The Hardball Times -- Brian Cartwright

Five questions: Pittsburgh Pirates

Brian Cartwright — 2012-03-16T08:31:15+00:00

Last summer offered Pirates fans their first taste since 1997 of an extended winning period, and some degree of pennant fever. In the end, the Pirates suffered the ignominy of a professional record 20th consecutive losing season.

Given this taste of winning, most fans are in no mood for punting another season in a bid to restructure the roster. Realists concede 2012 might still be too early to expect a winning team, but are looking to see sustained progress toward being a contending team.

The biggest of the Pirates' long term questions was answered last week when the team's best player, center fielder Andrew McCutchen, was signed to a six-year contract extension for $51 million, with an option for a seventh year, which buys out two to three years of free agency. Despite a low 2011 batting average brought on by a second half slump, McCutchen's solid on-base skills, increasing power and solid defense created a five-win season, second at his position in the National League to Matt Kemp.

Having suffered the losing streak, the Pirates have consistently selected among the top 10 in the amateur draft. The current administration of general manager Neil Huntington used a strategy of spending freely on these high draft picks to stock a farm system when it was deemed the Pirates could not compete for major league free agent talent. With the new collective bargaining agreement in place, that strategy may no longer be possible—even though the Pirates will select eighth in the coming draft, their allocated budget is only one third of what the team spent in each of the two previous drafts.

Therefore, the team may not be able to add more amateur talent in the mold of hitters Pedro Alvarez, Tony Sanchez, Alex Dickerson and Josh Bell and pitchers Gerrit Cole, Jaimeson Taillon, Stetson Allie and Luis Heredia, increasing the pressure to make a winning team with the players on hand.

To assist in my compilation of five questions for the Pirates, I asked my fellow readers of BucsDugout.com if they could give me their answers to questions I provided, and offer any additional questions of their own. By my selection and editing of their responses, this is less my opinion than sharing the thoughts of some of the most dedicated and knowledgeable Pirates fans.

How do the Pirates approach the revised draft rules?

The new draft budget caps have severely cut into the Pirates' ability to spend on draft picks and international amateur players. In each of the past two years, the team selected a hard-to-sign high school player with huge talent upside at the top of the second round (pitcher Stetson Allie and outfielder Josh Bell), then threw money at the teenagers until they decided to forgo college and sign.

Each of those years saw the Pirates spend about $17 million on their draft picks. Selecting eighth this year, they will have only a little over $5 million to spend. It will be impossible for them to go over slot to a college-bound player, or to be able to sign two top picks to sizable bonuses. For the draft class as a whole, I expect the bonus restrictions will cause more players to go to college instead of the minors straight from high school.

Which Pedro Alvarez shows up in 2012?

Most forecasts, including THT's, expect Alvarez to have a .240-.250 batting average with 25 to 30 home runs, but it could be just as likely he washes out as that he becomes a star. Even if he becomes the elite run producer that was hoped for when he was drafted, other young hitters such as right fielder Jose Tabata (who received a nine-year contract extension), second baseman Neil Walker and left fielder Alex Presley, all of whom the team has rewarded with starting roles, must step up above just league average performance.

Alvarez has the talent to be a top 10 third baseman, but to be a consistent winner the team must be able to put more than two top performers in the lineup. GM Huntington purchased some short term insurance for another Alvarez failure, acquiring Casey McGehee in a trade with Milwaukee, while outfielders Starling Marte and Robbie Grossman had breakout seasons in the minors last year. If Marte, a line drive hitter with a lack of plate discipline but developing power and stellar defense, continues to produce at Triple-A this year, and either Presley or Tabata falters, Marte would likely be up to take away one of their spots. Grossman, expected to open at Double-A, has a Nick Swisher skill set, in which he might produce a middling batting average while walking 100 times and knocking 20 to 25 home runs.

How about the pitching rotation?

Gerrit Cole and Jaimeson Taillon are expected to be heading the rotation in another year or two, with Erik Bedard and A.J. Burnett being place-holders until then. How about the rest? Will Charlie Morton continue to improve on his 2011 makeover, was Jeff Karstens' season a mirage, and can the Pirates get at least one starter out of Jeff Locke, Brad Lincoln, Kyle McPherson, Rudy Owens and Justin Wilson?

Morton, along with Oakland's Brandon McCarthy, attempted to remake himself the same way Roy Halladay did several years ago—using a power sinker to pound the strike zone and get as many grounders as possible. McCarthy regained his pinpoint control, while Morton struggled, especially early on, with keeping the movement in the strike zone.

Morton did drastically increase his ground ball rate while slashing his home run rate, becoming a reliable starter for the first time in his major league career. If he can throw strikes, I don't se any reason why he can't be an above-average starter for several years. Karstens is much more of a dice roll, a swing man who pitched to contact and only a year before had been left off the 40-man roster, but who suddenly had the batters hitting every ball right at someone, with virtually all of his long balls of the solo variety. Karstens has better control than Morton, but doesn't throw nearly as hard and doesn't keep the ball on the ground.

