The Hardball Times -- Jeffrey Gross http://www.hardballtimes.com/main Baseball. Insight. Daily. en studes@hardballtimes.com Copyright 2013 2013-05-17T08:57:15+00:00 Blind resume: starting pitcher http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/blind-resume-starting-pitcher/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/blind-resume-starting-pitcher/#When:11:04:15
That is not to say they are not immensely valuable. In fantasy, few players achieve, let alone achieve with regularity, the kind of production that Miguel Cabrera offers in 5x5 formats (and that is before you consider his third base eligibility). The extra few bucks you spend at an auction acquiring Cabrera above market rate have a better expected return rate than paying an extra few bucks to acquire a "lower tier" option such as Pablo Sandoval or even a next-tier guy like Evan Longoria. When you pay $45 and get $45 in production, you come out on top because, profit aside, so few players produce $50 worth of value.

The problem with marquee players arises not on the upside, but on the downside. If you spend market value on a top player who has a "down year," a real risk considering there are no guarantees in baseball (this is doubly true for pitchers), even if that down year is 75 percent his normal production, you are losing (or risking, in foresight terms) a lot of money that could have been better allocated elsewhere.

Players you draft are generally valuable because they are some degree better than "replacement level"—that is to say the best player available on the waiver wire in your league. The greater above the replacement level a player is, the more value he has. In some sense, this value can be looked at linearly. If say the replacement level RBI total is 60 in your league, then you can run a standard deviation analysis and calculate how much each additional RBI is worth.

However, this analysis can also be looked at exponentially. You have only a finite number of active roster spaces that can accrue stats for your team. The greater the production you can cram into a single player, the more value he has to your team. If you think of the value above replacement level a given set of players can offer, as you move further away from the replacement level, the pool of players to draw from shrinks.

That is one reason Miguel Cabrera is so valuable and often goes for above market. It is not just that he can put up $40-50 of value, but also that the "next best" third basemen, likely Adrian Beltre, is likely to produce $10 or so less in value. By spending a few extra bucks to cram additional production into your bottom line out of a single player, that gives you extra flexibility at the end of the draft and during the season. For this reason, players in the upper tiers have arguably "above market" value not reflected in their simple production-based dollar values.

The converse of this exponential view is also true. As a player deviates from his expectations and toward the replacement level in a down year, his value flattens. Those +20 RBI become +10, and all of a sudden you could have had that kind of production out of a much easier-to-replace/cheaper-to-purchase player plus additional dollars to allocate elsewhere.

Brand names, therefore, offer not only limited upside, but, if you buy into the exponential value or "uncaptured" value approach, they offer substantial downside—more so than good players in lower tiers who can be got at lower prices.

This is not to say, of course, that marquee players should be avoided. To the contrary, I practice the stars and scrubs approach to fantasy auctions. What it means is that marquee players need to be picked out with care. You should focus more on the downside than the upside when selecting a player and evaluating his value. Players like Cabrera, Robinson Cano and Prince Fielder end up atop my draft board in front of players like Mike Trout, Ryan Braun and Matt Kemp not because I think they are better players or even because I think they have comparable ceilings. Rather, I think the likelihood that my dollar investment in the former set of players is better maximized than my dollar value on the latter set of players. This is my personal risk assessment, as I lean toward calculated decision-making with small incremental victories as compared to the big win or big loss risk-taking approach.

In that vein, let's objectively look at a player who is traditionally ignored in fantasy formats but offers good value, a relatively high floor and no significant injury concern for his price.

This player, Player A, was ranked 320 overall by Yahoo in the preseason. In standard 12 team 5x5 leagues, he was thus deemed an undraftable player. Player A was the 156th most valuable player in fantasy last season. In the chart below, is Player A's 2012 fantasy season against the seasons of nine higher-ranked starting pitchers, none ranked outside the top 300. In fact, the second lowest rated player in the sample (Player C) is ranked nearly 50 spots ahead of Player A.

























































































































































































Name 2013 Y! ADP 2012 Y! Rank W ERA WHIP K/9 BB/9 GB% FIP xFIP SIERRA
Player A 320 156 13 3.67 1.22 6.7 2.5 51.2% 4.00 3.84 3.87
Player B 206 161 10 3.10 1.25 6.3 3.0 41.8% 4.60 4.44 4.44
Player C 273 35 16 2.86 1.09 6.1 1.6 40.5% 3.51 3.96 4.06
Player D 178 154 13 3.47 1.26 7.0 3.1 44.3% 3.43 3.95 4.14
Player E 218 205 13 3.78 1.29 7.0 3.3 61.2% 3.85 3.76 3.77
Player F 144 142 10 3.45 1.19 7.6 2.1 51.0% 3.42 3.39 3.43
Player G 213 259 11 4.03 1.25 7.0 2.6 58.8% 3.67 3.54 3.51
Player H 221 145 16 3.62 1.21 5.1 2.4 55.5% 3.78 4.10 4.14
Player I 241 483 11 4.56 1.33 6.1 3.0 47.6% 4.65 4.43 4.39
Player J 204 293 12 4.67 1.22 7.4 2.7 43.1% 4.75 4.14 3.96
10 Player Mean Stats 222 203 12.5 3.72 1.23 6.6 2.6 49.5% 3.97 3.96 3.97
Player A Rank 10th 5th T-3rd 6th 4th 6th 4th 4th 8th 4th 4th


Striving to find players of comparable value, I avoided players with a history of "elite" overall production. I did not want players like Dan Haren, even if 2012 was an aberration year, in the mix. Second, I tried to avoid players who clearly offered more value than Player A in a single category. I did not want to select a player slightly inferior to Player A or comparable to Player A in all aspect save for, for example, a substantially better strikeout rate. Third, I selected only players ranked higher inside the top 300 overall by Yahoo. There is clearly some personal bias in my selection process, but I believe that I found some good value comparables for the purpose of demonstrating that Player A is undervalued, even without the use of Z-Scores to confirm my selection.

Looking at the mix above, you will not find Player A clearly standing out in any category in comparison to the other nine players. He ranks third in wins, but his win total is only a half win greater than the sample average. On the flip side, you do not find this player lacking in any category in comparison to the other nine players. His WHIP, strikeout rate, walk rate, groundball rate, SIERRA and xFIP are all comfortably within the middle/middle-plus of the pack. Even in terms of the value that Player A provided in 2012, Player A is the sample median.

Player A is not an exciting or game-changing player. Few pitchers who strike out fewer than 7.0 batters per nine innings are. Player A is, however, the kind of key cog you hope can round out your pitching staff with quality innings so you don't have to micromanage and gamble on day-to-day match-ups and the waiver wire.

Of the 21 qualified pitchers who posted a ground ball rate of 50 percent or higher last season, nine had a higher strikeout rate than Player A. Only six had a strikeout rate greater than 7.0:Those six players are A.J. Burnett, David Price, James Shields, Adam Wainwright, Edinson Volquez and C.J. Wilson. Only Price, Shields and Wainwright had equal or better walk rates as Player A did last season.

So far this season, Player A has started two games and pitched 12.2 innings. He has won both outings, and and has a 13:4 strikeout to walk ratio. Player A started 210 games between 2006 and 2012 (an average of 30 per season). His average innings pitched over that span is 184 per season, and he has pitched under 175 innings pnly once (161.1 innings that season) since becoming a full-time major leaguer in 2006. While no 200+ inning work horse, Player A threw 1,291.1 innings between 2006 and 2012—16th highest overall among pitchers over that span. Player A is also not an apparent injury risk. The only time that Player A has been on the disabled list was for a shoulder sprain in the year he threw 161.1 innings.

Care to guess who Player A is? Let's reveal the 10 players listed in the above chart in reverse order

Player J is Derek Holland. Holland owns a career 4.69 ERA. Despite peripherals that indicate he is likely better a better pitcher than the results have shown to date, none of his FIP, xFIP, SIERRA or tERA check in below the 4.0 threshold (OK, his career xFIP is 3.99) in an era in which the average ERA is barely north of 4.0. Yahoo's preseason rankings valued Holland comparably to where he performed in 2012.

Player I is Clay Buchholz, who owns one elite fantasy campaign, one good half-season, one bad one, one average-at-best half-season, and a set of peripherals that do not match his minor league hype. Buchholz has a real nice curveball, but he still needs to work on his other pitches (and stay healthy) if he is ever going to be anything more than a spot starter with flashes of brilliance. Buchholz barley ranked in the top 500 among all fantasy players last season, but was ranked more than 75 spots ahead of Player A in Yahoo's preseason rankings. Buchholz, to this point in his career, is all name and without a reliable track record. At best, he is a medium reward, high risk player.

Player H is Tim Hudson, who is a much better real life pitcher than fantasy pitcher due to his chronically low strikeout rates and reliance on ground balls and a good defense. Hudson is actually a good comparable for Player A, albeit with a few more ground balls. Hudson's 2012 season was pretty similar to Player A's in terms of value provided. He was the 145th most valuable player overall in 2012, 11 spots ahead of Player A. Yet Hudson ranks 100 spots higher in Yahoo's preseason rankings. I would probably take Hudson over Player A—but it is a darn close call.

Player G is Alex Cobb, an interesting player to be ranked 100 spots ahead of Player A. Cobb's minor league numbers indicate that he has more strikeout upside (with good control), and his major groundball rate has been better than Player A's, albeit in under 200 innings pitched. Nonetheless, Cobb has no record of major league success, and ZiPS pegs him pretty close to Player A's expected output (albeit with a few more strikeouts). In terms of upside, I would rather have Cobb over Player A, but if filling out a roster for quality innings rather than upside risk plays, I would rather have Player A. Player A also pitches in the National League for a team with a good defense; Cobb pitches in the AL East.

Player F is Doug Fister, the only player in the list with substantially better control than Player A. Because he had a career minor league strikeout per nine rate of 6.7, I view Fister's post-Seattle strikeout rate skeptically. The lower a player's strikeout rate, the more he has to be better/reliable in other categories. I am not sure I want to bank on any wins of a Tigers pitcher who relies more on the defense behind him than his own skill in converting outs. I view Fister as a slightly better, post-renaissance Joel Pineiro. I am probably in the minority, but I would rather have Player A than Fister.

