tactics, however, are well within bounds. When he argues that Varitek, a .220 hitter in 2008, is a "premium catcher" who is worth a multi-year contract in excess of $10 million a season, or when he compares pitcher Oliver Perez—he of the 55-60 lifetime record with a 4.20 ERA—to Sandy Koufax, Boras is engaging in the time-honored negotiation practice of "puffing."

Although puffing often feels like lying, it isn’t; it is part of the negotiation ritual. Puffing is the exaggeration, hyperbole and bluffing endemic to the marketplace. In general, when a statement in negotiation involves a party’s future intentions, current desires, the negotiator’s opinion (even when stated as fact) or the negotiator’s characterization of the quality of the product being sold or what a "fair" price is, it is probably puffing. When a statement involves materially misrepresenting other facts material to the transaction, it is likely to be lying, and thus unethical negotiation.

Note the contrast:

Puffing: My client is in the best shape of his life. (He is healthy, but no healthier than ever.)
Lying: My client is healthy. (Actually, he has disclosed to me that he has been diagnosed with a rare muscle disease that will not be detected in a physical.)

Puffing: My client is a man of great character and a positive role model. (He has admitted to me that he has experimented with HGH.)
Lying: My client would never use performance-enhancing drugs. (But he has in the past.)

Puffing: If that’s your best offer, we’ll do better elsewhere. (When there is no other offer likely to be better, and if the team answers, "Well, that’s as high as we’re going," my client will say, "Take it!")
Lying: My client has higher offers than that. (But he doesn’t.)

Puffing: My client will not be happy with any fewer than four years. (Although my client specifically said that he would accept a three-year offer.)
Lying: My client says he will accept no fewer than four years. (When, in fact, he has said the exact opposite.)

The ethical distinctions are based, to a great extent, on an assumption that all parties are sophisticated and well acquainted with the coded language of the negotiation ritual. To a novice, the statement "This is my final offer!" might well seem like a statement of fact when it is actually a negotiating tactic. But truly deceiving sophisticated bargainers, like those Boras deals with, crosses the ethical lines into bad faith. Bad faith occurs when a negotiator deceives his or her adversary to achieve a deal that is unfair, based on misrepresentations.

We don’t know whether Boras engages in bad faith tactics. It is possible that the Boston Red Sox thought he was doing so when they (supposedly) pulled out of negotiations for the services of Mark Teixeira this winter, believing that Boras was citing imaginary offers by other teams to drive their offer up. But if all he said was that he knew he could get a higher offer, he was within the ethical boundaries. And, as it turned out, a higher offer was out there, as usual, in the Bronx.

The most recently cited example of unethical conduct by Boras was last year’s drama involving Pittsburgh draftee Pedro Alvarez. Alvarez, against the advice of Boras, agreed verbally to a $6 million minor league contract with the Pirates as the deadline to sign draftees was closing to its last seconds. Pittsburgh missed the deadline for filing the contract terms with Major League Baseball by two minutes, and Alvarez reneged on his oral agreement. After an arbitrator, the players' union and MLB weighed in, the Pirates capitulated and agreed to a longer agreement with Alvarez, four years rather than two.

There was no unethical conduct by Boras. He told his client what his client had a right to know: that because the original contract was filed late, it was not binding (in his opinion), and that Alvarez might be able to get a better deal if he did not agree to abide by his oral agreement, which (again, in Boras’s opinion) was unenforceable. Alvarez was perfectly free to stick to his word, which would have been the honorable thing to do.

But the rules and the law did not require him to do that, and not only was it not unethical for Boras to advise him of that factor, it would have been unethical and incompetent for Boras not to tell Alvarez that he could legally withdraw his verbal agreement. Alvarez, not Boras, was the decision maker. And again, the sequence of events worked out to Alvarez’s advantage. Nobody lied. Nobody bargained in bad faith. Boras gave necessary and accurate legal advice to his client, and his client acted accordingly.

Boras was able to give accurate advice to Alvarez because he is a lawyer. The professional ethical requirements on a lawyer serving as a sports agent are more stringent than on a non-lawyer, and this is part of Boras’ real ethical problem.

I regard Boras’ activity as an agent as the practice of law, though this is an unsettled matter and not all legal ethicists agree. A non-lawyer can be an agent, but the role of sports agent is one of several hybrid roles, including lobbying and estate and tax planning, that are often regarded as the practice of law when performed by a lawyer. And if the agent ever gives legal advice—and it strains credulity to believe that Boras does not—then there is no doubt: the agent is, for all intents and purposes, acting as a lawyer. As a lawyer, he is bound by the lawyer’s ethics rules.

As a lawyer, Scott Boras is absolutely violating the conflict of interest rules. He is defying a basic conflict problem called the Zero-Sum Conflict.

Imagine you are a lawyer who is retained by a parent to sue a school district in a sexual molestation case. You believe you can win and are pretty sure that you have a chance to break the bank and take almost all the assets of the district. Now another client comes to you wanting to sue a school in the same district to get damages for a horrible injury sustained by her child on a defective jungle gym. You can’t take the second case. If you achieve the objective of the first client, there won’t be money left for the second one. If you achieve the goals of one, you can’t possibly achieve the goals of the other.

The remedy for conflicts of interest is often informed consent. If both clients completely understand the implications of hiring the same lawyer to sue the same client with limited resources, can’t they just decide to trust the lawyer and hire you anyway?

The answer is no. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, specifically Rule 1.7, declare that the waiver of all parties is sufficient to waive the conflict only if the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation of one client won’t interfere with the representation of the other. In this situation, you can’t reasonably believe that, because it is impossible. To the extent that you help one client, you hurt the other. It is an unwaivable conflict.

Scott Boras has a number of these unwaivable conflicts this free agent season, as he has in the past. With three clients—C.C. Sabathia, Manny Ramirez, and Mark Teixeira—seeking in excess of $20 million a year, Boras had a classic Zero-Sum Conflict. At best, a handful of teams were able and willing to commit such resources, with only the Yankees a realistic candidate to sign more than one of the three premium players.

If the Yankees were the team most likely to contest the Dodgers for Manny Ramirez, in the event that New York did not wrap up Teixeira, Boras was undermining his own client’s bargaining power by helping Teixeira reach an agreement with New York. If the Angels signed Sabathia, as was a realistic possibility, it would have made the team an unlikely bidder for Teixeira or Ramirez. Sports commentators, talking heads and bloggers sensed this, speculating that Boras might "steer" Teixeira to an East Coast team to keep open a West Coast landing place for Manny. But Boras cannot ethically manipulate one client’s fate to benefit another. For a lawyer, doing so is grounds for bar discipline; for a non-lawyer, it is simply disloyal and wrong.

Boras represents two fading, star veteran catchers: Ivan Rodriquez and Jason Varitek. The Red Sox, with a veteran pitching staff, would like a veteran catcher. Varitek has appeal to Boston because he has anchored the team for over a decade and has been the team captain; Rodriguez might be attractive because, based on last season at least, his skills have not declined as steeply. With two different agents, I-Rod and Tek would be competing with each other for the job in Boston or other teams seeking a veteran catcher. But with the same agent, such competition is either impossible or unethical.

Scott Boras has over 60 major league clients, and most of them are not free agents. But unwaivable conflicts can arise with these as well. Several years ago, Boras client Bernie Williams was trying to hold on to his job as the New York Yankee center fielder, and Boras free agent client Carlos Beltran was eager to play center field in New York. He ended up signing with the Mets. Boras was ready to negotiate with the Yankees as well, evidently—ethically, he had to be, or he would not be serving Beltran’s interests. But if he was successful bargaining with the Yankees on behalf of Beltran, he would have been simultaneously sabotaging Williams, negotiating him out of a job. One way or the other, he was conflicted.

Two arguments are made to justify the conflicts of Boras and other sports agents who put themselves in the same position. The first is that classic rationalization of all bad conduct, "it’s done all the time" (or its ever-popular variant, "everybody does it"). That is certainly true, and Boras is far from the most egregious example. At one point years ago, an agent named Leigh Steinberg represented almost half the starting quarterbacks in the NFL. But such conflicting representations are still inherently unethical, because the conflicted agent cannot do what the agent promises to do when taking on a client: use his or her talents and skills to assist every client without harming any client.

The other argument is, as another legal ethicist recently said in an online exchange with me, "the players ought to have the right to choose Boras so long as they knowingly and intelligently understand that his loyalties will be divided." I would say, first of all, that getting Manny Ramirez, for example, to "knowingly and intelligently" agree that his agent can trade off his welfare for that of Mark Teixeira, costing Ramirez money in the process, is impossible on many levels, some of them unkind to articulate. But more important, the rules of legal ethics say that a client can only consent to conflicts the lawyer honestly and sensibly believes will be harmless. A client cannot consent to being screwed over, in other words, and it is unethical for lawyers to even offer them that choice.

And Scott Boras is a lawyer. He has too many clients to serve all of their interests well and fairly, and whether or not they understand this, he should, and almost certainly does. Out of hubris, arrogance, or greed, Boras continues to engage in unwaivable conflicts of interest. The truth is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is Boras’ clients, not his negotiating adversaries, who are the victims of his unethical conduct.

References and Resources
As more than one reader has pointed out, CC Sabathia isn't a Boras client. My apologies for the error.

Jack Marshall is a professional ethicist, writer, lawyer and lifetime baseball enthusiast. He is the president of ProEthics, a national ethics training firm, and the writer of the Ethics Scoreboard.

<< Return to Article TUCK! sez: Cha-ching, 2K9 from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

TUCK! sez: Cha-ching, 2K9

by Tuck
January 28, 2009

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Follow TUCK! on Twitter: @ TUCKsez
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<< Return to Article Dibble to the Nats from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Dibble to the Nats

by Craig Calcaterra
January 27, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article The People in my Neighborhood from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The People in my Neighborhood

by Craig Calcaterra
January 27, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Charm City gets more charming from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Charm City gets more charming

by Craig Calcaterra
January 27, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article The Cubs must protect this house from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The Cubs must protect this house

by Craig Calcaterra
January 27, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Chris Needham returns from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Chris Needham returns

by Craig Calcaterra
January 27, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Today at THT from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Today at THT

by Craig Calcaterra
January 27, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article First pitch fastballs, and who likes ‘em from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

First pitch fastballs, and who likes ‘em

by Josh Kalk
January 27, 2009

image
Eric Byrnes has a reputation of being a first pitch fastball hitter, but how does he stack up with the rest of the league? (Icon/SMI)


You often hear a baseball commentator say a hitter is a first pitch fastball hitter. This usually means that he goes up to the plate looking for a fastball on the first pitch and he is likely to swing at it if he gets it. Eric Byrnes is a great example of a player with this reputation. If you have watched a Diamondbacks game in the past couple of seasons, you have likely heard some version of this about Byrnes.

The problem is that such comments aren't very quantitative. How much does Byrnes swing at first pitch fastballs? How picky is he about where the pitch is located? How successful is he when he does swing? And, in addition to the raw numbers, we would like to be able to compare them to league averages so we really can say if he is a first pitch fastball hitter compared to others. Despite all the splits information for players out on the web, statistics like this aren't available because you first need to identify the fastballs. Luckily for us, with some help from PITCHf/x identifying first pitch fastballs is rather easy. From that sample we can quantify who the first pitch fastball hitters really are.

Method

For this study I looked at every hitter who had at least 100 plate appearances in which PITCHf/x was tracking pitches. I put the cutoff at 100 because I wanted a reasonable number of first pitch fastballs for each player and I wanted a large enough sample to ensure teams would have a decent scouting report on the hitter so I could look at pitcher response. This left me with 437 players in my sample.

I then used my pitch classification algorithm to identify if the first pitch was a fastball (two- or four-seamed) and I used my strike zone tool from last week to determine if the pitch was a strike by the MLB-defined strike zone. I now have enough data to calculate league averages for variables like first pitch fastball percent and how often a player swung at a first pitch fastball out of the strike zone.

While the mean is nice, these data also fit very well to a Normal (Gaussian) Distribution, so calculating the standard deviation is also very useful. I can then not only report the raw data for each player, but also how far he is from the mean. For example, if I say that a hitter has been thrown one standard deviation more first pitch fastballs, that means 84 percent of major league hitters saw fewer first pitch fastballs than he did. If you aren't familiar with how these standard deviations work here is a good description.

Results

We can now go metric by metric and look at the league average and the 10 highest and lowest players for that metric. Starting with percentage of first pitch fastballs a batter sees, which has a mean of 67.2 percent and a standard deviation of 6.8 percent, on any count the chance of a hitter getting a fastball is about 60 percent, so the first pitch is slightly a fastball count.

First Last FB% SD
Brett Gardner 87.7 3.0
Luis Castillo 86.3 2.8
Cliff Pennington 84.8 2.6
Reggie Willits 84.6 2.6
Ramon Santiago 83.5 2.4
Alex Cora 83.3 2.4
Brad Ausmus 83.1 2.3
Omar Vizquel 82.1 2.2
Adam Everett 82.1 2.2
Alexi Casilla 81.6 2.1


First Last FB% SD
Geovany Soto 47.6 -2.9
Alexei Ramirez 50.6 -2.4
Miguel Olivo 51.0 -2.4
Marlon Anderson 51.7 -2.3
Pedro Feliz 51.8 -2.2
Pablo Sandoval 52.5 -2.1
Ryan Howard 52.8 -2.1
Hunter Pence 53.9 -1.9
Nomar Garciaparra 54.0 -1.9
Corey Hart 54.2 -1.9


The players on the list for the highest first pitch fastball percentage are players you might expect to be there: mostly weak hitting middle infielders and catchers (a few other catchers just missed the cut) with little power. Pitchers aren't scared of giving these guys a cookie because they aren't likely to do much with it anyway, so the pitcher might as well try to get the at-bat over with as soon as possible.

On the other hand, the players with the lowest first pitch fastball percentage are a mix of some feared hitters (Dan Uggla just missed the cut) and some players with a reputation of swinging at just about anything. Players like Hunter Pence and Corey Hart rarely walk and generally go to the plate looking for something to hit. It doesn't make sense to give in to these guys, especially early in the count.

Next is percentage of first pitch fastballs thrown inside the MLB-defined strike zone. The mean here was 49.2 with a standard deviation of 5.2. That mean was much lower than I expected, since we all know how important getting strike one is. Here are the highest and lowest strike percentages.

First Last Strike% SD
Guillermo Quiroz 66.1 3.3
Dave Roberts 64.9 3.0
Chin-lung Hu 64.5 3.0
Brian Barton 61.3 2.3
Nick Hundley 60.5 2.2
Argenis Reyes 60.3 2.1
Sean Rodriguez 60.0 2.1
Humberto Quintero 59.8 2.1
German Duran 59.8 2.1
J.R. Towles 59.8 2.1


First Last Strike% SD
Javier Valentin 31.7 -3.4
Prince Fielder 35.4 -2.7
Dmitri Young 35.7 -2.6
Jacque Jones 36.7 -2.4
Vladimir Guerrero 37.8 -2.2
Mike Jacobs 38.0 -2.2
Victor Martinez 38.7 -2.0
Josh Hamilton 38.9 -2.0
John Baker 39.1 -2.0
Matthew Joyce 39.1 -2.0


Again, the players with the highest strike percentage are the guys you would expect. None of these are dangerous with the bat, so the pitcher is trying to get the ball over and get the at-bat done as quickly as possible. The lowest strike percentage list is loaded with some big names and power hitters. Some are known as free swingers, so why throw them a strike if you don't have to, and that starts with the first pitch of the at-bat. It is interesting to see Josh Hamilton on the list. Despite a fabulous 2008, Hamilton swung at more than his fair share of balls out of the strike zone. It didn't seem to bother him, but if that continues, look for pitchers to throw him fewer and strikes.

When you think of first pitch fastball hitters, though, you think of guys who swing the bat when they get what they are looking for. This is best represented by the player's swing percentage at first pitch fastballs regardless of whether the pitch is a strike. The league average here is 37.6 percent and the standard deviation is a whopping 11.0. That means that there is huge variation among hitters in this case.

First Last Swing% SD
Alexei Ramirez 77.7 3.6
Pablo Sandoval 77.0 3.6
Wily Mo Pena 70.3 3.0
Miguel Olivo 64.2 2.4
Wilson Betemit 64.0 2.4
Alex Cintron 63.7 2.4
John McDonald 63.0 2.3
Eugenio Velez 62.5 2.3
Joey Gathright 61.9 2.2
John Buck 60.2 2.0


First Last Swing% SD
Bobby Abreu 9.0 -2.6
Scott Podsednik 9.4 -2.6
Jayson Werth 11.3 -2.4
J.J. Hardy 14.6 -2.1
Luis Castillo 15.5 -2.0
Joaquin Arias 15.6 -2.0
Curtis Granderson 16.3 -1.9
David Eckstein 16.4 -1.9
Brad Wilkerson 16.9 -1.9
Johnny Damon 17.1 -1.9


Most of the players on the hack-tastic list are guys who have no business swinging at so many first pitches. Joey Gathright, for instance, is a leadoff man who should be working the count and getting on base to use his tremendous speed. Most of the other players don't have enough power to justify such free swinging. Wily Mo Pena had just a terrible year in '08, and this might be one reason. I have no idea what his first pitch fastball swing percentage was in previous years, but last year it was way too high and resulted in many easy outs or falling behind in the count.

On the flip side, the most patient hitters are mostly players you probably know. Most of these players are older and have a good eye at the plate; not swinging at the first pitch helps get them in a good hitter's count. Luis Castillo, though, is a bit of an exception. Pitchers are throwing him a tremendous amount of first pitch fastballs and he is not swinging at them. The word is out that Castillo will be taking on the opening pitch, so pitchers are throwing the fastball to get strike one on him. While Castillo is a very good two-strike hitter, getting into a hole right away was a real problem for him last year and contributed to his poor performance.

We can then break things up even further to look at how often players will swing at pitches inside or outside the MLB-defined strike zone, starting with swing percentage on first pitch fastballs inside the strike zone. The mean is 58.6 with an astronomical 17.2 standard deviation. This means that a lot of hitters will be swinging almost every time, but a lot hardly ever will be swinging.

First Last SwingStrike% SD
Wily Mo Pena 100.0 2.4
Pablo Sandoval 100.0 2.4
Magglio Ordonez 98.9 2.3
Alexei Ramirez 97.6 2.3
Russell Branyan 97.2 2.2
Coco Crisp 96.7 2.2
Yunel Escobar 95.9 2.2
Elijah Dukes 95.2 2.1
Eugenio Velez 93.2 2.0
Milton Bradley 92.9 2.0


First Last SwingStrike% SD
Bobby Abreu 12.9 -2.7
Jayson Werth 17.9 -2.4
Alberto Gonzalez 17.9 -2.4
Brett Gardner 18.0 -2.4
Scott Podsednik 20.3 -2.2
David Eckstein 22.2 -2.1
J.J. Hardy 23.6 -2.0
Joaquin Arias 23.9 -2.0
Sean Rodriguez 25.6 -1.9
Ruben Gotay 26.2 -1.9


Most of the players who rarely swing at these strikes were the same ones who were hardly swinging overall. This makes a lot of sense: If a player is rather choosy at the plate overall, he is not likely to be swinging at a lot of balls. On the other hand, we have a relatively fresh list of players who are swinging almost every time at a first pitch fastball over the plate. These hitters very likely are coming up thinking first pitch fastball. When they get one in the zone, they are going to take their hacks. Several of these players are big power guys as well, so if you are a pitcher you don't want to be giving them exactly what they are looking for.

What about pitches outside the strike zone? Who is swinging anyway when it is a first pitch fastball and who is laying off? The league average here is 17.6 percent with a standard deviation of 8.5 percent.


First Last SwingBall% SD
Alexei Ramirez 56.0 4.6
Alex Cintron 47.1 3.5
Vladimir Guerrero 45.0 3.3
Miguel Olivo 44.7 3.2
Victor Martinez 43.7 3.1
Pablo Sandoval 42.9 3.0
Marlon Anderson 42.5 3.0
Wil Nieves 42.4 3.0
John McDonald 41.4 2.8
Joey Gathright 37.5 2.4


First Last SwingBall% SD
Delwyn Young 0.0 -2.1
Scott Podsednik 0.0 -2.1
Joaquin Arias 3.2 -1.7
Jayson Werth 3.3 -1.7
Luis Castillo 4.2 -1.6
Curtis Granderson 4.8 -1.5
Johnny Damon 5.0 -1.5
Chris Iannetta 5.0 -1.5
Bobby Abreu 5.3 -1.5
J.J. Hardy 5.5 -1.4


Do not, under any circumstances, throw any of the players on the top list a first pitch fastball in the strike zone. There simply isn't any need to because they are more than happy to go outside the zone and swing at any fastball. The fact that Vladimir Guerrero and Victor Martinez show up here is not too surprising. They have had very good careers despite swinging at some poor pitches. They are the exceptions, rather than the rule, though. If you swing at poor pitches it will catch up to you at some point and may have caught up to these two as well. Again, the players who don't swing much overall don't swing much at balls.