James McDonald is another young pitcher who has found some measure of success in a year and a half with the team, but appears to be at best a third starter. Besides the five pitchers mentioned who have spent time with the Pirates or in Triple-A, there are even more further down in the minors who were drafted as high school picks in lower rounds - Nick Kingham, Colton Cain, Zack Dodson, Zack Von Rosenberg and Clay Holmes all rank among the Pirates' top 20 prospects, as do high-profile signees Stetson Allie and Luis Heredia.

Allie could end up a reliever, but that still leaves 11 quality prospects to fill two or three rotation spots over the next four to five years. The starting rotation does look like a very bright spot in the organization, something that has not been able to be said for over 20 years.

Can the new shortstop and catcher stabilize the lineup and contribute?

Clint Barmes and Rod Barajas were relatively cheap veteran free agents who were brought into fill the spots vacated by free agents Ronny Cedeno at short and Ryan Doumit and Chris Snyder behind the plate. Both are place-holders, no better than those they replaced, well into their 30s with low ceilings and high risks of failure. Whereas McGehee was brought in to back up Alvarez in the case Alvarez continued to struggle, Barmes and Barajas might be the best the Pirates have at those two positions.

If Barmes works his way out of the lineup, next in line is Jordy Mercer, who reached Triple-A last year and led the system in home runs, although his total was only 19. Mercer actually possesses almost exactly the skill set that Barmes does—low batting average, few walks, some power with good defense. Barmes is making $10 million over two years while Mercer would make the minimum, but Barmes is the veteran and much more of a known quantity.

The Pirates' top catching prospects behind Barajas are the 2009 first-round selection Tony Sanchez, who suffered offensively and defensively last year after doing well his first two seasons, and Eric Fryer, a former minor league batting champion with questionable defense. Sanchez will need a bounce-back season for the Pirates to regain confidence in his prospect status.

Really? No one has asked... is this the year the Pirates finally win 82+?

There is a fair chance. When I joined the Hardball Times Forecasts' internal depth charts (where our stringers, who are experts on each team, make their predictions of individual playing time) with the player projections, the Pirates team forecast was -30 runs for batting, -10 for defense and -50 for pitching, leading to a Pythagorean projection of 71-91, tied with the Cubs for fourth in the division, ahead of the Astros. I'll say .500 comes maybe in 2013, likely 2014, once the Pirates have a full season of Cole and Taillon in the rotation.

The entire thread at BucsDugout can be read here

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A better ERA projection

Brian Cartwright — 2012-03-11T20:17:15+00:00

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Rotovalue tests 2011 batting projections

Brian Cartwright — 2012-02-20T05:46:15+00:00

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Park factor fix for Forecasts

Brian Cartwright — 2012-02-19T05:54:15+00:00

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Why Oliver Loves Yu

Brian Cartwright — 2012-02-01T09:34:15+00:00

WAR  ERA WHIP  W  L  IP   H HR  BB  SO HR/9 BB/9 SO/9
6.2 2.57 0.97 16  4 185 138  8  41 198  0.4  2.0  9.6

It looks like Yu broke Oliver. That's Yu Darvish; Oliver is the engine of The Hardball Times Forecasts. It's not the first time it's happened, but when a player so dominates his non-major league competition that that his derived major league true talent exceeds generally accepted norms, it offers an opportunity to examine the system and make some changes for the better.

Darvish's performance against batters in Nippon Professional Baseball, the world's second best professional league, is indeed mind-boggling: consistently low hits, home runs and walks, with more than a strikeout an inning.

Patrick Newman of npbtracker shows pitch type, velocity and usage rate for pitchers in that league. This past year, Darvish's fastball sat at 94 to 95 mph, with a slider in the low 80s, and a high 80s change-up. He also mixes in a low 90s cut fastball, forkball, shuuto and slow curve.

Newman also pointed me to Pro Yakyu Nuru Data Okijyo from which I was able to get Darvish's ground ball rates.

Year Age  ERA  W  L  IP   H HR  BB  SO   GB%
2007  20 1.82 15  5 208 123  9  49 210  59.9
2008  21 1.88 16  4 201 136 11  44 208  57.8
2009  22 1.73 15  5 182 118  9  45 167  59.2
2010  23 1.78 12  8 202 158  5  47 222  57.4
2011  24 1.44 18  6 232 156  5  36 276  60.0

Still the question remains, how accurately can that performance be projected into a major league equivalent? The standard process is to find as many players as possible who have played in both leagues, comparing their performance, as a group, in both situations.

If, for example, starting pitchers might translate differently from relievers, players can be divided into different groups that better fit their role and profile, but at the risk of having the comparisons based on smaller, and thus less reliable, sample sizes.

