The Hardball Times, Fantasy Focus and ShysterBall

Great Moments in Championship Celebrations

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-20T17:00:50+00:00

This has nothing to do with baseball at all, but this story sent to me by MooseinOhio is so cool that I gotta post it somewhere.*

After the Celtics won the 1986 championship, [Bill] Walton sat alone in Bird’s kitchen drinking Wild Turkey until after the sun came up.

I told Bird I didn’t believe the Walton story. Simply too good to be true.

“Yeah, it happened,’’ he said. “After we won, me and Dinah went out to K.C. Jones’s restaurant. He had a rib place. I had two beers. Remember how we stopped drinking that year?’’ - the ’86 Celtics swore off alcohol for their playoff run - “Well, I had two beers and they didn’t even taste good. I was tired, anyway, so I went home an hour later.

“Bill came over. It was late. Doorbell rang and Dinah answered and she was like, ‘Hey, Bill. Larry’s in bed.’ I heard him, so I go out and I said, ‘Hey, man I ain’t doing this tonight. I can’t.’ He goes, ‘Don’t worry about it. I don’t even need you. I’m just going to sit down here at the table.’ He had a bottle of whiskey. And he said, ‘I’ll be here when you wake up.’ And he was.

Drinking Wild Turkey in a kitchen until dawn > spraying champagne all over sweaty guys in a locker room. Though, yeah, I suppose those things aren't mutually exclusive activities after cutting down the nets.

*As an FYI, after the switchover to NBC, I'm probably going to revive my old dead personal blog for stuff that I can't really post over there, non-baseball stuff, and what have you. As of now there's only some old remembrances and a road trip diary. It might serve as a nice hangout going forward, though.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

My Morning in Exile

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-20T15:10:11+00:00

So I get to take the kids for their H1N1 vaccinations today. That should be a barrel of laughs. On the bright side, they're spending the night at my folks' house, so I'll only have to hear their complaining about it until I drop them off around dinner time. After that, Mrs. Shyster and I grab some fabulous Columbus cuisine and sample the hot Columbus nightlife. Well, what else are we gonna do? We're all through with "The Wire" DVDs.

On the heels of his Cy Young ballot yesterday, you won't be surprised to learn that Keith Law has Carl Pavano at number one on his annual list of Top 50 free agents.

Tim Lincecum's agent, employer and publicist are very, very sorry for his actions.

Gammons and Edes break down the Red Sox' offseason. They'll return to pretending to be national as opposed to local columnists later today.

Aaron Heilman will definitely be coming out of the pen in Arizona.

Stephen Strasburg hurts his knee; Matt Wieters called to lay hands.

Paul Lo Duca: he may be old, he may have been a steroid creation, he may have messed around behind his wife's back with a teenage girl and he may have been caught up in gambling allegations, but . . . wait, I lost my train of thought here. Anyone wanna go get a sandwich?

As for "The Wire," the best thing I got out of it is the certainty that my recent decision to stop watching any non-ballgame-related television was a good one. Unless they bring back "Barney Miller" or something, there's no way any show can top it, so why waste my time?

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

Medium and short-time pitch memory

Max Marchi — 2009-11-20T10:30:39+00:00

Oct. 22, 2008.
Scott Kazmir has already faced Ryan Howard twice in Game One of the World Series.

Everybody in the postseason has avoided feeding the Phillies first baseman fastballs. That leaves lefty Kazmir with his slider and a change-up he seldom uses against left-handed batters.

Back in the first inning, he had served Howard two sliders, resulting in a whiff and a grounder to the shifted second baseman. The second time, he started with a fastball down and inside for ball one, followed by an outside slider chased for strike one. Then he tried to sneak a fastball past the clean-up hitter (foul), and finally he made him fish again on a slider down and away.

Top of the fifth, two outs, nobody on. Kazmir starts with three consecutive sliders outside, but Howard has the bat glued on his shoulder. He then swings through a 3-0 fastball and a slider that nibbles the corner low and outside.

Full count, Kazmir winds up and delivers... a change-up.

The least reliable pitch of the arsenal thrown to the best opposing batter in a key game has only one possible explaination: surprise. In the previous two at-bats, Howard has had the chance to time the slider and, to a lesser degree, the fastball; the change-up comes to him for the first time in the game.

Let's go back to the 2008 regular season. I looked at every Ryan Howard second at-bat of the game and split those at bats in two groups:
{exp:list_maker}Bucket One: In the first at-bat he saw at least one change-up;
Bucket Two: In the first at-bat he saw no change-ups. {/exp:list_maker}
Then I calculated the run value on the first change-up he saw on the second at-bat, if any. I kept only the instances in which the first two at-bats came against the same pitcher.

The average value (per 100 pitches) of Bucket One was 5.02 runs higher than that of Bucket Two, meaning that Howard fared better on the change-up when he had already seen one in the previous at-bat.

Is this something that happens to all players? Is it a consistent trait of Howard, at least? Fast forward to the 2009 season; let's repeat the process and we get -0.52 runs for Bucket one, implying that this year Howard fared a bit worse when he had the chance to time the change-up in the first at-bat.

The plot of year 2008 against year 2009 (only batters with at least 20 ABs in each bucket both years) doesn't show any correlation; in fact the Pearson's coefficient comes out at -0.004 (confidence intervals: -0.35; 0.35).

I repeated the process from a pitcher's point of view and, again, it doesn't seem we are dealing with something repeatable.

I'm not going to show them here, but the same plots for curves and sliders produce analogous results.

I'd like to come back on this in a couple of years because, when raising the cutoff at 40 ABs in each bucket, some relation seems to appear on the surface, at least for pitchers; unfortunately, elevating the floor means that fewer players meet the standard and the confidence intervals widen. When we have four complete years of PITCHf/x data, we can compare even year's results versus odd years' results, and a cutoff of 40 ABs should not imply losing many data points.

Let's take another angle of view.

Globally, batters on a change-up produce 0.3 runs (per 100 pitches) better if they have seen the pitch in the previous at-bat. The difference is not statistically significant, meaning that with the data we have, we can not conclude that batters hit the change-up better if they have had a first look at the pitch on their initial trip to the plate. The same is true for the curve and the slider. Again, while the lack of a statistical significance can induce us to dismiss the fact that batters can be better after they have timed a pitch, let's not forget that those who are served one or more change-ups in every at-bat are likely those who are the least proficient against the pitch.