Player E is Trevor Cahill, who strikes me as another good value comp for Player A. While neither has huge strikeout potential, I think Cahill has better strikeout upside. My biggest knock is that his control is average at best. Cahill's career 55 percent groundball rate goes a long way toward erasing free passes via the infield double play, but Arizona's bandbox is not the most forgiving place to make mistakes. Furthermore, the Diamondbacks defense is likely no better than league average. Player A's team's offense and defense rank among the best in the league, and his home park is pretty neutral. While Cahill is arguably the better "skills" pitcher with youth on his side (he is 26, compared to Player A's age of 31), I think Player A will be more valuable than Cahill in 2013—just as he was in 2012.

Player D is Jarrod Parker, a young pitcher with a lot of promise and upside. Although Parker's rookie season strikeout per nine rate, just under 7.0, was nothing special, his lower-level minor league numbers indicate that he has a little whiff potential to grow into. Parker's upper minor seasons do not give much confidence in an elite strikeout rate, though 2009 and 2011 were bookend seasons to his Tommy John surgery. Parker exhibited good control in the minors, and has regained his control form now three seasons removed from surgery. Oakland is a great place to call your home park, and the A's have a pretty good defense. Parker's skills upside is greater than Player A's, and his "real life" situation (playing in Oakland ahead of a good defense) make him a solid young pitcher to own. Without a doubt, I would take Parker over Player A at the same cost, but I would not pay multifold over for Parker.

Player C is Kyle Lohse, who barely hooked on a with a team this offseason coming off back-to-back seasons that rank among the three best in his decade-plus long career. Lohse is probably the best comp to Player A based purely on his strikeouts and walks. Lohse is decidedly below average in strikeouts for his career (5.7 strikeouts per nine), but so is Player A, who owns a marginally better career rate. Both are stingy with walks. Lohse, however, is four year Player A's senior, and he plays in front of one of the worse defensive teams in the game. Furthermore, the Brewers bullpen is terrible. Lohse is a pretty neutral groundball/flyball pitcher, so Player A takes the edge there as well. I would not bet that either will be better than the other by the end of the season, but at the same price, I would rather have Player A. At a cheaper cost, Player A as the better choice is a no-brainer.

Player B, Jeremy Hellickson, has had a pretty impressive start to his major league career on the surface (3.15 ERA and 1.20 WHIP with slightly above average control), but his career peripherals (4.52 SIERRA, 4.53 FIP, 4.53 xFIP, 4.59 tERA, 6.0 K/9, 38.7 percent groundball rate) paint the story of a pitcher who's been a bit more lucky than he has been dominant.

(Of course, some pitchers are able to outpitch their peripherals and the luck-neutral measuring systems are not great at capturing/evaluating "extreme" pitchers at the margins accurately. Matt Cain (and many of his Giants teammates over the past several years), for example, has thrived off of a notoriously low home run per flyball rate. This offseason, Jeff Zimmerman observed that pitchers who work the edges of the strike zone tend to have an apparent peripheral-results gap. Hellickson was one of the pitchers identified as an "extreme edge percentage" type pitcher, which may go a long way in explaining the nearly run and a half differential between his career ERA and career FIP/xFIP/SIERRA/tERA.)

Hellickson is also on a very good defensive team, and Tropicana is underrated in terms of its offense-suppressing environment. However, in a vacuum, there are more red flags than positive signs when it comes to Hellickson. Edge percentage and youth (age 26) aside, Hellickson's strikeout rate is pretty low (even by American League standards) and his career strikeout to walk rate (1.94) is below average (the league average has grown from 2.2 to 2.5 during Hellickson's major league career). Hellickson is also a slightly flyball pitcher (0.94 career groundball to flyball ratio) with solid, but unimpressive velocity (91.1 miles per hour career). That is not to say Hellickson is a bad pitcher; just that he is not the "ace" his results to date have indicated. He has not pitched any better, from a skills standpoint, than Player A has for his career. To me, Hellickson is to Player A what to Blind Pig is to Pliny The Elder.

Player A...drum roll please...is Paul Maholm. Maholm's not had the most impressive career, and he's certainly had more lackluster years than good ones, but he's been a solidly above average pitcher for two straight seasons. Maholm is a pitch-to-contact player who is no longer playing in front of a horrible defensive alignment, which lends some reason to believe in his recent success. From 2006 to 2011, he pitched for the Pirates, who ranked in the bottom third among all teams in defense in all but one year. In the aggregate, the Pirates were one of the five worst defensive teams during Maholm's tenure.

Given his skills base, his current team's defense and his offense-neutral Atlanta home park, there is a lot to objectively and subjectively like about Maholm. The fact that he is on one of the best defensive teams in the National League goes a long way toward bolstering his win totals. And it counts for something when you realize that he will never have to pitch against that offense. The Braves also play a disproportionate number of their games against the Marlins (who are not very good), the Mets (who are not very good and are rebuilding) and the Phillies (who are decidedly average).

There are really no red flags cautioning against Maholm repeating his 2011-2012 performance level, a performance level ranking in the top 150-200 range overall among players, in 2013. That's a pretty solid return for $1. How he was deemed undraftable in the preseason, especially when players like Clay Buchholz are ranked inside the top 250 overall, is beyond my comprehension.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2013-04-11T11:04:15+00:00 Daily Dollar debates: Smoak, Moss and Jones http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/daily-dollar-debates-smoak-moss-and-jones/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/daily-dollar-debates-smoak-moss-and-jones/#When:07:01:15
This daily dollar debate began as two separate first baseman questions. The first was to be between prospective full-time players Justin Smoak and either Brandon Belt or Kendrys Morales. The second was to be a question of prospective part-time hitters who are on the strong-side (lefties) of a prospective platoon. But the more I thought about the first question, the less I thought that Belt and Morales were fair comps to Smoak. Both are ranked within the top 200 overall per Yahoo's rankings, and neither is really unknown. At least one of them is likely to go $2 (if not a buck or two more) if you were to throw them out late in a draft. That said, i think Smoak's value is a lot closer to Morales than some think, while I am not fully buying Belt as more than a .260-.270 kind of guy with a 20-25 home runs.

That tidbit aside, let's dive into the analysis.

First up is Justin Smoak. My colleague Nick Fleder did a nice write-up on him about two weeks ago. Long story short, Smoak, the guy the Rangers traded to the Mariners to acquire Cliff Lee, has had a pretty disappointing start to his career.

He's hit for average/slightly above average power in a power-suppressing park while maintaining a strong walk rate (career 10.6 percent). His career strikeout rate is survivable, but still undesirably high at 21.6 percent. Smoak's biggest problems outside of the strikeouts have been that he gets under the ball way to often—12.8 percent of his career flyballs in play have been popups, compared to a 9-10 percent major league average—and the fact that he hits almost as many ground balls and flyballs with one of the major league's lowest speed scores to boot.

Smoak's speed score last year in the majors was lower than Prince Fielder's. Clocking in at 1.6 on a scale that ranges from 1-10, with mot players clumping between 4 and 6, Smoak's "speed" is downright Jim Thome-ian. Heck, even Jim Thome owns a career 2.4 speed score.

Because of his disappointing major league numbers, the Mariners temporarily demoted Smoak to Triple-A. He did not do much after being demoted (.242/.390/.364 in 20 Triple-A games), but that demotion seemed to light a spare in him. After being called back up, Smoak cut his popup rate down to a respectable 7.7 percent and hit five home runs in the process. His overall triple-slash line was Carlos Pena-ian (.217/.290/.364), but he still managed to float 19 home runs in one of the major league's hardest home run parks.

Entering his age 26 season, the Mariners are moving in the fences between fourand 17 feet throughout the outfield. Smoak has some cheap and underrated power upside to offer fantasy owners.

Katron's Gameday BIP Location tool data show that the shorter fences would have resulted in an additional two or three home runs at home for Smoak last year. I strongly believe that 25 home runs is in the cards for Smoak this year. He's wrapping up a hot spring batting .431/.474/.824 with four home runs over 16 games against pitching quality that falls somewhere between Quad-A and the major league level. Worrisome, however, are the 13 strikeouts in 57 plate appearances (22.8 percent). If Smoak can cut down on the strikeouts, he could end up being this season's Chris Davis.

Brandon Moss' situation presents a curious story. He is being platooned with Daric Barton despite posting a .337 wOBA (115 wRC+) against same-handed pitching last season (.419 wOBA, 172 wRC+ versus righties in 2012). Of course, there is an obvious sample size red flag considering that Moss had only nearly a quarter as many plate appearances (62) against same-handed pitching as he did opposite-handed pitching.

Then again, for his career, Moss owns a .331/.318 wOBA (103/94 wRC+) split against righties (843) and lefties (202 career PA). That is not to say that Moss is for sure a split-less hitter, or that he definitely broke out last year. At age 30, having struck out one quarter of his 1,000+ major league plate appearances, there are plenty of reasons to be bearish on Moss.

However, if you believe that last season was not a fluke, there's no reason to think he cannot be a poor man's Adam Dunn this year. Over 120 games, over which he could run away with a more full-time job, Moss should be able to muster 25-30 bombs for the Athletics. He almost certainly will not hit .290 (or anything close to it) this season, but .250 is in the cards with 150 runs plus RBIs. Ranked outside the top 500 in Yahoo, he won't cost you much.

Last, but hardly least, we have Garrett Jones. He'll turn 32 this season, and is what he is—a 20+ home run hitter who can post a liveable, but below-average batting average with marginal speed and the potential for 80-100 RBI. He also has average on-base skills, which, in tandem with the power, offers a respectable OPS for those who play in those kind of leagues. The Pirates intend to platoon Jones with Gaby Sanchez this season, which may curtail Jones' counting stats some, but increase/maximize his rate stats in the process.

Jones is a career .198/.237.353 (.257 wOBA) hitter against lefties and a career .279/.348/.504 (.365 wOBA) hitter against righties. Over 80 percent of his career home runs have come off opposite-handed pitching. Even in a reduced platoon role, Jones should see action in 110 to 120 games. That should still put him in the higher end of the 15-20 home run range based on his past three years of production.

Paired with a make-your-own platoon mate like Matt Joyce and a joyful desire to micromanage all season, a fantasy owners could Frankenstein their way into collective production to the tune of a .275+ batting average, 22-30 home runs, 80+ runs and RBIs and maybe even a few steals. Jones is clearly the least exciting of these three options, but he also offers the most consistency.

Time for you to chime in. Who would you rather have this season? Justin Smoak, Brandon Moss or Garrett Jones (plus a platoon mate)? Post your thoughts and arguments in the comments below!

