The Hardball Times -- Alex Eisenberg

The Hardball Times -- Alex Eisenberg http://www.hardballtimes.com/main Baseball. Insight. Daily. en studes@hardballtimes.com Copyright 2013 2013-05-21T08:09:15+00:00 How Liriano became a staff ace again http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/how-liriano-became-a-staff-ace-again/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/how-liriano-became-a-staff-ace-again/#When:10:45:15 Francisco Liriano has at least shown he's better than he was in 2008 and 2009. Now three years removed from Tommy John surgery, Liriano has increased his fastball velocity by about three mph since he first returned from surgery in 2008 and by about two mph over his velocity in 2009.

While you can attribute some of that to Liriano's returning arm strength, he's also adjusted his mechanics to maximize his output.

So what's changed since last year? I'll give you two angles of Liriano, comparing the 2009 and 2010 versions. The first angle is from the center field camera. On the left is the 2009 Liriano throwing a 90 mph fastball, while on the right is Liriano in 2010 throwing a 94 mph fastball:

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

The main thing I want you to focus on here is what the torso does as the hands break: It bends at the waist. It's called bend as you break and it's something I've spoken about before. Many high velocity throwers, at the time they break their hands (or just after), bend over at the waist. Just before their front foot lands, the torso springs back up and a whole bunch of torque/separation is created between the torso and the hips.

The next angle of Liriano comes from just right of center. You can't pick up as much difference in how deep the torso bends as you can from the center field angle. However, there are some other differences to note. On the left, Liriano is clocked at 88 mph in a game from the 2009 season, while on the right is Liriano in 2010, throwing a 95 mph fastball:

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

First, note how at the start of the clip, the 2010 Liriano is not as far along in his delivery. Since the release points are synchronized, we can conclude that Liriano's body in 2010 is moving at a faster pace throughout his windup. Second, it appears that at the top of his knee lift, the 2010 version has less of a pause. This means there is more momentum being created as he works his way through his windup. Any pause in one's delivery can bleed energy one needs to produce a high velocity pitch.

What's interesting is that the 2009 version appears to break his hands just a tad later than the 2010 version. A later hand break is most often associated with better velocity. But in this case, since Liriano's body is further ahead in 2010, the hands have to break sooner to keep up.

The last thing to notice is the finish of each pitch. Check out the intent of the 2010 version of Liriano; check out the violence. I intentionally chose fastballs with a big difference in velocity to illustrate the importance of intent on velocity. On the 95 mph pitch, the head gets jerked a little more to the side, the torso is thrust forward a little more violently, the back leg wildly swings around, and the front foot has to replant itself.

While the extra velocity is certainly nice, perhaps more important for the Twins is the fact Liriano has now been healthy for three straight seasons and his future looks as bright as ever.

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This evolution has been ongoing for some time now—at least since 2008. And the changes have been frequent. This year alone, Morrow has featured several variations of his delivery, both from the windup and the stretch before finally settling on its present form. But let's start with Morrow's mechanics from 2008 (left) and 2009 (right):

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

Comparing the two deliveries, Morrow in 2008 was a little more compact and had a quicker pace, a faster tempo. By tempo, I'm referring to the point in which the knee reaches its uppermost point, and the time it takes him to get to the point of release. Tempo is measured in frames. These clips are synchronized to release. Based on the fact that Morrow's 2009 delivery is further along in the process and still releasing the ball at the same time as the 2008 version tells you Morrow's body is moving faster in 2008 than it did in 2009.

Personally, I liked the compactness and faster tempo of the 2008 delivery compared to what he was doing in 2009.

Morrow came into the 2010 season with a few new tweaks to his delivery and for much of the season he seemed to be battling himself, trying to find a delivery he was comfortable with. Below from left to right is Morrow on May 16, May 31, and Aug. 8, the night of his masterful performance over the Rays.

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

Comparing just Morrow's May 16 start to his 2009 mechanics, Morrow added a little more movement to his hands, ultimately bringing them higher than before. He also added just a little more turn in the hips as he reached his "balance point." These adjustments were simply pit stops on the path to the mechanics he used in his Aug. 8 start.

However, there were bumps along the way. Something was off in that May 31 start. Morrow had made another adjustment to his mechanics (actually, the adjustment was made a start or two prior). The adjustment was to the way he would lower his hands as his front leg began to drop. This had an effect on how Morrow would break his hands, which subsequently changed the first phase of his arm action. I don't want to spend too much time on the changes made here since in the grand scheme of things, they didn't have much impact, but you can see these differences in the graphics above.

Rather, I'd like to go back to that Aug. 8 start and address what Morrow was doing differently compared to his starts from earlier this year. Some key adjustments by Morrow to get to where he is now:

1. He got rid of that new arm action he was using in his May 31 start.

2. Morrow increased his tempo and eliminated a lot of the random pauses he would have in earlier versions of his mechanics. Instead, Morrow's delivery was smoother with a more continuous motion, and that resulted in better rhythm and timing.

3. He added a much more distinct turn of the hips. He had a small turn of the hips before, but it is much more pronounced now. Some notable pitchers have made similar adjustments. Erik Bedard added a hip turn before he turned into one of the elite pitchers in baseball. Felix Hernandez made a similar adjustment last season, and Zack Greinke used the adjustment to catapult himself into the conversation of baseball's best pitcher.

As I said earlier, the hip turn adds a little more torque and a little more violence to the delivery, and that can help increase a pitcher's overall velocity. It also makes the ball a bit tougher to pick up because the pitcher turns his back to the hitter. However, in Morrow's case, the biggest benefit was the improved timing and rhythm of his delivery.

4. The hip turn is often accompanied by an adjustment of the hands. In Morrow's case, the hands are brought about as high as they were before, but now they end up next to his ear.

5. Rhythm is an extremely important part of pitching. If you don't have it, you're going to get inconsistent results. The segment in Morrow's delivery where the knee reaches its upper most point and—along with the hands—begins to move downward has always been a tricky spot for Morrow, never being particularly smooth or consistent. However, that changed on Aug. 8. His motion was much more consistent and fluid. And this extended to his delivery from the stretch as you can see below:

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

You'll notice how Morrow's leg kick from the stretch is a little bigger in his Aug. 8 start and he's probably a little more susceptible to the opposing team's running game, but he's also generating more power by using both the higher leg kick and the bigger turn of the hips than he was before.

But again I have to point to the newfound rhythm of the delivery. One of the reasons for the better rhythm is that the hands and leg kick are in sync with one another. The hands go up and come down at the same time as the leg goes up and comes down. Look at Morrow from the stretch earlier in the season and you'll notice that, as the hands begin to move downward, the leg is still on its way up. It's much easier to coordinate and correctly time a delivery where the entire body is moving in sequence

So what does this all mean for Morrow's future? It's not yet clear. He's always had top-of-the-rotation stuff. It's always been a question of command. The mechanical adjustments he has made indicate that his recent run of success (which goes beyond his Aug. 8 start) cannot be chalked up to a simple streak of good luck. I believe it comes down to consistency.

