The Hardball Times -- John Brattain http://www.hardballtimes.com/main Baseball. Insight. Daily. en studes@hardballtimes.com Copyright 2013 2013-06-19T08:32:15+00:00 The importance of Marvin Miller http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-importance-of-marvin-miller/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-importance-of-marvin-miller/#When:08:31:15 John Brattain, the longtime Hardball Times writer who died in 2009, could never be accused of waffling. He knew baseball, he knew his mind, and he let his readers know what he knew, forcefully. With the death of Marvin Miller this week, we thought this example of John's insight about Miller's place in history would be timely and appropriate. It originally appeared March 23, 2007, under the title "Mirror Mirror."

The death of former commissioner Bowie Kuhn caused a lot of reflection in baseball circles about his contributions (or lack thereof) to the sport. Kuhn will always be linked in the minds of many to his foil—Marvin Miller, former executive director of the Major League Baseball Players Association.

There has been only one other link between management and labor in MLB that has endured as long as Kuhn-Miller, and that’s Bud Selig and Don Fehr.

After giving it some rare thought, it hit me: It appears that the roles played by Kuhn-Miller have been reversed by Selig-Fehr.

How so?

When Kuhn was elected commissioner pro-tem in the late 1960s, the commissioner’s office was the final authority in MLB. The position was backed by court decisions, congressional inaction regarding those decisions, and the inevitable situation when the way things have been done over time is given the unofficial coronation as "the status quo."

When backed by the clubs, the commissioner was judge, jury and executioner and this situation was accepted by all within the game regardless of the illogic and lack of fairness that it produced. When Kuhn became commissioner, he felt he now possessed the big stick—to be used mostly against erring players and sometimes against management. This big stick was called “the best interests of baseball.”

When Miller was elected executive director of the MLBPA, the players' rights were whatever the clubs said they were. There was no free agency, there was no salary arbitration, there was no collective bargaining, and if a player had a grievance against management, he had to appeal to management’s handpicked leader to hope for justice. Since baseball was exempt from anti-trust laws, it could blacklist players at will and impose any penalties it saw fit. The player could accept that or find a different line of work.

How could Miller help the players become empowered in that environment? He had only one option: Forge a rock-solid, united bloc among the players. He needed to get all the players—scrub and superstar alike—on the same page and form a consensus. Miller knew that absent the players there was no game. He needed all the players to realize that and develop positions that all felt they could be 100 percent committed on.

While Miller went through the painstaking process of educating the players and forming a consensus, the owners, led by Kuhn, simply relied on the "big stick" they had wielded for so long. However, with a united MLBPA and labor law being brought into the game for the first time, players made progress. First, they got a formal grievance procedure installed (albeit a flawed one—the commissioner was the ultimate arbiter) followed by a legitimate one with real neutral arbitrators.

Aided by men like Curt Flood, who helped show the public how unfair MLB’s system was, Miller made genuine progress. Finally, arbitrator Peter Seitz decided that the option rule (known as 10A) was good for one year only, rather than perpetually), and free agency came to the game in 1976.

The strike of 1981 cemented player free agent rights and now the players had arbitration decisions supported by the courts. They had, through consensus, become fully empowered.

Through this period, led mostly by Kuhn, owners simply tried to swing "the big stick" as they had, feeling that it would be enough to push the tide back. Their inflexibility and devotion to the status quo, coupled by a lack of consensus among themselves (due to differing economic interests) made management about as mobile and maneuverable as Benjie Molina with a pulled hamstring. Their approach and structure was no match for the forces of consensus forged by Miller among the players. The big stick had been broken.

Over time, through the strike of 1985, the lockout of 1990 and the strike of 1994-95, the power of the union became unquestioned and assumed. It had become the status quo. Baseball would be played only on the MLBPA’s terms. It had been the other way around in the days when Ford Frick, Spike Eckert and Kuhn were commissioners. There was a new big stick—the power of the MLBPA.