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2013-03-27T07:01:15+00:00 Daily Dollar debates: Brown and Hicks http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/daily-dollar-debates-brown-and-hicks/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/daily-dollar-debates-brown-and-hicks/#When:08:25:15
Domonic Brown vs. Aaron Hicks

Both players are having big springs, but neither is getting much attention outside of single-league format leagues. Hicks is not even in the top 1,000 players ranked on Yahoo (I suspect that will change in the coming days, with Hicks having locked down a full-time position with the Twins to open the season), and Brown is ranked just outside the top 250 by Yahoo. Despite the low rankings, both are arguably relevant in non-shallow mixed formats (12+ teams, four or more outfielders). The players, however, are vastly different.

Hicks is the younger player, and a top three organizational prospect in a system that boasts two promising top-100 overall prospects ranked ahead of him (third baseman Miguel Sano and outfielder Byon Buxton).

Now entering his age-23 season, Hicks started his minor league career young and was slow to develop. He played well in Double-A last season at age 22, batting .285/.382/.459 with 13 home runs and 32 steals. However, Double-A is the highest level of professional experience on Hicks' resume, and he's making the leap to the majors to open the season. That jump is pretty substantial for a non-pitcher prospect who is near-universally ranked outside the top 50 entering the 2013 season.

Hicks' biggest strengths are his patience at the plate (career 14.8 percent minor league walk rate), speed and defense. He also has good gap power and should be able to post a double-digits home run season over a full season of at-bats—an increasingly rare attribute of players with 30+ stolen base upside. His minuses are a relatively high strikeout rate for his power level (career 20.1 percent in the minors), and below average, but improving, contact skills. Hicks could be an underrated major league staple with a prime time ceiling akin to Shane Victorino. But is he ready for The Show now, and might a level jump hurt his development?

Brown is no stranger to the prospect tag himself. Once ranked among baseball's brightest up-and-coming hitters, Brown has stumbled his way into post-hype obscurity over the past three years. Once a perceived 20-20 threat I compared, in terms of potential long-term fantasy value, to Shin-Soo Choo, Brown owns a career .236/.315/.388 triple slash line with 12 home runs and three net steals over 492 major league plate appearances. That makes him look more like a Ben Francisco wannabe.

Now he's 25 years old, and the Phillies' expectations of Brown have mellowed. However, a monstrous spring training seemingly has pushed the Phillies to hand Brown an everyday gig in the outfield. What is different this year, and should we buy into numbers that are traditionally to be taken with a grain of salt?

If Brown's post-hype spring numbers are legit, he should be a threat to post a slightly below-average batting average with 15- to 20-home run power and double-digit steal upside. He'll likely bat in the upper part of the bottom of the Phillies lineup, which should make for good RBI opportunities but minimal runs scored. That makes Brown a potential three-category player.

However, according to Baseball-Reference.com, the quality of pitching that Brown has faced overall this spring ranks somewhere below Quadruple-A. Once he is consistently matched up against major league talent, which Brown will we ultimately see at the plate?

Time for you to chime in. Who would you rather have this season in re-draft leagues: Domonic Brown or Aaron Hicks? Check out the stats below and post your comments!














































Name PA AVG OBP SLG HR SB R RBI
Aaron Hicks 2012 (AA) 563 0.285 0.382 0.459 13 32 100 61
Aaron Hicks 2013 Oliver 584 0.242 0.322 0.391 13 18 72 57
Aaron Hicks 2013 Spring 68 0.350 0.397 0.650 4 3 16 16















































Name PA AVG OBP SLG HR SB R RBI
Domonic Brown 2012 (AAA) 220 0.286 0.335 0.432 5 4 33 28
Domonic Brown 2013 Oliver 482 0.262 0.332 0.427 14 9 59 58
Domonic Brown 2013 Spring 84 0.368 0.429 0.671 7 0 22 16


Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2013-03-26T08:25:15+00:00 Blind resume 2013: a guy you’d never expect to be underrated http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/blind-resume1/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/blind-resume1/#When:07:02:15














































































Name ADP PA AVG HR SB R RBI R+RBI
Player A 35 597 0.270 22 18 98 59 157
Player B 23 628 0.280 17 18 107 67 174
Player C 8 701 0.290 23 28 102 83 185
Player D 27 655 0.261 22 16 86 74 160
Player E 34 658 0.284 28 14 86 82 168
Player F 9 579 0.303 22 20 89 85 174


On the surface, Player A holds his own against the sample in home runs (fifth out of six), stolen bases (tied for third out of six) and runs (third out of six), but lacks overall in the RBI (sixth of six) and batting average departments (sixth of six). As you might notice, however, players B, C, D and E got more playing time than Player A. Player A was healthy in 2012, but did not get regular major league playing time until May. In 2013, there is no indication that Player A will not play at least 150-155 games. He's athletic and young. Based on his 2012 numbers, that would prorate him to 665 plate appearances next year.

If we prorate Player A's 2012 campaign to 665 plate appearances, his numbers stack up:

















































































Name AVG HR SB R RBI R+RBI HR+SB
Player A per 650 PA 0.270 24.5 20 109 66 175 44.5
Player B 0.280 17 18 107 67 174 35
Player C 0.290 23 28 102 83 185 51
Player D 0.261 22 16 86 74 160 38
Player E 0.284 28 14 86 82 168 42
Player F 0.303 22 20 89 85 174 42
Player A Sample Rank 6th 2nd T-2nd T-1st 6th 2nd 1st


Player A's power/speed combination tops the sample, and his lackluster performance in RBIs last year (which I strongly anticipate to improve in 2013 since he will be batting in the three hole) was more than made up for in prorated runs scored. I find runs an incredibly underrated and undervalued statistic in fantasy baseball—and only Mike Trout scored more runs that our prorated Player A last season.

Before I name the mystery player, I want to give away the mystery by listing the ages of each of the unnamed players:
Player A: 19
Player B: 25
Player C: 26
Player D: 23
Player E: 27
Player F: 27

What does this all tell us? Player A is the youngest of the sample, by a healthy margin in light of hitters' historical aging curve data, and putting up numbers on par with older players at the same position that are being drafted ahead of him.

In case you have not guessed it, Player A is Bryce Harper's 2012 season. Player B is Justin Upton's 2012 season. Player C is Andrew McCutchen's career 162-game average batting line. Player D is Jason Heyward's career 162-game average batting line. Player E is Adam Jones' two-year (2011-12) 162-game average batting line. Player F is Carlos Gonzalez's 2012 season.

Now Bryce Harper, ranked 35th overall in Yahoo (37 in ESPN), is not a guy who is "falling far" and "getting forgotten." He's still a marginal third-round pick in 12-team formats. But does he really deserve to be taken there?

I have Harper valued just north of $30 ($32-33) in standard 12 team 5x5 formats. I think he can hit .280+ with 30 home runs, 15-20 stolen bases and a shot at 100 runs/RBI with upside to spare. Keep in mind that Harper will not be able to legally drink until the end of the 2014 season. ZiPS projects a .274 batting average, 26 home runs, 21 stolen bases, 89 runs and 70 RBI over 150 games played (641 PA).

Harper is the 27th overall rated hitter in fantasy per Yahoo. However, there are really only 10 or 11 hitters I'd take ahead of him at that cost: (in order): Mike Trout, Miguel Cabrera, Matt Kemp, Ryan Braun, Prince Fielder, Albert Pujols, Carlos Gonzalez, Giancarlo Stanton, Jose Bautista, Adrian Beltre, and maybe Matt Holliday.

Out of the pool of pitchers, I would consider taking only Justin Verlander, Stephen Strasburg, Clayton Kershaw and maybe Felix Hernandez over him. That said, I would not take a single pitcher ahead of Harper because in my experience, a later-round pitcher is more likely to outperform an early-round pitcher than a later-round hitter is to outperform an early-round one. Anecdotally speaking, I presume this is because a single pitcher's starts makes up a larger percentage of total team pitching contributions (assuming innings pitched limits) than does a single day of hitting for a given player.

In other words, you can better cherry-pick pitcher match-ups to maximize outcomes and require less day-to-day (consistent) contribution from pitchers than hitters to be successful in fantasy. That may not be true, but that is my experience/strategy.

Put that together and Harper is a borderline first-round, guaranteed early second-round pick. Considering that he has Trout's pedigree (Harper was ranked ahead of Trout in the 2012 preseason by Baseball America and Fangraphs), that he posted All-Star caliber production at age 19 in the majors last year, and that he's absolutely mashing the ball in spring training (a grain of salt required, but he has a .438/.455/.750 triple slash line), I expect the young batter to break out in a major way in the majors this year.

Of all the upside plays in baseball this year, Harper is the best one. He might not come the cheapest, but he has a high floor, minimal health risk and one of the best chances of finishing in the top 10 after picks 15-20. Spend big, regret nothing.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2013-03-21T07:02:15+00:00 Five questions: Milwaukee Brewers http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/five-questions-milwaukee-brewers8/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/five-questions-milwaukee-brewers8/#When:07:13:15 The first-base conundrum
One of the Brewers' most glaring organizational weaknesses heading into the 2013 season is their depth at first base. The organization's top two choices to man the position, Mat Gamel and Corey Hart, both are injured. The situation is so bad that the team is planning to begin the year with defensive-minded former shortstop Alex Gonzalez manning first base.

The Brewers did not bring in any outside first base depth this offseason, and they outrighted Travis Ishikawa to the minors. (He elected free agency and has since signed with the Orioles on a minor league deal.) Further complicating this situation is the fact that none of the Brewers' arguable top 10 prospects are first basemen, let alone major league-ready infielders.

First base was once a position of strength for the Brewers, with a young, homegrown Prince Fielder manning the position at the major league level while then-promising prospects Matt LaPorta and Gamel mashed pitching in the lower levels of the minors. Fielder has since left, LaPorta was traded for a CC Sabathia rental (LaPorta then fizzled out in Cleveland), and Gamel has had an uninspiring and injured beginning to his major league career.

Last season saw the Brewers commit to filling their open first base position in-house, leaning on former top prospect Gamel to fill the large void left by Fielder. Gamel struggled to walk (5.3 percent walk rate), hit for power (.101 isolated power) or make solid contact over his first 21 games before tearing his ACL chasing down a foul popup.

Hart stepped up for the Brewers in a big way, shifting from right field to first base and hitting .270/.334/.507 with 30 home runs, contributing nearly three wins above replacement for the Brew Crew in 2012.