The difference between a top-of-the-rotation starter and a No. 3 starter often comes down to consistency. The difference between a successful major league pitcher and a pitcher who can't hack it often comes down to consistency. Consistent quality of stuff and consistent command from start-to-start and pitch-to-pitch. And that's what it will ultimately come down to for Morrow, who is not known for being a consistent performer. These recent mechanical adjustments may be just the thing Morrow needed to elevate himself into top-of-the-rotation status.

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Heading into the All-Star break, Beckham's OPS placed him close to the bottom in the American League in slugging percentage. Now, I have to point out that Beckham has come back from the break on fire and, in looking at some very recent video of him, he seems to have fixed the mechanical problems that plagued his swing in the first half of the season.

While I may follow up with an article on the adjustments Beckham has made to get his old swing back, this article will focus on what went awry with his swing for much of this season. Below we see him from the center field camera angle. The clips below are in their entirety and are both synchronized to the pitcher's release of the ball and to the point of contact. On the left is Beckham in 2009 on an 81 mph pitch, while on the right you see Beckham in 2010 on an 80 mph pitch.

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

Let's break down his swing in segments. The first segment is from the pitcher in mid-windup until the pitcher's release. The 2009 version is on the left and the 2010 version is on the right:

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

What I want you to notice first is the angle of the bat at the start of the clip. It's more upright in 2009. Then you look at the arms in the same graphic, and they're also a little closer to the body.

Take note of how the bat loads in each swing. See how much more movement he has now compared to 2009, how the load is much deeper? And then notice the angle and position of the bat at the point of the pitcher's release—which version's swing takes the longest path to get into his hitting zone? Here's a hint: it's not 2009.

Now let's look at the next segment of Beckham's swing, which is from the release of the ball out of the pitcher's hand through contact. Again, 2009 version is on the left, 2010 version on the right:

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

I pause each clip at frames 10 and 11. You can see in the 2010 clip that Beckham's hips have already opened and because his swing is longer, he's forced to start his swing earlier.

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

Looking at Beckham from the side, we see similar elements. You see a deeper load with a longer swing and more complicated movements. The timing doesn't seem to all be there. Instead of a quick-trigger hitch, which he had in 2009, he now has a long, deep load that in theory might be better for his power production, but in actuality seems to have impeded his overall timing and made his swing longer as well.

He used to just uncoil on the ball with a whip-like swing helped in part by that quick-trigger hitch. But since Beckham's timing had been disrupted, he didn't trigger the same bat speed he generated in 2009. Unless Beckham could restore that whip-like swing, the ball would continue to come off his bat less crisply and the power he supplied would continue to be less than sufficient. Luckily for the White Sox, Beckham seems to have made the proper adjustments at just the right time.

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A quick synopsis of Crowley's career: He played professionally for 15 seasons, mostly as a reserve. He's known as one of baseball's all time best pinch-hitters. Crowley became the hitting coach of the Orioles in 1985, not too long after he retired as a player. He spent four years with Baltimore before moving on to Minnesota, where he spent eight years as the Twins' hitting coach. In 1999, the Orioles rehired Crowley to be the team's hitting coach and he's been there ever since.

Before I go any further, let's get the obvious out of the way:

1. Terry Crowley is not solely responsible for the struggles of the Baltimore offense.

2. Terry Crowley has not had the most talented group of hitters to work with.

3. Most of the blame should fall on the players because they are the ones actually hitting.

All that being said, there have been two constants over the past 12 straight losing seasons in Baltimore: Peter Angelos and Terry Crowley. Crowley has somehow managed to survive six managers: Ray Miller for one year, Mike Hargrove for four years, Lee Mazzilli for one-plus year, Sam Perlozzo for two years, Dave Trembley for three years, and now Juan Samuel for a few games. Can anybody think of any coach who has survived so much turnover on one team with results being as bad as the Orioles have had over the last 12 years?

Maybe the offenses Crowley has presided over have been great and it's been the pitching that has been the organization's downfall? Well, let's examine Crowley's entire career as a hitting coach...

Orioles hitting coach, 1985-1988

Pre-Crowley years, 1983 and 1984

AL Ranking BA/OBP/SLG/OPS, Walks

1983 - 7/1/3/3, 2
1984 - 12/6/8/6, 1

The Crowley years, 1985-1988

1985 - 8/3/1/3, 3
1986 - 8/8/10/10, 6
1987 - 12/13/10/11, 9
1988 - 14/13/14/14, 8

Post-Crowley years, 1989-1991

1989 - 12/7/11/8, 2
1990 - 13/6/13/13, 1
1991 - 11/11/4/9, 8

Twins hitting coach, 1991-1998

Pre-Crowley years, 1989 and 1990

1989 - 2/2/2/2, 11
1990 - 4/10/8/8, 13

The Crowley years, 1991-1998

1991 - 1/1/2/2, 9
1992 - 1/2/7/5, 9
1993 - 8/13/12/12, 11
1994 - 5/7/8/8, 14
1995 - 4/7/9/8, 14
1996 - 2/7/11/10, 10
1997 - 8/10/11/11, 12
1998 - 9/11/13/13, 11

Post-Crowley years, 1999-2001

1999 - 11/12/12/14, 12
2000 - 10/13/13/13, 12
2001 - 4/5/8/7, 9

Orioles hitting coach, 1999-present

Pre-Crowley years, 1997 and 1998

1997 - 9/6/6/6, 6
1998 - 5/4/7/6, 5

The Crowley years, 1999-present

1999 - 6/5/7/6, 4
2000 - 9/10/10/10, 13
2001 - 14/13/14/14, 11
2002 - 14/13/11/12, 13
2003 - 8/11/11/11, 13
2004 - 3/4/8/7, 5
2005 - 7/8/5/5, 9
2006 - 7/8/10/9, 10
2007 - 6/9/10/10, 11
2008 - 8/8/5/7, 9
2009 - 5/8/10/9, 11
2010 - 10/13/13/13, 14

When you take data like these, knowing there are many factors involved in deciphering how good a team's offense actually is, the reality is that you can twist it into anything that fits your agenda. But there are some things we can conclusively take from the numbers.

To start, Crowley generally has coached poor offensive teams. In terms of OPS, his teams have finished 10th or worse 13 times in 24 seasons. His offenses have finished fifth or better four times in 24 seasons and interestingly enough three of those top-five finishes were in his first two seasons as hitting coach for his respective team.

Another thing to take from these data is the startling lack of walks. This goes to the heart of the criticism many fans have of Crowley. His philosophy is to swing at the first good pitch you get to hit because you probably won't get a better pitch one later in the at-bat. It's not go up there and start hacking at whatever it is the pitcher throws at you. It's wait for your pitch and when you get it, don't miss it. It's a philosophy that doesn't make pitchers work. It's a philosophy that is not conducive to getting on base consistently unless the team is hitting for average at the time. It's a philosophy that can be a symptom of a team in a prolonged slump with the bat.