Oliver's Japanese translations are based on the performances of 260 pitchers who have performed on both sides of the Pacific from 1998 to 2011. Of these, 185 have been North American players who have gone to Japan, with 75 Japanese pitchers coming here, but only 28 of those 75 appearing in the major leagues. Since 1998, only five pitchers who were starters in Japan were given starting roles in the majors.

Oliver is rule based. Given a supply of play by play and seasonal data, I write code that describes how different parts of the data relate to one another. If I believe Darvish's translations are too strong, adjusting the code will also affect every other Japanese pitcher. Changes must be made in a way that balances the performances of all in the group. There did appear to be differences in whether the pitcher started his career in North America or Japan, and whether he was a starter or a reliever. After adjustments were made, Darvish's projection hardly budged.

With a projected 2.57 ERA, give or take a few tenths, Oliver is putting Darvish ahead of every current major league starting pitcher. The Texas Rangers were willing to commit $111 million dollars over the next six years to procure his services, but can he realistically be expected to out-perform this projected list of 2012's top 15 starting pitchers?

 ERA Name
2.75 Clayton Kershaw
2.79 Stephen Strasburg
2.88 Justin Verlander
2.97 Roy Halladay
3.05 Cliff Lee
3.05 Josh Johnson
3.15 Matt Cain
3.16 Jered Weaver
3.17 Felix Hernandez
3.25 Ian Kennedy
3.25 Mat Latos
3.25 Adam Wainwright
3.26 Cole Hamels
3.28 Tim Lincecum
3.33 Michael Pineda

Let's look at how Oliver's past projections for Japanese starting pitchers compare to their actual performances. I will note that the major league performance is a weighted mean of the player's first three seasons in the majors, with the first season weighted at 1.0, the second 0.7 and the third 0.5. This is the reverse ordering of how past seasons are used to generate the projections. No minor league data are included. Also, the projected ERA is based on the expected wOBA allowed, while the major league ERA is the actual, and not park adjusted.

Kei Igawa              Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1788 3.89 0.297 0.046 0.072 0.218
MLB 1st 3 years         330 6.54 0.317 0.064 0.109 0.161

Igawa was signed by the Yankees in 2007 and was expected to provide an above-average numbers of strikeouts, although accompanied by a few extra home runs. Maybe the pressure of working for George Steinbrenner was too much; Igawa allowed far too many walks and long balls and lasted only 12 starts that year and one the next before returning to Japan.

Kaz Ishii              Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1547 3.96 0.284 0.048 0.119 0.246
MLB 1st 3 years        1525 4.25 0.279 0.042 0.144 0.191

Ishii signed with the Dodgers in 2002, spending three years in their rotation. After one more with the Mets, he also returned to Japan. Wild in Japan, he walked even more here and also underperformed his projected strikeout rate, although the ERA projection was fairly close.

Kenshin Kawakami       Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1381 3.50 0.284 0.044 0.046 0.205
MLB 1st 3 years         943 4.22 0.295 0.032 0.071 0.157

Kawakami joined the Braves in 2009 and had a respectable 3.86 ERA, but suffered through a 1-10, 5.15 year in 2010, then spent the entire 2011 season in the minors. He walked more and struck out fewer than projected (I'm beginning to notice a pattern).

Hiroki Kuroda          Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1685 3.54 0.278 0.037 0.048 0.167
MLB 1st 3 Years        1520 3.65 0.283 0.025 0.045 0.170

Kuroda delivered four quality season from 2008 to 2011 for the Dodgers, almost exactly matching his projection, and just signed a 1 year, $10 million deal with the Yankees.

Daisuke Matsuzaka      Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1630 2.77 0.273 0.030 0.061 0.245
MLB 1st 3 years        1517 4.01 0.295 0.039 0.105 0.221

The Japanese import everyone loves to hate, Matsuzaka did have two solid seasons, in 2007 and 2008, for the Red Sox, but injuries have kept him sidelined and/or ineffective for the past three years. Showing fine control his last two years in Japan, he's issued an above-average numbers of walks in the majors.

Hideki Irabu           Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1658 3.19 0.281 0.028 0.100 0.258
MLB 1st 3 years        1125 4.94 0.283 0.058 0.085 0.187

Hideo Nomo             Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1707 4.40 0.291 0.040 0.157 0.243
MLB 1st 3 years        1884 3.16 0.269 0.035 0.094 0.275

Colby Lewis            Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1479 3.26 0.302 0.034 0.039 0.230
MLB 1st 3 years        1431 4.03 0.273 0.046 0.072 0.220

I looked at three more pitchers - Hideo Nomo and Hideki Irabu from the 1990s, and Colby Lewis, who after never experiencing any success in the majors spent 2008 and 2009 in Japan before returning the past two years with the Rangers.