Since then, Miller had retired and Don Fehr came to head the MLBPA. Fehr was there through the tenures of commissioners Peter Ueberroth, Bart Giamatti and Fay Vincent as well as the final days of Kuhn. Commissioners came and went while Don Fehr and the big stick remained.

Owners wanted testing for recreational drugs. Fehr swung the stick.
Owners attempted to collude. Fehr swung the stick.
Owners attempted to do away with salary arbitration. Fehr swung the stick.
Owners tried to implement a salary cap. Fehr swung the stick.

The stick, like the one called “the best interests of baseball” used by commissioners, became an assumed power. It became a security blanket for the players much the same way it had served as one for the owners. Management no longer needed to see the possible logic in the players’ proposals. Fehr and Gene Orza wanted to see how high the salary bar could be pushed and if an obstacle got in the way, the stick was swung.

The owners, who certainly deserve little sympathy, had some legitimate points. After all, how could a small market team assemble a contending roster when its best arbitration-eligible talent cost what comparable talent cost in big markets, even though it didn’t have big-market revenues? Wasn’t the system designed to give a team six years of service from talent it developed? Yet some teams had to deal their best talent to their very competitors because they had the same expenses as large market teams but not the same revenues.

Nobody would ever suggest that if somebody bought a piece of property for $10 million in downtown Manhattan, a comparable piece of property in Kansas City now costs $10 million.

However that was baseball. Fehr didn’t see want to see the logic; he just wanted the salary bar pushed higher so he swung the stick. Fehr suggested if places like Montreal or Pittsburgh couldn’t afford New York prices then they should be moved or sold to somebody willing to pay New York money for Pittsburgh property.

The players never worried about their position. They had the stick.

Then the players and their union, like the owners pre-Miller, became complacent.

Now enters a character who, in the place and time, seemed unlikely to amount to much in the current environment. Marvin Miller didn’t seem like much of a threat—he was a middle-aged man who mostly worked as an economist in various labor organizations. Who was he to become anything significant in the realm of major league baseball? In the same way, another man once sold used cars. He bought a bankrupt team and moved it to his home town. His team never won a World Series and only had a single pennant to his credit.

Bud Selig. Or Bud Lite as he was known in certain circles.

When he became temporary acting commissioner after the firing of Fay Vincent, he seemed hardly a threat to the monolith of the MLBPA—no more a threat than Miller had seemed in the late 1960s. Indeed, it seemed little more than a joke. After a disaster in Kohler where ownership first attempted to forge a revenue sharing agreement, it appeared that Selig would be impotent in the role of commissioner.

Selig, however, shared two qualities of Marvin Miller: He was patient and he saw the power of consensus. He knew that power could defeat the big stick; he had seen it happen in his own time in MLB.

Slowly, gradually, he got the owners together. He increased revenues and made sure they were shared. He got the fractious ownership group to share more traditional revenue. He showed them the power of consensus. He settled for small gains here and there. Selig gained the other owners' confidence. Even though 1994-95 was nothing short of a disaster, he proved to owners that they could stick together—much the same way the players learned the same lesson during the mass holdout of 1969 and the strike of 1972.

Selig tinkered with the game: three divisions, a wild card, inter-league play. He strong-armed communities into building luxurious ballparks for his cabal. The owners were learning the lesson Miller had taught the players: If they listened, and learned, this guy could make them some serious coin if they got with the program.

Fehr and Orza yawned. They had the big stick. They had something else. They had become complacent. They had become so fixated on pushing up the salary bar that they ignored issues important to a large segment of their membership—on their wants and needs.

While Selig was building, players were signing $20+ million-a-year contracts. Some players were earning $25 million, others $300,000. Fehr ignored the rumblings of players who didn’t understand the issues in 1994-95 and why they were on strike. They were on strike because they were told that’s what they had to do; nobody explained to them why they should risk their careers where they were making $115,000 year and had to compete in every spring training for a major league job just so a handful of guys could make $7 million a year rather than $6 million.