Now let's zoom in: Let's consider single at-bats.

If a pitcher goes back to the change-up after having already delivered one in the same at bat, the expected value (per 100 pitches) is 0.5 runs higher compared to when it's the first change-up of the at-bat. This time the difference is statistically significant and, again, keep in mind that it's very likely that multiple change-ups are served to batters who suffer the pitch. We also get a significant difference for sliders (+0.3 runs), while that's not the case with curveballs.

In 2008, Ryan Howard produced on change-ups 0.16 runs (per 100 pitches) better if he had seen another change-up in the same at-bat. In 2009, the difference was more pronounced, at 4.11. Here are the 2008 results for batters plotted against their 2009 results, for the three main breaking pitches.

And here's the same triplet for pitchers.

Though it's evident from the pictures where correlations exist, here are the correlation coefficients:

pitch     Batters Pitchers
Change-up    .104     .767
Slider      -.000     .723
Curve        .165     .808

Run value differences: year-to-year correlations.

So it's apparent that there's some permanent trait among pitchers. Some of them are more easily timed than others.

Let's sum up what we have seen so far.
{exp:list_maker}When it comes to throwing a change-up in the first at bat vs. the second, there may be a relationship that says that the change in the second at-bat is more effective if it isn't thrown in the first at-bat. However, we don't have enough data to clearly draw that conclusion.
When it comes to throwing a change more than once in a single at-bat, we can safely say that the second change is less effective (from the pitcher's perspective) than the first.
This trend holds regardless of the batter. Or, said differently, batters don't show any consistent tendency to beat this pattern over time. As we collect more data, we may find some batter-specific trends.
Pitchers clearly show a consistent pattern. Some can throw a very effective second change, while others have consistently shown they can't. This is another way of categorizing the effectiveness of a pitcher's change (as well as his slider or curve). {/exp:list_maker}
Looking at a few top/bottom lists can be helpful.

The most and the least "timeable" pitchers/pitches.
(Positive values mean the pitch is easier to hit the second time it's delivered in the same at bat).

Change-up
              last      first delta
           Eveland       Dana  8.97
           Holland      Derek  8.59
              Lehr     Justin  7.56
            Martin       J.D.  7.50
          Richmond      Scott  6.59
...
            League    Brandon -4.52
           Condrey       Clay -4.82
     Rowland-Smith       Ryan -4.84
            Street     Huston -6.03
            Madson       Ryan -6.53

Slider
              last      first delta
          Thompson       Brad  7.59
         Borkowski       Dave  7.46
             Wells      David  6.58
            Cahill     Trevor  5.73
          Stauffer        Tim  5.70
            Madson       Ryan  5.64
...
        De La Rosa      Jorge -4.31
          Donnelly    Brendan -4.62
           Rosales        Leo -5.11
            Walker      Jamie -5.26
           Ramirez      Edwar -6.41

Curve
              last     first delta
              Fogg      Josh  7.53
           Batista    Miguel  6.32
          Springer      Russ  6.04
              Lowe     Derek  5.58
              Huff     David  5.31
...
            Bailey    Andrew -4.04
        Falkenborg     Brian -4.31
          Carrasco      D.J. -5.47
           Hinshaw      Alex -5.73
           Belisle      Matt -6.24

Data since 2007, where available.

For the pitchers with negative values (e.g. Street's change-up, Donnelly's slider or Belisle's curve), the breaking pitch is actually more effective the second time it is thrown. Is the first time they throw the breaking pitch like a warm-up for them? Do they simply know better who the batters are who get killed by that pitch?

Further analysis is necessary to answer these questions, as well as to understand what makes certain pitches easier the second time they are coming.
It can have something to do with pitch selection: Pitchers who mix them better might be harder to time (seeing Madson low in the change-up list and high in the slider ranking doesn't make a good case for this hypothesis). It could be in the characteristics of the pitch: Maybe a change-up with a very high speed differential from the fastball can fool the hitter once but not twice.

Until we discover what it is, Derek Holland should avoid throwing multiple change-ups to the same batter, if he wants to lower his 6.12 ERA.

PS: Ryan Howard fouled off Kazmir's change-up, thus prolonging his at bat. Kazmir didn't serve him another change until Game Five.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

Cooperstown Confidential: Olbermann is off base

Bruce Markusen — 2009-11-20T10:00:27+00:00

Olbermann equals errors

I don’t ordinarily spend a lot of time in this space nitpicking about the work of other writers and authors; there is much more important subject matter, both contemporary and historical, worth discussing. Unfortunately, some people are so hollow in their words and actions that they need to be called out for their transgressions. No one is guiltier of this in the baseball world than Keith Olbermann, who began writing his “Baseball Nerd” blog for MLB.com this past spring.

Is there anyone connected to the game who is more annoying than Olbermann? Perhaps, but that person would have to go a long way to outdo Olbermann. As both a broadcaster and writer, Olbermann has made a cottage industry of pointing out the mistakes, supposed and otherwise, committed by others in the media. Years ago, he reveled in compiling a master list of all the errors that he found in Ken Burns’ miniseries, Baseball. And then earlier this year, Olbermann railed against fellow MLBlogger Curt Smith, the author of a new biography on longtime Dodgers broadcaster Vin Scully, for misquoting one word of a transcript of one of Scully’s most famous broadcast calls.

Olbermann shouldn’t be criticizing anyone who writes about baseball, if only because of his own poor record of getting his facts right. Perhaps he should point that highly introspective microscope at himself one of these days.

Olbermann’s blog routinely contains errors, both factual and interpretive. He has referred to Pittsburgh Pirates right-hander Ross Ohlendorf as Russ Ohlendorf, misidentified team names in game recaps, written Jerry Manuel’s name as Erry Manuel, mischaracterized Eric Bruntlett’s role in “saving” a game after he had actually committed an error, and referred to All-Star Jayson Werth as Dennis Werth, the former Yankee who is actually Jayson’s stepfather. Those are just some of the errors Olbermann has made since starting the blog in March.