Irabu issued fewer walks but also fewer strikeouts than expected, and couldn't avoid the long ball. Nomo was very wild in Japan but pitched much better than expected in the major leagues. Lewis' strikeout rates were as expected, but his walks jumped up.

Hisanori Takahashi     Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1355 4.27 0.292 0.047 0.066 0.175
MLB 1st 3 Years         713 3.60 0.294 0.037 0.068 0.215

Ken Takahashi          Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection              940 5.28 0.293 0.052 0.088 0.133
MLB 1st 3 Years         116 2.96 0.280 0.026 0.113 0.200

Koji Uehara            Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection              872 3.65 0.290 0.050 0.037 0.201
MLB 1st 3 years         522 3.34 0.282 0.043 0.036 0.248

Keiichi Yabu           Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1030 4.30 0.284 0.041 0.076 0.149
MLB 1st 3 years         262 4.50 0.330 0.033 0.089 0.170

These last four were all primarily starting pitchers in Japan, but did most or all of their major league pitching out of the bullpen. All showed better-than-expected strikeout rates, with Uehara almost doubling his rate after the Orioles removed him from the rotation.

It is known that on average pitchers perform better out of the bullpen. Tango calls it his rule of 15: Home runs and walks down 15 percent, strikeouts up 15 percent. I believe I can improve the Japanese translation factors by adjusting the stats as starters and relievers to the same baseline before compiling sets of matched pairs. Where I have play-by-play data from Gameday I am able to tabulate how each pitcher has performed as a starter and as a reliever, which then needs to be regressed to the standard splits. However, the available seasonal level stats from Japan do not offer this breakdown. The number of innings pitched as a starter and reliever can be estimated, but the Japanese leagues have not published games started for the past three seasons.

The records for the eight starting pitchers above suggest that the translation factors currently being used by Oliver are too generous: As a group, the observed major league performances of the eight compared to their projections were 0.99 for base hits (BABIP), 1.11 for home runs, 1.24 for walks and 0.91 for strikeouts. But, how much more should we trust the record of eight starting pitchers in the majors compared to the 75 Japanese pitchers who have pitched in the minors and majors over the past 13 seasons? How much different should we expect them to be from the 185 pitchers who have left here for Japan?

Yu Darvish             Size  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
Projection             1799 2.57 0.280 0.019 0.058 0.272
Adjusted                         0.278 0.021 0.071 0.248

The first line is Darvish's current Oliver projection, while the second shows the rate stats adjusted for those eight starters (still very good).

These are Darvish's top comparables using his current projection—a higher ERA than 2.57, but the top five still puts him right at the top with Kershaw and Strasburg, while a larger sample of comps still rates high enough to rank him fifth of sixth in the major leagues.

Rank Name              Season  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
  1  Martinez, Pedro     2004 2.55 0.288 0.020 0.056 0.285
  2  Verlander, Justin   2012 2.87 0.281 0.033 0.064 0.263
  3  Johnson, Randy      2005 2.96 0.290 0.034 0.054 0.272
  4  Santana, Johan      2007 2.78 0.274 0.039 0.056 0.269
  5  Kershaw, Clayton    2012 2.75 0.284 0.024 0.078 0.274
  6  Prior, Mark         2003 3.19 0.302 0.032 0.073 0.278
  7  Schmidt, Jason      2004 2.97 0.283 0.028 0.074 0.247
  8  Peavy, Jake         2008 3.47 0.304 0.034 0.063 0.254
  9  Greinke, Zack       2010 3.20 0.307 0.029 0.058 0.253
 10  Lincecum, Tim       2012 3.27 0.300 0.030 0.084 0.268
 11  Schilling, Curt     2005 3.02 0.292 0.039 0.042 0.248
 12  Matsuzaka, Daisuke  2008 3.29 0.283 0.038 0.072 0.243
 13  Hamels, Cole        2008 3.52 0.290 0.043 0.070 0.246
 14  Bedard, Erik        2008 3.39 0.303 0.031 0.079 0.250

                        Top 5 2.78 0.283 0.030 0.062 0.273
                       Top 10 3.00 0.291 0.030 0.066 0.266
                          All 3.09 0.292 0.033 0.066 0.261

Now using the adjusted projection. The composite ERA of the top five comps again puts Darvish fifth or sixth, while the larger list drops him closer to 15th.