This season has been the nail in the coffin for Crowley. No young Orioles hitter has progressed with the bat and most have actually regressed. Players have been slow to adjust, whether it be in their approach or mechanics, and many are still mired in their slumps. Crowley is not entirely to blame. But sometimes you need a new set of eyes and a different perspective for positive change.

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But let me take you back to this offseason. Many Orioles fans were looking for the club to take a big plunge into free agency, whether it be in the form of Matt Holliday or John Lackey, just like they wanted Mark Teixeira in 2009. Not I. For teams like Baltimore, I've always felt you needed to wait until you are two or three pieces away from contention before deciding to commit millions and millions of dollars to a couple of free-agent veterans.

It's pretty simple to understand why: You want to be sure you have the players surrounding your big money stars who are good enough to play playoff-level baseball on a regular basis, because if you don't, you're essentially wasting the talent of your star players and the money you gave them.

So I had no major problems with the offseason undertaken by the Orioles. There were some things I disagreed with, but my issue wasn't their inability to sign a "big bat" or an "ace" in free agency. What I was looking for was the young core of this team to take another step in the right direction -- I was looking for signs of progress.

But that hasn't happened. Almost everything that could have gone wrong, has.

Brian Roberts, the team's leadoff hitter has had everything from a bad back to pneumonia. He's been out almost the entire season. The young core the Orioles organization is relying on has stagnated or regressed. A quick rundown of those players...

Adam Jones - Plate discipline and pitch recognition -- both of which he's never been particularly good at in the first place -- have fallen off a cliff.

Matt Wieters - Perhaps the most frustrating player of them all, Wieters is mired in a deep slump. He's not letting the ball travel into his hitting zone and is making contact too far out in front. His swing has gotten longer and he's turned into a guess hitter at the plate and seems unsure of himself. When he does get a pitch to hit, he's not hitting it. But at least his defense has been excellent.

Nolan Reimold - He's been a shell of the player many regarded as one of baseball's best rookies last season. He's now struggling in Norfolk.

Chris Tillman - While performing admirably, he seems to have regressed from last year and isn't showing the dominance that a potential front-of-the-rotation starter typically shows.

Brad Bergesen - It wasn't a matter of if his ERA was going to regress from its 2009 level, but how much. Not too many expected his ERA to rise to 6.75 and for him to be out of the rotation by June.

Jake Arrieta - He's been up-and-down the entire season and probably profiles best out of the bullpen though the Orioles I believe will give him every chance to stick as a starter

Josh Bell - The team's top hitting prospect has a .297 OBP in Triple-A Norfolk and has close to a 5:1 K:BB ratio.

Brandon Snyder - The team's second best hitting prospect has a .685 OPS in Norfolk.

Brandon Erbe - The best of the team's secondary pitching prospects, he's been pounded in Triple-A thus far in 2010.

Kam Mickolio - Also in Norfolk, he was the team's top relief prospect heading into 2010, but he has a 10.43 ERA with the Tide and and 7.36 ERA in 3+ innings with the Orioles.

Felix Pie - The only young hitter not named Nick Markakis who was actually performing, Pie has been injured most of the year

The bulk of Baltimore's success this season has come from their stop-gap players, none of whom have any real future with the team.

So what now? Where do the Orioles go from here?

Short Term Plan

1. They have already fired Dave Trembley. It's not going to make much of a difference, but the change needed to be made, some type of shake up was needed. But I've got my eye on another coach: Terry Crowley. Stay tuned for that article in the coming days.

2. Hate to say it, but you have to continue losing. The goal should be the No. 1 pick in the 2011 draft. Buster Olney talked to a scout who said this:

Your instinct is to say that they should trade off their veterans for spare parts before the deadline," said the evaluator, who was talking about Ty Wigginton, Luke Scott and Kevin Millwood, specifically. "But I almost think those guys would have more value to the organization if you keep them, to stabilize the young players. The second half of the season is going to be hard for them, and they need support. You can't just continually get your ass kicked without having it affect you.

I'm worried about the psyche of the young players, too, but things are hard now. They are getting their asses kicked now. The steady influence of those veterans hasn't been felt all year by the looks of things, so why will the second half be any different?

The bottom line is that the Orioles have plenty of holes within their farm system. They should find prospects they feel are undervalued and look to acquire them in deals for teams desperate for additional pitching and hitting. Otherwise, the Orioles will have nothing left to show for many of the veterans on their 2010 roster.

Long Term Thinking

1. There needs to be some serious house cleaning once this season ends. It starts with the coaching staff. But Orioles management needs to look deeper. Some questions to consider...

Why did almost all their young players regress or stagnate this season?

When is the last time this team truly developed a hitter on their own -- and don't count Wieters, a highly advanced college hitter who spent very little time in the minors. For those that actually don't know, the answer is Nick Markakis. But how many prospects has the team developed other than Markakis in the past five or six years? The answer is zero or one, with that one being Reimold. But he was also a college player. And maybe Snyder can turn it around. But any way you look at it, the team's record on developing offensive talent is abysmal.

So what's the main problem: the scouts who pick the players or the coaches who develop them? Or is it the philosophy and teaching methods the organization adheres by?

Whatever it is, it needs to be addressed. There are people who need to be held responsible for the organization's failure to develop the young talent they've brought in over the years.

2. The Orioles are in the toughest division in baseball. They will never be able to spend the kind of money the Red Sox or Yankees do in free agency. So the organization needs to find an upper hand somewhere else. Two areas immediately come to mind:

The Draft

Luck can have a lot to do with the quality of one's draft. However, one thing teams can control is the amount of talent they draft. Because they are big-market teams, the Red Sox and Yankees can and do spend more money than your average team on players that drop because of signability issues. But it's not a huge disparity. What amounts to a large sum of money spent on player signing bonuses for a team's draft choices is around $10 million. That's roughly half of the one-year salaries for the highest paid players in baseball. Or to put it another way, that's a little under half of the one-year salary for Houston's Carlos Lee. So the Astros theoretically could have had Wil Myers (Round 3, $2 million), Max Stassi (Round 4, $1.5 million), Zack Von Rosenberg (Round 6, $1.2 million), Ian Krol (Round 7, $925,000), Madison Younginer (Round 7, $975,000), Jonathan Singleton (Round 8, $200,000), and Kendal Volz (Round 9, $550,000) for $7.35 million. Would you make that trade, Carlos Lee for all those players I just listed from the 2009 draft and $11.65 million? At the time each team made their selection last year, you can make the case for each player I just listed, that they were the best player on the board at the time they were selected.

So there is an opportunity here for teams to take advantage of -- and it's starting to happen, but teams aren't going far enough. This is especially true for a team like Baltimore which needs to find an edge over their richer counterparts.