Last week, Olbermann reached the boiling point in a shoddy piece about the managers, owners and umpires being considered by the Hall of Fame’s Veterans Committee. By my count, Olbermann made at least three factual errors, two that were relatively minor and one that was monumental:

(1) In arguing for Billy Martin’s election to the Hall of Fame, Olbermann claimed that in eight of nine full seasons as a manager, “Billy the Kid” had led his teams to first or second-place finishes. Olbermann counted wrong. Martin spent 10 full seasons as a manager, recording first or second-place finishes eight times. All in all, a minor error, and one that is understandable.

2) In running down the candidates on the two Vets Committee ballots, Olbermann supplied a defense for Danny Murtaugh as a Hall of Fame manager. Although I agree with Olbermann on his assessment of Murtaugh—a highly underrated manager if there ever was one—he made a mistake in reviewing the manager’s career. Olbermann provided an inaccurate count of the number of division titles Murtaugh won as the skipper of the Pirates. Olbermann credited Murtaugh with five National League East titles, perhaps failing to realize that “The Whistling Irishman” actually missed out one of those titles (1972) because of poor physical health. Murtaugh won only four division titles with the Pirates. Again, a relatively minor error, but now the second error in Olbermann’s post.

3) In arguing against Bob Howsam for the Hall of Fame, Olbermann blamed the former Cincinnati Reds general manager for making the ill-fated trade that sent Frank Robinson to the Baltimore Orioles for pitchers Milt Pappas and Jack Baldschun and outfielder Dick Simpson. “The Frank Robinson trade gets you into Cooperstown?” Olbermann wrote in casting a no-vote for Howsam. After all, how could the man responsible for that disaster possibly be considered a Hall of Fame general manager? There is one fundamental flaw in Olbermann’s argument. Howsam did not become the Reds general manager until 1967, two full years after the Reds sent F. Robby to the O’s for Pappas and two journeymen. Howsam wasn’t even working for the Reds organization at the time; he was still employed as the primary decision maker for the St. Louis Cardinals.

Blaming Howsam for the Robinson trade is like blaming George Steinbrenner for mistakes made by CBS as the owners of the New York Yankees. Unlike the two previous instances involving Martin and Murtaugh, this was an egregious error by Olbermann. The whole basis for his argument against Howsam was the Robinson trade, but Howsman had nothing to do with it!

I was tempted not to include the first two mistakes in Olbermann’s entry because of their relative inconsequence. Neither error refutes Olbermann’s arguments in favor of Martin and Murtaugh as worthy of Hall of Fame consideration. But Olbermann does not deserve to be spared criticism of those errors because of the petty, malicious way that he goes after the inconsequential mistakes of others; he merits the same treatment that he dishes out, whether it’s about Curt Smith, Bob Raissman, or yes, even Bill O’Reilly. Furthermore, Olbermann compounded his lazily written piece by making a huge error about Howsam, one that should be embarrassing to anyone considering himself a baseball historian.

To his credit, Olbermann admitted to his mistake about Murtaugh, but said nothing about the errors relating to Howsam and Martin. Perhaps Olbermann was too embarrassed about the Howsam remark. Or perhaps he was just hoping that nobody noticed. Or perhaps he was praying that we would all forget.

With errors like these, which have happened all too regularly since beginning his blog earlier this year, Olbermann badly lacks credibility. He continually fails to uphold the high standards of accuracy that he places on others. Frankly, he needs to stop spending so much time ripping other writers for their mistakes, and spend more time fact-checking his own.

Remembering Ron Klimkowski

Former Yankees and A’s reliever Ron Klimkowski died last Friday from heart failure. He was 65. A junkballing right hander, Klimkowski enjoyed some success as a middle reliever from 1969 to 1972, but then saw his career end abruptly because of knee trouble. He also missed out on the A’s’ 1972 world championship because of Oakland’s decision to release him in mid-May, a move that led to an immediate but brief reunion with the Yankees.

I have no special insight on Klimkowski’s pitching career, but I’ve always been intrigued by his 1972 Topps card with Oakland. Wearing the old-style green and gold combination that Charlie Finley loved so much, Klimkowski is sporting one of the widest grins I’ve ever seen on a baseball card. He looks absolutely thrilled to be photographed by the Topps cameraman.

Based on my memories of this card, I’ve always imagined that Klimkowski was one of the most fun-loving, outgoing players of his era. In reading about him in the obituaries reporting his death, that seems to be exactly the kind of guy Klimkowski was. In an interview with Newsday, longtime friend Tom Reilly Jr. described him as “a charming and very gregarious individual. If you met Ron, you'd never forget him. He had a pretty overwhelming personality.”

Sometimes a baseball card can give you a pretty good idea of what a guy is really like.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

Waiver Wire Offseason: AL

Rob McQuown — 2009-11-20T08:00:15+00:00

Rajai Davis | Oakland | OF
2009 Final Stats: .305/.360/.423

With a batting average and on-base percentage about the equal of Carl Crawford last year, and a slugging percentage close enough to call “close” after park adjustments, Davis had a 108 OPS+ with 41 SB in just 432 PA, a very Crawford-esque two-thirds of a season all told (Crawford has a career 103 OPS+). Yet the Oakland righty was probably taken as a late-round source of steals and nothing more in 2009. What can be expected from the surprising 29-year-old-to-be? Here are some projections from various sources:

Heater/Graphical Player: 455 AB, .274-69-5-44-42 (AVG-R-HR-RBI-SB)
Bill James Handbook: 496 AB, .284-74-4-44-50
CHONE (baseballprojection.com): 341 AB, .267-48-4-30-31
Career 162-G average (baseball-reference.com): 393 AB, .280-62-3-37-45

The career line is highly warped by the fact that he was used as a pinch-runner and defensive replacement for much of his career before breaking through with a starting job in 2009.