Fehr didn’t have to explain. When you have the big stick, explanations become unnecessary. The MLBPA was the most powerful labor union on earth. The MLBPA had turned indentured servants into multi-millionaires. That’s all the explanation you need, son—now do your part. While this was going on, Selig was patiently bringing the owners together.

Marvin Miller predicted that when one side becomes complacent, the other side grows bolder, and that holding your place, marking time, attempting to maintain the status quo was an invitation to be shoved backwards. He also felt that the reason the MLBPA usually kicked ownership’s butts was because the owners didn’t learn from history.

Fehr has done both. He let the union become complacent. He also forgot what gave the union victory over ownership: consensus and the fact that money splintered ownership interests. Alex Rodriguez might make $27 million next year while a number of rookies and journeymen will earn $380,000. Fehr didn't feel that salary stratification would create problems, despite history demonstrating conclusively that it was a big hinderance to unity. Fehr was so focused on the salary bar that he had no idea how his membership felt on the steroid issue.

Think about that: The use of performance-enhancing drugs was a huge issue to players, yet Fehr and Orza had no idea what the real members of the MLBPA—the players themselves—thought about it. What are the chances they’ve spoken to players about “lesser” issues players face?

There. Is. No. Consensus. In. The. MLBPA.

A large number of players have never been part of a work stoppage. Only a handful were affected by collusion. More and more players are coming in from around the world. How many of them have been educated about the importance of the union and its history? How many know how the current system came to be and the sacrifices made? What does the modern player know about his sport? They’re taught: Get a good agent, get teams bidding and watch the money roll in.

Now things are starting to swing back the other way. There are restrictions on salaries. There is revenue sharing. There is significant drug testing. To be sure, some came from outside pressures but make no mistake: Don Fehr knows that his big stick is starting to splinter. Selig has discovered the power of consensus and the MLBPA isn’t as powerful.

As much as it shocks me to type this, it appears the roles played by Marvin Miller and Bowie Kuhn have been reversed. The man with the big stick is Don Fehr. The man gaining power over a seemingly overwhelmingly powerful opponent by patiently teaching his employers the power of consensus and unity is Bud Selig.

Amazing.







Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2012-11-29T08:31:15+00:00 Five questions: Toronto Blue Jays http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/five-questions-the-toronto-blue-jays1/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/five-questions-the-toronto-blue-jays1/#When:05:05:15
Regardless: This offseason should always be thrown in their faces whenever the Jays’ brass complain about player costs—they had the most club-friendly, bargain basement player marketplace in the history of free agency and doggedly abstained, letting the other four clubs in the division take advantage of the savings (well, maybe not the Yankees—they never pay anything but top dollar as a rule).

Adding insult to injury, not only did the organization all but make the marketing slogan for this season “Wait ’til next year” but it added that the budget for 2010 will be largely based on how the club does at the box office in the first half of 2009. What the front office is saying is that not only did it sabotage enthusiasm for aught-nine but the decison-makers will base the next offseason’s activity on the self-inflicted depressed interest in the marketplace.

This is supposed to build consumer confidence that this front office can put together a winning club? Who is in charge of marketing? This is the greatest demonstration of generating fan excitement seen in Canada since Jeffrey Loria and David Samson were running the Montreal Expos.

So, what questions are facing your 2009 Toronto Blue Jays?

1. Can the Jays find at least 450 league average innings beyond Roy Halladay and Jesse Litsch?


The Toronto Blue Jays are without 484 innings of 3.92 ERA starting pitching with the losses of A.J. Burnett (Yankees), Shaun Marcum (Tommy John surgery) and Dustin McGowan (tentative return: May-June 2009). That’s a major hit for any contending team. The Blue Jays’ front office dealt with the disaster swiftly and decisively by opting not to contend this season.

That’s not the solution I would’ve chosen, but then again, I’d prefer the Jays to invest rather than kiss the sagging gluteal region of commissioner Selig in hopes of equalization payments from the low loonie (again, not a description of yours truly despite the strong resemblance). However, that’s not the major league way (look to our brother Jeffrey Loria: he will show us the way) under P.T. Selig the master collusionist.