Let's focus on the Red Sox here since they are especially good at taking talent in the middle rounds of the draft and signing them to big money deals. Since 2006, the Red Sox have handed out signing bonuses to an average of 16 players a year. They hand out large signing bonuses (I'll define this as $800,000 or more) to about three or four players with two of them being $1 million-plus bonuses. You then have around three to five players in that mid-sized bonus range of $400,000 to $799,000. The exception to this was in 2007.

The Orioles, on the other hand, have handed out bonuses to an average of 11 players per year since 2006 with two players typically getting the large bonus and two players in that mid-sized bonus range. The Orioles made an effort to emphasize the draft in 2009 by handing out signing bonuses to 17 players. Four of those players were given large signing bonuses. However, some of that came at the expense of their first-round pick where they drafted the signable Matt Hobgood over more talented prospects that would have cost the team more money. Hobgood is a good prospect, but teams like Baltimore need elite level prospects because they can't sign elite level players in free agency.

Nevertheless, those 17 players aren't enough. All they are doing is essentially breaking even with Boston. The Orioles need to go above and beyond what the big-market teams do come draft time.

In an ideal scenario, I'd like to see Baltimore stockpile high school players, especially the arms. A high school pitcher has less wear-and-tear on the arm and the organization can have much more influence on the player's development as opposed to a college player. The high school player is where the upside is. Will they all work out? Obviously not. But you hope that two -- or if you're lucky three or four -- players can break through with each draft class. Then sprinkle in a few college players that have a particular set of skills you look for in young players.

The other area where the Orioles need to take advantage of is an area where they have been an abject failure...

Latin America and International Signings

The most frustrating thing for many Orioles fans has been the complete lack of presence in Latin America. I can't recall the last time the Orioles signed an elite prospect from Latin America. The Yankees make up for their lack of spending (to their standards) by investing heavily in Latin America. The Red Sox have an active presence globally, the Rays have been very efficient in how they've spent their resources as they haven't signed that many players, but the ones they have signed are making an impact (Alex Colome and Wilking Rodriguez specifically). The Blue Jays are a little behind the others, but they have some intriguing Latin American prospects coming up in the system right now. The Orioles? Not so much. The Orioles have zero International prospects worth watching at the moment.

I understand it takes time to establish a presence in Latin America and the Orioles have made steps to address their shortcomings in this area. I also acknowledge that I'm not privy to all the ins-and-outs of the Orioles organization and everything that has actually been done to increase their presence there. But I do know the team was in the running for Miguel Sano and had we offered somewhere in the range of a $4 million signing bonus, then maybe Sano would be in the Orioles organization instead of Minnesota's.

But let's not limit this to Latin America. There is a ton of talent in this world waiting to be tapped into. Why not establish a presence where few teams reside. Set up an academy in India -- plant the seeds now for what could be a pipeline of talent a few years down the road. What about scouring areas where seeds have already been planted by other organizations? The work the Twins organization has put into Europe comes to mind.

There is, of course, one major issue that I've overlooked, but which I touched on earlier...

Money

Where does the money come from? Isn't there a budget the Orioles must adhere to?

Well, there are a couple of ways to look at this. The Baltimore payroll has been in the $65 - $75 million range for the past couple of years. As recently as 2007, the payroll was $93 million. That doesn't account for money allocated for the draft and other team expenditures. Money not used in free agency can be spent elsewhere. This team offered Teixeira a contract worth $150 million over the course of seven years, which comes out to more than $21 million a year. The Orioles obviously failed to sign him. So where did that money go? Why not take some of that money and invest it in the draft and internationally on top of the money already allocated to both areas?

Or let's look at this another way. This team spent $4 million on Garrett Atkins, $6 million on Miguel Tejada, and $12 million over two years on Mike Gonzalez. I think I speak for Orioles fans everywhere, that money would have been better used elsewhere. It baffles me how a team can spend as much as $4 million on a player with so little upside and no future with that team and then proceed to pass over players that could have a huge impact for your organization over the course of years because they might require a quarter of Atkins' salary to sign. That doesn't make sense to me on so many levels.

The Bottom Line

The goal for any organization is to have a foundation in place that allows the team to win games over a number of years. With the way the system is set up, that means in the AL East you must beat out one of the big market teams to make the playoffs and that almost always requires a 90-win season or better. How do you beat teams that outspend you in free agency, outspend you Internationally, and at best draw even with during the draft? When you rely on the failure of your opponents' prospects to develop, their big free agent signings to simply not work out, or you need another team to have a couple of key injuries so your team can get an edge, then you've already lost.

Two or three big name free agents doesn't fix things. They only mask the underlying issues within this organization and take away resources that are essential to the long term health of the Baltimore Orioles. It's difficult to ask fans of a team with a losing record in each of the past 12 -- soon to be 13 -- seasons to be patient. But I know they'd be content to wait it out as long as they knew this team was doing everything in its power to take advantage of a system that allows you to bring in potential impact players for relatively little money.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Alex Eisenberg 2010-06-09T08:58:15+00:00 2010 draft preview: Scouting pitcher Jameson Taillon http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/2010-draft-preview-scouting-pitcher-jameson-taillon/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/2010-draft-preview-scouting-pitcher-jameson-taillon/#When:10:25:15 Body TypeHe has a big, physical frame with some projection remaining

Stuff

Fastball—Tremendous velocity and life...can hit the upper 90s though he's more consistently in the 92-96 mph range...excellent carry through the strike zone and it picks up an extra gear as it approaches home plate. The fastball appears to rise on hitters.

Taillon sometimes has trouble keeping his fastball down in the zone and he'll get hit when he leaves the ball over the heart of the plate. The pitch will also straighten out on him at times, leaving it hittable.

Curveball—Good tilt and snap on a two-plane break...comes in on the same plane as his fastball. The trajectory of the pitch is a little higher when he throws his curveball for strikes, but it still looks like a high fastball out of his hand. Taillon throws from a three-quarters arm slot, but will occasionally raise his arm slot slightly when throwing the curveball.

The pitch could use a little more consistency, but it's still a plus pitch at its best and has the potential to be a bit better. Below you can see an example of Taillon's curveball on the left (84 mph) and his fastball on the right (94 mph):

*Credit to MLB Advanced Media

Slider—Another potential plus offering, the pitch is a little behind his curveball. The pitch breaks hard left though its depth is questionable and there are times you can spot the break soon after release before it really makes that sharp turn left. There is an almost Frisbee-like movement to the pitch.

*Credit to TxBaseballInstitute

Change-up—Behind his other offerings, as with most pitchers Taillon's age, but it has the makings of an above-average offering. He maintains his arm speed well and is clocked 8-12 mph slower than his fastball with solid fading action.

Scouting Report

Jameson Taillon is a potential top-five pick in the 2010 draft and is regarded by many as the top overall pitcher in this year's draft class. He's committed to Rice, but obviously he's considered signable or he wouldn't be considered a top-five pick.

At this point, Taillon's command is behind his control. He's generally able to throw strikes, but he doesn't always hit the glove. At the high school level, he's able to simply overpower hitters, but he's going to have to do a better job of commanding his stuff against more advanced hitters.