So, the first obvious question is: “How much will he play?” With Ryan Sweeney's fielding stats belying his reputation as a just a mediocre center fielder, the A's appear to have another in-house option to roam center field, though Rajai roams a bit more of it, and certainly looks like more of a center fielder. And though the sample size is still wanting, Scott Hairston's conversion to the outfield seems to have resulted in about average defensive skills in CF. Cunningham was a center fielder in the minors but appears to be limited to side-field duty now. All this suggests that if the A's want to try to force some of their slow DH/1B types (Barton, Wallace, Carter, Doolittle, Buck, etc.) into the lineup in 2010, they may reprise the Cust-to-outfield experiment, and Rajai could end up on another team or on the wrong end of a platoon with lefty Ryan Sweeney (though the A's have been reluctant to use straight platoons in recent years). Our mindset is that Rajai gets his regular gig in CF back (he started playing almost every day about midway through the season), as Oakland has quietly turned into a pitching, speed and defense team. And you can count on Beane heating up the trade lines shopping him around, too—both Chicago teams might have a use for him, for example. In short, anything under 450 AB would be somewhat surprising, but that “surprise” would be predicated on …

“How will he do?” Almost certainly, the CHONE system balanced out his PT based on his expected offensive contributions. They have the lowest predicted OBP at .326, but nobody seems to think he'll exceed .340 OBP again since his .366 BABIP stemmed from an unlikely .305 batting average. Still, the difference between CHONE and the other predictors is fairly minute—14 points of OBP over 500 PA is just seven times on base all season. And his career average stands at a decent .280, so predicting a decline to .267 seems overly pessimistic. One thing nobody disagrees about is his game-impacting speed, which will lend itself to pinch-running opportunities even if he's not playing regularly—as it has in seasons past. For raw speed, the “extra bases taken%” (from baseball-reference.com) probably is the most indicative as he's posted 60% for his career against an MLB average of 39%. His 78% career SB% sounds decent, with 93 SB in 358 SBO, but he's also been picked off 16 times (10 in 2009 alone), so actual straight steals aren't necessarily adding as many wins as would be assumed for a guy with one steal per 10 PA. All this combines to suggest that somewhat of a downtick in his stealing attempts could happen in 2010, but he still seems a great bet to log 40-50 SB, given 500 PA.

Wrapping it all up, we have a batter who clearly had a career year in 2009, isn't terribly efficient in his copious stealing attempts (due to the pickoffs), might get traded away, and yet is still a contributor of the coveted stolen bases needed for fantasy success. There are several risks with Rajai—and some outcomes which could cause his value to crater—but the chances of him finishing at or around 450 AB, a .275 AVG and 45 SB are pretty good. It seems very likely that he'll be valued much less than that on auction/draft day in most leagues. Not a great pick for a team that is already good and is conservatively trying to protect an advantage, but the “performance over price” possibility is large.

Aaron Hill | Toronto | 2B
2009 Final Stats: .286/.330/.499

When he was first starting out with Toronto, there were many who likened Hill's approach at the plate to former Blue Jay (and WAY former second baseman) Paul Molitor. Well, in 2007, he started showing some signs of Molitorism, hitting .291/.333/.459. “Molly” would obviously have been chagrined at the lack of patience, but for a guy whose career slugging percentage was .409 entering 2009, the power was a somewhat unanticipated turn in the right direction offensively. But 2008 was a lost season for Hill, with the struggles and the concussion, and then finally being shut down. But worries about his career going the way of Corey Koskie or Ryan Church were assuaged early, as Hill started 2009 with hits in nine straight games, including three multi-hit games and two homers. And he was extremely consistent all season long, driving in 108 runs (tied for fifth in AL) with 36 HR (T-3rd). This sort of production from a Gold Glove-caliber second baseman made him one of the league's best players in 2009.

Since the three “early” projection systems are almost entirely based on mathematical results derived from past statistical patterns, it's unsurprising that all think Hill's power rampage in 2009 was mostly a fluke. CHONE, BJHB, and Heater/GP project his homers at—respectively—21, 20, 22. And all three predict a .282-.283 batting average. Well, we're here to tell you those are not to be believed!

Playing time:

Certainly, the concussive symptoms could return, but this is a guy who played 155, 160, and 158 games in the three years surrounding his concussion-impacted 2008. So, CHONE and BJHB predicting lots of missed time seems off base. The GP projection is based on the Toronto expert for the book, and is a more-reasonable 643 AB. Hill's the type of player who doesn't come out of the lineup easily, and with his combination of offense and defense, no manager is going to be in a hurry to give him an off day, though giving him “rest” when the team faces an extremely hard righty like Jered Weaver will probably happen a handful of times. If the power stays high, it will be hard for the Jays to continue to bat him second 100 percent of the time, but his opportunities for runs and RBIs should only be dampened by Scutaro's departure. Whether he'll capitalize as well on them is another question...

Home runs:

Hill's HR/FB% was 3.6% in 2006, 8.6% in 2007, and 14.9% in 2009 (again, we're not treating 2008 with much gravity). In the same span, he's slightly increased his fly ball% (to 41% in 2009, compared to 39% for his career). The net result is that 15% of 41% of his 584 balls in play went for home runs, or about 6%. With his relatively high contact percentage (for a power hitter), he struck out only 14.4% of the time, which is why he was able to put almost 600 balls into play. For comparison, these numbers are quite similar to Aramis Ramirez's career rates (15.2% strikeouts, 44.5% FB%, and 13.7% HR/FB). While Hill has improved his strength, we think an Aramis Ramirez comparison is still out of reach, but many aspects of that type of power/contact hitter are likely to be repeating qualities. Expect around the same total of 584 balls in play. To fall back to 20 HR, Hill would have to reduce his HR/BIP% to just 3.5%. That's essentially what his HR/BIP% was in 2007 (3.36%). We're going to temper our enthusiasm, and use a 3:2 weighted average of 2009 and 2007 percentages of HR/FIP (which comes out at almost exactly 5%), and predict 29 HR for Hill in 2010.

Batting Average:

As we know, batting average is a tough stat to predict. For beginners, there's so much variance that a spot-on prediction can easily look terrible due to random sampling. But—as I noted in an article on Freddy Sanchez at the time of the trade—the better the contact skills, the less variance (duh!). Anyway, Hill has a .310 career BABIP. While he's hitting more fly balls than ever before and this number may drop a little, his .290 in 2009 seems overly low. We see a good chance that his batting average tops .290 with an increase in his BABIP more than making up for the decline in homers we've anticipated.