Okay, now we know who is swinging or not swinging at a first pitch fastball, but who is getting the best results? We can look at batting average and slugging percentage for balls in play to see who is doing the most (and least) with the first pitch fastballs they see. Warning: almost all of these players have a really small sample size. League average here was a .326 batting average with a standard deviation of 0.105 and a slugging percentage of 0.518 with a standard deviation of 0.214.

First Last AVE SD
Russell Branyan 0.667 3.2
Alberto Gonzalez 0.667 3.2
Jarrod Saltalamacchia 0.615 2.8
Hanley Ramirez 0.583 2.5
Emilio Bonifacio 0.583 2.5
Sean Rodriguez 0.571 2.3
Bobby Abreu 0.571 2.3
David DeJesus 0.564 2.3
Ian Stewart 0.563 2.3
Geovany Soto 0.556 2.2


First Last AVE SD
Mark Sweeney 0.000 -3.1
Luke Carlin 0.000 -3.1
Ivan Ochoa 0.000 -3.1
Miguel Montero 0.000 -3.1
Ryan Raburn 0.000 -3.1
Joaquin Arias 0.000 -3.1
Scott Podsednik 0.000 -3.1
Chin-lung Hu 0.071 -2.4
Rickie Weeks 0.087 -2.3
Freddie Bynum 0.100 -2.2


First Last SLG SD
Jack Cust 1.148 2.9
Bobby Abreu 1.143 2.9
Albert Pujols 1.098 2.7
Marcus Thames 1.091 2.7
David Newhan 1.091 2.7
Hanley Ramirez 1.083 2.6
Mark Reynolds 1.065 2.6
Nick Swisher 1.063 2.5
Manny Ramirez 1.058 2.5
Joey Votto 1.051 2.5


First Last SLG SD
Mark Sweeney 0.000 -2.4
Luke Carlin 0.000 -2.4
Ivan Ochoa 0.000 -2.4
Miguel Montero 0.000 -2.4
Ryan Raburn 0.000 -2.4
Joaquin Arias 0.000 -2.4
Scott Podsednik 0.000 -2.4
Chin-lung Hu 0.143 -1.8
Rickie Weeks 0.217 -1.4
Freddie Bynum 0.300 -1.0


On the plus side, rookie of the year catcher Geovany Soto saw the fewest first pitch fastballs of any player in the study, but when he did get one, he knew what to do with it. Some young players like Hanley Ramirez and Jarrod Saltalamacchia showed they were strong fastball hitters and the resurgent Russell Branyan burst out with a series of home runs after being called up from Triple-A. Here is a hint to pitchers for next season: The mussel likes fastballs over the plate and he can hit them very far.

On the down side, we have a list of players who struggled mightily last year. If you aren't hitting the fastball, there is a good chance you just aren't hitting, and that certainly was true of the players on this list. I keep waiting for Rickie Weeks to bust out and live up to all that potential, but it sure looks like he has a long way to go here. Weeks is supposed to be a fastball hitter who has to slow his bat with a wiggle to stay on the breaking pitches. Maybe Weeks would be better served to scrap the wiggle altogether and just concentrate on hitting the fastball.

There are a million different things that could be done with these data; I have just scratched the surface. I get a lot of e-mails from people telling me that they like my work and wish they could do some baseball statistical research but don't have the time or math background to do so. So I am going to make all of these data on first pitch fastballs public for anyone to use to get started.

The data are in a simple .CSV file, so any spreadsheet program should be able to open it easily and the column headings are at the top. If you want to use it to do a write-up on your favorite player (for instance, Eric Byrnes) or team on your favorite blog, just please put a link back to this page somewhere in the post.

If you have questions, my e-mail is below and I'd be more than happy to help get you started.



Josh Kalk is a physics and math geek who can also be found blogging at http://www.baseball.bornbybits.com/blog/blog.html. He enjoys good conversations about baseball and can be reached at .(JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address).

<< Return to Article BL, TR (Part 4:  The best left-handed hitting second basemen in major league history) from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

BL, TR (Part 4:  The best left-handed hitting second basemen in major league history)

by Steve Treder
January 27, 2009

In Part 1, we introduced the concept of the rarity of right-handed throwers who bat left handed, identifying how rare it's been over the past half-century for players at the defensive positions that nearly universally demand right-handed throwers (catcher, third base, second base and shortstop) to be left-handed hitters—not switch-hitters (though they're rare too), but straight, full-on left-handed hitters, batting lefty even against southpaws.

In Part 2 we examined the best of these rare birds at the position of catcher, and in Part 3 we looked at third base. Now we're ready to consider second base.

How rare are they?


As a reminder, here's what we saw last time, the proportion of major league second baseman plate appearances taken by straight left-handed batters (not switch-hitters) from 1957 through 2006:

image

As rare as lefty-hitting catchers and third basemen are, at second base the phenomenon is even less common. The proportion hovered right around 20 percent for a couple of decades within this span, and then dropped below that in the 1980s. Since then it's oscillated between 10 percent and 20 percent of the second base population.

So this is, most definitely, a distinct minority of second basemen. Bear this in mind as we work our way through the list of its most accomplished members.

The best


I've identified every left-handed hitting second baseman with a career of any significance in big league history, and done my best to rank them. My criteria aren't rigorous, and one can easily take issue with the precision of this or that ranking. The essential issues I've considered are total games played (at second base, and overall), total Win Shares, and Win Shares per game, filtered through a mild degree of Time Line Adjustment.

Here are the best of the also-rans:

Honorable mentions


Rank Second baseman      Years              G by Pos               G    WS WS/G
 25  Adam Kennedy      1999-2008     2B1161, OF12, 1B3, SS1      1227  104 .085
 24  Mickey Morandini  1990-2000          2B1245, SS4            1298  119 .092
 23  Todd Walker       1996-2007  2B1007, 3B83, 1B59, OF2, SS1   1288  124 .096
 22  Jerry Lumpe       1956-1967      2B1100, 3B118, SS105       1371  127 .093
 21  Billy Goodman     1947-1962 2B624, 1B406, 3B330, OF111, SS7 1623  170 .105
 20  Jerry Remy        1975-1984     2B1117, SS1, 3B1, OF1       1154  113 .098
 19  Don Blasingame    1955-1966       2B1310, SS52, 3B4         1444  140 .097
 18  Fernando Viña     1993-2004    2B1049, SS19, 3B14, OF6      1148  128 .111
 17  Chase Utley       2003-2008          2B669, 1B26             735  126 .171
 16  Jim Gantner       1976-1992  2B1449, 3B360, SS7, 1B3, P1    1801  163 .091
 15  George Grantham   1922-1934   2B848, 1B502, OF19, 3B14      1444  193 .134
 14  Pete Runnels      1951-1964 1B644, 2B642, SS463, 3B49, OF1  1799  216 .120
 13  Delino DeShields  1990-2002 2B1392, OF122, SS10, 3B5, 1B2   1615  186 .115
 12  Lonny Frey        1933-1948   2B966, SS420, OF34, 3B22      1535  208 .136
 11  Max Bishop        1924-1935       2B1230, 1B26, SS2         1338  184 .138

What's interesting about this group is the degree to which many of these guys were second basemen noted for strong bats, but not especially highly regarded with the glove: Todd Walker, Billy Goodman, George "Boots" Grantham and Pete Runnels, all of whom spent a little or a lot of time playing first base, would most strongly fit such a description.

To be sure, several of the names on this list were more along the lines of the stereotypical small, quick, light-bat, good-glove mode of second baseman (Mickey Morandini, Jerry Remy, Don Blasingame and Fernando Viña), but of them only Viña was awarded a Gold Glove. We may not always think of throwing ability as an essential challenge of playing second base, but this provides an anecdotal suggestion that it is, given that none of these ambidextrous athletes are pure defensive stars, while the list of pure defensive star second basemen (say, Hughie Critz, Oscar Melillo, Bill Mazeroski, Bobby Richardson, Bobby Knoop, Tommy Helms, Frank White, Manny Trillo, Pokey Reese) seems to be pretty strongly slanted in the right-handed-all-the-way direction.

Chase Utley is clearly on a trajectory to end up a whole lot higher on this list. He may become one of the best-hitting second basemen of all time, but his fielding, while competent, isn't what brings him his accolades. The fact that he's already been deployed at first base 26 times provides a hint as to where he may land eventually.

The 10th-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Rod Carew

Years: 1967-1985
Games: 2,469
Games by position: first base 1,184, second base 1,130, shortstop 4, third base 2, outfield 1
Win Shares: 384
Win Shares/game: .156

Speaking of second basemen noted for strong bats, but not especially highly regarded with the glove ... Carew always presents a challenge to those trying to figure out where he fits in comparison with others, because of his near-exact-equal career split between second base and first. Obviously he'd rank a whole lot higher here, but he gets dinged for the relatively light innings load at second.

Here's what I once wrote about Carew, comparing him and contrasting him with a switch-hitting part-time second baseman named Pete Rose:
Rose and Carew had a lot in common. Both were young second basemen who blew through the minor leagues in three seasons, leapfrogging Triple-A altogether. Both then burst onto the major league scene with runaway Rookie of the Year performances. Both were adequate defensively at second, though not outstanding, but both were moved off the position after a few years, more as an injury-prevention measure than as a function of fielding inadequacy: both were considered just too valuable at the plate to be left exposed to rolling blocks in the field.

Both Rose and Carew were essentially singles hitters, but both in mid-career developed the capacity to deliver the more-than-occasional home run, and both lost that power as they aged. Both were rather impatient hitters when young, but both gradually developed an outstanding capacity to draw walks.

Yet for all their similarities, as personalities Rose and Carew could hardly have been more different: Rose was ebullient and pugnacious, while Carew was laconic and imperturbable. And in the batter's box they were near opposites as well. While both hit from a pronounced crouch, Rose, beefily muscular, intensely squeezed his bat and was a tightly coiled spring, pure energy lusting for release, while Carew, angular and long-limbed, seemed relaxed at the plate to the point of drowsiness, resembling nothing so much as a housecat casually perched on a windowsill, languidly contemplating the afternoon scene.

The ninth-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Buddy Myer

Years: 1925-1941
Games: 1,923
Games by position: second base 1,340, shortstop 238, third base 219, outfield 13
Win Shares: 258
Win Shares/game: .134

A terrific player, Myer didn't hit home runs but he did everything else splendidly. Yet playing nearly all of his career in the relative anonymity of Washington, he was rather overlooked in his day, and by the time I was growing up in the 1960s and '70s, he was more or less forgotten, his name almost never appearing in the Big Time Baseball sorts of books I grew up with that listed the "stars of yesteryear."

But Bill James' original Historical Baseball Abstract, published in 1986, pretty well "rediscovered" Myer. James closely compared Myer with his contemporary, the well-known Hall of Fame second baseman Billy Herman. James ranked Myers and Herman as essential equals, and concluded with the question, "How in the world can you put one of these people in the Hall of Fame and leave the other one out?".

In that book James also gave his readership a fresh look at another long-forgotten second baseman, Del Pratt, saying "I began to take Del Pratt seriously as an outstanding player about 1976." Thanks to James, both Myer and Pratt are better remembered and regarded today than decades ago.


The eighth-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Cupid Childs

Years: 1888-1901
Games: 1,456
Games by position: second base 1,454, shortstop 1
Win Shares: 238
Win Shares/game: .163

Few folks other than 19th-century scholars may ever have heard of this guy, but he could play. In an era in which defensive specialization hadn't much taken hold, and even star players rotated pretty much all over the diamond, Childs made, literally, 99.9 percent of his major league appearances at second base, suggesting exceptional defensive acumen at the position. And at the plate, he didn't have power but was a terrific on-base machine.

The Hall of Fame overlooked him, but not the Hall of Merit.


The seventh-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Johnny Evers

Years: 1902-1929 (well, effectively, 1902-1917)
Games: 1,784
Games by position: second base 1,735, third base 21, shortstop 19, outfield 1
Win Shares: 268
Win Shares/game: .150

Among the blunders Hall of Fame voters have committed over the years, few have been more egregious than the as-a-unit election of Joe Tinker, Johnny Evers and Frank Chance in 1946. I mean, it's a cute poem and all, but come on.

And while one might think the honor was the best favor that possibly could have fallen upon the trio, in another sense it had an aspect of curse about it: Their Cooperstown status quickly became seen as tainted. Mention the fact that any one of them is a Hall of Famer, and even the casual fan's eyes roll.

And here's the thing: in the case of Tinker, being in the Hall of Fame is indeed highly dubious. But for both Evers and Chance, while the cases are debatable, they're hardly ridiculous. The Hall of Merit elected neither, but both cases drew serious consideration.

For his part, Evers (who was exceptionally small, even by the standards of the day: 5-foot-9 and 125 pounds!) presented pretty much the Cupid Childs value profile, not quite as good, perhaps, but for a longer period: a singles hitter with exceptional strike zone discipline and outstanding defense.


The sixth-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Larry Doyle

Years: 1907-1920
Games: 1,766
Games by position: second base 1,728
Win Shares: 289
Win Shares/game: .164

But this guy's skill profile was different: though he wasn't big (listed at 5-foot-10, 165), "Laughing Larry" was a big hitter, a middle-of-the-lineup power guy. He wasn't noted for great defense (though he wasn't bad; Win Shares rates him a C+), and in his era, with the double play far less an issue that it would be later, it wasn't uncommon to find players of this type at second base, while in later decades they've tended to play third.

Doyle is in neither the Hall of Fame nor the Hall of Merit, but he's definitely inner-circle in the Hall of Very Good.


The fifth-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Nellie Fox

Years: 1947-1965
Games: 2,367
Games by position: second base 2,295, third base 6, first base 2
Win Shares: 304
Win Shares/game: .128

Fox would qualify as a pure defensive star second baseman, except that for most of his career Fox was a fine offensive performer as well. But fielding was his strongest asset; he won just three Gold Gloves, but that's only because the award wasn't inaugurated until 1957. Had the Gold Glove been available throughout Fox's entire career, he almost certainly would have bagged at least five more.

Bill James once observed of a similarity between Fox and Brooks Robinson: both were so valuable defensively that they became regulars in the major leagues before they were good hitters, and remained regulars after they were no longer good hitters.


The fourth-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Lou Whitaker

Years: 1977-1995
Games: 2,390
Games by position: second base 2,308
Win Shares: 351
Win Shares/game: .147

The idea that Lou Whitaker isn't in the Hall of Fame, while, say, Bruce Sutter is, is staggeringly ridiculous.


The third-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Charlie Gehringer

Years: 1924-1942
Games: 2,323
Games by position: second base 2,206, first base 9, third base 6
Win Shares: 383
Win Shares/game: .165

Logically, any Hall of Fame voter who didn't support Whitaker must believe that Gehringer doesn't belong in Cooperstown. Of course no one has ever asserted that Gehringer doesn't belong (and they'd be nuts if they did), but the point is that the daylight between Whitaker and Gehringer is nearly nonexistent, and thus to include one and exclude the other is senseless.

Their major league careers were of exactly the same length, and, playing the same position, they logged almost identical totals of games. Their Win Share production was very nearly equal, and if one applies a time line adjustment it gets closer still. Not only that, their skill sets were amazingly alike: Each was a well-rounded talent, not great at anything but simply strong across the board, a good hitter for average with good power and good strike zone judgment, a good baserunner, and a very good fielder. They even played for the very same franchise for their entire careers, for crying out loud.


The second-best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Eddie Collins

Years: 1906-1930
Games: 2,826
Games by position: second base 2,650, shortstop 40, outfield 10, third base 1
Win Shares: 574
Win Shares/game: .203

The best left-handed hitting second baseman in major league history


Joe Morgan

Years: 1963-1984
Games: 2,649
Games by position: second base 2,527, outfield 16, third base 3
Win Shares: 512
Win Shares/game: .193

I give Morgan the first-place nod here only by virute of a time-line quality-of-competition adjustment. Fabulous as Morgan was, Collins played slightly more games, and earned Win Shares at a slightly better rate.

By most reckonings, if Morgan and Collins aren't the best and second-best second basemen of all time (in whichever order), they're damn close to it. Thus it's fascinating that at this position, demanding right-handed throwing excellence, where the proportion of left-handed batters is limited to around 20 percent, the two very best performers in history have sprung forth from that small minority.

And beyond that, there's a rather interesting linkage from Collins to Morgan, that goes by way of the No. 5 fellow on this list.

Collins was signed as a 19-year-old by Philadelphia Athletics' owner/manager Connie Mack, whose eye for young talent was among the sharpest. Mack patiently tutored his diminutive second base prospect, and was rewarded several years later when Collins blossomed into stardom. But at the peak of Collins' career, Mack sold him (whether rashly or through unavoidable financial necessity is open to debate) to the Chicago White Sox, where Collins would play the majority of his major league games.

Several decades later, Mack's A's signed a teenager named Nellie Fox. Like Collins, Fox would be brought to the majors by Mack at the age of 19. Mack spent several years patiently investing in the development of this diminutive second base prospect, but alas, instead of waiting for the blossoming, Mack traded Fox (rashly this time, there's no debating it) to the Chicago White Sox for a backup catcher. In Chicago, Fox would fall under the tutelage of manager Paul Richards (who'd played for Mack himself), and it was with the White Sox that Fox would break out as a star, and play the majority of his major league games.

A decade later, Richards was the GM for the Houston Colt .45s. There Richards signed a teenager named Joe Morgan, and Richards would bring Morgan to the majors at the age of 19 (of course). As a diminutive left-handed batting second baseman growing up in the 1950s, who was the big league ballplayer Morgan identified with, and emulated? Why, Nellie Fox, of course. And it would be, of course, Fox whom Richards would acquire via trade, to serve as Morgan's personal coach and mentor, as Richards patiently developed Morgan into a star—a star of such magnitude, in fact, that he would eventually join Collins at the very top of the list of the greatest ever to play second base.


Next installment


The best left-handed hitting shortstops in major league history

References and Resources
Bill James, The Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract, New York: Villard, 1986, pp. 346, 349.

Steve Treder can often be found spending way too much time talking baseball at Baseball Primer. He welcomes your questions and comments via e-mail.

<< Return to Article Scouting Orioles pitching prospect Jake Arrieta from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Scouting Orioles pitching prospect Jake Arrieta

by Alex Eisenberg
January 27, 2009

Back in August of 2007, Carlos Gomez made this comment about Baltimore Orioles pitching prospect Jake Arrieta:

Orioles paid first-round money for a guy who really just isn't that good. Disclaimer: Speed up his delivery and watch his velocity soar. If only I could convince them to do this, then Arrieta would not be as overrated.

And he was right; Arrieta was regarded as a first-round talent, but he didn't display first-round quality stuff during his junior season at TCU. His fastball velocity dropped from 91-95 mph down to 88-91 after his sophomore season.

More than a year later, Arrieta's stuff is back to what it once was and you can credit the mechanical adjustments Arrieta made as the primary reason. No, he didn't speed up his delivery—his tempo is still painfully slow—but he did make his mechanics more efficient. How did he do this? Let's go to the tape...

Below is Arrieta's draft video (left) and Arrieta during his stint with the U.S. Olympic team this past season. You'll see in both instances, after Arrieta lowers his leg, he appears to step over an imaginary object. This step-over enables Arrieta to kick-start an aggressive hip rotation and take a longer stride into foot plant. The point of the step-over move is to add velocity.

imageimage

But compare the differences... which version has the bigger, more aggressive move into foot plant? From my point of view, it's the 2008 version. This more efficient step-over move allows Arrieta to build up more momentum heading into foot plant and in the process generate more torque.

The more forceful the hip rotation, the more torque Arrieta creates between his torso and hips. The bigger the separation between his torso and hips, the more power is transmitted to the shoulder. The more power transmitted to the shoulder, the greater the potential for velocity—as long as the kinetic chain is in sync throughout the delivery, which Arrieta's is.

When a pitcher adjusts his stride, this can create problems with timing. To compensate for the bigger step-over move, Arrieta employs a larger tilting of the shoulders.

Another change between the two versions occurs at finish. Arrieta is better able to get out in front in 2008. In the clips below, notice the better upper body tilt and extension, meaning he is releasing the ball just a little closer to home plate than he was in college. The difference is very subtle—look closely at the frame in which the ball is released and the path the arm travels as it decelerates. This small change means his fastball gets on hitters a bit quicker and from an injury standpoint, this development means Arrieta is giving his arm a little more room to decelerate. His finish is a slightly more abrupt in the draft clip.

imageimage

In Arrieta's case, it was the classic case of taking a player's current mechanics and making them more efficient. Arrieta's mechanics weren't overhauled, but he displayed qualities that—if implemented more efficiently—could increase his velocity. The Orioles in all likelihood recognized this, since they shelled out a $1.1 million signing bonus to sign Arrieta—a record amount for a fifth-round pick.