Now, that's not to say he can't command his stuff. He can, but he must do it more consistently. Taillon can throw his ball to both sides of the plate, but he has better command to his arm side.

Part of Taillon's command issues can be traced to a tendency of rushing through his delivery.

Mechanically, Taillon starts out very slow as he lifts his front leg and then explodes from there. He has around an average tempo—the number of frames from which the knee reaches its uppermost point to release—of 24 or 25 frames, but he looks quicker than that. More importantly, there are no hitches in his arm action: It's very smooth looking. Any unnecessary pause in one's arm action or delivery can cause a pitcher to bleed energy, which costs him velocity. Taillon also loads his shoulder extremely well, which is surely a factor in his tremendous velocity. The more velocity, the higher the risk of injury, however.

*Credit to rkyosh007

Overall, Taillon has a lot going on mechanically. He dips his back shoulder in an effort to keep his torso back while he leads with his hips. He then has a a step-over move to increase his stride length and kick-start an aggressive hip rotation. Nevertheless, he has the athletic ability and body control to coordinate all these moving parts.

Taillon generates excellent separation between his torso and hips. The torso uncoils violently forward, bringing the arm along for the ride and resulting in a whip-like arm action with the ball exploding out of his hand.

Taillon's landing is a little inconsistent, sometimes on his arm side and in a closed position. However, he has the basics down for proper front side mechanics, firming up his glove out in front of his chest and keeping his front shoulder closed.

It's clear Taillon is a tremendously talented pitcher. He has most of what you look for in an elite level pitching prospect and he's somebody who can work his way quickly through a team's minor league system because of the quality of his stuff. While he's not a sure thing and has some things to work on, Taillon represents an opportunity for some team to add a potential true No. 1 starter into its stockpile of prospects.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Alex Eisenberg 2010-06-04T10:25:15+00:00 Scouting Orioles pitching prospect Jake Arrieta http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/scouting-orioles-pitching-prospect-jake-arrieta/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/scouting-orioles-pitching-prospect-jake-arrieta/#When:05:02:15 made this comment about Baltimore Orioles pitching prospect Jake Arrieta:

Orioles paid first-round money for a guy who really just isn't that good. Disclaimer: Speed up his delivery and watch his velocity soar. If only I could convince them to do this, then Arrieta would not be as overrated.

And he was right; Arrieta was regarded as a first-round talent, but he didn't display first-round quality stuff during his junior season at TCU. His fastball velocity dropped from 91-95 mph down to 88-91 after his sophomore season.

More than a year later, Arrieta's stuff is back to what it once was and you can credit the mechanical adjustments Arrieta made as the primary reason. No, he didn't speed up his delivery—his tempo is still painfully slow—but he did make his mechanics more efficient. How did he do this? Let's go to the tape...

Below is Arrieta's draft video (left) and Arrieta during his stint with the U.S. Olympic team this past season. You'll see in both instances, after Arrieta lowers his leg, he appears to step over an imaginary object. This step-over enables Arrieta to kick-start an aggressive hip rotation and take a longer stride into foot plant. The point of the step-over move is to add velocity.

But compare the differences... which version has the bigger, more aggressive move into foot plant? From my point of view, it's the 2008 version. This more efficient step-over move allows Arrieta to build up more momentum heading into foot plant and in the process generate more torque.

The more forceful the hip rotation, the more torque Arrieta creates between his torso and hips. The bigger the separation between his torso and hips, the more power is transmitted to the shoulder. The more power transmitted to the shoulder, the greater the potential for velocity—as long as the kinetic chain is in sync throughout the delivery, which Arrieta's is.

When a pitcher adjusts his stride, this can create problems with timing. To compensate for the bigger step-over move, Arrieta employs a larger tilting of the shoulders.

Another change between the two versions occurs at finish. Arrieta is better able to get out in front in 2008. In the clips below, notice the better upper body tilt and extension, meaning he is releasing the ball just a little closer to home plate than he was in college. The difference is very subtle—look closely at the frame in which the ball is released and the path the arm travels as it decelerates. This small change means his fastball gets on hitters a bit quicker and from an injury standpoint, this development means Arrieta is giving his arm a little more room to decelerate. His finish is a slightly more abrupt in the draft clip.

In Arrieta's case, it was the classic case of taking a player's current mechanics and making them more efficient. Arrieta's mechanics weren't overhauled, but he displayed qualities that—if implemented more efficiently—could increase his velocity. The Orioles in all likelihood recognized this, since they shelled out a $1.1 million signing bonus to sign Arrieta—a record amount for a fifth-round pick.

What kind of stuff does Arrieta possess today?

Fastball - pumped anywhere from 91 to 96 with some late life...velocity usually moves down to the 92-94 mph range after his first couple of innings. Commands the pitch well to both sides of the plate.

Slider - thrown in the mid-80s with good bite, though there are times when the pitch will break too early. He struggles to command the pitch, often bouncing it in the dirt. When he's commanding this pitch, he's very difficult to hit.

Curveball - a 12-to-6 version, thrown between 78 and 80 mph...he doesn't throw it often and it projects to be an average pitch. The pitch needs more consistency.

Change-up - he's made great strides with the pitch, doing a better job of maintaining his arm speed...the difference between his change-up and fastball ranges between 5 and 10 mph. It's another pitch that needs to become more consistent.

Arrieta is difficult to center the ball against because his many pitches all come in on similar planes. Below is an example of this as he's throwing a 95 mph fastball on the left and an 86 mph slider on the right. The slider was one of the best he threw in this particular outing.

Final thoughts

Arrieta has progressed appreciably since being drafted out of TCU in 2007. His stuff has ticked up another level, but his command still needs work. There is a reason some feel he'll be at his best out of the bullpen. He can be great in spurts, but will have innings where the plate can be anything but found. However, the fact that he does put it together in spurts leads many to believe he'll eventually be able to put it all together.

Should things click for Arrieta, he'll give the Orioles three pitching prospects—along with Chris Tillman and Brian Matusz—all of whom are close to MLB-ready with No. 2 starter upsides. That leads many Baltimore fans to expect their team to actually become a contender in the vaunted and highly competitive AL East. The promise of pairing these three with phenom Matt Wieters only furthers these expectations.

But for the Orioles to contend, they need their pitchers to pan out. Arrieta is the biggest mystery of Baltimore's big three pitching prospects. If he even comes close to reaching his upside, I suspect many Baltimore fans will be very happy.

Best case outcome: No. 2 starter

More likely outcome: Borderline No. 3 or strong No. 4 starter... worst case for Arrieta would be a move to the bullpen.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Alex Eisenberg 2009-01-27T05:02:15+00:00 Breaking Down the Draft: More Requests (Part 3) http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/breaking-down-the-draft-more-requests-part-3/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/breaking-down-the-draft-more-requests-part-3/#When:05:28:15 74. Tyler Chatwood | RHP | Los Angeles Angels
Chatwood likely would have gone much higher in last June's draft if he had been two or three inches taller. However, the Angels were able to snag him at 74, their first pick of the draft.