Putting together the pieces, it seems like Hill is a great buy-low candidate, in leagues where people put too much stock in the standard projection systems. He might not come up with a .290-29-90 season, but it seems very likely he'll come close to it.

Edwin Jackson | Detroit | SP
2009 Final Stats: 6.8 K/9, 2.3 K/BB, 3.62 ERA

2009 was a coming-out party of sorts for the former Dodgers phenom who has bounced around. His value was so low preseason that one well-known blogger called the trade of Matt Joyce for him “ridiculous” for the Tigers. Clearly, the trade didn't hurt the Tigers, but there are reasons for the Tigers (and E-Jax owners) to be worried that perhaps he won't repeat.

Starting with the list of accomplishments—he was just 25 years old, and had his innings bumped up to 214 in 2009, a total arrived at gradually, which should alleviate the risk of overuse. He went 13-9, 3.62, and helped the Tigers almost make the playoffs. He struck out 161 to just 70 walks. His WHIP was 1.262, just missing the top 10 in the AL.

But it really is a “what have you done for me lately?” sport, and Jackson was far better than this at the break, with a 7-4 record, 2.52 ERA, 97 K in 121.2 IP, and just 10 HR allowed with a 2.77 K:BB ratio. The second half, though, was more of “bad Edwin” (that would be the pitcher who had a career ERA of 5.15 entering 2009, with a 1.632 WHIP and 55 HR allowed in 456 IP). After the break, Jackson was over .500 (6-5), but his ERA was 5.05, and his WHIP soared to 1.527 (it had been barely over 1.0 in the first half). Possibly worst of all was the fact that he managed to allow 17 HR in just 92.1 IP.

In the final stats for the 2009 season (or two half-seasons in Jackson's case), he had a 4.34 FIP, which was an improvement over past seasons. He had a 4.58 xFIP, which—again—was an improvement. One thing that has been shown with pitchers is that second-half performance is roughly as predictive of next-year performance as using the entire season is. But what to do when the two are completely different? The conservative approach would be to assume that either a) the lucky BABIP and HR/FB% in the first half was lending him confidence, and he was pitching far over his head, or b) that he was hiding an injury in the second half. In either the (a) or the (b) case, it's prudent to stay away from him in fantasy.

The less conservative approach would be that all pitchers are unpredictable, and Edwin Jackson was downright nasty in the first half, even if his “luck” stats made him look better than he was. He has one of the fastest fastballs in the game (94.5 MPH on average), and his O-Swing% (from fangraphs.com) is 5% higher than MLB average, showing that hitters are often fooled into swinging at pitches not in the zone.

We won't suggest that predicting pitchers is easy. Bill James has declared it to be impossible in the past, and there are certainly enough examples every single season to make this declaration seem valid. But E-Jax is even less predictable than most. It's not like Daniel Cabrera was, with the “stuff” but never getting “results,” since Jackson got the results. But the concept is similar, in that he could help a team in every single SP category if he pitches like he did in the first half of 2009. Yet, he could easily be an almost complete waste of auction money if the second half (and his entire career before) is really him. He probably has the biggest difference between his likely upside (i.e. an upside which is likely to occur, not something that's more akin to dreaming, as is true of listed “upsides” for many other pitchers) and his likely downside of anyone entering the 2010 season.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

Waiver Wire Offseason: NL

Michael Street — 2009-11-20T06:00:47+00:00

Jake Fox | Chicago | CIF/OF
2009 Final Stats: .259/.311/.468

For all the things that went wrong with the 2009 Cubs, count Jake Fox among the few things that went really right. A power prospect with six years of minor-league experience, Fox started 2009 by leading Triple-A in every offensive category. Many critics pointed to his long road through the minors, his defensive inconsistency, and his whiff-tastic tendencies (479 Ks in 2,355 minor-league ABs) as reasons he'd never make it in the majors.

Despite this, his absurd .423/.503/.886 Triple-A line through the end of May, combined with a slow start by the Cubs, made Fox's call-up a no-brainer, though there was no real room for him on the field. Drafted as a catcher, Fox has since been moved to 1B, where his glove is barely competent, and where he's blocked by Derrek Lee, who had a resurgent 2009 season. Fox has played a bit of 3B and LF to give him a better avenue to the bigs, but he hasn't impressed at those positions, either.

When he did play in May and June, Fox was dynamite, hitting .320/.350/.528 in 53 ABs and just 11 starts. But even when Aramis Ramirez went down, Fox still couldn't get on the field regularly; he played a mix of 3B, DH and the corner outfield spots during those first two months. Fox continued to spot-start at 3B and the OF through July and kept hitting to the tune of .300/.339/.660, and it seemed that he'd really arrived. By the end of July, his overall slash line was .311/.345/.592, leading to ramped-up playing time in August.

At this point, however, Fox started to slide back down to more expected levels. Over the final two months of the season, he hit just .212/.280/.354 and, more significantly, his plate patience evaporated. In his 103 ABs through July 31, Fox displayed unusual patience, striking out just 14 times against six walks. But in 113 August through October ABs, he struck out 33 times, with eight walks. The seven HRs and eight 2Bs he'd clubbed before that point diminished to four HRs and four 2Bs.

This, along with an uncertain PT situation, makes his future very shaky. Neither Lee nor Ramirez is going anywhere, nor is LF Alfonso Soriano. Though Bradley has been the subject of trade rumors, the Cubs are saying they want a CF, meaning current CF Kosuke Fukudome would slide into Bradley's spot in RF.

The Cubs' new ownership has given no indication that they'll make any big lineup changes (which might make room for Fox), but they say they'll remain very active in the trade market. And that's where Fox is likely to have the most value.

His atrocious glove and roadblocked path to a starting job make him an excellent DH candidate, though he could also go to a team like the Giants, who are looking for a power-hitting first baseman. The Cubs would be foolish to hang onto Fox if they can get something in return for him; the team that might deal for him, however, would be equally foolish to assume that he's going to continue to produce at this rate.