But I digress.

Anyway, on the bright side, Cito Gaston will have plenty of intriguing options in rebuilding the rotation: David Purcey, Casey Janssen, Brett Cecil, Brad Mills, Rickey and Davis Romero, Mike Maroth, Matt Clement, Wade Miller, Scott Richmond and of course the return of McGowan.

Despite my earlier snark, with the talent on hand coupled with the backing of one of baseball’s top relief corps and defensive units, I feel that this will be a pleasant surprise in aught-nine. Some official predictions we can all enjoy a good laugh over at the end of September: Purcey will establish himself as a slightly better than league average starter and Cecil will open a few eyes with his electric stuff, although he’ll have a few missteps along the way. Doc will be Doc, Litsch will throw 200 innings with a sub 4.00 ERA, Scott Richmond will have a .500 record (not that W-L records mean much) and average six innings and be compared with Woody Williams circa 1997-98 whenever he starts and by September McGowan will have Jays fans eager for 2010 to arrive.

2. Will Gaston be able to coax a better than league average offense from the personnel on hand?


This much is certain: The offense was a much different beast under Gaston and Gene Tenace than it was under John Gibbons and Gary Denbo. One stressed taking a lot of pitches and going the other way whereas the other was more suited to the talent on hand: using an intelligent aggressive approach about having a plan, waiting for a particular pitch and creaming it. One had the hitters do things a certain way, the other building on what they already do well.

The results spoke for themselves.

If Scott Rolen is healthy and Lyle Overbay has no lingering effects from offseason hernia surgeries they should be improved. However, Overbay likely will be slowed (I’ve had the operation) at the beginning of the season. On the other hand, Jose Bautista likely will bat against lefties, so the offense from the position should be better. Both Alex Rios and Vernon Wells should start hotter than in 2008, but Wells' wonky hamstring is a wild card.

Speaking of wild cards: Production from Adam Lind, Travis Snider and Aaron Hill is a wait-and-see proposition while catcher and shortstop will likely be sub-par—it’ll be tricky but Gaston should be able to coax league average or slightly better from the talent on hand. Finally, a big bugaboo last season was the abysmal situational hitting under the previous regime. Odds are that won’t happen again. I hope.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the club received far, far below league average production from spots generally reserved for big boppers last year: left field (until Lind arrived) and DH. Even if Lind/Snider/whoever produce at average levels for the positions, it will represent a huge upgrade from what the Jays received in 2008. Let’s face it, it would be difficult to duplicate the production of Brad Wilkerson, Kevin Mench, Shannon Stewart, Frank Thomas and (the post-May 15 edition of) Matt Stairs short of throwing games.

3. How effective will McGowan be when he returns from surgery?


The last thing to return to a pitcher coming off surgery is command—and the biggest issue with McGowan at the major league level was/is command. Expect early struggles for the big righty. but we’ll probably see the old McGowan by August or September.

4. Can Aaron Hill re-establish himself as a top-flight second sacker?


It may be a couple of months into the season before we find this out; Hill is a notoriously slow starter who generally warms with the weather and really hits his stride in August and September. If he starts slowly, no one really will know whether it’s rust stemming from his long layoff due to his Eckussion or he’s just being himself.

For the optimists among us, he’ll be just 27 and he’ll be busting his butt to make it back. One reason his concussion took so long to recover from is that he was ignoring his doctor’s advice and working out when he was supposed to be resting. His problems started to clear after he began heeding the old sawbone's advice. Suffice it to say, the man is intense and desperately wants to play and contribute. It will be interesting to see how he works with Gaston and Tenace. It strikes me as a match made in heaven.