Chatwood's arsenal consists to two potentially plus pitches:

Fastball - thrown anywhere between 92 and 96 mph, sitting more comfortably in the 92-94 mph range. The pitch travels on a downward plane as Chatwood's release point is close to over-the-top, which should help Chatwood induce plenty of ground balls. He needs to do a better job of commanding the pitch and it profiles as above average right now.

Curveball - a true plus pitch and a knee buckler, the pitch has good depth, a late break, and looks harder than it actually is. He throws it from as low as 72 mph and up to 76 mph and he's able to throw it for strikes. The release point makes it harder for the batter to recognize the pitch out of his hand. Below you can see his 93 mph fastball (left) and his 74 mph curveball (right):

Chatwood also is working to develop a change-up, which will go a long way toward determining his future.

Command was a major issue for Chatwood in his first professional season, as he walked almost as many batters he struck out. No question that's a concern, but he has shown much better command in the past.

Mechanically, I think Chatwood needs to make better use of his lower body. Chatwood lands in a somewhat stiff position and doesn't use his front leg as a base in which to draw energy from as well as he could. I also think he stays over the rubber too long and as a result he pitches uphill and somewhat cut shorts his finish.

With all that said, Chatwood's arm is extremely fast and he's also an excellent athlete, which should help him make any necessary adjustments as well as repeat his delivery on a more consistent basis. Chatwood has already made mechanical adjustments after Tommy John Surgery as a sophomore in high school though the fact that he has already had that surgery is somewhat concerning.

Chatwood is certainly raw and his mechanics need to be refined, but his upside grades out to a No. 3 starter. However, he's young enough where the development of his change-up and the improvement of his command could push his upside to a No. 2 starter.

78. Jacob Jeffries | C | Tampa Bay Rays

Jefferies possesses a very short stroke with a minimal loading of the hands, which leads to high contact rates, but questionable power production.

Jefferies can get very pushy with his swing where it looks as if he pushes his hands out to the ball. Making matters worse, Jefferies looks to be working on this during his batting practice. Jefferies has a quick bat and keeps the bat head in the hitting zone for a very long time leading to a high contact rate, but it comes at the expense of a higher power output.

Tampa needs to work with him on letting the hands and hips turn together instead of pushing the hands out in front of the hip rotation. His swing is short enough to add a little length if needed. Jefferies could also increase his power output by continuing to fill out his frame.

Luckily for Jefferies, as a catcher, his bat will have much less pressure on it to succeed. He's more athletic than your typical catcher, but his arm is considered pretty fringy.

Jefferies lived up to expectations by producing a high contact rate to go along with a solid batting average and pretty good batting eye in his first year as a professional. However, he didn't show much power even though he did show some aptitude for hitting doubles.

Should he remain at catcher, Jefferies has a chance to become an average offensive minded catcher at the big league level. Should he have to move off the position, Jefferies' value takes a steep decline.

84. Zach Stewart | RHP | Cincinnati Reds

As opposed to the first round, the third round is a much more optimal place to be drafting a high-level reliever. In Stewart, the Reds are getting a pitcher with two potentially plus pitches, good control, and the ability to miss bats and generate ground balls. Overall, Stewart doesn't have too many glaring weaknesses.

Fastball - ranges from 91-95 mph and has both vertical and horizontal movement. The pitch has some heavy sink to generate plenty of ground balls, but also tails away from lefties and into right-handed hitters. The pitch profiles as above average, flashing plus at times.

Slider - a tight spinning, hard breaking pitch coming in the low 80's complements his fastball very well. The pitch can lose some of its tightness at times and turn into a slurvy-type pitch, but when he's on, the pitch can be very difficult to hit. Below is Stewart's fastball (left) at 93 mph, while his slider (right) is a little more slurvy, but still effective nonetheless:

Stewart has good command of both pitches as he can throw both pitches for strikes. His control is not perfect, however. There will be times he can lose the strike zone so he must do a better job of consistently throwing strikes.

Stewart comes to a compact, athletic position, which I like. His elbow gets a little high, but that doesn't concern me too much. You can see he generates very good separation between his torso and hips, helping him generate his plus velocity. The lower body is facing toward home plate, the numbers on the back of his jersey are pointing in the first-base direction.

One thing he does very well is maintain a firm glove out in front of his chest to prevent himself from flying open. His athletic/compact delivery, as I mentioned in my profile on Craig Kimbrel, helps Stewart coordinate all the moving parts of his body.

Stewart should move quickly through the Reds' minor league system and once he arrives to the big league level, he'll be a perfect fit in the homer-friendly Great American Ball Park, both because of his ability to miss bats and keep the ball on the ground.

210. Jordan Danks | CF | Chicago White Sox

Danks is long, lanky, athletic, and projectable. He's a plus runner, which serves him well both on the base paths and in center field, where his speed and long strides help him cover a ton of ground.

At the plate, Danks profiles best as a lead off hitter because of his excellent plate discipline. Talent evaluators saw a great deal of power potential in Danks coming out of high school, but it was slow to develop in college. His power production did increase his junior season at Texas, but still fell short of what some expected of him.

Danks claimed because he was batting at the top of the order for Texas, his approach changed from hitting for power to getting on base and focusing on contact over power. That could have an effect on his power, but there might be some issues with his swing that limits his power potential.

Danks has almost no leg kick or stride in his swing mechanics. He mostly relies on his ability to generate as much torque as possible between his hips and torso. However, Danks often plants his front foot in a very closed position that makes it difficult for Danks to create a truly efficient rotation of the hips.

He might be able to generate some more power by incorporating either a longer stride or widening his stance at the plate as long as the stride doesn't hinder his hip rotation. A longer stride or a wider stance would help Danks incorporate more of his lower body into his swing.

Danks possesses pretty good bat speed and did a much better job of letting the ball travel deep into his hitting zone during batting practice. In his game swings, Danks would have a tendency to get a little too far out in front.

When you look at Danks as a whole: the length, the projection, the speed, the defense, the plate discipline, the power potential, and the propensity to strike out--one player that comes to mind is Rockies center fielder Dexter Fowler. The difference is that Fowler has officially broken out and has turned potential power into actual power production. Fowler's overall swing looks better and he's a better runner, but much of the same tools possessed by Fowler are also possessed by Danks. However, even if Fowler didn't develop any power, he would still make for a pretty good ball player because of the others things he brings to the table, specifically his defense and patience at the plate. So while the hope is that Danks will at some point develop power, he doesn't necessarily need it to be good ball player at the professional level.

Again, I want to thank everybody that sent in requests and if you had a request that did not make it to these lists, I made sure to take down the player in hopes of eventually filing a profile on them, so keep an eye out for them in the future.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Alex Eisenberg 2008-10-23T05:28:15+00:00 Breaking Down the Draft: Some More Requests http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/breaking-down-the-draft-some-more-requests/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/breaking-down-the-draft-some-more-requests/#When:05:03:15

53. Seth Lintz | RHP | Milwaukee Brewers

There isn't a question that Seth Lintz struggled in his debut season, but I remain high on the 19-year-old pitcher for a number of reasons, which I'll get into soon, but first let's look at what problems Lintz needs to fix.