What kind of stuff does Arrieta possess today?

Fastball - pumped anywhere from 91 to 96 with some late life...velocity usually moves down to the 92-94 mph range after his first couple of innings. Commands the pitch well to both sides of the plate.

Slider - thrown in the mid-80s with good bite, though there are times when the pitch will break too early. He struggles to command the pitch, often bouncing it in the dirt. When he's commanding this pitch, he's very difficult to hit.

Curveball - a 12-to-6 version, thrown between 78 and 80 mph...he doesn't throw it often and it projects to be an average pitch. The pitch needs more consistency.

Change-up - he's made great strides with the pitch, doing a better job of maintaining his arm speed...the difference between his change-up and fastball ranges between 5 and 10 mph. It's another pitch that needs to become more consistent.

Arrieta is difficult to center the ball against because his many pitches all come in on similar planes. Below is an example of this as he's throwing a 95 mph fastball on the left and an 86 mph slider on the right. The slider was one of the best he threw in this particular outing.

imageimage

Final thoughts

Arrieta has progressed appreciably since being drafted out of TCU in 2007. His stuff has ticked up another level, but his command still needs work. There is a reason some feel he'll be at his best out of the bullpen. He can be great in spurts, but will have innings where the plate can be anything but found. However, the fact that he does put it together in spurts leads many to believe he'll eventually be able to put it all together.

Should things click for Arrieta, he'll give the Orioles three pitching prospects—along with Chris Tillman and Brian Matusz—all of whom are close to MLB-ready with No. 2 starter upsides. That leads many Baltimore fans to expect their team to actually become a contender in the vaunted and highly competitive AL East. The promise of pairing these three with phenom Matt Wieters only furthers these expectations.

But for the Orioles to contend, they need their pitchers to pan out. Arrieta is the biggest mystery of Baltimore's big three pitching prospects. If he even comes close to reaching his upside, I suspect many Baltimore fans will be very happy.

Best case outcome: No. 2 starter

More likely outcome: Borderline No. 3 or strong No. 4 starter... worst case for Arrieta would be a move to the bullpen.


References and Resources
This article is a part of the Team Top-15 Prospect Lists. Arrieta rated as Baltimore's fourth best prospect and received a grade of B/B+
MLB Scouting Bureau
USA Baseball



Alex breaks down major and minor league players by using sabermetric and video analysis at his website, Baseball-Intellect. To get full access to his entire collection of prospect video and scouting reports, you can sign up as a Premium Member. You can contact him at baseballintellect@gmail.com

<< Return to Article Consistency meter: Alfonso Soriano from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Consistency meter: Alfonso Soriano

by Paul Singman
January 27, 2009

Five-tool players are extra valuable for one simple reason: They have a positive impact on every category. Only a handful of players are truly five-faceted, and even fewer keep up this standard of production over a period of time. That is why Alfonso Soriano is so impressive; he has been a five-tool player his entire career.
image
Soriano sporting a uniform that would make any fantasy owner proud (Icon/SMI)

+------+-----+-----------+-----+-------+----+-----+-----+----+
| YEAR | AGE | TEAM      | AB  | BA    | HR | RBI | R   | SB |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+-------+----+-----+-----+----+
| 2004 |  28 | Rangers   | 608 | 0.280 | 28 |  91 |  77 | 18 |
| 2005 |  29 | Rangers   | 637 | 0.268 | 36 | 104 | 102 | 30 |
| 2006 |  30 | Nationals | 647 | 0.277 | 46 |  95 | 119 | 41 |
| 2007 |  31 | Cubs      | 579 | 0.299 | 33 |  70 |  97 | 19 |
| 2008 |  32 | Cubs      | 453 | 0.280 | 29 |  75 |  76 | 19 |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+-------+----+-----+-----+----+

Soriano certainly has had an impressive prime, but looking at the end of the above chart gives the impression that perhaps his golden years are behind him as he enters his ninth MLB season.

Compounding the concern is his recent injury history, something he never experienced in his first six seasons, save a minor hamstring injury in 2004 that has been recurring throughout his career. His broken finger in 2008 did result from a hit by pitch, meaning I would label it a fluke, but nevertheless I would call Soriano a medium injury risk in 2009.

With all this in mind, let's look at his stats to see what we can expect from him in the upcoming season.

Power ability


For a leadoff hitter Soriano has always been notoriously powerful, setting the record for most home runs to lead off a game in 2003. His power totals peaked in 2006, when he hit an astounding 46 home runs, but have since returned to normal, settling in around 30.

If you're new to THT Fantasy Focus and are unfamiliar with True Home Runs (tHR) or any of the other stats I'm using, check out our quick reference guide. These stats provide a much clearer picture of a player's talent, so it's well worth taking a couple of minutes to learn them.
+------+-----+-----------+-----+----+-----+-------+--------+--------+--------+
| YEAR | AGE | TEAM      | AB  | HR | tHR | HR/FB | tHR/FB | nHR/FB | OF/FB% |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+----+-----+-------+--------+--------+--------+
| 2006 |  30 | Nationals | 647 | 46 |  33 |    20 |     14 |     17 |     47 |
| 2007 |  31 | Cubs      | 579 | 33 |  28 |    17 |     14 |     14 |     44 |
| 2008 |  32 | Cubs      | 453 | 29 |  24 |    18 |     15 |     14 |     45 |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+----+-----+-------+--------+--------+--------+

Soriano seems to have the ability to outperform his True Home Run (tHR) totals by about five—a few other players just seem to be able to do that—so I would not consider Soriano's totals the past two years out of line. The other good news is that if we extrapolate Soriano's totals from the past two years to a full season's worth of play (remember he missed time in both years), we get 35 home runs for 2007 and 32 for 2008.

Now for the bad news. Soriano will be 33 years old next season, so I would expect about three fewer home runs from him simply because of his age. And then there is the ominous downward trend in power ability. I cannot say for sure (not that I can say anything for sure) if the downward trend will continue, but I can try to explain part of it. To do that, we will need to look more closely at his batted ball data.

+---------+---------+------+-----+--------+-----+-----+--------+-----+
| LAST    | FIRST   | YEAR | AB  | OF/FB% | FL% | LD% | IF/FB% | GB% |
+---------+---------+------+-----+--------+-----+-----+--------+-----+
| Soriano | Alfonso | 2006 | 647 |     42 |  11 |  14 |      4 |  29 |
| Soriano | Alfonso | 2007 | 579 |     41 |   9 |  14 |      2 |  34 |
| Soriano | Alfonso | 2008 | 453 |     36 |  22 |  11 |      3 |  29 |
+---------+---------+------+-----+--------+-----+-----+--------+-----+

While it appears that Soriano's outfield fly ball percentage (OF/FB%) has been stable, if we include the ever-intriguing fliner into the mix, a decline in OF/FB percentage appears. An admittedly slight decline, but enough to explain part of his recent drop in power.

Just as I cannot say if his decline in power will continue, I also cannot substantiate any claim that his fliner percentage (FL%) will remain at 22 percent in 2009. Twenty-two percent is well above the average 11 percent fliner rate, but also not extreme enough to guarantee a meaningful regression.

To clarify, (and I invite you to skip this paragraph if you feel you understand) when looking for home runs, outfield fly balls are optimal because they go over the wall the highest percentage of the time compared to the other types of batted balls. Fliners are better overall in terms of run production, but do not become home runs very often. So when Soriano hits 13 percent more fliners and five percent fewer outfield fly balls as he did in 2008, his home run totals are gong to suffer, by about three home runs. If he were to hit fewer fliners in 2009, his outfield fly ball percentage almost surely would tick up a few points, resulting in a couple of home runs.

From this information—despite all the uncertainty mentioned above—we still can come up with a reasonably small range for Soriano's expected home run total in 2009. My low end projection is 24 home runs. In making this prediction I expected the same high fliner percentage and some time missed because of injuries. The high end projection is 32 home runs, which is assuming good health for the most part.

Overall I expect Soriano's power totals to remain the same as last year, around 28 home runs. Let's now check on that batting average of his.

Contact ability


+------+-----+-----------+-----+-------+-------+-----+-------+--------+-----+--------+---------+
| YEAR | AGE | TEAM      | AB  | BA    | tBA   | CT% | BABIP | mBABIP | LD% | BIP/HR | BIP/tHR |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+-------+-------+-----+-------+--------+-----+--------+---------+
| 2006 |  30 | Nationals | 647 | 0.277 | 0.255 |  75 | 0.302 |  0.300 |  20 |     11 |      15 |
| 2007 |  31 | Cubs      | 579 | 0.299 | 0.273 |  78 | 0.337 |  0.313 |  20 |     14 |      16 |
| 2008 |  32 | Cubs      | 453 | 0.280 | 0.274 |  77 | 0.305 |  0.312 |  23 |     12 |      15 |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+-------+-------+-----+-------+--------+-----+--------+---------+

First off, if you are wondering why Soriano is also outperforming his True Batting Average (tBA), it is because tBA uses the tHR numbers. If we cancel out the home run noise his tBAs for 2006, 2007 and 2008 become .267, .280 and .283 respectively. That makes things look a bit rosier, but besides that not much else is happening. Let's look at those plate discipline stats.

+------+-----+-----------+-----+-----+------------+------+-------------+----------+
| YEAR | AGE | TEAM      | AB  | CT% | JUDGMENT X | A/P  | BAT CONTROL | BAD BALL |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+-----+------------+------+-------------+----------+
| 2006 |  30 | Nationals | 647 |  75 |         85 | 0.65 |          85 |       52 |
| 2007 |  31 | Cubs      | 579 |  78 |         93 | 1.07 |          84 |       57 |
| 2008 |  32 | Cubs      | 453 |  77 |         90 | 0.94 |          83 |       57 |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+-----+------------+------+-------------+----------+

Soriano has below average judgment, and makes about just as many passive mistakes and aggressive ones (A/P). Interestingly, he was more passive in 2006, his monster home run year. He is about average in terms of hitting balls inside the zone (Bat Control) and is exactly league average at hitting balls outside of it (Bad Ball).

Soriano will never be a great average hitter, but for the time being it appears that he still will bat somewhere in the .270s. If you feel he will hit the high end of his power projection, expect something closer to .280, and if you feel the opposite, think high .260s.

Speed ability

+------+-----+-----------+-----+----+-----+-------+------+-----+-----------+-------------+
| YEAR | AGE | TEAM      | AB  | SB | SBA | SBO%  | SBA% | SB% | FAN SPEED | FAN BALLOTS |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+----+-----+-------+------+-----+-----------+-------------+
| 2004 |  28 | Rangers   | 613 | 18 |  23 | 0.220 |   16 |  78 |        84 |           8 |
| 2005 |  29 | Rangers   | 637 | 30 |  32 | 0.186 |   25 |  94 |         0 |           0 |
| 2006 |  30 | Nationals | 647 | 41 |  58 | 0.206 |   39 |  71 |        84 |          27 |
| 2007 |  31 | Cubs      | 579 | 19 |  25 | 0.201 |   20 |  76 |        82 |          32 |
| 2008 |  32 | Cubs      | 453 | 19 |  22 | 0.211 |   21 |  86 |        73 |          56 |
+------+-----+-----------+-----+----+-----+-------+------+-----+-----------+-------------+

Soriano has stolen at least 20 bases every season of his career, and certainly has the potential to steal a lot more. Recurring leg injuries have prevented him from reaching his potential and since joining the Cubs he has been attempting to steal a lower percentage of the time (SBA%). If his legs are not bothering him in 2009, I could see Soriano stealing up to 30 bases, but more realistically I see him getting about 15-20 steals.

Final thoughts


If you were nervous about selecting Soriano in your draft, I would not worry because it seems that this will not be the year he burns out. My biggest concern with him is injuries, and he is not even a high risk compared to plenty of other players.

If you want him on your team, you will have to take him early. In the mock drafts I've seen and participated in, he has gone as high as 16th overall and as low as 34th. With my second-round pick, I probably would not pull the trigger on him but in the third I would have no reservations selecting him.

Paul has been managing fantasy baseball teams for many seasons and writing for THT Fantasy over the past three years. He is currently a student at UPenn welcomes readers' thoughts at his email here or in the comments below.


<< Return to Article Pettitte to the Yankees from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Pettitte to the Yankees

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article MLB Front Office Manager from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

MLB Front Office Manager

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Greinke Extended from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Greinke Extended

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article POTUS baseball factoids from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

POTUS baseball factoids

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article I’m waiting for the Chester A. Arthur “Redstockings” model from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

I’m waiting for the Chester A. Arthur “Redstockings” model

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article The next Rays from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The next Rays

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Finding hope from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Finding hope

by Dave Studeman
January 26, 2009



Dave was called a "national treasure" by Rob Neyer. Seriously. Comments about this article can be sent to him through the miracle of e-mail.

<< Return to Article Tal Smith moonlights from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Tal Smith moonlights

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Under the Hood from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Under the Hood

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Lie down with dogs . . . from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Lie down with dogs . . .

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Stronger than dirt from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Stronger than dirt

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Today at THT from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Today at THT

by Craig Calcaterra
January 26, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Dollar specials from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Dollar specials

by Victor Wang
January 26, 2009

In this article I'll be looking at a few end gamers who can provide some good value for 2009. By end gamers I mean players you can get for $1 near the end of your auction or at the end of your draft. One thing to keep in mind when taking these players is that often times one ends up evaluating these players based on a limited sample size. For example, you may have cut a player like Jason Kubel early last year only to end up seeing him put up a pretty solid season. This is a topic for another article some time but is something to keep in mind.

Nelson Cruz, OF, Texas: Cruz is a very interesting case. He gets really good projections by pretty much every projection system out there and is slated to start on opening day for Texas. However, part of me feels that he may be overvalued come draft day. There's a little bit of uncertainty around his projections and a lot of owners out there will be looking for the next Ryan Ludwick. Cruz figures to be one of the more popular picks to be that guy. Despite this, if you can get him for cheap or towards the end of your draft, I would highly recommend it.

Joey Devine, RP, Oakland: Brad Ziegler is likely to be Oakland's closer come opening day. However, look for him to face some regression to the mean. Meanwhile, Joey Devine figures to get the first crack at a closer's job should Ziegler falter. Devine displayed a very good skill set in his first season in Oakland. While we have a bit of a limited major league sample size on him, Devine's scouting reports tend to back up his performance from 2008.

Boof Bonser, SP/RP, Minnesota: Look past the ERA from his last two years. Bonser was troubled by a lot of bad luck over the the past few years, including a ridiculously low 57.9% LOB. He has displayed solid skills over the past few years and should see some better luck with his more dependent pitching statistics. The Twins' rotation could be tough to crack but you never know what could happen with injuries. You figure this would be a perfect opportunity for a major league team to buy low and trade for Bonser as well, which would improve his fantasy stock tremendously.

Yusmeiro Petit, SP, Arizona: Petit has always put up some pretty good minor league numbers. However, scouts have always questioned how well his minor league stats would translate to the majors. Petit struggled initially in his first few major league appearances but showed glimmers of some upside in 2008. There are concerns with his flyball rate but if Petit keeps his skills growth up, there is some solid upside here.

Gary Sheffield, OF/Util, Detroit: Sheffield had a pretty brutal year, on the surface at least. However, he had some bad luck with a poor hit rate, granted that he did have pretty low line drive rate. Sheffield still does have a solid set of secondary skills, with solid walk and strikeout rates while maintaining decent power skills. Look for him to bounce back this year. While he does have some potential to collapse, you can deal with that sort of risk if you commit to him during the end of a draft or for cheap at an auction.

Russell Branyan, 3B, Seattle: Branyan has a decent chance to start on the right side of a first base platoon for Seattle. You know what you're going to get with Branyan: a mediocre batting average but very good power. If gets consistent playing time, Branyan can really help with your power numbers. However, you'll need to get some additional batting average support from somewhere else.

Cha Seung Baek, SP, San Diego: Baek was a nice pick up from Seattle last year. His lack of a true out pitch limits his upside potential, but he showed a solid skill set last year. Of course, it helps to be pitching in PETCO park. Baek should be a solid addition to the end of a fantasy rotation, though he might not be able to help much with your win totals.



Victor Wang's work on OPS has been featured in SABR's By the Numbers magazine, and was the 2007 recipient of SABR's Jack Kavanagh Memorial Youth Baseball Research Award. He can be reached via email here.

<< Return to Article 50 great potential closer songs from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

50 great potential closer songs

by Chris Jaffe
January 26, 2009

One of the great pleasures in having a regular gig here at THT is the ability to have an original idea (or at least original to me), do the research to study it, write it up, and winning fame and accolades when it goes up (and by "fame and accolades" I mean a link or two to other websites).

This isn't one of those columns, though.

Another pleasure of life at THT is taking someone else's idea, and ripping it off. This is precisely one of those columns.

A few weeks ago, SNY writer Ted Berg wrote a two-part article on the 10 best non-traditional closer songs of all-time. It was a blast and well-worth reading (as were the BTF threads based on it).

For no good reason other than the pure fun of it, I started thinking up a list of possible closer songs in my head. I wasted enough time thinking of it to come up with this column: my top 50 possible closer songs.

A few ground rules:

(1) they can't be songs listed by Berg or that I remember someone other than myself mentioning at BTF (note: I came up with the list a few days after those threads, so some overlap is possible).

(2) No song, as far as I know, can be used by a closer currently. The key phrase is "as far as I know." Though I found this exercise in closer-song-finding fun, I know very little about which songs closers actually use. Trevor Hoffman uses "Hells Bells" and about 85 percent of the remainder use "Enter Sandman," right? Ultimately, there is a good shot some of my list will repeat actual songs. Ah, well.

While I'm thus technically under qualified to do this list, that's not a big deal. It's supposed to be fun, not brain surgery.

3) Try to avoid obvious clichés - unless I really want to include them. In part, this is to minimize overlap with actual closer songs and in part, choosing the most obvious songs is boring.

Below is my 100 percent arbitrary, 0 percent scientific list of closer songs. (Sorry if that disappoints, but if you were expected any 50 best ___ songs list to be scientific, you got bigger problems than this article).

50. "White Room" by Cream. This belongs in just for the opening rip of notes. They makes a person lift his head up in expectation of what's coming up. It sounds important—regal, even. That's not a bad thing for people to be thinking when a closer steps on the field.

49. "I Feel Good" by James Brown. One thing I noted in looking up songs: while closer songs are normally intimidating sounding works (like "Enter Sandman") another angle can be taken with them: songs of celebration. Instead of telling of the opposing team's doom, you can cheer on your team's impending success. If you're going to celebrate, there are few better ways to do it than with the Godfather of Soul.

The celebratory approach might backfire if you have a lousy closer entering with a one-run lead on the road (the other team can be happy he's entering), but then again no one would be that intimidated by a heavy metal song either.

48. "King Kong" by the Kinks. A good rockin' tune about how the unstoppable beast is coming after you. It's more of a traditional pick, but that's OK. Nothing wrong with having a bragging closer's song.

47. "U Can't Touch This" by M. C. Hammer. I'm not a big Hammer fan, but this belongs on the list just for the title alone. It gets extra credit as a possible Oakland closer song, since Hammer was once a batboy for the A's lo those many years ago.

46. "One Fine Day" by the Chiffons. OK, I admit—this one has some problems; namely, you have to ignore at least half of its lyrics for it to work. Yet rarely, if ever, has a celebratory song sounded so infectiously exuberant. Plus that introductory jackhammer-piano riff makes a real nice attention getter. It's the all-time leader in VORSD (Value Over Replacement Shoobie-Do).

45. "I Hope You're Happy Now" by Elvis Costello. "I hope you're happy now, like you're supposed to be / And I know that this will hurt you more than it hurts me."

44. "Give Up the Funk (Tear the Roof Off the Sucker)" by Parliament. So the closer can turn this mother out.

43. "Mannish Boy" by Muddy Waters. Machismo. Many did it louder than Muddy Waters, but how many really did it better? You want some macho confidence in you closer, hence this song's inclusion on the list.

42. "Rock This Town" by the Stray Cats. Just a fun little tune about not letting anything getting in the way of having a helluva a time. Makes sense for a closer to do it.

41. "I Put a Spell on You" by Screamin' Jay Hawkins. Certainly one of the more distinctive songs to come out of the 1950s. One detriment: no closer will be able to enter as effectively with this song as Hawkins did. Screamin' Jay would wear a cape and step out off a coffin on stage to sing this one.

40. "Hellbent for Leather" by Judas Priest. As closer songs go, Priest's motorcycle anthem is a heavy metal cliché, and I wouldn't be surprised if someone's actually using it. However, I want to include it here because this would have been a perfect song to use back in the days of bullpen cars.