5. Is Adam Lind a full time regular or platoon LF/1B/DH?


The position itself is irrelevant; the man will not be in the everyday lineup due to his defense. What will determine Lind’s role will be whether he can readjust to adjustment AL pitchers made to him after his hot start following his recall. He returned and batted .329/.362/.600 over his first 47 games and when pitchers stopped feeding him fastballs he hit just .255/.287/.292 with nary a round-tripper until it was time to go home.

In the “sample size alert” category, Lind is just .240/.293/.359 against southpaws at the big league level, but that’s in just 167 at-bats. Regardless, he has hit at every level (with power) and has demonstrated that he can mash right-handed big leaguers; he’ll be 26 in mid-July, so the time is now for young Mr. Lind. If he can adjust to the breaking stuff he should be able to adapt to facing lefties as well. If he doesn’t make a significant impact this year (say, a 120 OPS+ and 20 homers assuming 500+ AB) he may find himself working as a spare part/platoon player. He is not gifted enough defensively to make up for shortcomings with the bat.

Overview


Despite the snark, I’m not ready to give up hope for the 2009 Toronto Blue Jays. There is bona fide talent available in both quantity and quality for the starting rotation—the only thing to worry about is inexperience. I think Purcey will have a better year than Burnett. With the defensive and bullpen support he has, Gaston will be able to cobble together enough quality innings from some combination of Janssen, Cecil, Richmond, Mills, the Romeros, Maroth, Clement, Miller and McGowan to create 350-plus frames of league average work.

The offense—while nobody’s idea of a juggernaut—will have fewer black holes (defined as when the hitting sucks so hard that it creates a vortex where runs cannot possibly escape) and a solid middle of the order with improved situational hitting under Gaston.

I am not sold on the Yankees' rebuild; they’ve been adding talented superstars for the better part of the decade without finding the right mix. C.C. Sabathia will be good but it would be naïve to think that we’ll see the Milwaukee edition of him when you consider that he had an ERA+ of 116 in the AL last season and faced the Yankees once and the Red Sox not at all. He’s thrown a ton of innings the last two years and both Randy Johnson and Kevin Brown didn’t deliver as promised the Bronx.

The Yankees have had a fair number of talented arms wither under the New York spotlight, so I’m not prepared to anoint Sabathia as the second coming of anything at this point. Burnett has yet to throw consecutive seasons of 180+ innings and he’s coming off the greatest workload of his career. Mike Mussina is gone, Andy Pettitte is a year older, Joba Chamberlain has yet to throw 150 innings in a season and none of the vaunted kiddie corps have really proven they can handle a full season.

The lineup is aging, the defense is improved only at a non-vital position (Mark Teixeira at first base) and is dubious up the middle and the bullpen behind Mo Rivera is sketchy.

Color me skeptical as respects their chances.

While the Rays are solid, they received more than 150 starts from their Opening Day rotation last year. I’m betting that won’t happen again, and young teams have been known to regress.

Bottom line: I’m not willing to consign the Blue Jays to the bottom of the AL East standings just yet. Yes, they’re in tough but they play the games for a reason. Remember, just one year ago anybody who predicted that the Tampa Bay Rays would play in the World Series would’ve been written off as certifiably insane.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2009-03-19T05:05:15+00:00 A-Reck http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/a-reck/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/a-reck/#When:05:03:15
Now if we could only do something about Jeffrey Loria and David Samson.

But I digress.

Anyway, the more I think about it, the more I think Scott Boras has been a very destructive influence on Alex Rodriguez.

Oh sure, he’s helped him make a ton of money but I think it’s safe to say that his skills would have made him a wealthy man regardless of who represented him as an agent. Nevertheless, I do think that absent Boras, Rodriguez might be a better player and certainly he would be better liked.

It goes far beyond 252, although it did play a factor. His free agency at the end of the 2000 season was a definite turning point for A-Rod insofar as being both a baseball player and an icon.