First, there are some inefficiencies in Lintz's delivery, which lead to two of his biggest weaknesses: fastball velocity and control.

1. He doesn't scapula load particularly well. There is a point in the delivery—when the elbow drops before rotating—where the shoulder blades should be "pinched" together. Power is then transmitted from the chest/torso to the shoulder. Since Lintz doesn't execute this pinching of the shoulder blades all that well, less power is transmitted from the chest/torso to the shoulder.

2. Lintz loses out some of the rotational forces generated by his hip/torso separation because his arm isn't in a position to come along for the ride. At the time Lintz's torso is uncoiled, his arm is still in the midst of reaching its loaded position.

3. Lintz has a tendency to fly open, which not only hurts his control but also lessens the amount of torque he can create. This torque is a product of Lintz's hip/torso separation.

Now, Lintz is fast to the plate, which is something I generally like. His tempo comes out to around 21 or 22 frames from the point in which his knee reaches its uppermost point until release. He also drifts through his balance point, which is a great way to build up momentum in one's delivery.

However, Lintz might be a little too fast as he isn't giving his arm enough time to get into a loaded position. One remedy for this could be getting Lintz to turn his hips a little more as he brings his lead leg up, which would give his leg a longer distance to travel before planting and allow him to build up more momentum as he heads into foot plant, thus creating more torque and giving his arm a little bit more time to get into the loaded position. What about lowering the hands? As Lintz strides forward, his hands are moving down toward his mid-section. If he eliminates that movement, he may be able to get his arm up into the loaded position a little sooner. However, Lintz would have to feel comfortable with any changes made to his mechanics.

With so many things to work on, why I am still high on Lintz?

I really think Lintz has great velocity potential; his frame has plenty of room to fill out, and he possesses enough athleticism to help make any necessary adjustments mechanically.

At present time, Lintz already possesses high quality stuff. His fastball has good life and boars into righties and tails away from lefties though its velocity only registers between 87 and 92. He also throws a tight, late breaking curve ball that looks much harder than it actually is. Below shows Lintz's curveball on the left and his fastball on the right:

Command is an issue with Lintz, and as I mentioned earlier, the problem is partly related to some inconsistent front-side mechanics. He doesn't pull his glove down to his hip, but he also doesn't keep the glove firm out in front of his chest. Instead, he curls it into his side and as a result, Lintz's front shoulder occasionally flies open.

The bottom line is that Lintz, while clearly a work in progress, has two potential plus pitches and a developing a change-up to go along with a projectable and athletic frame that will make it easier for Lintz to add velocity, adjust his mechanics, and repeat his delivery. I think Lintz's upside is ultimately pegged at around the level of a No. 3 starter, with a slight chance to become a solid No. 2 should everything just click.

96. Craig Kimbrel | RHP | Atlanta Braves

Very impressed with what I saw out of Kimbrell. First, he possesses an athletic and well-built frame.

The second thing I noticed is the compactness of his delivery. Everything is together throughout the wind-up and close to his body's core. It's much easier to coordinate all the moving parts in your delivery if everything is compact and together. Third, he's quick to the plate—no pauses or hesitation to his wind-up.

Kimbrel's best assets are his two plus pitches:

Fastball: comes in at 92-94 mph and can occasionally touch a bit higher. The pitch has both a tailing action and a natural sink which allows Kimbrel to generate both ground balls and miss bats.

Slider-late breaking and hard, the pitch is usually clocked in the mid-80s and comes in on a similar plane as his fastball. He needs to become more consistent with the pitch as there are times he'll leave it up in the zone. Below is Kimbrel's fastball on the left and his slider on the right:

Kimbrel can throw both pitches for strikes, though there are times his arm lags behind his body, which can throw off his command.

Kimbrel's stock took a hit due to his height. My philosophy: if you can throw, you can throw. It doesn't matter how tall you are, and no study has ever suggested that shorter pitchers have a higher injury rate than taller pitchers.

To compensate for his height, Kimbrel is able to generate tremendous arm speed. At foot plant, Kimbrel has yet to get his arm into a loaded position, but due to his excellent scapula load and the precise timing with which this load is done, Kimbrel's arm is accelerated forward with tremendous force and produce velocity that defies his size. Of course that very well may increase his risk of injury, but without that arm action, he probably doesn't throw with the same velocity.

One last thing about his mechanics: his finish is somewhat abrupt, so that is something he'll need to work on going forward.

Kimbrel's on-field performance matched the quality of his stuff. He started in the Appalachian League with Danville and ended in Single-A Myrtle Beach in the Carolina League. The numbers were filthy at each level:

Rookie, Danville: 17.2 IP, 13.5 BB%, 33.8 K%, .118 BABIP against, 67 GB%, 1 Extra Base Hit Against (double), 0.00 ERA
Single-A, Rome: 12.2 IP, 8.3 BB%, 54.2 K%, .353 BABIP against, 44 GB%, 0 Extra Base Hits Against, .71 ERA

Kimbrel also threw 3.2 innings at A+ Myrtle Beach and did not give up a run in his appearance there.

Kimbrel's value will be held down because he's a reliever, but he is on the fast track to the major leagues, having already torn through the lower minor league levels. His upside grades out to closer level.

174. Robert Grossman | CF | Pittsburgh Pirates

Grossman has a very quick bat—a short swing to go along with fast hands. My feeling is that he's a little too handsy in his swing. He's sort of flicks his wrists at the ball. He has a quick enough swing to add some length without it being much of a problem.

Grossman generally does a solid job of carrying his hips forward into foot plant, but he also has appears to have a problem of occasionally opening up too soon. He could stand to do a better job of getting his lower body more actively involved in his swing. He doesn't get any production out of the below at-bats, but each clip shows Grossman making a clean hack at the ball:

Do you see how Grossman's head jerks forward as he swings, especially on the right-hand side swing? This head movement makes it that much harder to track the ball from the pitcher's release point to when it reaches home plate. It is also a symptom of pushing the hands toward the ball rather than letting the ball travel deep into his hitting zone.

With all that said, my philosophy is to invest in quickness over bat speed because it is much harder for a player to quicken up their swing than it is for a player trying to create more bat speed. Grossman's swing is short enough where he can add a little length to the swing and still maintain a high contact rate.

As I mentioned earlier, Grossman should also be able to increase his power output by getting his lower body a little more actively involved and also by filling out his projectable frame.

Grossman is going to take a lot of coaching up, but the potential to be an average-above average regular in center field is there.

Next time out, I'll close this series out with four more requests: Zach Stewart (Reds), Jacob Jeffries (Rays), Jordan Danks (White Sox) and Tyler Chatwood (Angels).