However, Hart was not, and is not, the intended long-term solution for the Brewers. He is a 31-year-old right fielder by trade and is set to become a free agent after the 2013 season. Furthermore, Hart is slated to miss the first month or two of the regular season recovering from knee surgery (though his recovery is reportedly ahead of schedule).

The Brewers had every intent of beginning 2013 the same way they began 2012, committing to Gamel as their everyday first baseman. Gamel, however, will now miss the entire 2013 season after tearing the surgically repaired ACL in his right knee during the Brewers' first full-squad workout.

Milwaukee considered giving 23-year-old prospect Hunter Morris, who has never played a game above Double-A ball, an extended early-season tryout, but he now appears ticketed for Triple-A to begin the year. Morris originally was drafted out of high school in the second round of the 2007 draft by the Red Sox, though he chose college over the Red Sox and later was drafted by the Brewers in the fourth round of the 2010 draft.

He spent most of 2011 in Single-A ball, where he showed good pop (.190 isolated power) but poor patience (3.4 percent walk rate). Last year, he hit .303/.357/.563 with 28 home runs in Double-A, was named the Southern League's Most Valuable Player and the Brewers' minor league player of the year. Morris showed more mature patience (7.0 percent walk rate) and developing power (.261 isolated power), but an analysis of the whole paints the picture of a rough-around-the-edges player who is still developing.

Morris' 20-plus percent strikeout rate is not bad given his level of power, and his seven percent walk rate is certainly improved, but his nearly 3:1 strikeout to walk rate and average contact skills indicate a weakness in his approach that major league pitching likely will be able to exploit. Further, his most recent showing in the Arizona Fall League was disappointing. Morris mustered a mere seven extra-base hits (one home run) over 21 games.

The leap from Double-A to Triple-A is a pretty big step itself, so skipping a level and going straight to the majors is not a challenge easily met by even the most talented players. Mike Trout did it in 2011 with notably poor results. Most position players who skip Triple-A are top-rated prospects, guys like Alex Rodriguez, Miguel Cabrera and Starlin Castro.

At best, Morris is a marginal top-10 organizational prospect in a weak minor league system. Long term, Morris has solid potential to be what the Brewers are hoping Gamel can be. However, he has not demonstrated that he is polished enough to be an everyday major leaguer. Much like the chili I made the other week, Morris could use a little more seasoning.

Currently, the only remaining first basemen on the free agency market are Aubrey Huff and Carlos Lee. A cheap, one-year, incentive-laden reunion with Lee might hve made sense, but it's unknown whether Lee is in playing shape, or even interested, at this time. At best, it would have given Milwaukee a full-year major league stopgap at first base, allowing the Brewers to shift Hart back to right field (how such a move will play out with Hart's repaired knee is an entirely different story) while providing a little positional flexibility, as well.

At worst, such a move would be a waste of a couple million dollars to plug first base for the first four to eight weeks that gives the team depth at first once Hart returns to the field. Heck, the Brewers could have given Lee his old number back and sold unsold "retro" El Caballo jerseys.

As things currently stand, Gonzalez gives Hart more time to heal, and he allows the Brewers the opportunity to let Morris continue to develop in the minors and call him up when he is ready rather than out of necessity. It is not like the Brewers are in a contending position in 2013 anyway.

The Axman comebacketh?


One of the Brewers' unexpected narratives of 2012 was the implosion of their once-reliable closer. For two years, Axford had consistently shut the door for the Brewers. Over 131.2 innings across 2010 and 2011, Axford accumulated 70 saves in 75 chances (93-plus percent closing rate) while posting a 2.19 ERA, 1.16 WHIP and a strikeout rate comfortably north of the major league average (11.1 strikeouts per nine compared to a major league average around 7.1).

Axford had never been a control pitcher in the minors, posting 4.8 walks per nine innings over his Triple-A career, but he seemed to be developing solid control in the majors. After posting 4.2 walks per nine in 2010, Axford posted a decidedly average 3.1 walks per nine rate in 2011 while throwing more first-pitch strikes.

His peripherals were trending in the right direction heading into the 2013 season, but then Axford lost all sense of command. His first-pitch strike rate plummeted to a career-low 54.2 percent (compared to a major league average rate of 59.8 percent), and his walk rate ballooned in excess of five batters per nine innings. His strikeout rate remained high, and his swing-and-miss rate actually ticked up a bit, but this simply may have been the byproduct of increased wildness.

Axford never truly lost his closing job last season because there was never a clear option to succeed him. Francisco Rodriguez struggled with a career-high ERA (4.38) and a career-low strikeout rate. Kameron Loe, who had been a solid bullpen piece for the Brewers in 2010 and 2011, as well, was no better, posting an ugly 4.61 ERA despite solid control and good groundball induction.

Jim Henderson debuted for the Brewers as a solid 30-year-old rookie with a respectable ERA and excellent strikeout numbers, but his control was no better than K-Rod's, and he had no track record of success to speak of.

Currently, Axford is set to open the season as the Brewers' everyday closer. Is there reason for renewed hope? I would not bet on it, but there are some positive signs.

On the plus side, Axford's fastball velocity last year ticked up half a mile per hour, and his fastball historically has been his best weapon. Additionally, a lot of Axford's damage potentially could be attributed to a seemingly high line-drive rate (24 percent). The major league average tends to be just under 20 percent, so there is some bad luck that could see some correction in 2013.

On the negative side, however, Axford's walk rate did not improve as the season progressed. There was no real "turning point" to his struggle to find the strike zone. His first- and second-half walk rates were nearly identical, and that is likely going to be his biggest challenge in returning to form in 2013.

Brewers fans should keep an eye on Henderson in spring training. If he continues to do in 2013 what he did in 2012, he may succeed Axford as the bullpen stopper.

Is Yovani Gallardo an ace in waiting or a No. 2 starter?


For awhile, it seemed as though Gallardo was the former, merely suffering from bad luck, but after last season you have to wonder.

After a promising debut in 2007 (3.67 ERA, 2.84 xFIP, 8.2 K/9, 3.9 BB/9), Gallardo was off to a strong late start to the 2008 season before it was cut short by a freak season-ending ACL injury. The next season—Gallardo's first full one in the majors—his first- and second-half numbers were nearly day and night.

Over his first 114.2 innings, he registered a 3.22 ERA, 9.7 strikeouts per nine and a better-than-average 1.23 WHIP. Gallardo struggled a bit with his command, however, and he walked nearly a batter every other inning (55 in total) during the first half of the season. In the second half of the year, Gallardo upped his strikeouts a bit but seemed to lose gas as the season wore on.

Fatigue only exacerbated his control issues. Over his last 71 innings, Gallardo walked 39 batters and registered a 4.56 ERA and 1.45 WHIP. By mid-September, Gallardo was shut down. Only Doug Davis (203.1 innings pitched, 103 walks) and A.J. Burnett (207 innings pitched, 97 walks) walked more batters than Gallardo (94) in 2009. His end-of-year numbers were nonetheless promising. Gallardo compiled a 3.73 ERA, a 3.71 xFIP and 3.83 SIERA that signaled a promising future for the then-23-year-old hurler

Gallardo's subsequent season ERAs did not change much relative to the league—he posted a 3.84 ERA in 2010 and a 3.52 ERA in 2011, but his ERA- index numbers from 2009 to 2011 were 90, 95 and 92—but his control markedly improved while maintaining strong strikeout numbers.

Gallardo's walk rate fell from 4.6 in 2009 to 3.7 in 2010 and 2.6 in 2011, while his first-pitch strike rate jumped from 52.6 percent in 2009 to 61.8 percent and 62.7 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. Gallardo showed merely average control in the minors, so this development was a major step if he was to take the leap from good to potentially excellent starting pitcher.

Heading into the 2012 season, Gallardo had three consecutive years of 200 strikeouts, he had built up sufficient stamina to effectively pitch 200-plus innings, and his peripherals in 2011 (3.22 SIERA, 3.19 xFIP) indicated that he was ready to truly break out and reach that "next level" based on more than luck.

Alas, like Axford, Gallardo saw his progress take several steps back. His groundball rate remained strong, but he was not very effective at inducing weak flyball contact. His popup rate, at four percent, was a significant career low that ranked among the absolute bottom of all qualified major league starting pitchers last year.

More significantly, his first-pitch strike rate fell below the major league average (to 56.6 percent), his fastball velocity lost a full tick of gas, and his walks-per-nine rate ballooned to 3.6. Although Gallardo's nominal walks-per-nine rate was slightly higher in 2010 than it was in 2012, the major league average walk rate in 2010 was nearly eight percent greater than it was in 2012. This means the step back in control was more significant than it appears on its face.

These are ominous signs, but on the surface, little changed for Gallardo. His 3.66 ERA fell somewhere between his 2010 and 2011 results. He struck out just as many batters per inning in 2012 as he did in 2011. His WHIP was league average, and his xFIP was better than it was in 2009.

But these are just nominal observations. Gallardo was certainly still an above-average major league pitcher last year, but his xFIP, relative to the rest of the league, was worse in 2012 compared to 2009. Whereas his xFIP- index clocked in at 82 in 2010 and 83 in 2011, it registered at 91 in 2012. That is a significant jump.

An 82-83 xFIP- would have placed Gallardo's peripherals within the top 15 last year among all major league pitchers that logged 100 or more innings. The difference between a low 80s xFIP- player and a low 90s xFIP- player last season is Cole Hamels versus Lance Lynn or Jon Lester.

That is not to say Gallardo was not still effective overall, just that he was not in the upper echelon of pitchers last season. In some games, Gallardo was masterful; in others, he was a mess. Her certainly was inconsistent last season if you look at his game-by-game graphic data. Inconsistency, however, is the natural byproduct of wildness. And added uncertainty is not a beneficial attribute for a team in rebuilding mode.

If I were the Brewers (or an attentive fantasy owner), however, I would bet on a return to form for Gallardo in 2013. Of his 81 walks, 31 came in the first two months of the season. After posting ghastly walks-per-nine rates (3.7 and 4.8) in April and May, respectively, that rate fell to 3.1 in June, 2.7 in July and 3.0 in August. Gallardo seemed to lose a bit of steam toward the end of the season, and his walk rate ballooned back up to 4.1 in September.

However, what is critical here is that, once Gallardo found his groove, he was pitching pretty effectively. Gallardo's xFIP in June was 3.33, in July it was 3.28, and in August it was 2.86. His ERA over this span was 3.11, while his walks per-nine-rate was 2.9.