Rank Name              Season  ERA   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
  1  Schmidt, Jason      2004 2.97 0.283 0.028 0.074 0.247
  2  Martinez, Pedro     2006 3.01 0.281 0.032 0.059 0.243
  3  Matsuzaka, Daisuke  2008 3.29 0.283 0.038 0.072 0.243
  4  Verlander, Justin   2012 2.87 0.281 0.033 0.064 0.263
  5  Latos, Mat          2012 3.25 0.290 0.032 0.069 0.234
  6  Hanson, Tommy       2012 3.43 0.285 0.036 0.072 0.233
  7  Peavy, Jake         2010 3.40 0.298 0.034 0.076 0.243
  8  Lester, Jon         2011 3.34 0.298 0.029 0.083 0.241
  9  Hamels, Cole        2008 3.52 0.290 0.043 0.070 0.246
 10  Kennedy, Ian        2012 3.24 0.277 0.036 0.071 0.226
 11  Jimenez, Ubaldo     2012 3.49 0.295 0.024 0.091 0.240
 12  Scherzer, Max       2011 3.59 0.296 0.038 0.084 0.249
 13  Kershaw, Clayton    2012 2.75 0.284 0.024 0.078 0.274
 14  Bedard, Erik        2009 3.57 0.296 0.036 0.083 0.237
 15  Beckett, Josh       2005 3.50 0.303 0.031 0.077 0.238
 16  Santana, Johan      2009 3.37 0.286 0.043 0.059 0.235

                        Top 5 3.08 0.284 0.032 0.068 0.246
                       Top 10 3.23 0.287 0.034 0.071 0.242
                          All 3.29 0.289 0.033 0.074 0.243

For the final set of comparable projections, I used a defense independent approach, using only groundball, walk and strikeout rate. Assuming that major league baseball has a slightly lower rate of ground balls than the Nippon league, I found Darvish's top comps using a ground ball rate of 0.55, a walk rate of 0.071, and a strikeout rate of 0.248. There's no difference between the different sized groups, each with a composite ERA out of major league baseball's top 15, but much of the ERA difference between this and the previous sets of comps is in the home run rate, almost 50 percent higher here than in Oliver's projection.

Rank Name              Season  ERA  GB%   BH%   HR%   BB%   SO%
  1  Liriano, Francisco  2007 3.58 0.53	0.304 0.037 0.087 0.254
  2  Hernandez, Felix    2011 3.16 0.54	0.287 0.026 0.071 0.219
  3  Burnett, A.J.       2008 3.81 0.55	0.295 0.037 0.082 0.217
  4  Jimenez, Ubaldo     2011 3.18 0.52	0.284 0.020 0.097 0.240
  5  Lester, Jon         2011 3.34 0.51	0.298 0.029 0.083 0.241
  6  Wainwright, Adam    2011 3.12 0.51	0.295 0.028 0.061 0.226
  7  Garcia, Jaime       2012 3.64 0.54	0.310 0.027 0.069 0.201
  8  Carpenter, Chris    2006 3.27 0.54	0.292 0.031 0.052 0.205
  9  Zambrano, Carlos    2006 3.23 0.51	0.276 0.023 0.088 0.215
 10  Chacin, Jhoulys     2012 3.61 0.52	0.271 0.033 0.105 0.213
 11  Halladay, Roy       2012 2.96 0.52	0.305 0.024 0.034 0.216
 12  Wilson, C.J.        2012 3.47 0.51	0.290 0.024 0.089 0.212
								
                        Top 5 3.41 0.53 0.294 0.030 0.084 0.234
                       Top 10 3.39 0.53	0.291 0.029 0.079 0.223
                          All 3.36 0.53	0.292 0.028 0.076 0.221

Yu Darvish is clearly a very talented pitcher, enough that the Texas Rangers were willing to put $51 million down and $60 million over the next six years to have him in their starting rotation. Just how well his future major league performances can be projected is a work of art, with different available methods where even small changes in estimated base hits allowed can vary the ERA estimate by a few tenths. Oliver has had a good record so far, such as with Stephen Strasburg and Ian Kennedy. However, players have some amount of natural variance each year as well as changes in their true talent.

Examining several sets of comparable pitchers shows an expected ERA for Darvish anywhere from 2.78 to 3.40, which is from excellent down to merely very good, but no recent major league pitchers have the combination of Darvish's expected home runs, walks and strikeouts. Looking at those comparables and Darvish’s pitch metrics give me a personal opinion: I would compare him to Felix Hernandez with more strikeouts or Ubaldo Jimenez with fewer walks.

Meanwhile, as these customized estimates all gave a higher ERA projection than Oliver, I’ll retreat to my office, where first things on the drawing board are incorporating ground ball rates to give regression means for base hit and home run rates, and separately consider pitching as a starter and reliever.

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What’s the effect of the new college bats?

Brian Cartwright — 2011-09-16T06:44:15+00:00

In 2011, in an effort to have non-wood baseball bats perform more closely to wood bats, the NCAA mandated that those bats conform to a BBCOR (coefficient of restitution) rating of 0.50, replacing the previous BESR (ball exit speed ratio) method, which estimated the batted ball speed. The National Federation of High Schools (NFHS) will require compliance with NCAA standards in 2012, although some states instituted the change this year.

According to the NFHS, “the new standard ensures that performances by non-wood bats are more comparable to those of wood bats. It’s also expected to minimize risk, improve play and increase teaching opportunities”.