Can you imagine: the opening notes cry out, and instead of a tough looking Harley Davidson, the crowd sees a silly looking modified golf cart shaped like a baseball cap. Not only would it be a good song, but it would also make for a surreally brilliant (and entirely unintentional) parody. There's an extra level of irony if someone like Todd Jones came out to Rob Halford's voice, but that is a whole other issue.

39. "The Power" by Snap. How many closers use rap/hip hop songs anyway? (For all I know, a bunch, but the closer song genre is more associated with metal from what I know). This would be a great song for the relief ace to enter in with when it's getting kinda hectic.

38. "Raw Power" by Iggy and the Stooges." Actually, there are several Stooges songs that might work. (I might've picked "You're Pretty Face is Going to Hell" if it stuck with it's original name, "Hard to Beat."). This one works best, especially for a closer with a great fastball.

37. "I Wanna Take You Higher" by Sly and the Family Stone. Celebrations don't come much livelier than this.

36. Theme from "The Natural." Roy Hobbs was originally a pitcher, after all.

35. "96 Tears" by ? and the Mysterians. It's one of the darker 1960s one-hit wonders, and a closer certainly wants the opposition to cry 96 tears.

34. "Rebirth of Slick (Cool Like Dat)" by the Diggable Planets. It's not the loudest song out there, but it certainly contains plenty of inarguable, self-possessed confidence. It's nice for a real cool cat of a closer.

33. "Higher Ground" by the Red Hot Chili Peppers. No offense to Stevie Wonder, but I'll take this version. A nice celebration, and wining after nine innings is a higher place than leading after eight.

32. "Baba O'Reilly" by The Who. Certainly the hardest rocking song to ever end with a fiddle jam.

31. "Reach Out - I'll Be There" by the Four Tops. This would rank higher, much higher, except that the lyrics are a touch on the desperate side. That partially makes it one of the greatest songs of all-time, but it's a little off for our purposes here.

30. "Gimme Some Lovin'" by the Spencer Davis Group. Maybe it should lose a little ground for appearing in a financial planning TV commercial (then again, given how much money closers make, that might make it even more appropriate). It's a great celebration with a memorable opening bit.

29. "Sledgehammer" by Peter Gabriel. "All you have to do is call me / I'll be anything you need." Plus the title is a good one for a closer song.

28. Various U2 songs, including: "It's a Beautiful Day," "I Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking for," "Where the Streets Have No Name," and "I Will Follow." Nobody does uplifting rock'n'roll songs quite like this band of Irishmen. Added bonus: the song "I Will Follow" sort of describes a closer's job description.

27. "Thank God I'm a Country Boy" by John Denver. Ah, you go to hell—it's a great song. Look, this song wouldn't work for most closers, but for the right kind of reliever it would be great. And by "right kind of closer" I mean a country boy. People tend to respect someone who takes pride in his heritage, regardless if it's racial, ethnic, or (in this case) rural.

26. "I Wanna Destroy You" by the Soft Boys. That is one helluva juxtaposition between a song title and the band's name, don't you think?

25. "Train Kept a-Rollin'" by the Rock'n'Roll Trio. It's a good time song and it can't be stopped.

24. Tie: "You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet" and "Taking Care of Business" by Bachmann Turner Overdrive. Both are fairly obvious songs that ought to make it just for their titles alone. Obvious doesn't mean inappropriate, though.

23. "Shut Down" by the Beach Boys. Cockiness is one of the classic attributes of closers and their songs. The Beach Boys might have more of an entitled, smug, suburban sense of cockiness, but they had it nonetheless. At any rate, a song with the refrain: "Shut it off, shut if off, buddy now I shut you down" belongs on the list.

22. "Walking on Sunshine" by Katrina and the Waves. It's time to feel good.

21. "Hail to the Chief." Look, as long as you're going to go with a cocky, arrogant song for a closer, may as well get it over with and pick the president's song. Added bonus: given that the president throws out the first pitch once a year, a non-zero chance exists that Fearless Leader would have to stand for someone else when this song plays.

20. "Don't Fear the Reaper" by Blue Oyster Cult. Actually, I wouldn't be surprised it someone was already using this song.

19. "Rave On" by Buddy Holly. Another great song of celebration.

18. Theme from "Empire Strikes Back." Want to talk intimidation? Then let's start with Darth Vader. You could do a whole lot worse than playing his song.

17. "Tonight, Tonight" by the Smashing Pumpkins. Another joyful song, which promises something wonderful is about to happen. With its "city by the lake" reference, it works especially well for a closer from Chicago, Milwaukee, Cleveland, or Detroit.

16. "Hair of the Dog" by Nazareth. This is either the greatest crappy song of all-time or the crappiest great song of them all. Either way, it's a lot of fun to listen to as the band gets into it and the lead singer (I could look up his name, but it's Nazareth—who really cares?) sounds like he means when screaming "Now you're messing with a son of a bitch."

15. Tie: "Get Off Of My Cloud" and "Jumpin' Jack Flash" by the Rolling Stones. You can't go wrong with either one of these tunes. The first one tells the other side to get the hell away (plus has a fantastic snappy drum intro). As for "Flash," it's a gas, gas, gas. (And thus especially appropriate for a fastball pitcher).

14. "Speed King" by Deep Purple. Speaking of songs for fastball pitchers, none are more appropriate than this one. The title is perfect and the song rocks, too. Other possible Deep Purple songs include: "Hush" (like "White Room" it has a memorable opening barrage), "Highway Star" and, of course, the guitar riff that ate the world.

13. "This Is a Call" by Foo Fighters. I'm tempted to go with "Everlong" instead (or at least make it a tie) but I'll take this one when you get down to it. After all, the manager has to make a call to the bullpen to get the closer out.

12. Much of the soundtrack from "The Good, the Bad, the Ugly," especially "Ecstasy of Gold," "The Trio," and the main theme. Perhaps there is a better movie score out there, but there can't possibly be a cooler one. There is a slight heavy metal connection as apparently Metallica has "Ecstasy of Gold" play before they enter the stage at their concerts.

11. "Just What I Needed" by the Cars. I was going to pick "You're All I've Got Tonight" by the same band, but the line "I don't care if you even the score" disqualifies it. This one is pretty effective, too.

10. "Under Pressure" by Queen (with David Bowie). Sure, they no longer enter the game with the tying runner on base like they did in the days of Gossage, but holding onto a one-run lead in the ninth inning still involves a good deal of pressure.

9. "One Way or Another" by Blondie. Because the closer is going to getcha getcha getcha getcha. I suppose this song could be flipped around so the batters coming up can pump themselves up for a possible comeback, but that can be said of many traditional closer songs. If "Enter Sandman" plays before Albert Pujols faces Generic Closer, who do you think should feel afraid?

8. "Night on Bald Mountain." Everything I know about classical music I learned from "Fantasia" so this is easily the most appropriate piece from that genre I can think of. It sounds like doom rolling down from the hills, which is just what a closer wants the opposing hitters to feel.

7. "Mama Said Knock You Out" by LL Cool J. The last thing I closer wants anyone to do is to call it a comeback. Plus it's a great, hard-driving song.

6. Theme from "Superman." Forget "Hail to the Chief." Why settle for the president's song if you can claim to be the frickin' man of steel?

5. "It's Like That" by Run DMC. The closer's laying down the rules, and everyone else just has to accept it. That's just the way it is.

4. "Uptight (Alright)" by Stevie Wonder. This might be the most fantastic, liveliest celebration song of them all. It pulsates along like nothing else. If any positive-sounding song should be used in the ninth inning, it should be this one. I'd rank it higher except for the "I'm just an average guy" line.

3. "Heroes" by David Bowie. Ain't that the whole point of a closer? He's supposed to come in and save the day.

2. "Hold On, I'm Coming" by Sam and Dave. Jeez, just look at the title. It doesn't hurt that it's one of the greatest soul records of them all, either.

1. "Iron Man" by Black Sabbath. Part of me feels bad for ending with a cliché, but this really is my pick for the best of all possible closer songs. It has all the elements you want in a closer song: a slow start, an instantly recognizable guitar rift, and a foreboding sound of doom. Are closer songs supposed to be intimidating? Well, the hero of this song is an unstoppable mass-murdering killing machine. Top that.

Several Sabbath songs would make good closer tunes - "Sabbath Bloody Sabbath," "Children of the Grave," "Black Sabbath" itself - but there is only "Iron Man."

Then again, if we were to be honest about it, the perfect closer song for at least ten teams would be "19th Nervous Breakdown" by the Rolling Stones.


References and Resources
Though it's linked in the site's main page and up top of the article, it's impossible to overdue the debut I owe Ted Berg for his brilliant idea for a two columns at SNY. They inspired this piece, to put it mildly.

In case anyone's curious, the followins songs were deemed "too cliched" by my entirely arbitrary standards to make the list: "Ace of Spades" by Motorhead, "Run for the Hills" by Iron Maiden, "Hells Bells" by AC/DC (duh), "Closing Time" by Semisonic, "Celebration" by Kool and the Gang, "Wild Thing" by the Troggs, "We Are the Champions" and "We Will Rock You" by Queen, and "Enter Sandman" by Metallica.

Those also considered but ultimately rejected include: "House of the Rising Sun" by the Animals, "Catch Us If You Can" by the Dave Clark 5, "It Won't Be Long" by the Beatles, "Don't Stop" by Fleetwood Mac, "Real Wild Child" by Iggy Pop, "Head On" by the Pixies, "Do It Again" by Steely Dan, "London Calling" and "Clampdown" by the Clash, "Tub Thumping" by Chumbawumba, "Killing Me Softly with His Song" by Roberta Flack, "Movin' Right Along" by the Muppets, "Heartbreaker" by Led Zeppelin, "Psycho Killer" by Talking Heads, "Lose Yourself" by Eminem, "Pictures of Matchstick Men" by the Status Quo, "Electric Avenue" by Eddy Grant, "No Action" by Elvis Costello, and the theme from "Chariots of Fire."

Oh, and Nazareth's lead singer was named Dan McCafferty.

History instructor by day, statnerd by night, Chris Jaffe leads one of the most exciting double lives imaginable; with the exception of every other double life possible to imagine. Despite his lack of comic-book-hero-worthiness, Chris enjoys farting around with this stuff. His new book, Evaluating Baseball's Managers is available for order. Chris welcomes responses to his articles via e-mail.

<< Return to Article What’s the best BABIP estimator? from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

What’s the best BABIP estimator?

by Derek Carty
January 26, 2009

BABIP is a stat that lots of people like to throw around but many don't fully understand (even some who profess to be statistically inclined).

Background info


BABIP stands for Batting Average on Balls in Play. It measures the rate at which balls in play fall in for hits. Essentially, any ball that the batter makes contact with, puts into fair territory, and does not become a home run falls into the domain of BABIP. It is calculated as (H-HR)/(AB-K-HR).

We use BABIP to evaluate both pitchers and hitters, but the way in which we use it differs greatly among the two. Most pitchers regress toward the league average BABIP of around .300 or .305. Very few pitchers can repeatedly do better or worse than this, so we say that pitchers have very little control over BABIP.

Hitters, on the other hand, can have a substantial amount of control over BABIP. Ichiro Suzuki, for example, has a .356 career BABIP. Hitters do not regress toward league average, rather, they each regress toward their own, unique number.

The big question these days seems to be, what is that number? Today, I'd like to look at several ways of determining it and see which is best.

The test


This is something I've been curious about for a while, so I took as many BABIP estimators as I could think of and decided to put them up against each other to see which does the job of predicting the following year's BABIP the best.

The combatants


  • Previous year BABIP (BABIP): This is simply the player's BABIP from the previous year.
  • Expected BABIP (xBABIP): This is a BABIP model created by Chris Dutton and Peter Bendix, introduced at THT last month in this article. xBABIP is the primary reason for this article as I have been very curious how well our newest model does what it intends. Also, please note that Chris has tweaked the model a little since the original article ran. Please check the bottom of this article for more details.
  • Quick Expected BABIP (qxBABIP): As Dutton and Bendix's xBABIP includes some stats that aren't readily available to the casual fan, they've created a simplified version using stats that are readily available, of course, at the (expected) expense of accuracy.
  • Line drive BABIP (ldBABIP): This is the one that gets the most play. Everyone seems to be using it these days, but for reasons I've explained many times before, I'm not a fan. It's calculated as line drive rate plus .120.
  • Studes BABIP (studesBABIP): This one was created around the same time Dave Studeman put out Line drive BABIP but doesn't get nearly the same attention. Not a whole lot more difficult to calculate, but uses more than one variable. It's calculated as 0.245 + 0.52 * LD% - 0.16 * FB% + 0.11 times K%.
  • Expected Batting Average BABIP (xBA BABIP): This one is the BABIP portion of Baseball HQ's Expected Batting Average (xBA) statistic. I should note that this uses HQ's SX stat, which I couldn't replicate precisely. I was, however, able to get it very close. Also, because SX and PX are indexes based on league (American/National) average, for player's switching teams mid-year, I weighted each based on games spent with each team.
  • Marcels BABIP (mBABIP): This isn't so much an estimator as a projection, but I thought it would be good to include for context. It's simply what Marcels projects for the following year. It's also currently what I'm using in my True Batting Average calculations.

The process


I used data from 2004 to 2008, matching players from one year to the next. As xBABIP was the reason for doing the study, I had to work around that a little bit. xBABIP wasn't calculated for anyone with fewer than 300 plate appearances, so I made that the cut-off for both year one and year two. There are some biases with using cut-offs, but there's no way around it in this instance.

From there, I adjusted each stat for differences in league average and ran a couple of tests. You can see the results below.

The results


+---------------+-------+--------+---------+---------+-------------+-----------+--------+
| TEST          | BABIP | xBABIP | qxBABIP | ldBABIP | studesBABIP | xBA BABIP | mBABIP |
+---------------+-------+--------+---------+---------+-------------+-----------+--------+
| Correlation   | 0.38  |  0.50  |   0.45  |   0.20  |       0.32  |     0.40  |  0.46  |
| R-Squared     | 0.14  |  0.25  |   0.20  |   0.04  |       0.10  |     0.16  |  0.21  |
| Average Error | 0.028 |  0.021 |   0.022 |   0.029 |       0.024 |     0.022 |  0.022 |
+---------------+-------+--------+---------+---------+-------------+-----------+--------+

As you can see, there's a pretty clear pecking order in these results:
+------+-------------+
| RANK |   ESTIMATOR |
+------+-------------+
|    1 |      xBABIP |
+------+-------------+
|    2 |      mBABIP |
|    3 |     qxBABIP |
+------+-------------+
|    4 |   xBA BABIP |
|    5 |       BABIP |
+------+-------------+
|    6 | studesBABIP |
+------+-------------+
|    7 |     ldBABIP |
+------+-------------+

I've also broken things down by tiers. Dutton and Bendix's xBABIP seems to be the best, and I can only imagine what looking at multiple years of it would do. Just one year of data can explain 25 percent of the change in BABIP, a very big number for a stat with such wide variability. That it beats three years worth of Marcels data (plus regression to the mean and age adjustments) is excellent as well.

After that comes Marcels (which I've currently been using), and the quick version of xBABIP (which, I should note, doesn't include a not-hard-to-apply team adjustment. I didn't include it for some logistical reasons, but it would likely improve the accuracy a bit). It's very nice to see the quick version grade out so nicely since it will be easy to calculate in-season (although thanks to Sal Baxamusa, Marcels isn't very difficult either).

Then comes Baseball HQ (which Average Error thinks belongs in tier two) and actual BABIP, followed by Dave's more complex BABIP estimator (which was derived back at the beginning of 2005 when we were first starting to work with batted ball data).

Finally, line drive BABIP — which is the arguably the most popular of any other measure on this list — comes in dead last, well below everyone else and significantly worse than simply using actual BABIP. I've long said that I dislike this way of estimating BABIP, and it's very nice to see the tests confirm it.

Going forward


Going forward, I'll be using xBABIP in place of Marcels BABIP in my True Batting Average calculations and when discussing a player's BABIP in general. I'm committed to giving you guys the best there is, and Chris and Peter's model is tops among any BABIP estimator that I know of. If you missed the original article, I'd definitely recommend you go back and read it.

Some notes from Chris Dutton


Chris worked a lot with me on this, and I really appreciate his receptiveness and helpfulness. Here are some things he wanted me to pass along.

First, he has changed the model a bit since the original article. Here are the exact changes and his explanation of them:

Old formula: Hitter eye, Pitches per extra-base hit, LD%, FB/GB, Speed score, Contact rate, Spray, Pitches per AB
New formula: HR/FB, IF/FB, LD%, FB/GB, Speed score, Lefty*(FB/GB%), Contact rate, Spray

The differences are basically that I used hr/fb as a measure of power rather than pitches per extra base hit, added popups/FB to measure poorly hit balls, and included an interaction variable of lefty*(fb/gb%) to adjust for the fact that lefty ground ball hitters tend to often hit balls to the right side of the field (which rarely become hits). I also removed pitches_per_AB, which seemed to be potentially correlated with other variables, and removed hitter_eye since contact rate seemed to be capturing a very similar effect.

Chris also says that he's isn't done improving the model. He is constantly looking for ways to improve it even further, and is specifically hoping to incorporate some PITCHf/x data as soon as possible.

Finally, Chris is developing a tool that would allow readers to easily calculate the quick version of xBABIP. This would prove to be useful in-season when we constantly need to be changing our evaluation of hitters. While constantly calculating things like Spray would be time-consuming and difficult, the quick version utilizes stats that are all readily available and — as the tests show — is still effective. The tool also has some other cool features: interactive graphs, projected stat lines, and some other things you might find useful.

References and resources


Expected BABIP and Quick Expected BABIP data was provided for me by Chris Dutton. A big thanks to him for his help and also for helping to create such an excellent stat.

Marcels BABIP was taken from Tango's site. The rest of the stats I calculated myself.


Derek Carty, 23, has also been published by NBC's Rotoworld, Sports Illustrated, FOX Sports, and USA Today. This season, he'll be contributing to FanDuel and will be linking to all of his work at DerekCarty.com. In his three years competing in expert leagues, he has won 2 titles with 4 top three finishes, including a LABR NL title in 2009, making him the youngest person to ever win a major expert league title. Derek is a proud graduate of the MLB Scouting Bureau's Scout Development Program and is a firm believer in the importance of combining stats and scouting. He welcomes questions via e-mail, Facebook, or Twitter.

<< Return to Article THT Season Preview 2009 goes to printers from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

THT Season Preview 2009 goes to printers

by Derek Carty
January 26, 2009

After months of hard work, THT's David Gassko is getting a well-deserved rest. He's been hard at work on The Hardball Times Season Preview 2009, which has now been sent to the printers.

I'm not going to try telling you everything that's in the book; David did that over on the main site today. In brief, I've got an article in there on rookies to watch, and THT Fantasy's Chris Neault and Victor Wang also have articles on injuries and risk, respectively. Plus, there's team commentary from some of the top bloggers, projections, fantasy values, depth charts, and all kinds of other stuff.

I haven't had a chance to read it yet, but if the all work that went into it is any indication, it should be a good one. If you're going to buy it, please support THT by purchasing it from the publisher’s website using this link. THT gets much less if you buy it from a site like Amazon.

On an unrelated note, we've got more articles going today than can fit on the main page, so make sure you don't overlook the other two: mine on BABIP estimators and Victor's on late-round picks.


Derek Carty, 23, has also been published by NBC's Rotoworld, Sports Illustrated, FOX Sports, and USA Today. This season, he'll be contributing to FanDuel and will be linking to all of his work at DerekCarty.com. In his three years competing in expert leagues, he has won 2 titles with 4 top three finishes, including a LABR NL title in 2009, making him the youngest person to ever win a major expert league title. Derek is a proud graduate of the MLB Scouting Bureau's Scout Development Program and is a firm believer in the importance of combining stats and scouting. He welcomes questions via e-mail, Facebook, or Twitter.

<< Return to Article Lost in Transactions 1/19-1/25/09: Garden variety signings from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Lost in Transactions 1/19-1/25/09: Garden variety signings

by Evan Brunell
January 26, 2009

image
Jeff Kent (Icon/SMI)
The Baltimore Orioles got their starting catcher (at least until uberprospect Matt Wieters hits the bigs) and there were several other small moves that comprised this past week of baseball transactions. The minor league and one-year contracts are starting to trickle in, but they are of the garden variety. More interesting to me is which (and when) of the bigger names in free agency will cave and take a one-year deal at low dollars just to make sure he has a job for the season. Maybe we'll cover that player next week?

NOTE: Unless significant, I will not be posting contract/arbitration decisions as they are already bound to the team for the 2009 season.

1/19/08


Baltimore Orioles acquired RHP David Pauley from the Boston Red Sox in exchange for RHP Randor Bierd.