Gallardo also maintained strong strikeout stuff, whiffing 111 of the 429 batters he faced in June, July and August combined (25.9 percent). If he can work the edges of the plate better in 2013, even with a league-average walk rate, he should not have to look hard to find success.

The Brewers currently have Gallardo locked up through 2014 with a club option for 2015 that would keep him in Milwaukee through his age-29 season. Despite his struggles and steps back in 2012, the Brewers still have an ace on their hands. That is, assuming we see more of the June, July, August Gallardo in 2013 as opposed to the April, May, September Gallardo.

What are the Brewers going to do about their outfield?


As the calendar turned to 2013, the Brewers already were heading into the 2013 season with a relatively shallow outfield. They were planning to deploy Ryan Braun and Hart (once he returned from knee surgery) in the corners, with a Carlos Gomez/Norichika Aoki platoon in center.

With Gamel out for the season, the Brewers likely are going to need to shift one of Aoki or Gomez (likely Aoki) to right field long-term, hoping that Gomez can repeat/retain his breakout numbers from last season (whether his power is legit is a separate question), and that Aoki is legitimate and does not see any regression in his lefty/righty splits.

Who does this leave to play a utility outfielder role, however? Clearly it is Logan Schafer at the moment, but what if Braun is out? As mentioned above, the Brewers do not have impact hitting talent in the minors. Recently signed minor leaguer Cole Garner is rapidly approaching 30 and has barley been able to muster a .700 OPS in the upper minors. Rene Tosoni is younger, but his wOBA at Double-A and Triple-A last season was comfortably below .300.

If Braun gets suspended, a plausible concern in light of new information about a deeper connection to the Biogenesis clinic than originally suspected, then the Brewers are going to go from barely treading water to drowning. Johnny Damon, Scott Podsednik and Bobby Abreu figure to be on the Brewers' radar over the next few weeks.

The Brew Crew went all in for 2011-12 ... and lost. So what's next?


The Brewers are in an ugly state. Their payroll was just shy of $100 million last season, and they are a small-market team with little to show for their aggressive approach to the 2011 and 2012 seasons. Their farm system ranks among the worst in baseball due to a lack of hitting and impact talent. The Brewers have only a few large contracts, and nothing unbearable that extends past the 2014 season, but their major league roster is pretty shallow on talent.

The Brewers likely are going to need two to three rebuilding years, focusing on the draft, if they want to get back to competition while Braun is still a relatively young man and without blowing up their payroll or putting the team in a worse long-term position than it already is.

Depending on whose list you look at, five to seven of the Brewers' present top prospects are pitchers. Most of them are likely middle-of-the-rotation types, which certainly have value at cost-controlled rates. The Brewers should focus on economizing their present strength, developing their young pitching, and then parlaying that into solid depth elsewhere on the team.

Make no mistake, the Brewers have nothing on the team that they could reasonably flip into a high-upside upper minor league player outside of Braun, and he is going nowhere. Because they are unlikely to be able to obtain a young, major league-ready talent that they can build around in tandem with Braun in the short term, they should instead work to build a roster of major league role players that they can add to with smart free agency moves and a long-term focus on acquiring high-upside talent in the draft.

The short-term focal point for the Brewers will need to be on corner infielders (third base, primarily) followed by the addition of a few more outfielders (even assuming that one of Mitch Haniger, Victor Roache, Tyrone Taylor or Khris Davis pans out as a major league-capable player). Third base is the organization's biggest long-term need. If Aramis Ramirez were to get injured, there would be virtually nothing in the system to replace him at this point.

The Brewers also may need a shortstop or catcher long-term, too. They now have rookie Jean Segura set to play shortstop and a top offensive prospect named Clint Coulter catching in the system, but both players are offensive-minded and have questionable defensive utility.

Segura is a recently converted second baseman who has the tools to hit for a respectable average and post a good on-base percentage, but he has about as much power upside as Marco Scutaro. Coulter has shown excellent patience for a 19-year-old (17.3 percent walk rate in rookie ball last season) and possesses good power potential, but catcher is a relatively new position for him, and his arm is graded by scouts at average at best (50 on the 20-80 scale).

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2013-03-18T07:13:15+00:00 In defense of Barry Bonds http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/in-defense-of-barry-bonds/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/in-defense-of-barry-bonds/#When:09:13:15 Dear Reader,

Before you dive into the article below, I want to reiterate that Wins Above Replacement, or WAR, is by no means a perfect statistic, the only statistic, or the be-all-end-all statistic. It is merely a shorthand for a lot of important comments and observations about the on-the-field attributes of a player. I merely use it to illustrate a point, not to claim the point is definitive. WAR, and its derivative statistics, as utilized in this article, is calculated using Fangraph's version of the metric.

Yesterday, something moderately historic-ish happened. No one was voted into National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum by the BBWA. This is the first time this has happened since 1996. It is also only the eighth time since the establishment of the Hall Of Fame in 1936 that this has happened (although two players were elected by the Veterans Committee that year).

In 1996, the top 10 vote-getters were (asterisks denote that the player was eventually inducted into The Hall, not that they used steroids):

























































































Name Postion(s) Career WAR # Seasons Career WAR Vote Population
Phil Niekro* SP 84.6 24 3.5 68.3%
Tony Pérez* 1B/3B 67.8 23 2.9 65.7%
Don Sutton* SP 89.8 23 3.9 63.8%
Steve Garvey 1B 42.5 19 2.2 37.2%
Ron Santo* 3B 79.3 15 5.3 37.0%
Tony Oliva DH/OF 48.6 15 3.2 36.2%
Jim Rice* DH/OF 56.1 16 3.5 35.3%
Bruce Sutter* RP 22.3 12 1.9 29.1%
Tommy John SP 78.7 27 2.9 21.7%
Jim Kaat SP 71.2 25 2.8 19.4%


This ballot in 1996 was pretty shallow. The only other "notable" name (as a player) worthy of entering The Hall was Curt Flood, and he deserves recognition in the sport for entirely different reasons.

This year, only two players crossed the 60 percent vote threshold—first time eligible second basemen (slash catcher, slash outfield) Craig Biggio and Jack Morris. Neither really deserves entry, though Craig Biggio is borderline worthy in my book.

Despite this fact, however, I could easily pick out five Hall Of Fame caliber players in this year's eligible mix, and 10 I would likely vote in. Even before considering the steroid issue, I would, without a doubt in my mind based on the evidence in front of me, vote for Jeff Bagwell, Tim Raines (whose drug addiction in the 1980s and skin color may have more to do with his failure to receive enough votes than his on-the-field production), Edgar Martinez (Mr. DH), Alan Tammell and Larry Walker, whom I have previously defended. I am still on the fence with respect to Kenny Lofton (a world class lead off man) and Craig Biggio. That's five to seven arguably deserving players before you even get to the steroid cloud that surrounds Roger Clemens, Curt Schilling (the world's most opinionated pitcher (that was also pretty great)), Mike Piazza, Rafael Palmeiro, Mark McGwire (but not Sammy Sosa)... and Barry Bonds.

A lot can be said about Clemens, Schilling, Palmeiro and McGwire, but I want to focus on Barry Bonds. Bonds, along with Clemens, is one of the two scapegoats of the industry of a tainted era. Records were broken, amazing feats were accomplished, and asterisks with footnotes have been affixed.

But here is the thing I feel that a lot of people forget. Barry Bonds was great before he allegedly took steroids. By most accounts, this began sometime in the mid-1990s. Time Magazine posted an interesting article titled The Evolution of Barry Bonds a few years back that profiles his physical and baseball stats by season.

In the first 10 years of his career (1986-95), Bonds did something that very few players in the history of major league baseball have ever accomplished by WAR's measure of value—he crossed the 10 wins plateau. He did this not only once, but twice in those 10 years of play. The way we measure the value a player contributes to his team in a single season with his glove is a fickle thing, so take this somewhat arbitrary threshold with a grain of salt, but, by way of perspective, both Albert Pujols and Alex Rodriguez have each only done this once in their careers. In fact, only two of the 26 players elected to The Hall since Mike Schmidt in 1995 has posted a single 10 WAR (or higher) season in their career—Cal Ripken and Rickey Henderson. In 2010, no major league player even accumulated 9 WAR. Mike Trout, who unquestionably deserved the AL MVP, reached the 10 WAR plateau this past year at age 21, which is almost ineffably impressive, but the last player to post a 10+ WAR spot in a season prior to Trout this year was... Barry Bonds, in 2004.

Bonds was also a perennial all around player and 40/40 threat prior to his 40/40 1996 season. In his first 10 years of major league play, Bonds crossed the 30/30 mark three times, and missed it twice by just a single stolen base. Over the first 10 years of his career, Bonds batted .286/.398/.541 (.938 OPS), averaging 34 home runs, 39 stolen bases and 107 walks per 162 games played. By the close of the 1995 season, Bonds had accumulated 73.7 WAR. That's more value than such great modern players as Kenny Lofton, Jim Edmonds or Larry Walker accrued in their entire careers.

Still not impressed? If you were to combine the single-season WAR values of the top 10 hitters in baseball last season, their collective WAR would total 76.7.

Without any doubt in my mind, Bonds was headed to The Hall before the specter of steroids and BALCO began to haunt his record. Had he retired before the 1996 season, he would have gone down as Kofauxian in how brightly he shined. But he did not retire before 1996; instead, he went on to accomplish something only a three other players have ever done—hit 40 home runs and steal 40 bases. I should probably note here, however, that two of those three other players, Jose Canseco and Alex Rodriguez, admitted using steroids at some point in their careers.

What happened in and after 1996 in Bonds' career is infamous, and hardly needs retelling. He shattered Mark McGwire's home run record less than five years after it was set. He walked 232 times in 2004 with a .609 on base percentage (OBP) that was greater than all but five other baseball player's slugging percentages (SLG). Bonds' SLG between 2001 and 2004 was greater than the major league average OPS. Yada yada yada.

By the time Bonds hung up his glove after the 2007 season,demonized by the media, he accumulated 168 WAR. That averages out to more than 7.5 WAR per season. Only five players in all of baseball last season posted a single season WAR greater than what Bonds averaged over his entire career.