I'm the developer of the Hardball Times Forecasts, which include college batting and pitching statistics as part of the player analysis. The change in the bat standard created a discontinuity in the statistics which would prevent me from using data from before and after the change until I was able to quantify to differences in the two sets of data.

Dr. Alan Nathan was a member of the NCAA Baseball Research Panel, a group of scientists who provide advice to the NCAA on issues regarding bat performance. He had written an article at Baseball Analysts in January 2010 which described how the BESR and BBCOR measurements work. He explained to me:

"By spring 2008, the BESR standard had been in place for some seven-eight years, and I was looking for a way to improve on that performance metric. It had been known for some time that there is not a direct correlation between the BESR of a bat, as measured in the laboratory, and performance on the field. The latter is defined by batted ball speed (BBS). That is, two bats with identical BESR values would not necessarily have the same BBS.

"So, I was looking for a way to improve that situation. Armed with lots of data on bats that had been tested up to that time, I did lots of data analysis and calculations. The net outcome of all that effort was that I was able to show that for NCAA-type bats (which have a fairly narrow range of lengths and weights), BBCOR provided a direct correlation with BBS. By that I mean, if bat A has a higher BBCOR than bat B, then bat A will have a higher BBS than bat B. Having found the metric that I was looking for, I proposed it to the rest of the panel. The full panel saw merit in it and we agreed to recommend it to the NCAA. By later that summer, the NCAA Rules Committee agreed to adopt it."

Dr. Nathan told me that lowering the bat's BBCOR to 0.50 would reduce the batted ball speed by about 5 percent, which would be 5 mph for a typical hard hit ball, which would reduce the distance of a long fly ball by 25 to 30 feet. This was expected to reduce home runs by up to 60 percent, and a quick and dirty check of home runs per game at the end of the 2011 seasons showed an approximately 50 percent reduction.

With a lower batted ball speed, other offensive statistics could be expected to change as well. The problem this posed for me, the data analyst, was how to mix statistics from 2010 and before with 2011 and later when projecting player performance.

To measure and account for the difference in performance of the bats, I generated next-season projections for all the batters in my college database, which is mostly Division I schools from 2002 until 2011. I used the same projection methodology as in the weekly THT Forecasts, except that only college data were input.

One complication was that the projections require a birth date, which is normally not a problem as I project the players only after they turn pro. But to conduct this study, I needed as many additional birth dates as possible for players who had not played past college. Some schools publish players' birth dates on their roster pages, but others don't. After much digging I had birth dates for about 12,000 of the 40,000 players in my batting table.

After the projections for seasons up to 2010 were best fit with the actual performance in the projected seasons, those adjustments were made to the 2011 projections and then compared to the actual 2011 stats. Those results were gathered into matched pairs of projected and observed totals for each player, scaled to the smaller of the plate appearances.

I had a total of 1,977 players with 2011 projections who subsequently played in that year. The following table shows the ratio of observed to projected totals in all the batting categories, at various minimum sizes of weighted plate appearances.

size players     PA    BH   XBH    TR    HR    HP    BB    SO    SH    SF   GDP 
  0   1,977 268,128 0.939 0.931 1.048 0.567 0.945 1.008 1.040 1.115 0.872 1.178 
100   1,410 247,545 0.938 0.930 1.042 0.567 0.938 1.016 1.043 1.088 0.886 1.200 
 200     966 195,796 0.937 0.931 1.057 0.563 0.925 1.022 1.047 1.046 0.889 1.208 
 300     540 117,458 0.944 0.920 1.010 0.575 0.927 1.024 1.035 1.010 0.897 1.229 
 400     296  67,676 0.942 0.911 1.002 0.586 0.918 1.026 1.037 0.974 0.943 1.212 
 500     109  26,341 0.951 0.920 0.932 0.566 0.930 1.006 1.033 0.921 0.817 1.107 
 600      20   4,930 0.927 0.855 0.825 0.492 0.905 1.027 1.020 0.869 0.842 1.125

Indeed, when measured on a player-by-player basis, home runs were down 43 percent. Base hits per balls in play as well as extra base hits (doubles and triples) per base hit were down, while triples per extra base hits were up. I'd guess that outfielders might be playing closer, allowing fewer balls to fall in, but when a ball did get by an outfielder, it was more likely to go for three bases. The only stat which varied by sample size was sacrifice hits. Players with smaller sample sizes (bench players or those with little experience) bunted progressively more often as the sample size decreased.

I now multiply both batting and pitching stats from 2010 and before by these factors (at size = 250) to get a version normalized to the 2011 baseline, which can then be inserted into the same table with the 2011 (and later) stats for furthering processing. As I am now using a new baseline, the league factors used to create major league equivalencies (MLEs) have changed, but they can now be applied to data from all seasons.