Fox's history of hacking has followed him to the majors. His career BB/K ratio of .38 slipped to .29 in MLB, showing how little that part of his game has changed. The other knock on him has been that he can crush a fastball, but can't hit offspeed stuff. Fangraph's Pitch Type Values shows that's true—against fastballs and cutters, he scored 1.9 and 3.7 runs above average, respectively. But against sliders, curves and changes, he hit -3.8, 0.0, and -2.6, respectively.

Most likely, pitchers figured that out in the second half and started feeding him offspeed stuff. He could still learn, of course, and the right hitting coach combined with playing time could reverse those trends. But it doesn't bode well for a 27-year-old entering only his second full major-league season, and strike zone knowledge isn't a skill he can develop at that age.

Fantasy owners will want to see where he ends up in 2010; with the Cubs, he's practically worthless, barring an injury or blockbuster trade, but he could be a good power gamble as a DH or 1B with the right team. He's not as good as he seemed in the first half of 2009, but he might not be as bad as his second half indicates, either. Just don't pay too much to find out.

Jordan Zimmermann | Washington | SP
2009 Final Stats: 9.1 K/9, 3.2 K/BB, 4.63 ERA

Zimmermann rocketed through the minors as their top pitching prospect, before a visit to The Dreaded Dr. Andrews ended his season this past August. Tommy John surgery will keep him from returning to full strength until 2011, and he might not even toe the slab for all of 2010.

That's a shame, since The Other Zimmermann (note that extra "n" to distinguish him from All-Star teammate Ryan) had impressed coaches and scouts at every level. Already gifted with a sinking two-seamer and four-seam fastball in the mid-90s, Zimmermann has worked on perfecting his curve and slider, while trying to develop a changeup. Right now, just those first four pitches are above-average, but imagine if he can develop a fifth plus pitch for his repertoire.

He was drafted as the third player in the second round of the 2007 draft, and quickly served notice to the other teams who passed him by. In short-season A ball, he racked up 12.1 K/9 and 3.9 K/BB rates, en route to a 2.38 ERA and a 1.19 WHIP. He continued to average better than a strikeout per inning as he rose to Triple-A over the next two seasons, throwing just 5.1 IP in the minors in 2009 before earning his call-up.

His overall minor-league numbers were equally eye-popping, with that gaudy 9.9 K/9 leading the way, followed by a 3.2 K/BB, 0.7 HR/9, 2.81 ERA and 1.14 WHIP. With barely 195 pro innings under his belt, he got the early call from Washington, joining the pitching-hungry big-league club in time for his April 20 debut against the Atlanta Braves.

He won that start, as well as his next one against the Mets, for a 2.39 ERA, 6.4 K/9 and 2.7 K/BB. Zimmermann wouldn't win another start until June, after a rocky May when he only gave up fewer than fewer earned runs once in six starts, for a 7.27 ERA, 10.1 K/9, and 3.54 K/BB.

His control wasn't a problem, but his 1.6 HR/9 clearly was, along with the defense behind him. Overall, his FIP ERA for 2009 was .99 lower than his actual ERA, not surprising from a team that scored dead last in the NL in R/G, fielding percentage, errors (their 143 muffs led 15th-ranked Arizona by 19, or about 13%), and 15th in defensive efficiency.

Zimmermann righted the ship in June, giving up two or fewer runs in all four starts, for a 1.90 ERA, 8.4 K/9 and 3.7 K/BB. For all that Washington fans had to moan about, this was something that gave them hope for the future. That is, before July.

In that month, he started four times and gave up two or more runs in each outing. His strikeouts were still strong—9.6 K/9 brought him back over a strikeout per inning—but his walks were up, to 3.75 BB/9 to bring that K/BB down to 2.6. Worse, his elbow was bothering him, so the Nats pulled him from the rotation. A short rest and rehab didn't help, and when they sent the MRI results to Dr. James Andrews, Nats fans braced for the worst.

They got it. Zimmermann is out for the usual TJS timeframe of 12-18 months, so you can safely ignore him entirely in next year's draft and monitor him for 2011. Keeper owners will have a tough call to make, as he looked excellent, and is still just 23 years old. Whether you want to hang onto him all next year will depend on your league's depth, whether you have an open DL slot, and whether you're building for the future or the present.

TJS is more of a rite of passage these days than a cause for long-term concern, but it's got to diminish his rising star significantly, at least until 2011 or 2012. The good news is that he might return in two seasons to an improved team, sort of like waking up from cryogenic sleep to find that all the world's problems have been solved and everyone finally has those jet packs they've been promising us since the 1950s.

Hey, it could happen, and it's only slightly less likely than Zimmermann returning to a competitive Washington team. You never know.

Mat Latos | San Diego | SP
2009 Final Stats: 6.9 K/9, 1.7 K/BB, 4.62 ERA

Like Zimmermann, Latos was his team's top pitching prospect before shooting through the minors to earn a hasty promotion by a crummy team wanting a sneak peek at its future. Unlike Zimmermann, Latos is two years younger and finished the season hale and healthy. But there are other differences, too.

The Padres didn't take Latos until the 11th round, not because of his skills, but because of his reported attitude problems—according to BA, he's got a poor work ethic and "rubs teammates the wrong way with his flippant attitude." But those skills are something else. He's got a 95-plus mph heater, tight curve and hard slider, and has averaged more than a strikeout per inning throughout the minors, along with increasingly sharp control.

As a 19-year-old in short-season A-ball, Latos struck out 74 and walked 22 in 56.1 IP, giving up just pne HR. Those 22 free passes would represent the most he'd give up in the minors, and he would continue to strike batters out while keeping the baseball in the yard. At three levels in 2008, his K rate would dip slightly from 11.8 to 11.1 K/9, while his K/BB grew from 3.4 to 5.3; only his HR/9 rose to 0.6 from 0.2. His 2.57 ERA and 1.11 WHIP confirmed his dominance.

Amazingly, almost all would continue to improve in 2009. Though his strikeouts fell to 9.1, his K/BB continued to rise to 6.1, his HR/9 fell to 0.1 (1 HR in 72.1 IP), and his 1.37 ERA and 0.75 WHIP were at elite levels. The Padres could wait no longer and promoted him straight from Double-A for his July 19 start against Colorado.