Only one other player produced more value, according to Fangraphs, in the history of baseball. And that man is Babe Ruth (177.9 career WAR). Bonds is exclusively part of a group of only five players in the history of baseball to accumulate 150 or more WAR over their career. The other three are Willie Mays (163.2 career WAR), Ty Cobb (163.2 career WAR) and Hank Aaron (150.4 career WAR). Ted Williams (139.8 career WAR) would also likely be in that mix but for being such a great American and fighting for his country during his peak physical years.

Assume for a moment, somewhat arbitrarily, that steroids double a player's potential (note that I call it potential, because you cannot just take steroids, sit on the couch and each chips and instantly become great at sports). If we were to accordingly slash his career WAR in half, his 84 career WAR would still be greater than the career WAR of any single player on this year's Hall Of Fame ballot. Such "half-slashing" of Bonds' whole career would put his value on par with Jeff Bagwell in terms of career value added to his teams. Not a single one of the five baseball players inducted into the Hall Of Fame over the past three years has value equal to or greater than our mythical "Half Bonds."

Still not convinced? There is a a statistic called Wins Above Excellence, or WAE. This statistic subtracts three wins off of any single season of a given player (if a season would then produce negative value, it is zeroed out) to measure how much better than "All Star caliber" a player was over the course of his career. This adjustment also removes value added by not being great, but from being healthy (which itself, quite honestly, is a valuable tool).

By WAE standards, Bonds produced 104.2 wins of value for his career in excess of All Star caliber production. Putting this figure into perspective, only 30 hitters (soon 31, with Albert Pujols on the horizon) in the history of baseball even accumulated 100 wins by WAR standards in their career. Cal Ripken (99.7 career WAR), Wade Boggs (91.9 career WAR) and Chipper Jones (90.3 career WAR) all fell short. Mike Schmidt (110.6) and Rickey Henderson (113.9) are the only modern era players to be elected to The Hall with even 100 wins by WAR standards over their entire careers. By WAE standards, Schmidt and Henderson only produced 64.4 and 56.0 wins-worth of career value above All Star production over the course of their careers, respectively. Barry Larkin (70.5 career WAR) and Ron Santo (79.3 career WAR), the two latest inductees to The Hall, likewise produced 25.7 and 42.7 career wins of value in excess of All Star caliber production, respectively.

What WAE roughly tells us is that Bonds' level of "super star" production—that is, the amount of value he added in excess of being a mere All Star caliber player—was substantially higher than the career value provided by almost every player that ever played the game. And yet, despite all this data, Bonds' career barely convinced one out of every three of the BBWA writers to vote for him. That's just downright ridiculous. It might even be racist, considering that Clemens, equally vilified for steroids and substantially less valuable by WAR standards than Bonds (then again, almost all pitchers are inherently less valuable than their hitting counterparts), received more votes.

Bonds was not just really good. He was not even just great. He was downright amazing—steroids or not. He did things we'll likely never see again. And many of his amazing accomplishments cannot be entirely explained by steroids. He was beyond great before steroids came into the conversation. And that is why I would vote for him.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2013-01-10T09:13:15+00:00 Black Magic Woman http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/black-magic-woman/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/black-magic-woman/#When:03:03:15 Carlos Santana, entering his fourth season in the majors, has seemingly been a sleeper forever. It’s been said a lot before, but I have a strong feeling this will be the last time.

Santana is starting to feel a little bit like the catching version of Ricky Nolasco (all potential, no results). His career batting average in his 344 game major league career is .247. His career high batting average was .260 (back in 2010). He is slow on his feet (2.6 speed score last season), and hits the ball on the ground more often that he hits fly balls. Further, although he has a very respectable 51 career home runs in less than 1,500 major league plate appearances, Santana saw his power stroke drop significantly last year (.050 ISO differential).

However, these knocks are superfluous. Santana has made strides in his game over his major league tenure that make him look more like a player in the mold of 2008/2010 Geovany Soto than the 2009/2011/2012 Soto.

For starters, Santana has consistently maintained one of his key assets at an elite level, his plate discipline. Just over 15 percent of his trips to the plate in the major leagues have resulted in a free pass. Thus, despite posting a career batting average south of the .250 mark, his career on-base percentage is north of .360. Only three players drew more walks than Santana's 91 last year: Adam Dunn (105), Ben Zobrist (95) and Dan Uggla (93). Each of those played 150 or more games in 2012. Santana played in 142. For his two-plus years of major league service, Santana has walked 15.4 percent of the time. Over the past three years, the only major league players to draw a greater percentage of walks are Jose Bautista, Joey Votto, Lance Berkman and Daric Barton. Not even Kevin Youkilis, the Greek god of walks, drew free passes 15 percent of the time in any single season of his career.

Santana’s plate discipline skills and pitch recognition talent as a catcher have developed in a way that should manifest in ways outside on-base prowess. In 2012, Black Magic Woman swung more often than in 2011, but at pitches in the zone. At the same time, while remaining selective with bad pitches, he made contact more often with pitches outside of the zone.

The results have been apparent in his process-based metrics, although not in his results. Santana saw his line-drive rate jump to league average rates last season, while his popup rate fell at an even faster rate. His walk rate remained consistent, while his strikeout rate fell nearly four percentage points. A 16.6 percent strikeout rate is respectable for any player; for a power hitter, it is rare. Santana has shown the ability to handle almost every pitch except the slider. For whatever reason, his other weak pitch last year was the fastball. Santana has shown the talent to absolutely crush fastballs in both the major and minor leagues. Assuming health, I am not worried about the young power hitter (his power graded as a 65-70 on the 20-80 scale, if memory serves) handling fastballs in 2013.

Santana sees a first-pitch strike barely half the time, and only 45 percent of all pitches thrown to him last season were actually strikes last year. As pitchers become increasingly aware they need to throw Santana strikes if they want to keep him off the bases, and as Santana gets more chances at quality pitches, things should turn around. This is particularly true as pitchers fall behind in the count on him and need to lean on their fastball.

By my calculations, and based on his approach at the plate, Santana should have posted a batting average in the upper .270s last year. Even with depressed power, he should have pushed an .810+ OPS. Santana is not going to win a batting title any time soon, and he’s not a player in the mold of Joey Votto, but in the upper minors Santana hit .296 over 189 games between the ages of 22 and 24. His major league equivalent batting averages between 2008 and 2010 were .287, .258 and .273. Over that span, his respective MLE wOBAs were .375, .367 and .392.

Santana's career trajectory has been an odd one. A freak knee injury ended his rookie season prematurely. A concussion likely stunted him last year. While David Wright is a testament to the risks and effects of a concussion on a promising young player's career, Santana finished the second half of 2012 strong. His power numbers in July and September were in line with expectations, and he walked (49) more often that he struck out (43) over the season's final three months.

There is no such thing as a "sure thing" in baseball, and Santana is certainly a name that carries some amount of brand recognition for a player who's never cracked the top 150 in a given season. However, if I were a betting man, I'd put plenty of chips on Santana being one of the better value picks of 2013, even if he costs you double-digit draft dollars.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2012-12-27T03:03:15+00:00 Alfonso Soriano is not overpaid http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/alfonso-soriano-is-not-overpaid/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/alfonso-soriano-is-not-overpaid/#When:09:05:15 All stats current through the end of August

Alfonso Soriano is a popular totem for the failures of the Cubs' Jim Hendry era, and he often is considered the quintessential scapegoat of excessive free agent spending by "old school" general managers who valued guts and brand names over aging curves, walk rates and other modern sabermetric standards.

He is routinely ranked among the worst contracts in baseball (did I miss any major media outlets there?). If Vernon Wells' contract was tradeable, what did that say about the unmoveable Soriano? Heck, even I have been guilty of Soriano contract bashing from time to time.

But you know something? The more I research the matter, the less I am convinced that Soriano is an "overpaid bum." Let's examine the facts.

The contract


Following a bottom-feeding 2006 season, the financially struggling Tribune Company tried to bolster the Cubs and make them a marketable asset. The team did this primarily with several major free agent acquisitions: Jason Marquis, Mark DeRosa, Ted Lilly and Soriano. Soriano was universally considered to be the top available free agent hitter that offseason following a 40/40 season for the Nationals in 2006.

Soriano's contract with the Cubs was structured by year this way:

2007: $9 million
2008: $13 million
2009: $16 million
2010-2014: $18 million

Soriano also got an $8 million signing bonus, a no-trade clause, a suite on road trips, six "premium" tickets for each home game (including spring training and the postseason) and premium tickets to the All-Star Game if he was selected to play. Soriano's contract also has award bonuses built in, and it calls for him to donate $25,000 annually to both the United Way & Cubs Care. There is no readily available information on how Soriano's $8 million bonus was paid out, so let's just assume the Cubs paid it all in 2007 (raising his 2007 cost to the team to $17 million).

The narrative


When did the feelings about the Soriano contract take a turn for the worse? I hypothesize it was after the 2009 season.

A good chunk of Soriano's 2007 value was driven by a red hot September, but plenty of people—especially Cubs fans—forget that it was Soriano who helped the Cubs ultimately edge out the Brewers and make the playoffs after being one of baseball's worst teams the year before. Soriano was unquestionably one of baseball's best in 2007 (after a 40/40 season in 2006). Only eight other hitters (plus CC Sabathia) outproduced Soriano's WAR in 2007, and all but two of those hitters (Chipper Jones and Chase Utley) did it while playing at least 20 more games than Soriano did that season.

Soriano followed up his superstar 2007 with an elite 2008 campaign that was marred by injuries. In only 109 games, Soriano racked up 4.1 WAR and 29 home runs. If he had played the same number of games in 2008 as he did in 2007, his WAR would have eclipsed 5.0. Both years, Soriano provided the Cubs with really good defense from left field and a strong throwing arm—much stronger than most would expect from a former second baseman.

Just as in 2007, Soriano was a key cog in the Cubs; dominant 2008 season that saw them again win the NL Central. (While Soriano certainly helped the Cubs reach the postseason in 2007 and 2008 with his combined 11.1 WAR, his playoff contributions in the six games (29 plate appearances) consisted of just three singles and a walk.)

Despite their postseason failures in 2007 and 2008, the Cubs were still in strong "win-now" shape heading into 2009. They signed Milton Bradley as their token lefty power bat who could walk (something the Cubs desperately needed) following his two strong seasons with the Rangers and A's/Padres. The Cubs also were going to receive a "full" season of Rich Harden who, while quite injury-prone, had been downright dominant for the Cubs down the stretch in 2008.