I like this acquisition for the Orioles. Pauley has a fringe-average fastball but was able to post a 3.55 ERA in 25 starts for Pawtucket. He gave up 147 hits in 147 innings, walked 41 and whiffed 103. With his sinker, he could make a solid back of the rotation starter. He's prone to the home run ball, so the probably Orioles aren't a perfect match for his skill set (as opposed to, say, the San Diego Padres).

1/20/08


Detroit Tigers agreed to terms with pitcher Juan Rincon on a minor league contract.

He used to be pretty good with the Minnesota Twins. He's not anymore. Still, worth a flyer.

1/21/08


Baltimore Orioles signed RF Nick Markakis to a six-year contract.

As I wrote last week when the O's acquired Felix Pie, the club now has one of the more dynamic outfields in baseball. Markakis is the most accomplished of all three and is fast becoming the face of Orioles baseball.

Entering his age-25 season, the possibility exists that Markakis will eventually hit 30 taters, but for now he will have to settle for being in the low 20s. His walk rate spiked last year to 14.3 (8.1 in 2006, 8.7 in 2007) so he's adjusting more and more to major league pitching. His isolated power held steady at .185, same as 2007, so he still has room for growth there.

An encouraging sign in his progression is the increase of his line drive percentage, which rose to 21.1 percent a year after checking in at 17.7. Line drives are the balls hit with the most authority, so any trend upwards is considered a good thing. He also drastically improved his defense, posting a 3.6 UZR a year after going -0.7. All told, he was worth $24.3 million in true value last year. He has yet to make an All Star Game, but expect that to change, if not in 2009.

Los Angeles Dodgers signed C Brad Ausmus to a one-year contract.

Los Angeles Angels signed P Matt Palmer and 2B Luis Figueroa to minor league contracts.

Boston Red Sox acquired pitcher Fabian Williamson from the Seattle Mariners for pitcher David Aardsma.


R.J. Anderson covered this acquisition over at Fangraphs and brings up some examples that Aardsma could be following, most notably the ascension of Grant Balfour and Matt Thornton to above-average relief pitchers. Aardsma's issue has always been command but was able to harness most of it and be a valuable piece out of the Red Sox bullpen before going down midseason with an injury after trying to pitch through it. His statistics after the injury were not pretty. Still, check out this K/9 correlation:



Pat Hickey explains what Red Sox fans should expect from Williamson:

Williamson is a finesse pitcher who locates an 85-90 mph well on both sides of the plate. As a lefty, he possesses natural deception and could be a solid situational guy out of the Boston bullpen in three or four years. He also commands a curveball and change-up with good control, both of which rate as average with the potential to become above-average. He struck out Appalachian League hitters to the tune of 11.45 K/9. At 6'2", 175 lbs., Fabian should continue to grow into his frame by adding muscle that could improve his fastball to bode better as he advances through the Sox minor leagues. With the combination of a present below-average fastball and that kind of strikeout rate, he shows advanced pitchability for his age.


Texas Rangers signed shortstop Omar Vizquel and catcher Adam Melhuse to minor league contracts.

Words can't do justice to how bad Omar Vizquel was as a hitter last year. A .550 OPS in 300 plate appearances? Ouch.

There are some positive indicators for Vizquel, however. His BABIP was a paltry .242 (average is .300) and his line drive percentage actually rose to 20.8 from 18.3 in 2007 when he posted a .621 OPS. He was still an above-average defensive shortstop and likely can hang around a couple more years as a utility infielder if he wants to. He'll push Elvis Andrus for a starting job in Texas' infield. My money is on Omar winning the job so Andrus can get some at-bats in Triple-A, something he has yet to do. In my opinion, it's a bit surprising that the Rangers pushed Young off short. They could have gotten by with him for one additional year and taken a flyer on someone like Joe Crede or Ty Wigginton to man third base.

However, the double play combination of Young and Ian Kinsler was horrific defensively (despite Young's gold glove), so it is understandable that the club would want to move to improve their defense for the pitchers. (I wrote today over at Fire Brand about Jon Lester and made note of how significantly the defense helped him. You cannot underscore the effectiveness of defense behind a pitcher.) Take for example Carlos Silva. As I quote:

Take Carlos Silva into account. With a fine defense behind him in the 2007 Minnesota Twins, he posted a 4.19 ERA and 4.67 xFIP. In Seattle in 2008, we all know how atrocious he was: a 6.46 ERA. Ah, but his xFIP? 4.74. Significant difference, as it is widely held that the Mariners hold one of the worst defenses in baseball, especially in the infield where Silva makes his living.


That would explain in part, as well, why the Baltimore Orioles (another team with a struggling pitching staff) has chosen to go with Cesar Izturis as their shortstop. You're seeing the pendulum swing back to good-field, no-hit shortstops after a generation of hitting shortstops.

San Diego Padres agreed to terms on a one-year contract with C Henry Blanco.

The Padres have essentially punted this season, but the addition of Blanco gives them what could be a valuable trading chip down the line. He has been one of the better backstops in the league the last several years with his defense and his ability to make enough contact to continue to have a job as a catcher. If another team's backup catcher (or even primary) catcher goes down, Blanco will definitely be near the top of the list for possible replacements. For a rebuilding team in San Diego, they can nab another prospect for no loss.

1/22/08


Baltimore Orioles signed C Gregg Zaun to a one-year contract. Designated INF Oscar Salazar for assignment.

Zaun's had a long career and in another day and age, could have been one of the better starting catchers in his era had he just gotten lucky. He has a career .344 OBP and had his best year in 2006 for the Toronto Blue Jays. The Orioles nabbed themselves a great catcher, at least for the price and situation.

Zaun will start the season as the starter as the Orioles push off Matt Wieter's free agency year by one additional year. Wieters will then receive the call in May or June and integrate himself behind the plate with Zaun as a mentor. All told, Zaun should catch around 70-80 games on the year, which will give him a solid resume when teams consider bidding on him when his deal is up next year. If he can have a good offensive year, he may be able to land a job as a starter next year. Indeed, despite losing his job, he still contributed 1.2 wins to the Toronto ballclub last season.

Los Angeles Dodgers announced the retirement of second baseman Jeff Kent.

Say what you want about his personality, but Kent goes down in history as one of the best second basemen to play the game. Kent struggled to find a niche with the Toronto Blue Jays, New York Mets, and Cleveland Indians before arriving in San Francisco as a 29-year-old and going on to contribute 11 seasons of excellent offense from the second base position. He won the NL MVP in 2000, hitting .334/.424/.596 with 33 home runs and 125 RBIs. He was never known as a defensive whiz at second but demonstrated enough ability to play the position that he never had to move off it.

Atlanta Braves signed C Alvin Colina, 3B Brooks Conrad, P Emiliano Fruto, P Juan Perez to minor league contracts.

New York Mets signed infielder Alex Cora to a one-year contract.


The Mets really needed a solid backup in the infield position, and you can't really go wrong with Cora. He's never been known for being a good hitter, but does maintain a career .245/.313 line, which is good enough for a backup. He's prone to hot streaks, as the Red Sox can attest. Cora has carried the Sox for stretches at a time. This past year, when Cora missed time with injury, he posted 152 at-bats, his fewest since establishing himself as a major leaguer. He's average to below-average at second in UZR, but is very good at shortstop.

The Mets needed someone like this to back up Jose Reyes and Luis Castillo. With Castillo increasingly becoming a liability both at the plate and in the field, it wouldn't surprise me if Cora eventually usurped the starting job by the end of the season.

1/23/08


Milwaukee Brewers signed SS Craig Counsell to a one-year contract.

New York Mets signed OF Rob Mackowiak and SP Freddy Garcia to minor league contracts, signed OF Cory Sullivan to a one-year contract.


Garcia made an encouraging return from surgery in 2008, starting three games for the Detroit Tigers. He posted a 4.20 ERA, but struggled to retain his command. He posted a 3.80 BB/9 after consistently being in the low 2s in his career. With more repetitions that number should go down. He was able to maintain his K/9 rate of the mid-7s, where he's been most of his career (and dipped to the 5s in 2005-6 for the Chicago White Sox, probably a contributing factor to his eventual surgery after imploding for the Philadelphia Phillies in 2007). He is a fine gamble for the Mets and should he make the rotation out of spring training, should deliver fine numbers as a No. 5 starter.

Sullivan logged almost 400 at-bats as a 25- and 26-year old for the Colorado Rockies but lost playing time in 2007 and 2008. His career line in 927 at-bats is .279/.330/.391. In Triple-A for the Rockies, he hit .320/.373/.475 and has 25 career stolen bases to go with nine caught stealing. The issue is that he's not a very good fielder in center field. He's fine in the corners but center seems to pose problems for him. With the Mets deep in outfielders that can play the corners, he's going to have to show an ability to pitch in at center.

1/24/08


Detroit Tigers agreed to terms with pitcher Brandon Lyon on a one-year contract and pitcher Scott Williamson on a minor league contract; designated pitcher Eddie Bonine for assignment.

Ah, Scott Williamson. He was filthy for the Red Sox in 2003 and parts of 2004. Williamson was half of a fearsome combo with Mike Timlin; "Timlin in the eighth, Williamson in the ninth" became a common phrase in 2003. Too bad Grady Little didn't listen in Game 7 of the 2003 ALCS ... but let's not re-open old wounds. He hasn't been a good major league pitcher since his run with the Sox in 2004, so the odds are against him.

Lyon was a nice pickup for the Tigers. It was obvious they needed to make some changes in the bullpen. Although Lyon isn't going to be confused with a dominant pitcher, he at the very least is a better option than Fernando Rodney in the ninth. He's never demonstrated an advanced ability to miss bats, although he did make significant progress towards this in 2008 when he posted a 3.38 K/BB, the best mark in his career by far. His main issue in 2008 was the abundance of hits: 75 in 59.1 innings. This after 70 in 74 innings in 2007. He was a very good reliever for the DBacks in 2006 and 2007 so if he can get back to that, should help the Tigers in their pursuit of making it back to the postseason.

Boston Red Sox announced the retirement of 1B Sean Casey.

I'm a bit surprised that Casey chose to retire after hitting .322/.381/.392 for the Red Sox in a backup role. Every time he came up to the plate, he always seemed to deliver. He could have easily lasted the next five years in the NL as a pinch-hitter. However, two things probably factored in Casey's decision: the daily grind of being away with his family just to pinch-hit and taking a remarkably reduced role on the Red Sox once the team acquired Mark Kotsay, which more than likely told him it was time to hang it up. We'll be seeing him on the MLB Network and maybe we can finally hear some amusing anecdotes on exchanges he had at first-base. Widely considered the nicest ballplayer in the game, he will be missed.

1/25/08


Boston Red Sox signed C Carlos Maldonaldo to a minor league contract.

Evan Brunell is currently editor of Fire Brand of the American League, a Red Sox blog he began in 2003. He also scores games at Fenway Park for MLB. He was the co-founder and president of MVN, an independent sports media web site.

<< Return to Article It’s The Hardball Times Season Preview 2009 from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

It’s The Hardball Times Season Preview 2009

by David Gassko
January 26, 2009

I haven’t written an article for The Hardball Times since November, and if you were wondering why (and you probably weren’t), it was because I was hard at work on The Hardball Times Season Preview 2009, our annual book previewing the upcoming major league baseball season.

This is the third year we’ve done this book, and it’s the third year that I can honestly say we’ve surpassed my every expectation. I know my opinion is biased, but our writers have done a fantastic job covering every aspect of the upcoming season.

The bulk of the Season Preview consists of team essays, player comments, and projections. In all, we have 1,050 player projections and comments in the book, meaning that we’ve covered just about anyone who might have an impact on the 2009 baseball season. In addition, purchasers of the Season Preview will have access to a spreadsheet with over 2,600 projections.

The projections include all the regular statistics you might expect, plus fielding ratings, three-year projections, a reliability score, projected fantasy values, and depth charts. In other words, no matter what you’re using these projections for, we have you covered.

But enough about the projections. They’re good, but they’re not so much better than any other system that I’m going to ask you to buy the book just for them. Instead, I want to talk a little about the lifeblood of the Season Preview—the writing.

The writers featured in the Season Preview are not just some random schmucks we pulled off the street (well, except for John Brattain), but some of the best bloggers on the internet writing about the teams they follow every day. Who better to tell you about the Arizona Diamondbacks than Jim McLennan? And who knows more about the Seattle Mariners than Jeff Sullivan?

Our writers can tell you more about the teams and players they’re covering than just about anyone else in the world, and as someone who has already read the book, and is completely and totally unbiased, let me tell you, they do a great job of it. If you want to be prepared for the upcoming season, you need to read what these guys have to say.

That’s not all the writing in the book, though; after you’re done with all the team essays and player comments, you’ll find three essays in the back of the book that will further help prepare you for the 2009 season, especially if you play fantasy baseball.

First, we have a piece by our injury expert Chris Neault, who runs down all the injury situations you need to know about in the upcoming season. Chris covers 40 players in-depth, and more than 100 overall. Injuries play a huge role every year, so this article is a must-read for just about everyone.

Following Chris, we have Derek Carty writing about rookies to watch in 2009. Rookies are notoriously difficult to project, but they can have a huge impact on both the real and fantasy baseball season. Derek will tell you about each rookie’s upside, and who he thinks is ready to make an impact this year.

Finally, we have a piece specifically for the fantasy baseball players among you. Victor Wang is our resident risk expert, and this piece, he tackles how to manage risk in your fantasy baseball draft. Risk can be a good thing—by definition, it involves a large potential upside—but too much risk can also cause your fantasy season (or the worldwide economy) to blow up. Victor will tell you how to balance these considerations.

Beyond that, the Season Preview includes our first shot at projection the 2009 standings (let’s just say the Yankees and Red Sox look like the elite teams in baseball once more), projected fantasy values, career projections based upon a tool I developed in last year’s Season Preview, and cartoons by Tuck!, who provides his own humorous take on the upcoming season.

All in all, we have produced a 296-page behemoth that is an essential buy for any big baseball fan. Please support THT by purchasing it from the publisher’s website. As a completely unbiased observer, you can trust me: You won’t regret it.

And for those who are still unsure, here are some sample pages from the World Champion Philadelphia Phillies team chapter:

Team Essay Sample Page
Hitter Comments Sample Page
Pitcher Comments Sample Page

David Gassko is a former consultant to a major league team. He welcomes comments via e-mail.

<< Return to Article Aaron Gleeman Wants YOU from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Aaron Gleeman Wants YOU

by Chris Jaffe
January 23, 2009



History instructor by day, statnerd by night, Chris Jaffe leads one of the most exciting double lives imaginable; with the exception of every other double life possible to imagine. Despite his lack of comic-book-hero-worthiness, Chris enjoys farting around with this stuff. His new book, Evaluating Baseball's Managers is available for order. Chris welcomes responses to his articles via e-mail.

<< Return to Article Draft Manifesto (part 2) from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Draft Manifesto (part 2)

by Michael Lerra
January 23, 2009

In the first part of my Draft Manifesto, I went over a few quick strategies that I try to keep in mind during a draft. I took some flak about my stance on catchers, namely, that the top-shelf ones are often drafted too high in my opinion. But the resulting discussion was enlightening and caused my stance to soften a bit. In any case, here's a continuation of that piece.

7) Don't take a starter until the 8th or 9th round unless you have a very good reason. Wins fluctuate wildly from year to year, but for some reason preseason rankings always seem to assume 18-, 19-, 20-, and 21-game winners are going to repeat that the following year. Odds are overwhelming that they won't. In addition, there's always guys who get called up midseason (Cole Hamels), turned to starters midseason (Francisco Liriano), or who demonstrate a true talent improvement during the season (Cliff Lee) that you can capitalize on. In most 12-person leagues, most players simply pick up starters based on Wins and ERA to that point in the year. By looking at stats like FIP and even simple ones like K/9 and BB/9, you can make better decisions than your opponents on who to pick up, who to trade, and who to trade for. Hitters are far more consistent from year to year, and I think the relatively unsophisticated fantasy owners still have a good sense about the true talent of hitters.

8) Avoid hitters who have had wrist injuries. If you ask 10 people what the most important part of the body is when swinging a baseball bat, you'll get 10 different answers. But one of them will be the wrist, and wrist injuries just seem to take the longest for players to recover from.

9) After the 9th or 10th round, give precedence to any certain-closers that remain. When someone needs saves, they'll often overpay for them. Closers make the best trade bait mid-season.

10) Power hitters make the second-best trade bait. For some reason, Juan Pierre is draftable in the 6th round, but almost entirely untradeable mid-season. Likewise with Wily Taveras—always drafted in a reasonable position in the draft, but impossible to trade. Players are far more likely to give up on steals and focus on the power stats than they are to make a mid-season trade to solidify steals. In the draft, err on the side of too much power over too much speed.

11) Know the value of the Mark DeRosas. Players most often get six games per week, and days off either Mondays and Thursdays. So a bench hitter is really only looking at one game per week that he could fill in over regulars. Derosa played 149 games last year, so 149/162 or 92% of the time, and was qualified at 1B, 2B, 3B, and OF. On any given Monday or Thursday that he was playing, odds were you had a 1B, 2B, 3B, or OF whose team had the day off. The fantasy season is typically 22 games long, so in assessing his value as a bench guy, we want to look at 92% of his production per 22 games. This comes out to a .285 BA, 13 Runs, 3 HR, 11 RBI, and 1 SB. Obviously not a ton of production, but enough to swing a few games during a head-to-head season, or a few spots in a Roto league. Of course, the tradeoff is the benefit of those numbers, versus an extra SP or middle reliever that provides some value as well. I think one bench utility player like DeRosa is a must, even in leagues where opponents are maximizing their bench slots for starters—if you're dedicated, you can even boost that production a bit more by subbing him in for regulars when the park or opposing pitcher makes it an even more favorable game for him.

I once again welcome comments that anyone wishes to share. I'm not saying I'm correct about all of these assertions—they are almost entirely anecdotal—but they're my best guess at ways to go towards an optimum draft experience.


Mike is located in Cambridge, MA, working in the search engine marketing field, and waiting for fantasy baseball to get as big as poker so he can "go pro". Feedback on all pieces is welcome and appreciated!

<< Return to Article The Old Home from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The Old Home

by Craig Calcaterra
January 23, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Troy Glaus to Miss Start of Season from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Troy Glaus to Miss Start of Season

by Chris Neault
January 23, 2009



Send all injury-related questions or comments to .(JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address)

<< Return to Article Moving Day from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Moving Day

by Craig Calcaterra
January 23, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Never fear, George Mitchell is here! from The Hardball Times

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Never fear, George Mitchell is here!

by Craig Calcaterra
January 23, 2009



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New York BBWAA Dinner

by Craig Calcaterra
January 23, 2009



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Waivers

by Craig Calcaterra
January 23, 2009



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<< Return to Article Today at THT from The Hardball Times

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Today at THT

by Craig Calcaterra
January 23, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article This annotated week in baseball history: Jan. 18-Jan. 24, 1972 from The Hardball Times

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This annotated week in baseball history: Jan. 18-Jan. 24, 1972

by Richard Barbieri
January 23, 2009

On Jan. 21, 1972 Alan Benes was born. In his major league career, he would win 29 games, or 126 fewer than his older brother Andy. Richard returns to one of his favorite subjects, looking at the "other brother" of great pitching families.

Orison Swett Marden, a sort-of Gilded Age Deepak Chopra, once wrote that the “greatest thing a man can do in this world is to make the most possible out of the stuff that has been given him.” That’s not bad advice to live by, doing the best you can with the tools you have, but it did bring me back to one of my favorite topics.

In the past I have written about the “other brother” of those who have achieved baseball glory, like Trevor Hoffman’s brother Glenn, or Jose Canseco’s brother Ozzie. It is players like these, doing the best they can with the “stuff that has been given,” who must sometime wonder why their siblings apparently were given so much more.

And while truly great players (Hank Aaron, Honus Wagner) have had utterly pedestrian siblings reach the majors, pitchers especially seem to specialize in this. Of the 22 men to win 300 or more games, five had brothers who pitched—to varying degrees of success—in the majors.

(And Tom Glavine had a brother, Mike Glavine, who reached the majors. Mike only hit like a pitcher, though; he was actually an infielder.)

That’s nearly a quarter of 300-game winners, and the list is even more impressive when you consider that Pedro Martinez, who won’t win 300 games but had the greatest peak of any pitcher in history, also had a pitching brother.

But while sorting through all the pitching brothers could fill a whole year’s worth of columns itself (and force me to actually write about Alan Benes) I will instead just look at the 300-game-winning five. Starting from the past, and moving forward:

John Clarkson, and his brothers, Dad Clarkson and Walter Clarkson


Arguably the most obscure 300-game winner in history (his only real competition is Mickey Welch) Clarkson nonetheless compensates by having not one, but two pitching brothers. “Dad” and Walter combined to win 57 games, a total that could be multiplied five and a half times and still not match John’s 328.