My measurement of a home run rate reduced by 43 percent is not as much as the 60 percent that was anticipated from the theoretical model of bat performance, but it is still a significant reduction which likely meets the goals of returning amateur baseball to the offensive levels seen with wood bats. A legitimate question would be, "Why not just use wood bats?" as the new BBCOR bats cost more than $400 each. Prominent collegiate leagues and the All American Amateur Baseball Association have mandated wood in recent years, but even with the large cost of each BBCOR bat, the rate at which wood bats break and need replacement keeps the long term cost of BBCOR bats lower than wood.

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Forecasts updated to reflect deadline trades

Brian Cartwright — 2011-08-02T03:44:15+00:00

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Oliver production notes

Brian Cartwright — 2011-07-26T04:16:15+00:00

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Quantifying Dustin Ackley

Brian Cartwright — 2011-06-03T08:20:15+00:00

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Five questions: Pittsburgh Pirates

Brian Cartwright — 2011-03-28T09:01:15+00:00

I've been a Pirates fan since 1970. It was a great time to be a kid who loved baseball—six division titles (plus three second-place finishes) and two world titles in the first 10 seasons. Willie Stargell and Roberto Clemente led to Dave Parker and John "The Candy Man" Candelaria

Still, there were the heart-stopping bleak moments, such as Bob Moose's wild pitch in the 1972 playoffs and the agony repeated 20 years later on Francisco Cabrera's pinch hit to left. Many people say they hate Barry Bonds, but I have to point out that the Pirates won their division each of Bonds' last three seasons in Pittsburgh—and haven't had a winning season since, allowing Rocco DeMaro to teach us the meaning of ignominy.

So here it is, the dawn of the 2011 season, and I have volunteered for the task of asking (and answering) five questions about my still-beloved team.

Are there any hitters left in the farm system?

After the promotions of Andrew McCutchen, Jose Tabata, Pedro Alvarez and Neil Walker gave the Pirates a solid, young core to build the lineup around, there's little left in the system. Only two position players, shortstop Brock Holt and catcher Tony Sanchez, both of whom played at High-A Bradenton (and both of whom suffered seasoning-ending injuries halfway through the season), project as major league-average performers at their positions, but at least those are two positions where the Pirates are currently in need of an upgrade.

Sanchez, 23, was the team's first-round pick in 2009 from Boston College and was considered a signability pick at the time, but he has put up good batting numbers in his two years in the minors. They don't translate quite as well, showing a .241/.309/.371 line for 2011, but that's almost average for major league catchers. In 125 pro games he has a 0 Fielding Runs Above Average, but that can be quite an improvement on Ryan Doumit behind the plate.

Holt, also 23 and drafted in 2009 out of Rice, projects to a .267/.314/.382 line and has had +10 fielding runs in 113 pro games. Not stunning, but better than Ronny Cedeno. Both expect to start the season at Double-A Altoona and could be with the Pirates some time in 2012.

How long until the pitching improves?

While the lineup has promise, the pitching staff is a mess. There are 10 pitchers in camp who started more than nine games in the majors last year, although only Paul Maholm (33) had more than 26 starts. Of those 10, only Maholm, Scott Olsen and Kevin Correia spent the whole of last season in the majors, and I don't expect the last two to survive the upcoming season with the team.

Oliver projects the top four starters to be fairly average—Jason McDonald (projected 4.42 ERA), Ross Ohlendorf (4.67), Maholm (4.68) and Charlie Morton (4.77)—and honestly, if they meet projections it will be a big boost over last year. After that, there's Olsen (4.88) who's likely to start the season in the bullpen, and then Correia, Jeff Karstens, Brad Lincoln, Brian Burres and Daniel McCutchen all projected to have ERAs in excess of 5.00.

As far as the farm system, Rudy Owens has put together two quality seasons, with Major League Equivalent ERAs of 4.11 and 3.51, and is expected to open the season in Triple-A. I expect him to be in Pittsburgh by the trading deadline, as his projected 4.16 ERA would lead the staff. Bryan Morris and Jeff Locke are also seen as prospects, but so far Oliver still projects them with ERAs above 5.00. Still, it might be better to see those guys at least by 2012 than the likes of Olsen and Correia.

On the bright side, in a span of four days last August, the Pirates signed what were arguably the three best teenage pitchers in North America. But with Jamieson Taillon and Stetson Allie both only 19 and Luis Heredia only 16 years old, it's likely to be two or three seasons before any of them reach Pittsburgh, barring, of course, any injuries, which seem to follow Pirates pitching prospects. I might have to add some West Virginia Power games to my traveling schedule this summer.

Is the defense really that bad, or is the pitching at least partially to blame?

DIPS theory, at its extreme, says that pitchers are responsible only for hit batsmen, walks, strikeouts and home runs. More realistically, pitchers are likely responsible for about 20 percent of hits on balls in play, but defense efficiency (DER) follows DIPS and assumes that all runners who reach by hit or error are on the defense. In the past five seasons, the Pirates have finished 29th, 27th, 28th, 14th and 30th out of 30 in DER as compiled by Baseball Prospectus.