The 2009 season, however, did not work out for the Cubs. It seemed that almost every player hit the DL at some point, while poor seasons from Geovany Soto, Bradley, Harden, and Soriano (he hit .241/.303/.423 following a combined .291/.340/.547 triple-slash line the previous two seasons) led to disappointment on the North Side. Most forget that the Cubs were in first place in the NL Central as late in the season as August. Instead, fans remember only the volatility of Bradley and the poor season by Soriano.

It was at this point that the "he's overpaid" narrative began to appear in the popular press, as Bradley's signing became even more questionable. I think the Bradley contract controversy spilled over onto Soriano and his 2009 struggles; a perfect media storm of questionable contracts (Kosuke Fukudome being another) and sentiment on the North Side turning against Hendry's failure to produce a World Series winner fueled the "worst contract in baseball" narrative.

To be sure, several baseball writers criticized Soriano's back-loaded contract from the start, arguing that the Cubs would regret it after several years. However, the contract put the Cubs in a strong contending position from 2007-2009. Before 2009, fans proudly wore their Soriano jerseys. He was a popular star, and had the Cubs made it to the Series one of those years, I doubt so many would call the signing a total flub the way most writers do in hindsight these days.

The numbers


First, let's look at the raw production of Soriano during his tenure with the Cubs through the end of August 2012.










































































Wins wOBA wRC+ FRAR HR
2007 7.0 0.380 123 33.2 33
2008 4.1 0.374 121 16.2 29
2009 0.0 0.314 84 -2.9 20
2010 3.1 0.353 113 5.1 24
2011 1.3 0.325 99 3.4 26
2012 3.2 0.342 110 13.6 24
TOTAL 18.7 0.349 109 68.6 156
AVERAGE 3.1 0.349 109 11.4 26

A quick glance at Soriano's six-season WAR totals with the Cubs reveals one bona fide superstar season, another elite season cut short by injury, two All-Star seasons (one still in progress), a disappointing, below-average season, and a replacement-level season. There has been much more good than bad, and Soriano's average season production on the Cubs is pretty darn respectable: 3.1 WAR with a .348 wOBA that, adjusted for park factors, has been eight percent better than the major league average player's offensive output.

Further, contrary to popular opinion, Soriano has been a defensive asset for the Cubs. Take 2012 as evidence. After averaging about seven errors a year with the Cubs, Soriano is the only outfielder this year with zero errors in at least 150 chances. While Soriano is unlikely the three-win defender he was in 2007, he is just as unlikely the negative defender he was in his disastrous 2009 campaign.

Fielding metrics are notoriously fickle in small sample sizes, even in single seasons. Usually you need at least three years of data before you can say something somewhat reliable about a player's defensive talent. UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating) is a flawed sabermetric tool, but it is a better defensive yardstick than fielding percentage.

Soriano's fielding value per 150 games played (UZR/150) over the past six seasons combined rates at an elite +15.5 runs over more than 6,100 inning. That leads all qualified major league outfielders, as does his aggregate fielding runs above replacement (FRAR) value of +68.5.

Soriano's arm is also surprisingly strong given that he was a second baseman for almost his entire career before coming to the Cubs. Only Jeff Francoeur, Shane Victorino, Jayson Werth, Adam Jones and Hunter Pence have higher rated arms according to Fangraphs.

These numbers are all relative to the "replacement level" player; that is, how much better Soriano has been than the best guy in Triple-A in any given season. Compared to the average major league player (subtracting two wins from each of Soriano's seasons and zeroing out any season that would have produced negative value), Soriano still has produced 9.3 wins above average in his time with the Cubs.

Before we move on, it is essential to note that no one is claiming Soriano's production has been elite over the past six years. He is not even top 50 in cumulative WAR since 2006 among qualified hitters. However, a player does not need to be the best in order to be worth a lot, and this is the key theme.

Taking stock of Soriano's value as a Cub—by season and cumulatively, according to WAR—the next step is to put a dollar value on a "free agency win" for each season of Soriano's contract. The value of free agency wins is different from the average value of a win because service time-controlled players make less under the arbitration process than free agents do.

According to THT's Dave Studenman, the value of a free agency win in 2007 was $5.1 million. Per Fangraphs' calculations before it added stats that measured baserunning, a free agency win was worth $4.1 million in 2007. Let's split the difference and say it was $4.6 million. We need to account for the increased cost of a win from 2008-2012, so let's peg it at 10 percent per season. This would be about in line with Fangraphs' free agency win value inflation rate by season between 2002 and 2008 and would put the 2008 free agency win value at close to $5 million.

However, for the sake of argument, let's give major league teams the benefit of the doubt when it comes to smarter signings and better dollar expenditures and keep the dollar value of a win constant at $5 million from 2008 to 2012, ignoring inflation entirely after year one. Keep in mind we are using values scaled to Fangraphs' WAR system, not any other WAR system such as the ones calculated by Baseball-Reference or Baseball Prospectus.

Using a $4.6 million free agency win value for 2007 and a constant $5 million free agency win value from 2008-2012, we get the following "value chart" (assuming the entirety of his signing bonus was paid in 2007 and pro-rating his 2012 salary through the end of August for Soriano's contract to date).










































































Year Wins Win Value Dollar Value Contract Price Net (DV-CP)
2007 7.0 $4.6 $32.2 $17.0 $15.2
2008 4.1 $5.0 $20.5 $13.0 $7.5
2009 0.0 $5.0 $0.0 $18.0 -$18.0
2010 3.1 $5.0 $15.5 $18.0 -$2.5
2011 1.3 $5.0 $6.5 $18.0 -$11.5
2012 3.2 $5.0 $16.0 $15.0 $1.0
TOTAL 18.7 -- $90.7 $99.0 -$8.3
AVERAGE 3.1 -- $15.1 $17.0 -$1.4

We find that Soriano's aggregate "overpay" to date calculates to around $8.3 million. That averages out to just under $1.4 million per season. But here's the kicker: $8.3 million over six seasons would be the value of the overpay to the average major league team. The value of a marginal win to a playoff contender is considerably higher than it is to a non-contending team. Teams stand to gain substantial additional revenue from reaching the playoffs through additional ticket sales, additional concession sales, potential TV deals, marketing, additional branded product sales, etc. I have seen the average additional value of a playoff win range between $1 and $2 million. Let's cut the difference at $1.5 million dollars and apply it to the Cubs' contending seasons. But which seasons?

Without a doubt, the Cubs were a contending team in 2007 and 2008. Soriano's hot bat was one of the main reasons the Cubs ultimately downed the Brewers to win the NL Central in 2007, while his four-plus win production in 2008 surely helped the team clinch the division again. For most of the year, 2009 was also a contending season for the Cubs, who were in first place in the NL Central standings as late as August.

On the flip side, no one is going to argue the Cubs were in any sort of competition for a playoff seed in 2011 or 2012, as they have not even had a .500 record in any of the past three seasons.

But what of 2010?

On one hand, the Cubs were never above .500 that season. On the other hand, following a collapse in 2009, it seemed the Cubs were poised to again compete for a playoff seed. By my bullish homer projections for the "last chance season" of the Chicago Cubs, the roster had the talent to potentially win 90 games in 2010 if 2009 were to repeat itself without the bad luck of injury and a dead-cat bounce from Soriano.

Obviously, hindsight tells us the Cubs were about as close to a contender in 2010 as Marlon Brando was in On The Waterfront. However, hindsight does not mean the Cubs were not spending with foresight as a potential contender. To try to neutralize my homer bias, I will not consider 2010 a "contending spending" season for the Cubs. That gives us three years of contending spending and three seasons of regular spending for the Cubs.

Adjusting the above chart data to reflect the additional marginal value of a win to a playoff contender, here is what happens to that original $8.3 million dollar overpay in a vacuum:










































































Year Wins Win Value Dollar Value Contract Price Net (DV-CP)
2007 7.0 $6.1 $42.7 $17.0 $25.7
2008 4.1 $6.5 $26.7 $13.0 $13.7
2009 0.0 $6.5 $0.0 $18.0 -$18.0
2010 3.1 $5.0 $15.5 $18.0 -$2.5
2011 1.3 $5.0 $6.5 $18.0 -$11.5
2012 3.2 $5.0 $16.0 $18.0 -$2.0
TOTAL 18.7 -- $107.4 $102.0 $5.3
AVERAGE 3.1 -- $17.9 $17.0 $0.9


Factoring in the value of free agency-purchased wins to a playoff contender, we see that Soriano has actually produced slightly positive value for the team. By these calculations, Soriano has been worth a little over $5 million in surplus value to the Cubs to date.

Even if we slash the marginal playoff value of a free agency win to an additional $1 million (as opposed to $1.5 million), Soriano's contract value would be a wash relative to his cost. Using the $1.5 million figure, Soriano's been worth just under a million dollars more per year on average for the Cubs than he has been paid by them (admitted, two-third of this surplus value is fueled by his 2007 and 2008 seasons).

Thus, by these calculations, Soriano is not only not grossly overpaid by the Cubs, he is not really overpaid at all. He's likely been paid market value or slightly under market value for his services.

Of course, Soriano's past production is not going to help any team that would acquire him in the future, which is a sticking point in negotiations for a player set to make $36 million over the final two seasons of his contract. But from the standpoint of the Cubs, Soriano is hardly the "overpaid bum" fans and media make him out to be.

The future


Let's assume for a moment that my analysis is correct. Is it really likely that Soriano will continue to produce in his age-37 and age-38 seasons to justify being paid $18 million per year?

Frankly, the answer is probably no.

Standard aging curve projections for players past their peak tend to assume a 0.5 win falloff per season. With Soriano on pace for a 3.8 win campaign this season, that would mean that Soriano could be projected to produce 3.3 wins in 2013 and 2.8 wins in 2014.

Given that Soriano is on the wrong side of 35, however, let's be a little more bearish and say that Soriano could be worth a total of five wins over the next two seasons as a left fielder. If we hold the value of a free agency win constant at $5 million, that would peg Soriano's expected rest-of-contract value at $25 million—or $11 million shy of the $36 million he is still owed.

The first thing to note about that $11 million is that it should be offset by the $5 million in surplus value that Soriano has likely produced for the Cubs to date. If the Cubs were to try to move Soriano, they could eat that $5 million before giving away more than they have gotten. That leaves approximately $6 million dollars in "overpay" value to consider.