In fairness, John pitched primarily in the 1880s, starting as many as 70 games in a season. That’s not to take away from his pitching ability; he appeared in the top 10 in ERA eight times in his 12-year career.

Meanwhile, Dad (his real name was Arthur; he was the middle brother and I have no idea where that nickname comes from) also pitched in the 1880s, but lacked the quality of his brother. Walter was 17 years younger than Jack and pitched exclusively in the 1900s, when inning totals no longer matched what his older sibling could do. Nonetheless, he too was not the talent his brother was.

Christy Mathewson, and his brother, Henry Mathewson


Can you name the most successful pitching brother pairs of all-time? Without getting into exact win totals, the top five are the Niekros, Perrys, Clarksons, Madduxes and Mathewsons. The Mathewson family total is 373, which is, of course, also the career total of Christy.

This tells you a lot about Henry Mathewson, Christy’s younger brother. Like Big Six, he attended Bucknell University and pitched for the Giants. Unlike the elder Mathewson, he was terrible. Henry’s first season in New York was 1905; he pitched 10 innings and gave up six runs. He pitched a scoreless inning in 1906 but that was it. Henry finished with a career 4.91 ERA, which would be an ERA over six in 2008.

I suppose Henry could claim that he and Christy averaged more than 185 wins each, but that seems cold comfort.

Gaylord Perry, and his brother, Jim Perry


Of course, not all brother pairs are of the Clarkson/Mathewson one shining star variety. Sometimes there is a clear superior talent, but one would not be displeased to have the other. Such is the case of Gaylord and Jim Perry who, not coincidentally, rank second among all-time brother wins with 529.

Gaylord, of course, is well known for throwing (or not throwing, depending when you asked him) the spitball, and it carried him to 314 wins, the 1972 and 1978 Cy Young Awards, and the Hall of Fame. Jim was never quite the pitcher Gaylord was, but he did win 215 games and the 1970 Cy Young Award when he went 24-12 for the Minnesota Twins.

Given time on better teams—collectively the pair appeared in the playoffs only four times—they might have accumulated enough wins to overcome our next pairing.

Phil Niekro, and his brother, Joe Niekro


Speaking of pairings in which either brother would be fine to have on your team, there’s the family Niekro. Phil finished with 318 wins, and earned a spot in the Hall of Fame, while Joe had 221 victories. Individually, neither Phil nor Joe were better pitchers than Gaylord or Jim Perry, respectively, but as knuckleballers they both held on for many years, with Phil not retiring until he was 48.

That helped them earn their collective 539, still the most ever by siblings. Phil was clearly the better of the pair—Joe actually has the most wins of any pitcher with a career ERA worse than average—but both were capable of pitching huge numbers of innings at a high level of effectiveness.

Greg Maddux, and his brother, Mike Maddux


As bad as Henry Mathewson was, it really didn’t matter, because he didn’t have much of a chance to hold a candle to Christy. The same goes for Mike Maddux. You don’t need me to run down Greg Maddux’s accomplishments, so I will just say that there is a very strong case to be made that he was the greatest pitcher who ever lived.

Mike Maddux, meanwhile, was, well, not the greatest pitcher to ever live. Mostly a reliever, he could be very effective (he posted two back-to-back strong seasons for the Padres in 1991-92) but finished his career with an essentially average ERA and just 39 wins. That many wins was a good pair of seasons for Greg, so you can understand why Mike is now making his name as the very talented pitching coach of the Brewers.

So perhaps Mike Maddux, Dad Clarkson and others will never have the Hall of Fame glory of their siblings. Nonetheless, they did as would make Orison Marden proud, making the best of what they had. And so did Alan Benes, Mark Leiter and others lucky enough to be related to the merely good. Sometimes, that’s all you can do.



Questions, comments and thinly veiled threats can be mailed to Richard on the back of a twenty dollar bill or e-mailed to him at RichardBarbieri@yahoo.com

<< Return to Article The 2009 High School Power Showcase from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The 2009 High School Power Showcase

by Greg Rybarczyk
January 23, 2009

As we all know, Jan. 1, 2009 was a day that had no parallel in the world of sports. I am of course referring to the debut of the MLB Network, a 24/7 channel devoted entirely to baseball. (Orange Bowl? Isn’t that what they have first-year art students draw pictures of?) The MLB Network, along with Extra Innings and DirecTV’s Strike Zone Channel, is just one more thing they can take away from me only after they pry the remote control out of my cold, dead hands…

Nevertheless, I spent Jan. 1 on a plane, headed for St. Petersburg, Fla., because there I had the opportunity to witness the top 69 high school hitters in the United States and nine other countries swinging for the fences in the Third Annual International High School Power Showcase Home Run Derby, held for the second straight year at Tropicana Field. I was invited to provide distance measurements for the home runs hit during the event, using Hit Tracker, and I came away mightily impressed with the talent assembled under the dome in St. Pete.

The Showcase is the creation of Brian Domenico, a 35-year-old former professional baseball player now coaching high school ball in Boca Raton, Fla. Domenico organized the first Power Showcase in 2004 as a South Florida event held at Olympic Heights High School in Boca Raton. It was a great success, and the following year the showcase became a statewide Florida tournament, then a regional tournament, then national in December 2006. For the last two years, the Power Showcase has included representatives from the U.S. and several foreign nations.

Showcase Day 1:


On Friday, Jan. 2, the participants took batting practice and executed running and fielding drills under the instruction of members of the New York Yankees spring training staff at their baseball complex in Tampa. Under sunny skies, and backed by a crisp breeze, a couple of players generated a traffic hazard on nearby Dale Mabry Highway with some long homers. Later, several hitters threatened to make me regret declining the extra insurance on my rental car, which I unwisely parked beyond the left field fence of one of the four practice fields.

That evening, the Showcase participants gathered in the Grand Banquet Ballroom of the Bayfront Hilton in St. Petersburg for a formal dinner and the presentation of their uniforms. The dinner began with opening remarks from Showcase President Domenico, who presented a plaque to Van Conway, of Conway MacKenzie and Dunleavy, in appreciation for that firm’s sponsorship of the international Showcase players.

Next came Davey Johnson, 2008 U.S. Olympic and 2009 U.S. World Baseball Classic managerDavey Johnson Johnson shared stories from his long baseball career, in which he won two World Series as a player and one more as a manager. His most memorable recollection came from Game 2 of the 1966 Series, in which, at 23, he got a hit off Sandy Koufax. Koufax retired after that season, and Johnson’s hit turned out to be the last he allowed in his career. The next year at spring training, Johnson approached Koufax and introduced himself, mentioning the hit from the previous season. Koufax’s response: “Why do you think I retired?”

Perry Husband from Hitting is a Guess provided a demonstration of its system for video-based analysis of pitch recognition and swing mechanics. Video overlays showed the difference in release points for different pitch types, highlighting the potential value of disguising pitches, or of seeing through the disguise. High-speed video of swings, combined with geometric tools for measuring lines and angles, provided a tool for identifying and optimizing swing characteristics to improve exit speed, or how hard the ball is hit.

Linda Ruth Tosetti, granddaughter of Babe Ruth, was the final speaker. She offered her encouragement to the hitters, and described some of her famous grandfather’s ties to the St. Petersburg region. Notable was a long home run Ruth hit during spring training one year that was reported to have traveled more than 600 feet. I can’t offer any confirmation of the distance on Ruth’s homer, but I can attest that when you read about the home runs hit in the Power Showcase, the numbers you read are “how far they really went”!

Day 2: The Home Run Derby


Beginning just before 9 a.m. on Saturday, each of the 69 hitters took his swings in the preliminary round. In groups of three, each player batted off a pitching machine, first with a wooden bat for 10 outs, and after the others in the group had batted, each player batted for 15 outs with a metal bat. Any swing not resulting in a home run counted as an out. After all hitters had taken their turn, the five with the highest number of home runs passed through to the final round for an additional 15 outs with metal bats. It was a long day: Aside from occasional two-minute breaks to replenish baseballs, and a 10-minute break before the finals, the action did not stop for more than 12 hours!

Preston Overbey from Jackson, Tenn., drew the unenviable leadoff slot, and after coming up empty with the wood, he ripped the first of 271 total home runs in the showcase, a line drive to left-center field that narrowly cleared the fence. Overbey totaled three homers to set the early pace, and was matched in the lead by Tyler Garrone (Pennsylvania) and Adam Walker II (Wisconsin), before Ryan Gunhouse (Texas) broke out with 10 home runs, including two with his wooden bat. Matthew Kirkland (Tennessee) managed only three homers in all, but he hit the first of 16 homers to reach the upper deck in left field, and the first of 21 balls to hit a catwalk during the event.

Brett Sanders, representing Canada, racked up seven home runs to jump into second place, including a 408-foot home run with his wooden bat (tied for the longest wood bat homer of the event), and a 478-foot blast with his metal bat to deep left-center field that would stand up as the longest of the event for more than eight hours, although not all the way to the end. Jacob Mayers (Virginia) knocked three balls over the fence with his wooden bat, and a total of seven, to move into a tie for second place. Christian Walker (Pennsylvania) followed with three wood bat homers, and seven more with the metal bat, to move into a tie for the lead; his 10 home runs included a 468-footer to the upper level of the Power Alley Pub in deep center field.

Miles Head (Georgia) knocked nine homers to gain a place in the top five. Tommy Joseph (Arizona) crushed three home runs in his metal bat round that traveled more than 450 feet, including two to the upper deck and another 465-foot drive that hit the U.S. flag hanging in deep left-center field some 75 feet above field level. Dante Bichette (Florida), son of the eponymous former major leaguer, showed off his sweet swing by hitting two wood bat homers and nine more with the metal for a total of 11, to take the lead. Corey Davis (Georgia) got off to a slow start, but in the second half of his metal bat round, he ripped five long homers, including shots of 468, 464 and 455 feet. Jayce Boyd (Florida) tallied nine home runs, and Matt Conway (Michigan) smashed eight that averaged 435 feet.

After several more hitters took their turns, Randal Grichuk (Texas) forged into the lead with 12 homers, including two catwalk shots and four balls that reached the upper deck. His longest ball came off the bat at just over 122 mph, covered 477 feet and hit the “Fast news you can use” sign above the Party Deck just inside the left field foul pole. Cody Geyer (North Carolina) and Chris Marconcini (Tennessee) each totaled seven homers, and Josh Leyland (California) launched a 472-foot rocket onto the roof of the restaurant in center field, but no other hitters were able to crack the top five until Nevada’s Bryce Harper took his turn.

Like a lot of hitters in the Showcase, Harper wasn’t able to hit any home runs with his wooden bat, but he showed a beautiful left-handed swing and hit several balls hard. My Hit Tracker assistant Brenton Blair and I agreed that he was a good candidate to get some out with the metal bat, but nevertheless we weren’t ready for what we were about to witness. Stepping back to the plate with his metal bat, Harper knocked his first homer 443 feet on a line to the back of the right field seats. Three unremarkable homers and a number of outs followed, but then over the next 60 seconds, Harper unleashed an awe-inspiring series of hits to areas of Tropicana Field few major leaguers have reached:

• 460 feet to the top edge of the Jumbotron in right field; 119 mph off the bat
• 484 feet to the back wall of the stadium, 15 feet above the Jumbotron; 122 mph
• 485 feet to the back wall, just below the orange Bright House “target” sign; 123 mph
• 405 feet on a blistering line drive around the RF pole; 118 mph
• 502 feet to the back wall, in the vicinity of the first “A” in the Tropicana Field sign, 20 feet above the top of the Jumbotron; 124.5 mph
• 477 feet to right-center field, halfway up and a few feet to the left of the Jumbotron; 119 mph.

That’s six home runs, averaging 469 feet and 121 mph off the bat—all struck by a 16-year-old high school sophomore. Here's a picture of where each home run fell:

image
Photo by Jeff Horton

Harper hit 11 homers in all, enough to make the top five and join Gunhouse, Walker, Bichette and Grichuk in the finals. Walker led off with nine homers, and Gunhouse followed with eight. Harper, third, was able to hit only one more ball out. He looked worn out, understandably so since he had the misfortune to have hit 67th out of 69 batters, and had only a few minutes to recover before the finals. Grichuk hit fourth and scored eight homers including a 454-foot bomb, longest of the finals. Bichette hit last and scored four long balls, but when his last out landed on the warning track just short of the 370 sign in left field, the clock read 9:17 p.m. and Christian Walker had become the 2009 Power Showcase champion.

Wood vs. metal bats


The format of the Showcase provided an excellent opportunity to quantify the difference between power hitting with metal bats and wooden bats, since each hitter got 10 outs with wood and 15 with metal. The fact that each player started with wood and then switched to metal is not ideal, from a scientific standpoint, because the data could be biased due to the players being more warmed up for the metal round, or more fatigued in the metal round. However, because the players batted in groups of three, with time between their wood and metal rounds, both of these potential biases should be reduced.

The most obvious comparison method is average distance with wood vs. average distance with metal. The 30 wood bat homers averaged 373.1 feet, while the 230 metal bat homers that were measured averaged 408.1 feet (a few catwalk homers have not yet been analyzed). That’s a difference of 35 feet, or about 9.4 percent. A similar comparison of speed off the bat yields 100.6 mph for wood, and 108.9 mph for metal bats, a difference of 8.3 mph, or 8.3 percent.

The small sample size for wood bat homers means that there remains a lot of uncertainty in the “translation factor” from wood to metal bats, but knocking roughly 10 percent off the distance of a home run hit by a high school or college slugger can provide a good rough estimate of how far it might have gone with a wooden bat. For line drives that don’t clear the fence, knocking off about 8 percent of the speed off bat will give a reasonable wooden bat estimate.

Next year:


The International Power Showcase was a resounding success in 2009, and we certainly can look forward to watching another collection of outstanding high school sluggers swing for the fences in 2010. If Domenico has his way, perhaps next year’s event might be rotated to another warm-weather ballpark such as Chase Field or Minute Maid Park, and perhaps baseball fans will be able to watch it on television. Either way, your best chance to see the future sluggers of the major leagues “before they were famous” will be in the 2010 International Power Showcase.

Greg Rybarczyk maintains the site Hit Tracker Online, which logs and calculates the trajectory of every major league home run. Comments for Greg can be sent via e-mail.

<< Return to Article Keith Law’s Top 100 from The Hardball Times

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Keith Law’s Top 100

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Waiting for Wieters from The Hardball Times

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Waiting for Wieters

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Comment of the Day from The Hardball Times

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Comment of the Day

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



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<< Return to Article Baseball writers wanted from The Hardball Times

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Baseball writers wanted

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article More Commish for Day from The Hardball Times

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More Commish for Day

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



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<< Return to Article Somebody talked from The Hardball Times

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Somebody talked

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Today at THT from The Hardball Times

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Today at THT

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article KittleBall from The Hardball Times

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KittleBall

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Best outfield arms of 2008 from The Hardball Times

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Best outfield arms of 2008

by John Walsh
January 22, 2009

There is something about an outfielder with a cannon arm that captures our imagination, isn't there? I guess it's not too surprising: Plays involving a crucial throw from the outfield are among the most important and exciting in the game. I would guess that a runner gunned down at the plate is one of the most satisfying plays of all for the defensive side, and their fans. Another thing about throwing arms: Anybody can see who has a good arm or not. Well, that's not quite true, in the sense that strong arm doesn't necessarily translate into an effective one. But, still, we all have a general idea of who is patrolling the outfield with a cannon and who is trying to control the running game with a pop-gun.

Evaluating outfield arms is also satisfying for the baseball analyst. It's a straightforward and clean analysis — I think Bill James once wrote that all the information we need to evaluate outfielder throwing is in the recorded data, we just have to pick out the right pieces. On the other hand, the analysis is not so simple that you can get the results on your favorite mainstream media web site. I believe the Hardball Times is still the only place where you can get comprehensive outfield arm ratings.

The method

This is the fourth year I've written about outfield arms and the basic method hasn't changed. Here's a brief summary about how I go about measuring the value of outfield arms. (If you're already familiar with the method or don't care about the details, skip down to the next section.)

Using play-by-play data from Retrosheet, I consider five different situations when a throw from the outfield is important:

  1. Single with runner on first base (second base unoccupied).
  2. Double with runner on first base.
  3. Single with runner on second base.
  4. Fly out with runner on third base, fewer than two outs.
  5. Fly out with runner on second base, fewer than two outs (third base unoccupied).
For those plays, I add up how often the runner (any runner, actually, including the batter) is thrown out (I call that a "kill") or else how often the runner is "held," i.e., prevented from taking an extra base ("hold"). I then compare a players number of "kills" and "holds" with the number that a league-average outfielder would have gotten, given the same number (and types) of opportunities. Along the way, I define Kill+ and Hold+ values, which are the rates of obtaining kills or holds relative to league average (normalized to 100, like OPS+).

Last year I added a new twist: I included in the analysis all assists that did not fall into one of the five standard categories. Most of these extra assists involve throwing out a batter trying to stretch a single or doubling up a baserunner after catching a fly ball. It's not easy to define how many opportunities a player had for these extra assists, so I look at the number per defensive inning and compare to league average.

Finally, I evaluate the value in runs of kills, holds and extra assists in each of these situations, which allows to me assign a run value (above or below average) to all outfielders.

Park effects or "Manny's arm is above average? Really?"

This year I have finally found the time to sit down and figure out park effects for outfield throwing. That there might be such effects is not hard to imagine — the left fielder in Fenway Park will generally play shallower than in other parks and therefore he has a shorter throw back to the infield. The Green Monster itself can also have an effect, posing problems for both the fielder and the runner. And large parks, like Coors Field, can make throwing tougher, presumably. Artificial turf may also help outfield throwing, since balls will get to the outfielder more quickly and they will get truer bounces on their throws. (Of course, outfielders must play deeper on turf, so it's not obvious which effect will win out.)

To measure park effects for throwing, I used the same technique that is generally used for park effects: for each team, I compared the throwing stats for the team and its opponents in home and away games. Any difference is ascribed to a park effect. Actually, I did this for each of the three outfield positions in each park. I used multi-year data: For the oldest parks, I used data from 1992 through 2008. For newer parks, I used all the years in existence for that park. Finally, I regress to the mean to take into account finite sample size.

The correction I obtain is given in terms of Runs per 200 opps (roughly a full season). I found seven fields where fielders are helped or hurt by more than two runs per season:

+------+-----+------------+
| Team | Pos | Correction |
+------+-----+------------+
| BOS  | LF  |        3.9 | 
| BOS  | CF  |        2.6 | 
| TEX  | RF  |       -2.1 | 
| COL  | LF  |       -2.1 | 
| COL  | CF  |       -2.1 | 
| KCA  | LF  |       -2.7 | 
| KCA  | RF  |       -2.8 | 
+------+-----+------------+
These values represent the number of runs that an average fielder would save playing half his games in that particular park. In other words, we need to subtract these values from a player's run value to correct for park.

So, the Green Monster does help the Red Sox left fielder (and center fielder, too). I'm not surprised to see Coors hurting outfield throwing given its size, but I don't know why outfield throwing is suppressed in the corners in Texas and Kansas City.

In any case, in what follows, I've applied regressed park corrections, appropriately scaled to opportunities, for all players.

Okay, now that we've got the techie stuff out of the way, who had the best arm in 2008?

Right fielders

Hunter Pence, that's who, at least among right fielders, who traditionally have the strongest arms. The Houston right fielder was nearly eight runs better than average, tying him with the Orioles' Nick Markakis. Pence had a handful fewer opportunities, though, so his rate stat (which I call Runs200, runs above average per 200 opps) was a bit higher.

Here's Pence's performance broken down by situation:

Hunter Pence , best RF arm of 2008.(Icon/SMI)
Pence, Hunter  HOU   RF
   Situation  |   Opps  |    H    K  |   Hexp   Kexp 
        S-1B  |     53  |   32    2  |   31.4    0.7 
        S-2B  |     40  |   17    6  |   13.7    2.9 
        D-1B  |     24  |   13    2  |   14.6    1.1 
       OF-3B  |     14  |    6    0  |    3.2    0.8 
       OF-2B  |     37  |   24    1  |   22.0    1.0 
     Overall  |    168  |   92   11  |   84.8    6.4
Opps - opportunities
H - holds: runner did not take the extra base
K - kills: number of baserunners thrown out
Hexp - expected holds based on league-average arm
Kexp - expected kills based on league-average arm
Here's how to read this table: focus on the second row of numbers. The situation is "S-2B" meaning "single, runner on second base". The throw is generally going to be at home to nail the runner attempting to score. In 40 such plays, Pence nailed six runners (the column labeled "K" for "kill") while only half that many kills would be expected from an average right fielder ("Kexp" column). Seventeen times the runner held third base, while the average number was fewer than 14.