However, I've observed that Andrew McCutchen, whom Oliver rated as +4 runs in center field in 2008-2009 and had a good defensive reputaton, was -4 for the Pirates in 2009-2010. Neil Walker was considered one of the best defensive third basemen in Triple-A, but had a -5 season with poor range in 2010 for the Pirates after switching to second base.

Pedro Alvarez had a poor defensive reputation, but College Splits had him at +11 plays in his last two years at Vanderbilt. Oliver then had Alvarez at +5 runs in 192 minor league games, but -5 in 80 games in Pittsburgh. Alvarez did show good range with the Pirates, but suffered from too many errors. Oliver gave Ronny Cedeno +7 runs with the Cubs and Mariners in 2008-2009, +8 runs in 92 winter league games over the past three seasons, but -5 in 185 games with the Pirates.

No one ever accused Garrett Jones of good defense, but Oliver says +4 runs in 180 Triple-A games, then -20 in 240 with the Pirates. The only player coming to the Pirates who showed improvement was Jose Tabata, +4 runs in the previous three seasons, then +3 in 102 games with the Pirates, and a vast improvement over Lasting Milledge's -25 runs in 171 games.

The absence of Zach Duke should help the defense, but with the exception of McDonald and Joel Hanrahan, Evan Meek and Chris Resop in the bullpen, the rest of the staff pitches to contact and has not shown a history of helping the defense.

Whom should the Pirates make the first overall pick in the 2011 draft?

One of the benefits of finishing with the worst record in the majors in 2010 is that the Pirates get to pick first in the 2011 draft. This is said to be a deep draft class, and the top two names being mentioned are Anthony Rendon, a third baseman at Rice, and Gerrit Cole, a pitcher at UCLA.

Rendon is said to have a good glove and hit 26 home runs as a freshman, 20 as a sophomore. What really catches my eye is his 31 walks and 23 strikeouts his freshman year, 65 BB and 22 Ks his sophomore. So far in 2011, with the new bats, Rendon has hit .348/.495/.600 in 19 games, with 19 walks and 10 strikeouts. When Oliver looks at those first two seasons, it projects a peak performance for Rendon of .280/.370/.510—fairly similar to what we've seen from Evan Longoria—and that he should require not more than a year, maybe less, to be ready for the majors.

Cole also has seen considerable playing time in college, starting 14 games as a freshman and 19 as a sophomore. Cole's fastball was reported at 95-97 his freshman year, up to 98 and touching 100 in 2010.

His strikeout rates were consistently good at 29.3 percent and 29.5 percent his first two years, but I was concerned about his walk rates of 10.7 percent and 10.0 percent. Through March 17 of this year, Cole has improved to five walks and 37 strikeouts in 31 innings, rates of 4.5 percent and 33.0 percent, respectively. If he can keep his walks down, Cole looks to be a No. 1 starter ready for the majors within a year.

Should Pedro Alvarez be moved to first base to improve the defense?

Quick answer: not until they have someone better to replace him at third. The THT Forecasts say he should be good for a .345 wOBA in 2011, with a .255/.327/.477 slash line. That's above average for a major league third baseman, where the mean wOBA is .329, and his projected 2.3 WAR is shown as 10th-best in the sortable batting list.

We'll assume Alvarez's offense will be the same whether he plays third or first, but the problem is that a player with that offense might be better than Lyle Overbay, but a .345 wOBA is nothing special at first base (ranking 21st), where the mean is .355. This method considers Alvarez's value relative to the whole of major league baseball, but at this point he is competing for playing time only with players already on the Pirates (although the team is free to pursue other players through trades and the draft).

How good would a new third baseman have to be to make the move of Alvarez worthwhile? You would need to compare the combined value of the players at first and third before and after the move.

At third base, where replacement-level wOBA is .299, Alvarez would contribute 625 PA*(.345-.299)/1.15, or 25 batting runs above replacement, -5 fielding runs, for a total of +20. At first, with a replacement level of .332, it's 625 PA*(.345-.332)/1.15, only +7 batting runs, and let's say -2 on defense, for a total of +5. Alvarez at third (+20) and a league average player at first (+12) combine for +32. We'd then need a new third baseman who's at least +27 to break even.

Overbay is projected for only a .339 wOBA as the Pirates first baseman, but is one of the best fielders at his position at +6 runs, so he comes in with a total +10 runs above replacement, only two runs below our mythical league-average Pirate. Either way, Alvarez's replacement would need to be at least +25 runs, or 2.5 WAR, and there are only eight third basemen projected to perform at least that level, nine if you include Anthony Rendon.

I could pose another question, "How long until the Pirates are contenders?" But I also have to provide the answers, and for that one I don't yet have an answer. But if Rocco has hope, then so should I.

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