On one hand, if the Cubs were to trade Soriano to a contending team, that $6 million could easily be made up for by the marginal value of a win to a playoff contender. If a win is worth between $1 and $2 million additional dollars to a team trying to, and capable of, making the playoffs, then Soriano's projectable five win production in 2013 and 2014 would cover the "overpay" in and of itself.

On the other hand, if the Cubs were to keep Soriano, that $6 million dollars is arguably offset by the surplus value of the David DeJesus signing. DeJesus got off to a very slow start to the season, but he is still on pace to produce somewhere in the 2.0-2.5 WAR range, which would put his contract surplus value at almost $5 million this season alone. DeJesus' contract gives the Cubs additional financial flexibility with respect to Soriano without leaving a hole in left field (at least once Brett Jackson is here to stay).

It is also worth considering that Soriano provides value to the Cubs off the field, although measuring the value of these contributions to the organization is impossible. "Intangibles" have been a fun poking point ever since the Fire Joe Morgan era came and went, but as overvalued as things such as leadership, grittiness and "playing the game right" may have been traditionally, these things do have some value to the organization's public image and internal workings.

By all accounts, Soriano is the kind of guy who leads by example and plays the game right; he is a true baseball professional. He arrives early to spring training. Some call him the "hardest-working guy in the clubhouse". He mentors young players and even plays a role in the team signing its young cost-controlled players to long term deals. He donates money to charity and is spending his money to help provide meals to children in impoverished areas of the Dominican Republic. He takes his "boos" in stride when he is not producing. He genuinely loves Chicago. Heck, as my father likes to point out, he even "wears his socks right."

Those qualities may not contribute to a team's end-of-season win total, but they certainly help project a positive public image for the Cubs, it provides the team with leadership by example, and it gives the organization a positive role model for kids in an era of sports still tainted by steroids. That kind of public image marketing is not cheap.

But even ignoring all these caveats, off-sets and justifications against calling that last $6 million (or $11 million, if you want to call call Soriano's contract-to-date a wash) on Soriano's contract an overpay, that all pro-rates to $750,000 of overpay per year ($1.4 million if the contract-to-date has been a wash).

While three-quarters of a million bucks may not be "chump change," when viewed through the lens of major league baseball that is barely more money than the cost of adding a quad-A player to the major league roster. Is overpaying Soriano by that amount for eight seasons really that outlandish for a franchise that is trying to buy a win-now window after what is now over 100 years since the last time it won a World Series?

Concluding thoughts


Soriano's career is tainted by unfair popular media rhetoric. His defense is criticized, but unfairly. His contract is called one of the worst in baseball, yet he's been one of the rare $100-million contract players who arguably has been worth his contract.

His contract might be unmovable for a variety of reasons (Soriano wants to stay in Chicago, other teams do not or cannot eat the cost of his contract, etc.), but from the standpoint of what the Cubs paid for and what the Cubs have gotten to date, Soriano gets a bum rap.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2012-09-07T09:05:15+00:00 Matt Moore is a fantasy stud http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/matt-moore-is-a-fantasy-stud/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/matt-moore-is-a-fantasy-stud/#When:09:22:15 Matt Moore is having a solid season that is being supported by a little luck. He has posted a nice 3.60 ERA and league average 1.33 WHIP, but his xFIP (4.34) and SIERRA (4.06) leave something to be desired and raise an eyebrow for repeat success in 2013. Moore has flashed pretty good strikeout stuff (22.8 percent strikeout rate, 11.9 percent swinging strike rate), but has been equally liberal with the free passes (3.96 BB/9).

But Moore’s season numbers are pretty misleading; since the end of May, he has been a much different pitcher than what he showed at the beginning of the year:
































First 9 Past 16
ERA 5.35 2.87
WHIP 1.66 1.21
K% 21.4% 23.5%
BB/9 5.2 3.5
K/BB 1.8 2.5


Moore’s ERA and WHIP numbers on the season have been elite the past three months; his overall season numbers have been inflated by a poor seven-week stretch to start the year. As you might notice, the big difference for Moore has been his walk rate. Over the past three months, Moore has thrown more first pitch strikes, and walked fewer batters. The results have been a slight uptick in strikeouts and a huge downtick in “big innings” allowed.

To be certain, Moore’s walk rate over the past three months has still been a tick above league average, but let's be practical and put that into perspective. This is Moore's rookie year in the AL East. He just turned 23 years old. He has plenty of room to grow, and his improvements in the walks department as the season has worn on is a positive sign.

Now to be sure, Moore’s minor league walk rates were hardly elite. In five seasons (497.1 innings), Moore registered a pedestrian 3.8 walks per nine rate. However, Moore's wildness calmed down substantially as he matured as a prospect and moved up the ladder. His walk rate in Double-A was a much improved 2.5 walks per nine, and in Triple-A it was a still average 3.1 walks per nine. Oliver projects Moore’s walk rate to improve over the next six seasons, and from what Moore has shown us in the second half (2.9 walks per nine), next year could be the beginning of great things for this top three former prospect, who was ranked on par with the likes of Bryce Harper and Mike Trout last year.

Here is the real kicker question, however: What should keeper league owners do with Matt Moore next year? Certainly he is a guy to target in 2013, but should you keep him? Let's ignore leagues where Moore was had at bargain prices this year; in those leagues the answer is an obvious yes. Focusing solely on leagues where Moore went at "hype prices," the answer is a seemingly counter-intuitive no.

In leagues where Moore owners paid sticker price this year, it is likely that Moore produced slightly negative value. More over, hot prospect name brand prices limit potential value as a keeper and in legacy leagues with escalating costs, higher costs today limit "keepability" tomorrow (for example, I am in a "+$7" cost league that quickly eliminates the long-term "value" of keepers outside the superstars like Jose Bautista you got for $1 in year one). Outside experts leagues and the most intense leagues, and unless someone else owned Moore this season, it is highly unlikely they are paying close enough attention to his season to have noticed his recent dominance.

Most players in fantasy look at the end-of-season totals, not the month-to-month trends. That is not to say he will be cheap next year, but given what he’s done overall this season, he is likely to sell at a slight discount (at least compared to this year) in next season’s draft. Of course between now and then, articles like this may come out and render moot this argument, but at least right now, unless you got Moore at a steal of a price this year, why spend more money on keeping him than you have to?

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2012-08-30T09:22:15+00:00 Francisco Liriano is the Javier Vazquez of 2012 http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/francisco-liriano-is-the-javier-vazquez-of-2012/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/fantasy/article/francisco-liriano-is-the-javier-vazquez-of-2012/#When:06:54:15 All stats current through July 19.

Francisco Liriano | Twins | SP | 50 percent Yahoo ownership
YTD: 4.81 ERA, 1.40 WHIP, 25.2% K%, 12.7% BB%, 2.0 K/BB
Oliver ROS: 4.06 ERA, 1.35 WHIP, 8.5 K/9, 2.2 K/BB

Much like we saw with Javier Vazquez last season, Francisco Liriano is covertly bouncing back to form after an incredibly rough start to the season that saw most fantasy owners abandon hope for him.

If you peek at the surface numbers, Liriano's season still looks pretty ugly in the aggregate. His 4.81 ERA is well below average (the league average this year is 4.15) and only recently dipped below the 5.00 mark. His WHIP (1.40) is not much prettier. He is getting a lot of strikeouts (107 in 97.1 innings), but he has given away almost enough walks to totally offset that fact (54, not including four hit batsmen). And it is not like he has been contributing wins (three on the season) to owners' bottom lines.

But something's happened since the Twins put Liriano back in the rotation—and it may have something to do with his velocity and better mixing of pitches (ignore the increased injury concerns from the greater than 30 percent slider usage for now).































FB Velo FB% SL% K% K/BB ERA BAA
First Six Starts 91.9 52.4% 26.0% 15.9% 1.11 9.45 0.346
Past Ten Starts 93.0 42.3% 34.3% 29.7% 2.75 2.84 0.171


It has been well established that fastball velocity is highly correlated to a pitcher's strikeout rates, ERA, FIP, and batting averages against. Baseball Time in Arlington found that 91 miles per hour was a significant inflection point in the fastball data; pitchers with fastballs averaging above 91 mph significantly and disproportionately posted stronger ERAs than pitchers with average fastball velocities below 91. Liriano topped the 91 mph threshold only twice in his first six starts.

Look at the above chart comparing Liriano's pre- and post-demotion statistics. His first six and past 10 starts are nearly inverse, with one data set looking like an Orioles pitching prospect and the other like a bona fide ace. Check Liriano's full battery of relevant numbers since returning to the rotation: 63.1 IP, 2.84 ERA, 77 K (30 percent K rate), 2.75 K/BB, 1.04 WHIP, 2.71 FIP. To be sure, Liriano is still walking more than an average number of batters (28 over the past 10 games, for a 10.9 percent walk rate), but it's a much more tolerable rate than his pre-demotion rate (14.4 percent).

A lot of this recent success likely has something to do with the extra tick of gas on his heat and better mixing his two most often thrown pitches. It also does not hurt that Liriano is inducing twice as many swings as misses on his slider now than he was to start the season (his fastball is also getting more swings and misses as well).

Alas, if Liriano's recent string of success and increased velocity was not enough of a reason to believe, let's check in with the xWHIP calculator for more reassuring data:
image

The xWHIP calculator further confirms that Liriano's past 10 games have been talent-fueled, not luck based. xWHIP pegs Liriano's past 10 starts as good for a slightly sub-3.00 ERA and 1.20 WHIP independent of defensive and park considerations. Some combination of the Twins' above-average defense and Liriano's home park should help his second half resemble that talent line, assuming Liriano continues pitching like he has his past 10 starts. His upped velocity, better mixing of pitches and upped swing-and-miss rate (a possible byproduct of different spin and movement measured on his pitches over his last ten starts compared to his first six) also indicate that Liriano's recent improvement is potentially somewhat sustainable.

I warned fantasy owners to keep a close eye on Liriano, whose spring statistics and spring K/BB ratio were eye-popping (27.0 IP, 2.33 ERA, 33 K, 6.5 K/BB ratio), upon his return to the rotation at the end of May. For those who have not taken the leap yet, it is time to hop on board. With 25 strikeouts in his past 14 innings, the secret of Liriano is likely out of the bag. Shockingly, as of Wednesday, Liriano is still available in 50 percent of Yahoo leagues. Half of you need to pick Liriano up immediately. The other half need to trade for him before he totally loses "buy low" status. Liriano is the Javier Vazquez of 2012.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> Jeffrey Gross 2012-07-20T06:54:15+00:00