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Alex Eisenberg 2008-10-15T05:03:15+00:00 Breaking down the draft: some requests http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/breaking-down-the-draft-some-requests/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/breaking-down-the-draft-some-requests/#When:05:04:15
I have broken down these requests into various segments rather than one big, long article. That allows a more concentrated focus on each player, and frankly, is easier on me. Today, we'll look at three players: Tim Melville, Kyle Russell and Xavier Avery.

50. Xavier Avery | CF | Baltimore Orioles

Avery wasn't drafted for his baseball skills or because he would move quickly through the minors. He was drafted because he is an excellent athlete with plenty of tools that his organization will try to mold into results.

The biggest problem I have with Avery—and picks like him—is that it isn't just his tools that will need to be molded into results. He has to learn how to recognize pitch types, develop adequate plate discipline, and notice pitcher tendencies, among other things. He also has to overhaul his swing to produce desired results.

Avery's swing mechanics are inconsistent. He opens his hips too soon and can let his swing get long and armsy, meaning he is relying mostly on his arms to generate bat speed. He displays these qualities in the clip below:

Other times, Avery will maintain a shorter swing. However, he'll also get too handsy, pushing his hands out in front to achieve "extension," which is helps neutralize a player's power. The hands and hips should be turning together on a firm front leg.

Avery does display good bat speed when he lets the ball travel deep into his hitting zone, but he doesn't do that often enough. Avery's initial appearance in the Gulf Coast League was a mixed bag. He started off dreadfully (.482 OPS in June), but bounced back with a .744 OPS in July and a .681 OPS in August. He hit for a .280 average, but displayed little power (.057 ISO) and more importantly, displayed little plate discipline or patience (1:5 BB:K ratio and a base-on-balls percentage of just 5). Avery did show a good feel on the base paths with 13 steals in 16 attempts.

Avery has a lot of development ahead and likely won't find himself on a major league roster for years. On the plus side, as a center fielder, Avery's bat doesn't have to be special for him to succeed.

93. Kyle Russell | LF | Los Angeles Dodgers

Russell's stock dropped a little after he failed to improve on his numbers from his sophomore season at Texas. Both the batting average and the power dropped off and his OPS went from 1.263 to 1.087. Russell ended up dropping to the third round of the draft.

The problem for Russell involves contact and there are two big reasons for this:

1. In last year's draft review article, Carlos Gomez pointed out the need to adjust Russell's swing plane to make sure the bat head stayed in the hitting zone for a longer period.

This is still a problem for Russell. Watch how little time his bat stays in the hitting zone—with his bat in the zone for as little time as it is, you can expect Russell to swing and miss an awful lot. His current swing plane is very much an uppercut. As you would expect, Russell hits a lot of fly balls (close to 70 percent of his batted balls for the Ogden Raptors of the Pioneer League were in the air), which will naturally lend itself to more home runs.

2. Russell also has a long swing. He's able to generate terrific bat speed, but it takes him longer to produce that bat speed. As a result, Russell has to start his swing a little earlier than normal, which gives him less time to judge the pitch's type and location.

Probelms notwithstanding, when Russell does make contact, the ball travels an awfully long way. He shifts his weight forward, plants firmly on his front leg and then rotates his hands and hips together as the ball travels deep into his hitting zone.

The biggest question with Russell is obviously whether he can make enough contact to hit at the major league level. You can alleviate some problems by adjusting the swing plane, which I think is a relatively easy adjustment. But can he shorten the swing, which is a much tougher thing to do? He needs to quicken his bat without losing much of the bat speed he is able to generate from his longer swing. Russell has passed his first test by dominating a league he was probably too old for. But the red flag remains: a 31.4 strikeout percentage. Russell had to use a .390 BABIP just to hit for a .274 batting average.

It only gets tougher from here, and he likely will have to make some sort of adjustment to make more contact.

115. Tim Melville | RHP | Kansas City Royals

You can see why scouts drool at his velocity potential. Melville has a very projectable frame and is said to throw anywhere from 90-95 mph, though I have not seen him reach 94 or 95 mph. He does this with a pretty slow tempo, which I add up to around 27 frames. His windup also looks smooth, and combined with the slow tempo, you can see why his fastball velocity looks harder than it really is.

Melville could add velocity if he sped up his delivery or at the very least increase his perceived velocity. One thing that may be limiting Melville's velocity is the way he plants his front foot. It lands in a closed position and as a result he is cutting his hip rotation short, which you can see below:

This not only is an issue with velocity, but also injury risk. Because the foot lands closed, Melville is forced to throw more across his body. He's also not maximizing the stretch between his hips and torso/shoulder, so he has to use more of his arm to generate velocity.

My advice would be to simply change the path his front leg takes as it strides into foot plant. He could do a couple of things:

1. Instead of bringing the leg around into foot plant, drop it in more of a direct line toward home plate. Aaron Crow, draft pick of the Washington Nationals and now pitcher with the Fort Wayne Cats of the Independent League because he didn't sign, does this very well. You can see it illustrated in the clip below:

This would require a change in how Melville initiates his hip rotation and builds momentum before planting. Rather than using what I call his "kick out" move, he instead uses a step-over move to increase the stride length and pick up an extra dose of momentum just before planting his front foot. Kicking out or following a straight path both trigger similar results, but I think the straight path makes it easier to plant the foot in a more open position.

Melville may be more comfortable kicking out, but he kicks out fairly softly. He might want to kick out more aggressively, which would help make his hip rotation more forceful. Accompanying any changes in stride would be the need to adjust other areas of a pitcher's mechanics to correct for any timing differences in the delivery. Any adjustments made to Melville need to be done in a way where it feels natural and comfortable for him.

Lastly: Melville's arm. I'm sure many of you noticed his elbow going above the shoulder during his delivery. Brett Marshall, a player I profiled recently, had a similar arm action and here is what I said about it:

One reason the injury risk rises is that it can delay the external rotation, which occurs when the forearm appears "lay back" as the arm is rotating into release. The elbow goes above the shoulder, but drops back down just as the front shoulder begins to open. In an effort to keep up with the opening of his front shoulder, Marshall's rotation is faster, more forceful. This is good for velocity, but perhaps more stressful on the shoulder because again, more force is being applied to the shoulder.

That's just a theory. Until we get actual research and evidence of its effects, all we are dealing with is speculation.

Don't get confused, however. The general feeling is that the more velocity you throw with, the more stress you put on the arm. Since the "M" type arm action speeds up the arm and can increase velocity, we also have to assume that more stress is placed on the arm.

The bottom line on Melville is that he is a projectable pitcher with an above-average fastball with the potential to be plus, an inconsistent but plus-flashing curve ball, and a still-developing change-up. Combining these qualities with his good command and a strong makeup, Melville is a high school pitcher who could rise quickly. His upside is somewhere around a solid No. 2 starter.

Next time, we'll look at Seth Lintz (Brewers), Craig Kimbrel (Braves) and Robert Grossman (Pirates).

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Alex Eisenberg 2008-10-03T05:04:15+00:00