Overall, Pence threw out almost five more runners than expected and "held" about eight extra runners. Pence chose the right situations to throw out runners — all those kills at home plate boosted his run total significantly. In any case, I've got a new nickname for the big Houston right fielder with the high-powered arm: "Big Game" Hunter Pence.

The following table shows the results for 25 right fielders in 2008 (the top 25 in throwing opportunities), ranked by Runs200.

+--------------------+---------+------+-------+-------+-------+---------+
| Name               | Team    | Opps | Kill+ | Hold+ | Runs  | Runs200 |
+--------------------+---------+------+-------+-------+-------+---------+
| Pence_Hunter       | HOU     |  168 | 172   | 112   |   7.7 |     9.2 | 
| Ludwick_Ryan       | SLN     |  129 | 126   | 112   |   5.6 |     8.7 | 
| Markakis_Nick      | BAL     |  198 | 136   | 112   |   7.7 |     7.8 | 
| Guerrero_Vladimir  | ANA     |   99 | 125   | 101   |   2.4 |     4.8 | 
| Church_Ryan        | NYN     |  110 | 92    | 105   |   2.5 |     4.5 | 
| Nady_Xavier        | NYA/PIT |  122 | 183   | 102   |   2.7 |     4.4 | 
| Griffey_Ken        | CIN     |  109 | 151   | 102   |   2.0 |     3.7 | 
| Suzuki_Ichiro      | SEA     |  125 | 103   | 116   |   1.9 |     3.0 | 
| Francoeur_Jeff     | ATL     |  153 | 170   | 101   |   2.0 |     2.6 | 
| Gutierrez_Franklin | CLE     |  115 | 104   | 108   |   0.9 |     1.6 | 
| Ethier_Andre       | LAN     |  109 | 134   | 92    |   0.8 |     1.5 | 
| Fukudome_Kosuke    | CHN     |  129 | 80    | 106   |   0.5 |     0.8 | 
| Dukes_Elijah       | WAS     |   96 | 135   | 84    |   0.2 |     0.4 | 
| Ordonez_Magglio    | DET     |  165 | 119   | 98    |   0.0 |     0.0 | 
| Winn_Randy         | SFN     |  145 | 76    | 98    |  -0.3 |    -0.4 | 
| Hawpe_Brad         | COL     |  180 | 99    | 91    |  -1.0 |    -1.1 | 
| Hart_Corey         | MIL     |  150 | 67    | 100   |  -1.5 |    -2.0 | 
| Abreu_Bob          | NYA     |  171 | 104   | 99    |  -3.5 |    -4.1 | 
| Upton_Justin       | ARI     |  103 | 89    | 91    |  -2.1 |    -4.1 | 
| Hermida_Jeremy     | FLO     |  153 | 70    | 88    |  -3.9 |    -5.1 | 
| Drew_J.D.          | BOS     |  115 | 75    | 82    |  -3.4 |    -5.9 | 
| Kearns_Austin      | WAS     |  111 | 23    | 97    |  -3.5 |    -6.3 | 
| Dye_Jermaine       | CHA     |  157 | 66    | 88    |  -5.8 |    -7.4 | 
| Teahen_Mark        | KCA     |  103 | 24    | 79    |  -4.3 |    -8.3 | 
| Giles_Brian        | SDN     |  152 | 33    | 81    | -10.3 |   -13.6 | 
+--------------------+---------+------+-------+-------+-------+---------+
Kill+ - rate of throwing out baserunners, compared to league average
Hold+ - rate of holding baserunners
Runs - runs saved above average
Runs200 - Runs per 200 opportunities (roughly a full season)
It's interesting to find Pence followed by Redbird Ryan Ludwick and the Orioles' Nick Markakis in the above table. Ludwick, in part-time work over the last few years, has shown a below-average arm, but he came through big in 2008. Markakis, who really is developing into a fine all-around player, also improved his throwing significantly this year. Vlad has never been at the top of my rankings, despite his rep, so I'm glad to see him pretty high this time around. Andre Ethier continues the bewildering pattern of a high Kill+ paired with a low Hold+.

I'm puzzled by Jermain Dye — I mean, you look at the guy and he just looks like he should have a strong arm. And, in fact, he did have a good arm, he just doesn't anymore. Since 2002, Dye has been below average every year except one, 2005 when he rated +1 run. A noodle arm seems to be the least of Brian Giles' worries at the point, but I will note that his -10.3 runs is the second worst performance for a right fielder in the last 50 years. Owie.

Matt Kemp, best CF arm (probably best OF arm) of 2008. (Icon/SMI)

A caveat on Kill+ and Hold+: These measures should be used as a rough guide, but they are not super-accurate for two reasons: 1) they don't include the park effects and 2) they do not take in the extra assists. That's why you can't infer Runs from Kill+ and Hold+.

Center fielders

The best center field arm in 2008, on a per-opportunity basis, belongs to 23-year-old Matt Kemp who patrols the middle garden at Chavez Ravine. Here's how Kemp did it:

Kemp, Matt  LAN  CF 
   Situation  |   Opps  |    H    K  |   Hexp   Kexp 
        S-1B  |     39  |   25    1  |   27.1    0.4 
        S-2B  |     29  |    9    0  |    5.7    1.4 
        D-1B  |      9  |    4    1  |    2.1    0.5 
       OF-3B  |     11  |    4    1  |    1.6    0.3 
       OF-2B  |     13  |   10    1  |    8.5    0.2 
     Overall  |    101  |   52    4  |   45.1    2.8 
Kemp was better in both Holds and Kills in nearly each of the five situations. Additionally, Kemp had six extra assists, which boosted his run total significantly. All told, Kemp was 5.7 runs above average in a partial season (101 opportunities). He also saved 3.6 runs in 68 opps in right field. Excellent work.

Here are the other center fielders:

+-------------------+------+------+-------+-------+------+---------+
| Name              | Team | Opps | Kill+ | Hold+ | Runs | Runs200 |
+-------------------+------+------+-------+-------+------+---------+
| Kemp_Matt         | LAN  |  101 | 142   | 117   |  5.7 |    11.3 | 
| Upton_B.J.        | TBA  |  168 | 190   | 98    |  6.6 |     7.9 | 
| Victorino_Shane   | PHI  |  149 | 111   | 123   |  5.0 |     6.7 | 
| Suzuki_Ichiro     | SEA  |   93 | 147   | 113   |  2.9 |     6.2 | 
| Kotsay_Mark       | ATL  |  101 | 68    | 123   |  2.5 |     5.0 | 
| Ankiel_Rick       | SLN  |  108 | 94    | 126   |  2.3 |     4.3 | 
| Jones_Adam        | BAL  |  169 | 65    | 120   |  3.1 |     3.7 | 
| Taveras_Willy     | COL  |  140 | 98    | 107   |  2.6 |     3.7 | 
| Rowand_Aaron      | SFN  |  200 | 105   | 118   |  3.6 |     3.6 | 
| Cabrera_Melky     | NYA  |  120 | 118   | 108   |  1.8 |     3.0 | 
| Gomez_Carlos      | MIN  |  193 | 132   | 103   |  2.3 |     2.4 | 
| Ross_Cody         | FLO  |  102 | 150   | 94    |  1.1 |     2.2 | 
| Bourn_Michael     | HOU  |  140 | 170   | 94    |  1.3 |     1.9 | 
| Gathright_Joey    | KCA  |  100 | 114   | 96    |  0.7 |     1.4 | 
| Hamilton_Josh     | TEX  |  136 | 45    | 109   |  0.5 |     0.7 | 
| Beltran_Carlos    | NYN  |  189 | 107   | 106   |  0.0 |     0.0 | 
| McLouth_Nate      | PIT  |  196 | 72    | 104   |  0.0 |     0.0 | 
| Patterson_Corey   | CIN  |   96 | 84    | 103   | -0.2 |    -0.4 | 
| Cameron_Mike      | MIL  |  119 | 66    | 97    | -0.4 |    -0.7 | 
| Granderson_Curtis | DET  |  179 | 60    | 97    | -1.6 |    -1.8 | 
| Wells_Vernon      | TOR  |  105 | 130   | 80    | -1.0 |    -1.9 | 
| Young_Chris       | ARI  |  183 | 59    | 100   | -3.0 |    -3.3 | 
| Hunter_Torii      | ANA  |  152 | 43    | 95    | -4.1 |    -5.4 | 
| Milledge_Lastings | WAS  |  152 | 22    | 98    | -4.4 |    -5.8 | 
| Sizemore_Grady    | CLE  |  164 | 21    | 96    | -6.7 |    -8.2 | 
+-------------------+------+------+-------+-------+------+---------+
Most of the other top names here are familiar: I wrote about B.J. Upton and Shane Victorino last year and they kept up the good work in 2008. Ichiro was fine in a half-season in center (and above average in right) as was veteran Mark Kotsay in his Atlanta stint.

Alfonso Soriano, best LF arm of 2008. (Icon/SMI)

Curiously, Carlos Beltran and Mike Cameron, who are considered to possess strong arms, showed as merely average. Torii Hunter's arm continues to decline (-0.6, -3.6, -4.1 runs the last three years). And if you're the kind of person who can't stand perfection in others, well, you'll be pleased to know that Grady Sizemore, who seems to be good at everything, is quite noodle-armed. This was his worst season to date, but he's been below average every year of his career.

Left fielders

Alfonso Soriano has done it again. For the third straight season, Soriano takes top honors in throwing for a left fielder. As in past years, Soriano excelled in nailing baserunners.

Soriano, Alfonso  CHN  LF 
   Situation  |   Opps  |    H    K  |   Hexp   Kexp 
        S-1B  |     30  |   28    0  |   25.1    0.3 
        S-2B  |     19  |    7    1  |    6.0    1.4 
        D-1B  |     14  |    6    2  |    8.5    0.5 
       OF-3B  |     13  |    1    4  |    2.5    0.6 
       OF-2B  |     17  |   14    0  |   15.5    0.4 
     Overall  |     93  |   56    7  |   57.6    3.2 
Soriano was hurt for part of the 2008 season and only accrued about a half-season's worth of opportunities, but he made the most of them. He impressively threw out four runners trying to score from third base on a fly ball. Curiously, Soriano's hold rate is only about average, despite his proficiency in gunning down opponents since he became an outfielder. You'd think that runners would start wising up.

Here's how other left fielders around the leagues fared in controlling the running game (or not) in 2008:

+-----------------+---------+------+-------+-------+------+---------+
| Name            | Team    | Opps | Kill+ | Hold+ | Runs | Runs200 |
+-----------------+---------+------+-------+-------+------+---------+
| Soriano_Alfonso | CHN     |   93 | 218   | 101   |  3.7 |     8.0 | 
| Lewis_Fred      | SFN     |  118 | 212   | 101   |  4.4 |     7.5 | 
| Boggs_Brandon   | TEX     |   89 | 219   | 105   |  2.6 |     5.8 | 
| Jackson_Conor   | ARI     |   77 | 146   | 107   |  2.1 |     5.5 | 
| Ramirez_Manny   | LAN/BOS |  122 | 158   | 108   |  2.5 |     4.1 | 
| Young_Delmon    | MIN     |  185 | 111   | 102   |  3.6 |     3.9 | 
| Burrell_Pat     | PHI     |  155 | 146   | 106   |  2.9 |     3.7 | 
| Francisco_Ben   | CLE     |  103 | 97    | 102   |  1.6 |     3.1 | 
| Quentin_Carlos  | CHA     |  139 | 69    | 108   |  2.0 |     2.9 | 
| Ibanez_Raul     | SEA     |  205 | 112   | 100   |  2.8 |     2.7 | 
| Holliday_Matt   | COL     |  195 | 120   | 101   |  2.5 |     2.6 | 
| Anderson_Garret | ANA     |   85 | 194   | 85    |  0.9 |     2.1 | 
| Braun_Ryan      | MIL     |  155 | 113   | 98    |  0.9 |     1.2 | 
| Willingham_Josh | FLO     |  110 | 94    | 104   | -0.1 |    -0.2 | 
| Crawford_Carl   | TBA     |  100 | 53    | 109   | -1.5 |    -3.0 | 
| Scott_Luke      | BAL     |  144 | 59    | 100   | -2.5 |    -3.5 | 
| Cust_Jack       | OAK     |   76 | 137   | 86    | -1.4 |    -3.7 | 
| Harris_Willie   | WAS     |   76 | 42    | 92    | -1.4 |    -3.7 | 
| Damon_Johnny    | NYA     |   78 | 41    | 102   | -2.2 |    -5.6 | 
| Dunn_Adam       | ARI/CIN |  139 | 42    | 93    | -4.2 |    -6.0 | 
| Headley_Chase   | SDN     |   90 | 29    | 97    | -2.7 |    -6.0 | 
| Bay_Jason       | BOS/PIT |  210 | 68    | 92    | -8.1 |    -7.7 | 
| Lee_Carlos      | HOU     |  112 | 56    | 93    | -4.7 |    -8.4 | 
| Pierre_Juan     | LAN     |   84 | 0     | 96    | -3.6 |    -8.6 | 
| Gonzalez_Luis   | FLO     |   76 | 0     | 105   | -3.6 |    -9.5 | 
+-----------------+---------+------+-------+-------+------+---------+
I must confess I have not had a chance to see Fred Lewis or Brandon Boggs in action much, but I'm going to be paying attention this coming season. Manny Ramirez showed an above-average arm this year, even taking into account the help he got from playing most of the season in Fenway Park's left field. Now that we have the park corrections figured out, we can say that in his Boston years Manny's arm was just below league average: I have him at -3 runs in almost 1000 opportunities.

Manny's replacement in Boston, Jason Bay, is a terrible thrower, at least he was last season. Curiously, almost all of those negative 8 runs were "earned" in Pittsburgh, Bay was slightly above average in Boston (with 61 opps).

For Juan Pierre there was good news and bad news in 2008. The good: he was nowhere to be found at the bottom of the list of center field arms, a place he had inhabited for several years running. The bad: Juan has now established residency at the bottom of the left fielders' list. I'm not counting Luis Gonzalez, who, as far as I can tell, has been playing with a paralyzed throwing arm for the last several years. Note the Kill+ of zero for these two.

Visual aids

A good way to grasp quickly who has an effective outfield arm is to view the plot on the right. Each point in the plot represents a single player, with the color denoting the position played, red for right field, etc. The horizontal position of the point gives the player's hold rate (Hold+) — recall that above 100 is good and below 100 is bad. The vertical axis represents the kill rate, where, for example, a kill rate of 150 means the player threw out 50% more baserunners than average. The dotted gray lines show the average values (100) of hold and kill rates.

So, players that are above average in both Hold+ and Kill+ appear in the northeast quadrant of the plot and indeed here we find "Big Game" Hunter Pence, Matt Kemp, Shane Victorino, etc. Soriano, as I mentioned, has great Kill+ but average Hold+ and you can see him near the top of the plot.

The worst throwers are in the southwest quadrant (Giles, Teahen, Pierre). Players in southeast quadrant are good at holding runners, but not throwing them out. Mark Kotsay and Josh Hamilton are in this group.

That raises the question of what makes a fielder good at holding runners? Since it's the runner who decides to run or not, the fielder doesn't have complete control over his hold rate. Of course, if a player has a strong reputation, runners will be more cautious, leading to high hold rates. Looking at the plot, though, you can see that there isn't a strong correlation between hold and kill rates. Clearly, a fielder can help his hold rate if he generally gets to the ball early and efficiently puts himself into throwing position, perhaps discouraging runners from taking the extra base.

Dwight Evans, the strong-armed right fielder of the Boston Red Sox back in the '70s and '80s said that he made it a point to make several serious warm-up throws before each game in clear view of the opposing team's dugout: Dewey wanted to make sure potential baserunners got a good look at his throwing prowess.

Final word

A few things to keep in mind when evaluating outfield thowing. First, there is quite a bit of year-to-year variation in these results, since they are based on a rather low number of opportunities. Do I know that Matt Kemp or Hunter Pence are among the best-throwing outfielders in the game? I do not, although I do know that in 2008 they were among the best. (I'm pretty sure Soriano is exceptional at controlling the running game, since he has been great for several years.)

Another thing to note is that for the majority of outfielders throwing is a relatively minor contribution to their total value. In 2008, only thirteen players saved or cost their teams more than five runs with their throwing arm. Obviously, offensive and non-throwing defensive contributions are more important. On the other hand, according to the economics of the game today, five runs cost over $2 million on the free agent market.

And at the extremes, there can be wide swings in value: replacing Brian Giles' arm with Matt Kemp's would result in two additional team wins. So, let's not overestimate the importance of outfield throwing, but we shouldn't underestimate it either, especially when it comes to evaluating the guys with particularly good or bad throwing arms.

Well, that about wraps it up for this year's annual "Best arms" review. We will be updating the arms stat on the site in the near future, so you'll have access to all players.



John Walsh dabbles in baseball analysis in his spare time. He welcomes questions and comments via e-mail.

<< Return to Article Players who are worth more in Rotohog from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Players who are worth more in Rotohog

by Alex Zelvin
January 22, 2009

Rotohog Baseball is a fantasy baseball game with free entry, large prizes, and a unique "stock exchange" trading mechanism. Thousands of players compete in a global contest to see who can accumulate the most points. Like some "salary cap" baseball games, Rotohog gives you the opportunity to turn over your entire roster every day, greatly increasing the importance of taking factors such as opponent and park into account when determining your lineup.

Different fantasy baseball formats place an emphasis on different types of players, and Rotohog is no exception. There are several types of players who are worth more in Rotohog than in other formats. In this article, I’ll talk about which players those are, and in future articles I’ll discuss some of the specific players who fall into each category.

In general there are two categories of players who will tend to gain the most value in Rotohog relative to other formats – those with extremely favorable home parks and those ‘wait and see’ players whose value can’t be fully assessed until after the season begins.

The increased value of players with favorable home parks comes from the ability to turn over your roster every day in Rotohog. You can select players with the most favorable situation each day, and avoid those with less favorable situations. Two important aspects of your evaluation should be what park a player is playing in, and whether the player is benefiting from home field advantage when they play in that park. When a player is benefiting from a favorable park (a pitcher in a pitchers’ park or a hitter in a hitters’ park) AND is at home, their performance will be far better than their average performance for the season. When they’re not at home, you can simply drop them and look for another player with a more favorable match-up that day.

Because of that, you should end up using players with extremely favorable parks more often than a slightly superior player who is projected for the same full season statistics despite playing in a less favorable park. Hitters with home games in Philadelphia, Colorado, Cincinnati, Chicago, Boston and Texas will frequently find their way into your lineup. The same goes for pitchers whose home games are in San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and other pitchers’ parks.

The second group of players who gain the most value in Rotohog are those who whose role or effectiveness can’t be determined until after the season begins. While you might stay away from them in a traditional league (where drafts occur before the season starts), in Rotohog you have the luxury of waiting to see how things turn out before you start using them on your roster.

This group of players includes players with health concerns, young prospects with star potential, and possible closers. You’ll have a chance to see if the player is being used in a role that will give them enough value to be worth using before you have to make a decision on whether to include them on your roster. For example, did the relief pitcher get his team’s first few save opportunities? You’ll see able to see how those with health issues or other concerns about effectiveness perform before you commit to using them. That’s an especially strong advantage with pitchers, where a high strikeout rate over as short a span as three or four starts may give you confidence that the player is healthy, or has reached a new level of performance.

A group of players who gain value from a more subtle effect are top starting pitchers who don’t tend to pitch deep into ballgames. Because a win is worth so much (20 points) relative to other statistics a player can compile, you’re generally going to benefit more from a starting pitcher being pulled after five innings with the lead, rather than having him left in the game another 3 or 4 innings. Players who tend to have this happen the most frequently are young pitchers (whose managers will tend to protect them from throwing high pitch counts) with very high strikeout rates, but relatively poor control. Some prime suspects are Joba Chamberlain, Edinson Volquez, Scott Kazmir, and Chad Billingsley.

One last group of players who are worth more in Rotohog are those who are strong in categories that Rotohog places a higher value than other formats. The best way to identify these players is simply to calculate their projected point totals based on whatever set of statistical projections you prefer. You’ll find some interesting names popping up high in the rankings. For example, I used Nick Swisher in my lineup a number of times last season, with very good results.

If there’s a general lesson in all of this it’s that whatever format you’re playing, you need to understand the specific rules of the game and how those will impact which players you should target.


Compete against Alex and other players in one day fantasy baseball contests at Fanduel or visit his site, Daily Baseball Data, which has daily hour by hour weather forecasts for all games on one screen and batter vs. pitcher matchup data for the full day's schedule.