He lost that first start, despite giving up only two ER in 4.1 IP, but such is the fate pitching with the Padres' offense behind you. But he won his next two starts, ending the month with 7.0 K/9, 3.3 K/BB, and a 2.70 ERA. His problem, though, was the longball, as he gave up four for the month. This trend continued through August, as he would ultimately give up at least one HR in each of his first six starts.

He also began to struggle finding the strike zone; after just four free passes in his first three starts, he walked 12 in his next four. The bottom fell out in a loss at Chicago, when it took him 92 pitches to get through just 3.2 IP, coughing up five ER on seven hits and four BBs against just five Ks.

It speaks very well of Latos' makeup and perhaps his improved maturity that he rebounded from this to pitch seven scoreless frames against the Braves, needing only 89 pitches to shut down 23 hitters (two more than his brief performance against the Cubs), striking out four, while walking none and surrendering just two hits.

The Padres shut Latos down two starts later to preserve his arm, since he'd thrown 120 IP at both levels and—lest we forget—this kid's only 21. In those two final starts, he again regressed, giving up six ER in 6.1 total IP against the Marlins and Dodgers, striking out six, walking seven and giving up seven hits. Possibly, he was getting tired, physically or mentally, but San Diego made the right call regardless.

Though his numbers don't look great for the year, Latos showed the stuff to cement his status as one of the top young pitchers in baseball. He's slotted for the Padres' rotation next year, and PETCO Park, plus the team's solid defense, should help smooth out the expected rough spots in his performance.

What those can't help, of course, is the battle that goes on between Latos' ears. It's one of the cruel ironies of baseball that a hard-working team player like Zimmermann goes down for TJS, while a reputed head case like Latos soldiers on. I couldn't find any reference to clubhouse problems with the Padres, so it might be that Latos has reformed—or it might be that he takes a while to get under his teammates' skin.

Just like the Padres, fantasy owners should be cautious about drafting Latos too highly, at least until he's got more MLB innings under his belt. But his talent is undeniable, and keeper owners should hang on to him, while everyone else should consider him a good mid- to late-round pick or moderate gamble with a decent bid.

Why am I being so cautious? Young pitchers can implode for a variety of reasons, and a pitcher with a reputation for irritating teammates and shirking a disciplined approach to the game has more red flags than most. Bid appropriately.

Keep offering your suggestions for players you'd like to see covered below. Next week is Brewerfest, with Corey Hart, Matt Gamel and Ben Sheets.

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Your Thursday afternoon tizzy

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-19T20:24:38+00:00

There is some brewing discontent over the NL Cy Young vote, as two members of the webby portion of the BBWAA -- our friends Keith Law and Will Carroll -- did not include Chris Carpenter on their three-man Cy Young ballots. Keith voted Javier Vazquez second (Lincecum first and Wainwright third) and Will voted Wainwright first, Lincecum second and Danny Haren third. They were the only ones who included Vazquez or Haren on their ballots.

A comment about this from reader Ron in the thread below my earlier post:

“Two voters, Will Carroll of Baseball Prospectus and Keith Law of ESPN.com, did not include Carpenter on their ballots.” Nice. Leave the best pitcher in the NL off of your ballots to insure the saber-metric favorite wins. The BBWAA guys might not be the best at voting, but the saber friendly guys don’t have the right to accuse them of manipulating the vote anymore.

Ron, I love you. You've been reading this blog longer than just about anyone and I always appreciate your input. But you're factually wrong here inasmuch as even if Will changed his vote for Haren to Carpenter and and Law did the same with his Vazquez vote, Lincecum still wins. And really, if Will was really trying to throw it to Lincecum, wouldn't he have voted him first?

But I don't mean to single out Ron. I posted his comment simply because it stands at the somewhat extreme end of the discontent I've read at a few message boards. There really are people out there scratching their heads at this, and I imagine there will be at least a little grousing about their votes over the next couple of slow news days.

For my part, I wouldn't have voted the same way Keith and Will did -- neither Vazquez nor Haren would have made my ballot -- but they explain their rationale and I understand why they voted the way they voted even if I disagree with it. At the very least I understand docking Carpenter based on innings pitched, and that seems to be the point of controversy here. I'm a bit more of a romantic than Keith and Will are, I think, so I'd probably have included him on my ballot for reasons associated with his comeback from injury and all of that, but it's certainly legitimate to not include him.

I predict that some people will use Keith's and Will's votes in some argument that statheads shouldn't be given the franchise over the next couple of days. Such an argument, if it comes, should be rejected out of hand. At most this is some down-ballot curiosity, the sort of which we see on the votes for every award.

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Lincecum takes the Cy Young

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-19T17:54:42+00:00

I don't have a link yet, but people are talking about it already. He's a fine choice. Great year. I probably undervalued the fact that he had more innings than Carpenter, so no arguments here.

Given that he has a court date on a controlled substance thing coming up soon, be prepared for the most boring celebration party of all time.

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My Morning in Exile

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-19T16:16:21+00:00

I know it's basically just been a string of MMIE's lately, and for that I apologize. Wrapping up one's legal career and preparing to jump right into a new one really has a way of taking up the afternoon. Still, six new posts a day ain't exactly chopped liver as far as baseball bloggers go. You can still complain in the comments, though. Heck, I'm not happy with it myself. I feel like I'm watching baseball from 1000 yards right now. Anyway:

A guy I know up in Flint tells this story about life at GM in the 80s that may be total bullshit, but I hope to God is true (it's certainly truthy). Goes like this: GM used to give out cash awards to engineers and designers who came up with particularly innovative ideas, redesigns, etc. that ended up being adopted in production cars. One year, this fellow suggests that the radiator caps and windshield washer fill caps and stuff be painted and color coded so that morons don't confuse them with one another and, I dunno, quit putting oil in the radiator. Great idea! Here's your $1000 or whatever. After it's put in production, the paint started to burn and bubble under the heat of the engine and caused a terrible smell. Same guy proposes that they cease painting the caps and gets another $1000. I bring this up only because Bud Selig now has the bright idea to tighten up the playoff schedule he loosened up a couple of years ago. I can't wait until this dude's Hall of Fame induction speech.