<< Return to Article How to measure a player’s value (Part 1) from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

How to measure a player’s value (Part 1)

by Colin Wyers
January 22, 2009

There are a number of metrics that attempt to combine a player’s offensive and defensive value into one, all-around “uberstat.” I shall mention a few of the more prominent at the risk of leaving out one or more worthy candidates, just to give a survey of the field:

I am not trying to argue for one system in particular, or to get too far into the weeds on any one metric in particular. Instead, what I want to do is go over the theory and principles behind a total player evaluation system, and to present an overview of the substantial areas where such systems can disagree with each other.

I don't claim to be a nonpartisan - I'll tell you upfront that I'm partial to Tango's WAR system. And I have strong opinions on most of these points, and if I wasn't confident in those opinions I probably shouldn't write articles like this. I will endeavor greatly to be fair, but fairness is not the same as being noncommittal. You've been forewarned.

In later articles, we'll get down to some of the gritty technical details. For the time being, consider this a statement of principles as much as anything else. We'll set some definitions, try to find some common agreement on some basic concepts, and lay out the underpinnings for what's to follow - unless you lay the groundwork first, you run the risk of math for math's sake, something that provides heat but no light. We're looking for illumination.

Definition of value

One thing that all of our uberstat metrics have in common is that they attempt to measure a player's value, generally in runs or wins, to his team. Thanks largely to the need for daily newspapers to justify paying their baseball writers in November, yearly we are, ahem, treated with numbingly trivial arguements about the meaning of the word value. So before we begin, I should clarify what value means for the purposes of this discussion:

A player's value is his contributions to his team based upon his on-field performance (hitting, running, fielding and pitching) in a neutral context.

I am not trying to claim that this is the only definition. I am not even trying to claim that this is the best definition - that is determined by the specific question you are trying to answer. I am simply laying out the definition of value that most total player metrics are intended and suited to answer.

Yes, this definition ignores things like leadership and character - and it would be horrifying to watch a statistical measure of performance try to capture those things! That is not to say that these things don't matter, simply that they're not readily quantifiable.

It's important to note that we're interested in a neutral context, and to explore what that means. First, we want to measure a player's performance independent of his teammates' - a player is no better on a good team and no worse on a bad team. (If you care to argue that a player's contributions are more valuable if they're in support of a pennant or a playoff spot, that's an entirely separate question.)

We also want to isolate a player from his environment. A poor pitcher is not suddenly a better pitcher if he pitches in Petco and a poor hitter is not a better pitcher if he hits in Coors Field. It is true that their raw stats - ERA, RBI, OPS, and so forth - will look better, but that doesn't make them any more valuable, because their opponents benefit as well. A run is simply more valuable in Petco and less valuable in Coors.

A note on accuracy, bias and sample size

Because baseball is a team sport, it's not always obvious how to split credit between players (although the official scorers do try so hard). In order to do so, sabermetricians have to build models of how a baseball team works - how an offense scores runs, how a defense prevents them. We use these models to try and isolate an individual player's performance. Alfred Korzybski, a Polish scientist and philosopher, once remarked, "A map is not the territory." By the same token, the models that we construct of baseball are simply that, models. This does not make them useless or pointless, as some would have you believe. But it does mean that when using them, we need to bear in mind their limitiations. It helps to bear in mind some of the ways in which a model can be limited:
  • The data itself. Sometimes there are simply mistakes - transcription errors and the like. Some things are based on borderline judgments - is that a hit or an error? A fly ball or a line drive? A ball or a strike?
  • There can also be important information left out of the data that has to be inferred, or simply ignored - where was the shortstop positioned? Did the coach have the hit-and-run on?
  • Constructing a model without an understanding of the basic principles involved - it's inherent to the nature of baseball that a double is more valuable than a sacrifice fly, but a linear regression is going to have a real hard time figuring that one out.
  • Factors that the model ignores - opponent quality, platoon advantage, and so on.
  • Failing to account for subtle differences between players - a park will have a different impact on the home run rates of Barry Bonds and Juan Pierre, for instance.

A common way to test a model is to look at its accuracy - how well do its results match up with the observed reality? There are several ways to test accuracy; commonly you can look at how consistent a measure is year-to-year for players, or you can look at how well the model fits a team's runs scored/allowed.

The most common measure of accuracy among sabermetricians is generally correlation, or a measure of how closely two measures are related. Correlation works best for two measures that use different units. For measures that use the same units - runs, for instance - you are better off using a measure of average error, such as mean absolute error or root mean square error.

Accuracy is desirable, but it does not come without its costs; typically, added accuracy comes at the sake of added complexity. For several reasons - whether it's ease of explaining, or ease of implementing, or concerns of overadjusting - there may be a threshold of complexity one is willing to accept. This is fine, so long as one understands the tradeoff they've made - if you have two players that differ by only 2-3 runs on offense, for instance, it makes little sense to claim that one player is provably better than the other.

The other thing to note about accuracy is that the difference in accuracy typically washes out once you achieve a large enough sample size - in a single game it's possible a player gets robbed of a Ball Four call by a bad call, but in a whole season those sort of things tend to come out in the wash. This is not true if you have a biased measure. I'd like to make this clear - you can live with a less accurate measurement, so long as you're understanding of the tradeoffs. This isn't necessarily true of a biased model - if your model underestimates the value of a walk, then no matter how many games you have, you will underrate a hitter with a high walk rate.

Value versus True-Talent Level

It should be noted that the sampling concerns above are only presented in the interest of accuracy in measuring performance itself, not in measuring the underlying ability of the player. It is possible for us to have a high level of confidence about measuring a player's value without having a similar level of confidence in measuring his ability.

For instance, prior to the 2008 season, Ryan Ludwick had a career batting line of .251/.319/.446. Then, in 2008, he batted .299/.375/.591, well above what you'd expect from him. Given his career batting line, we have reason to suspect that he was an "overperformer" in 2008. But for the sake of constructing a player value stat, we really don't care whether or not Ludwick is really as good as his 2008 batting line would suggest. Whether or not he lucked into some more base hits than he perhaps "should" have, those base hits contributed to real runs and wins for his team. And that's what we're trying to measure here.

Setting the baseline

A value metric absolutely has to have a baseline, and you can end up with it either on accident or on purpose but you will have one. So given that, it makes sense to put some thought into what baseline you're using and why. The most common baselines are:
  • "Absolute value," or value above zero. Win Shares is the most popular absolute value metric - every win is accounted for in the system.
  • Replacement level, commonly defined as value above "freely available talent," or those players who can be had by any club for the league minimum. (Note that I said any club. Evan Longoria may have been paid the league minimum, but the Rays weren't ready to give him away. Remember that assets given away in trade are a cost to the team, even if they don't go towards a player's salary.)
  • Average.

These are not the only baselines available, of course - here at the Hardball Times we have Win Shares Above Bench, which compares a player to the production of the average bench player. You could also, for instance, compare a player to the production of the average starter. There are probably other permutations as well.

It should be noted that - for the most part - the choice of a baseline is a matter of presentation, rather than of actual fact, because the actual meaning of a stat requires you to know the amount of playing time as well. Once you combine the measure of value with the rate of playing time, you can easily convert between any baselines you like. So why should we care about baselines at all?

Baselines matter because we aren’t interested in a player by himself – there is no such thing as a baseball player in isolation. We want to know about a player’s contributions in the context of a team – the marginal contribution of that player relative to who else could have been playing instead. If you’ve ever spent a lot of time on baseball forums and message boards, you’ll often see an idea prefixed with, “What could it hurt to do this?” It’s the opportunity cost – playing time is a (mostly) fixed commodity, and playing time given to one player cannot be given to another.

View that way, then, the “absolute zero” baseline measures a player against the notion of simply playing nobody, or failing that, playing somebody like, well, you and me. (Unless you, the reader, happen to be a professional-caliber baseball player.) To be frank, I’m uncertain that this is very useful – a nonpitcher who bats .151 in a full season has done more at the plate than I would have, but it’s a stretch to say that he contributed any value to his team in doing so.

On the other hand, comparing a player to the average makes some people annoyed, because they point out – correctly – that a below-average player can still have some value to his team. The baseline isn’t saying he doesn’t, of course - he simply has less value than the average baseball player.

The common compromise is the replacement level – it’s not as high as the average baseline, so that half of all players don’t end up in the negatives, but it’s not so low as to become meaningless like the absolute baseline. You can look at replacement level as being in the spirit of the Mendoza Line - it's the point at which the opportunity cost of even having that player on the roster is greater than the value he could possibly provide to the team. If a player is below the replacement level for too long, he'll be out of a job, because the team will pick up some minor leaguer off the scrapheap that can probably do a better job.

It should be noted that replacement level is the most difficult to pin down, as the definition of replacement is open to interpretation. The key thing to note here is that you cannot necessarily compare figures between systems that both claim to use the replacement level baseline. This doesn't make the replacement baseline meaningless - it's an abstraction, to be sure, but a useful one nonetheless.

You've obviously made some sort of mistake - Player X's value is all wrong!

Baseball fans can be very protective of their home players from time to time - or they can be very, very cruel. This has much to do with how good this player is (or at least, is thought to be) and how well the team has played recently. Fans also like to think that their long, patient devotion to their ballclub has been rewarded with an incalculable amount of knowlege about the players they follow, not readily accessible to outsiders.

Some of them are rather, ahem, agressive in reminding you of this.

I'm a firm believer in testing, and showing proof. If anyone shows you a model for player performance, he should be showing you the evidence that his model works. If he isn't, you should be very careful in accepting his conclusions - even if you otherwise find him trustworthy.

But simply pointing to a single player's value and claiming, "That can't be right" - why can't it? If there's absolutely no way that the model can be correct and you wrong, why are you bothering to look at the model's conclusions in the first place? If our perceptions were perfect, we wouldn't need to build these models in the first place.

So be skeptical, and ask questions, but please - come prepared to engage the evidence, not to simply dismiss it when it doesn't match your preconceptions. If you are convinced the model is wrong, then say so - but proffer a reason as to why the model may be inaccurate (or biased). And ask yourself why you're so certain that it's the model that's wrong, not you.

Up next

In Part II we'll examine how to appropriately evaluate a player's on-field contributions, and in Part III we'll examine how a player's value translates into his salary.



References and Resources

I was inspired by Dave Cameron's series at Fangraphs - Parts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven.

Read more about THT’s Win Shares here, here and here.

David Gassko and Sean Smith look closer at replacement level.

Tom Tango explains WAR.

For further reading on pretty much anything, Patriot’s website is probably the single-best resource I’ve ever encountered.



Colin Wyers knows exactly how much of a nerd he is. He is very interested in hearing about any other concerns you may have; you can reach him by e-mail, and he will try his best to respond in a timely fashion. He also blogs at Statistically Speaking.

<< Return to Article The Rangers are the tops from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The Rangers are the tops

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article The Hall of Left Fielders from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

The Hall of Left Fielders

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Things are tough all over from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Things are tough all over

by Craig Calcaterra
January 22, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Checking out early today from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Checking out early today

by Craig Calcaterra
January 21, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Baseball is not for everyone from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Baseball is not for everyone

by Craig Calcaterra
January 21, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Deep Thought from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Deep Thought

by Craig Calcaterra
January 21, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article How is this possible? from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

How is this possible?

by Craig Calcaterra
January 21, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Arbitration from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Arbitration

by Craig Calcaterra
January 21, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Poor Jon Miller from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Poor Jon Miller

by Craig Calcaterra
January 21, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Today at THT from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Today at THT

by Craig Calcaterra
January 21, 2009



Craig writes the HardballTalk blog for NBC Sports.com

<< Return to Article Why one closer over another? from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

Why one closer over another?

by Derek Carty
January 21, 2009

image
Joel Hanrahan might not be a household name right now, but he could be just as valuable as a guy like Mariano Rivera and come at a fraction of the cost. (Icon/SMI)

Around this time last year, I showed that saves are unpredictable and explained why I don't like paying much for them on Draft Day. Does that mean, however, that we should treat all closers as precisely equal commodities and flip a coin to decide which one to take in any given situation? Of course not. If Mariano Rivera is sitting next to Fernando Rodney in Round 20, is it a toss-up? No, sir. I'm taking Rivera, and so are you. But why?

The answer deals largely with probability. While both Rivera and Rodney are expected to start the year closing games (assuming the Tigers don't sign someone like Brandon Lyon), what's the probability that each will end the year closing games? I'm sure most would agree that Rivera is a much surer bet than Rodney to still be closing games in September. But how do we quantify the difference?

I'll be the first to admit that the process I'm about to outline is a bit subjective, but that's the only way we can do this. This will change based on your own judgments of situations, but hopefully the process I lay out will prove useful.

When looking at how long a closer will last, there are two primary probabilities we much come up with: the probability of injury and the probability that poor performance or managerial whim will lead to removal. Also, if you're drafting early and the team's closer hasn't been announced yet, the probability of winning the job is important too.

To elaborate further, the injury probability isn't the probability that a player will get injured, because that begs the question "how long?" Instead, the percentage of time we expect the player to miss due to injury. As a guideline, one month is roughly 17 percent of the season.

The save system


Now let's take a look at how you might go about putting this all together. For our purposes today, keep in mind that these figures aren't based on any real measurements. They are quick estimates simply to show you how this should be done.

To keep things simple, I'll ignore the impact of team quality on save opportunities and the impact of closer skill on save conversions, since the effects aren't that large. If we were to do this in a more scientific manner, both would need to be considered, although there would be a heavy regression to the mean component since there is so much random variation in these things (check out the article I linked in the first sentence to see more precise figures).

In this vein, I assigned every closer 42 save opportunities (which I got by taking the average number of opportunities for all pitchers who closed the entire year in either 2007 or 2008) and a conversion percentage of 88 percent (the aggregate rate for this same set of pitchers).
+-----+-----------------+-----+---------+--------+---------+-----+----+
| ADP | CLOSER          | SVO | GET JOB | INJURY | REMOVAL | SV% | SV |
+-----+-----------------+-----+---------+--------+---------+-----+----+
|   9 | Joakim Soria    |  42 |    100% |    11% |      3% | 88% | 32 |
|   7 | Mariano Rivera  |  42 |    100% |    15% |      6% | 88% | 30 |
|  18 | Joel Hanrahan   |  42 |     97% |    12% |     10% | 88% | 28 |
|  23 | Fernando Rodney |  42 |     65% |    22% |     60% | 88% |  7 |
+-----+-----------------+-----+---------+--------+---------+-----+----+
Note: I didn't include it in the table above, but for some closers, you could add another column with the percentage chance that the pitcher is traded to a team who will only use him as a setup man or that the team will trade for a closer to supplant him. In 2009, this could apply to a guy like Huston Street or Jonathan Broxton.

Again, while these are based on some quick, subjective judgments on my part, you can see that — strictly in terms of saves — it is completely unnecessary to take a closer in the early portion of a mixed league draft. Under this method, early round options like Joakim Soria and Rivera would be just as good of bets as Joel Hanrahan, who could come a full ten rounds later.

As long as you're making reasonable assessments and you pick the right late-round closer options, you will be making the correct percentage play. Of course, if you pick the wrong option, you could wind up with Rodney's seven projected saves (ADP: Round 23).

But remember...


It's very important to keep in mind that this method will not parallel real world results, and using it will severely decrease the value of closers in comparison to the rest of the player pool. Even if we assign a closer who is 100% to win the job a 0 percent injury score and 0 percent removal score, he would still only project out to 37 saves. The save leader next year will have far more than 37 saves.

The problem is that whoever this is will get there through a lot of good luck, something we simply can't project. Therefore, when making your projections (or looking at someone else's), it would be imprudent to assign any closer more than 40 or so saves, and certainly no more than 45. If you're using a set of projections that have several closers above 40 or 42 saves, I would definitely consider looking elsewhere for save projections.

Further implications


While a closer projected to save 45 or 50 games (or 35 or 40 games with poor skills, ala Todd Jones)—as some systems will project—might have 60 or 70 percent of his value tied up in saves, a closer projected to save 30 games might only receive 40 percent or so of his value from saves.

This is notable because, when evaluating closers using this method, it makes it more important to identify the closers with good skills. Not only will good skills decrease a closer's "Removal percentage", those good skills will translate to a better ERA, WHIP, and strikeout total, which now make up a greater portion of the pitcher's value.

Unless you're playing in a league of full owners who pay attention to peripheral stats (as many of you do), you can gain a bit of an advantage here. Closers are often known for great "stuff" and blazing fastballs, but they certainly don't need these things to succeed. Trevor Hoffman is a change-up specialist who throws his fastball just 86 MPH, but he is still a good pitcher, far better than a guy like Matt Lindstrom who can touch 100 MPH. Still, they are both being drafted around the 18th and 19th round.

Closing thoughts


Hopefully this provides you with a new, better way of evaluating a closer's save potential. Again, it's absolutely subjective, but many of these things simply can't be objectified, and this doesn't have to be a precise exercise. You can gain value from it simply by separating the Hanrahan's from the Rodney's. It doesn't matter if your judgments put Hanrahan at 25 saves and Rodney at 15; that's still a large enough gap to differentiate them for drafting purposes.


Derek Carty, 23, has also been published by NBC's Rotoworld, Sports Illustrated, FOX Sports, and USA Today. This season, he'll be contributing to FanDuel and will be linking to all of his work at DerekCarty.com. In his three years competing in expert leagues, he has won 2 titles with 4 top three finishes, including a LABR NL title in 2009, making him the youngest person to ever win a major expert league title. Derek is a proud graduate of the MLB Scouting Bureau's Scout Development Program and is a firm believer in the importance of combining stats and scouting. He welcomes questions via e-mail, Facebook, or Twitter.

<< Return to Article BOB:  Yankees Get Even More Money from The Hardball Times

The Hardball Times

BOB:  Yankees Get Even More Money

by Brian Borawski
January 21, 2009

City approves funding to finish Yankee Stadium


The New York Yankees got their money late last week. They were looking for an additional $370.9 million in what was primarily tax-exempt bonds to finish the construction of Yankee Stadium. The New York Industrial Development Agency approved the funding by a vote of 11-1 with just one abstention. The money will be used primarily to finish all of the upgrades that the Yankees sought, including better security and a new scoreboard.

The Yankees weren’t the only winners. The New York Mets secured the $82.3 million they were looking for as well, although probably because of the smaller amount of money, there was less fanfare to that unanimous approval. The Yankees' funding was contested by one board member who thought the vote should be postponed to renegotiate the terms of the bond issue so the Yankees would pay more of the infrastructure costs.

Bud Selig holds Fremont’s feet to the fire


MLB commissioner Bud Selig gave the Oakland Athletics permission last week to begin talking to other communities about a ballpark if the city of Fremont doesn’t move quickly to approve what’s hoped to be Cisco Field. Athletics owner Lewis Wolff expressed his frustration with the process and said that ground should have been broken over a year ago. Traffic congestion has been one of the primary road blocks that’s prevented the city from approving the deal despite the fact that no public money is being sought. For now, we’ll just have to wait and see. The team has invested a lot of time in the Fremont site, so there's no plan to abandon it quickly, but that won’t stop the threats of looking elsewhere from cropping up.

Success in the minor leagues


In an interesting story, Benjamin Hill at Minor League Baseball talked about the top 10 biggest attendance jumps throughout the minors over the past three years. Topping the list were the Greenville Drive and their Fenway Park replica stadium from 2005 to 2006. They picked up a 178 percent increase from 2005 to 2006 when they moved into West End Field that sports its own Green Monster and Pesky Pole. The largest increase two years ago was from the Arkansas Travelers who moved into a new ballpark as well and sported a 71 percent increase from the year before. Last year, the leader was the Quad Cities River Bandits, who saw attendance increase 53 percent from the year before.

Owners adopt two new rule changes


In a never-ending pursuit to improve the quality of the game, baseball owners recently enacted a couple of new rule changes. Rule number one deals directly with the rain delayed/postponed game that happened in this past year’s World Series, and it basically solidifies the ruling made Bud Selig made. Basically, all postseason games will now be played to completion, regardless of the score and also regardless of how long the rain delay is.

The second rule change deals with home field advantage in a one-game playoff in the event of a tie for either the division winners or wild card. Before, home field was determined by the toss of the coin, but from here on out, it’ll be head-to-head record that determines which team gets to play on its home field.

Anaheim finally gives up


One of the first articles I ever wrote for The Hardball Times had to do with the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim and their name change. That was written four years ago to the day. Here we are, four years later, and the city of Anaheim has finally dropped its legal battle with the Angels over changing their name. This came after they finished 0-2 in the courts, including losing in the appellate court just this past month.

Cardinals drop plans to buy affiliate


The poor economy claimed another victim. The St. Louis Cardinals recently abandoned plans to purchase the Memphis Redbirds, the teams' Triple-A affiliate. The team acknowledged last week that in the current economic environment, the transaction couldn’t be consummated. For now, the Redbirds will remain as a Cardinals affiliate through 2012.

Brian Borawski is a member of SABR's Business of Baseball Committee and writes about the Detroit Tigers at his own website, TigerBlog. He welcomes comments, questions and suggestions via e-mail.

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