The Nats hire Davey Johnson. Maybe they should call Howard Johnson about their opening at shortstop.

Hideki Matsui pays for himself. You can't afford not to buy!

Scott Boras is allegedly living in fantasyland. I wish it were "Fantasy Island." I loved that show. I even liked the Malcom McDowell remake from a few years ago. Smiles everyone, smiles.

Lincecum or Carpenter? I dunno. Lincecum was probably better, but I'm finding myself sort of leaning Carpenter. If this whole blogging thing takes off I suppose it's not crazy to think that I'd become a BBWAA member someday. In light of that I should probably man-up and make a case for one of them.

The Yankees and Jays are talking Roy Halladay. If that happens, they may as well just suspend baseball because it will guarantee the Yankees the championship. You know, like how signing Mike Mussina, Jason Giambi and Randy Johnson guaranteed them all of those championships a few years ago.

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This annotated week in baseball history: Nov. 15-Nov. 21, 1967

Richard Barbieri — 2009-11-19T10:20:51+00:00

On Nov. 18, 1967, Tom Gordon was born. Gordon is one of only a handful of pitchers in the "3-100 Club"—those with 100 games started, wins and saves. Richard looks at the entire group.

At the recently concluded general managers' meetings, Brian Cashman was asked how his team saw Joba Chamberlain and Phil Hughes, young pitchers who have experienced success out of the bullpen, but were previously starters. Cashman replied that the Yankees viewed them as "starters that can relieve," which is the sort-of Nixonian non-answer you learn to give when running a team in New York. But it did make me think of pitchers like Tom Gordon who were at various times both starters and relievers and who did it with success on both fronts.

100 wins doesn't necessarily sound like a lot, and it is true that some fairly ordinary pitchers (Russ Ortiz, Brett Tomko, recently) have reached that figure, it is still relatively exclusive company; until recently, 100 wins still put one in the top 500 all-time. The same could be said of 100 saves; while the occasional Mike Williams slips in, only 120 pitchers have recorded that many saves, though modern usage patterns would suggest the figure will zoom up in the future.

But the convergence of those groups is truly rare company; only 15 pitchers have reached both 100 saves and 100 wins in their career. Of those, only eight fall into Cashman's "starters that can relieve" category, marked here by starting at least 100 games in their career. I will cover each individually in a moment, but it is an interesting group.

Dennis Eckersley, in his closer days (Icon/SMI)

Two of the eight made their debut in 1988 (both were active last year), but the years of debut besides that range all the way back to 1923, with a player debuting in each decade save the 30s since then.

One of the group made a majority of his appearances as a starter, the rest vary in a relatively small grouping from a fifth to a third of their appearances coming as starters.

There is less than three-quarters of a run difference between the highest and lowest ERAs of the bunch, although the many decades the group covers means that certain numbers—like Gordon's—--are more impressive than they appear.

The earliest debut starts with Firpo Marberry. Marberry spent most of his 11-year career in Washington. After a brief appearance in 1923, Marberry burst onto the scene in 1924, leading the league in games, games finished and saves. For good measure, he also started 15 games, a number that equaled his save total. Used as both a starter and reliever in the World Series that year, Marberry was masterful, throwing 8 innings with a 1.12 ERA, though unearned runs ruined his only start.

Marberry continued to alternate between reliever and starter throughout his career, winning as many as 19 games (in 1929, when he made 26 starts) and recording as many as 22 saves (in 1926, when he started just five games).

Saves were not, of course, an official statistic back then, but Marberry was sui generis in baseball history. He was the single-season saves leader from 1924 through 1948, the first pitcher to record more than 20 in a season, and the total saves leader from 1926 through 1945.

Like Marberry, Dennis Eckersley also helped to change the common usage of relievers. It is true that big save totals were not unprecedented prior to Eckersley assuming the closer role in Oakland. Dave Righetti, for example, had 46 in 1986. It is also true that the role that Eckersley (and Tony LaRussa) played in making “the modern closer” is somewhat overplayed in the popular history of baseball.

Nonetheless, Eckersley did excel in his role, and is the only Hall of Famer on this list. Of course, that might only be until John Smoltz comes up for election. Smoltz is the odd man out here; nearly two-thirds of his games were starts, unlike the rest of the list. He’s also the best pitcher on the list, having thrown more innings than anyone—many, many more innings than some—and sharing the best ERA+ on the list.

He shares that title with Ellis Kinder. Kinder comes from the Eckersley career type. He won 23 games in 30 starts in 1949, and outside of his rookie season he started two-thirds of his games through 1950. After 1950 he became a full-time reliever. He would never start more than 10 games in a season, and just 14 of the nearly 300 games after 1950.

Kinder is also notable for the trivia-question aspect of his spot on this list; he finished his career with exactly 102 wins and saves.

On the other side of the spectrum from Smoltz and Kinder are Ron Kline and Dave Giusti, who finished their careers with an ERA+ of 101 and 95, respectively. Kline was a righty who earned his spot on this list the hard way, pitching forever. He played for nine teams over a 17-year career, the best coming in his early 30s when he pitched all but exclusively out of the pen for the Senators, raking up 83 saves and a 2.54 ERA. He was never close to that good before or after.

Giusti meanwhile, also earned his spot on the list through persistence. From 1970 through 1976 he never won more than nine games in a season, but also never won fewer than five, all while averaging 19 saves a year. Combined with his early career work as a starter, Giustui makes the list despite his worse-than-average career ERA.

The remaining men are Tom Gordon, who won 17 games at age 21 with the Royals throwing what has been called “perhaps the best curve of his generation.” By 1998 arm problems forced him into the bullpen, and he has never started another game.

Ron Reed is on the list, but the most interesting thing about him is probably that the 6-foot-6-inch righty spent two years playing in the NBA before moving back to baseball and making the All-Star team as a rookie in 1968. Reed was shifted to the bullpen in 1976 after earning 89 wins but just one save in the years prior. He would reach 100 saves in his final year, while crossing the wins plateau in '78.

Finally, if you’re wondering, Derek Lowe is 15 saves away from joining the club (though now starting full time) and the only active player close. Someday Phil Hughes or Joba Chamberlain might join the club, but for now the “3-100 Club” remains exclusive.

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