Of note, when he was with the Seattle Mariners, it was Ken Griffey Jr. and not Rodriguez that was king in the clubhouse. A-Rod enjoyed a single season as “top dog” (although he would have had to share that status with Edgar Martinez) and after he left as a free agent there weren’t all the stories about the special privileges he enjoyed there as there were when Junior was dealt to the Cincinnati Reds. The slugging shortstop assumed a leadership role on the 2000 Mariners, and it appears that he wasn’t given the type of perks and privileges that would cause other players to resent him in the Pacific Northwest.

However, when he became a free agent, Boras made it known that a team would have to move heaven and earth to land him—it was entirely about what a club could do for Alex Rodriguez; as Boras put it, it was about ‘their desire to bring A-Rod to them.’ Allegedly he demanded a long list of perks from the New York Mets, and even though Boras denied asking for such things, he did get a lot of them out of the Texas Rangers.

Did these perks originate in the mind of Boras or Rodriguez?

While it might be tempting to blame A-Rod for such outrageous demands, don’t forget, Boras is always looking to push the envelope insofar as contracts go (and few free agents have ever enjoyed the leverage he had) and made sure the deal with Texas included escalator clauses and opt outs. Boras is going to ask for the moon since it helps him recruit players to his stable. Heck, when one considers how badly Rodriguez wants to be liked, it’s hard to imagine that he could sit down one day and come up with a long list of items of special treatment that he would want on his own.

I’m willing to bet that Boras seeded the young man’s mind about what he could get and what he’d be worth to a club; oh sure, I’m not saying that Rodriguez might have a few goodies in mind himself but the scope and extent seems out of place for a 25-year-old baseball fanatic who wouldn’t even be entirely certain of what might be available.

Ironically, it was shortly after the contract was signed that Rodriguez—with Boras at his side—made the comments to Esquire magazine downplaying Derek Jeter’s contributions to the Yankees’ success.

I wonder who put the comparisons to Jeter in his mind in the first place? Here's his remark: "Jeter's been blessed with great talent around him ... He's never had to lead. He can just go and play and have fun. And he hits second—that's totally different than third and fourth in a lineup. You go into New York, you wanna stop Bernie [Williams] and [Paul] O'Neill. You never say, Don't let Derek beat you. He's never your concern." That always sounded to me like something Boras might say to an owner or general manager on selling why Rodriguez is a more valuable property to a team (hence worth more money) than a guy with four rings.

Regardless, Rodriguez was made king in the Arlington clubhouse and his every wish would be somebody’s command. To his credit, A-Rod wanted to live up to the contract and allegedly his desire to do so is what got him dabbling in anabolic steroids.

He had this environment for three years; by the time he reached the Yankees, the concept of getting his own cup of coffee was foreign to him. He had gotten into the habit of saying jump and having someone on hand ask “how high?” Further, when you consider the close relationship between Boras and the Rangers during this period of time it’s reasonable to conclude that the care and keeping of one Alex Emmanuel Rodriguez was a frequent topic of conversation.

It was in Texas that Rodriguez would’ve become truly obsessed with his stats and conditioned to think that’s all that matters. After all, great stats translate into winning baseball—who is gonna argue that a Gold Glove shortstop that can clobber 50 home runs isn’t a huge asset to a winning team?

One problem though--despite his amazing numbers in Arlington, they were accumulated in an almost stress-free environment. In 2001, the Rangers were 16 games out of first place on May 15 and went 15-20 over the next 35 games. The following season they were nine out on May 16 and again went 15-20; in 2003, Texas was again nine out (albeit on May 15) and despite a seven-game winning streak that gained them but one game in the standings, they went 4-23 thereafter tumbling to 23 games back.

In short, the Texas Rangers were never in it, and by the time June 1 rolled around, there was nothing left but to focus on his own numbers. After all, in his mind they were paying him all that jack to put up huge totals; that would be his contribution to winning baseball.

However, that’s three years of being treated like a king and never facing any real pressure to perform where the team is counting on you to carry them to the promised land. The club is playing out the string long before the All-Star break.

With the trade from the Rangers to the Yankees he was dropped from an almost pressure-free environment where all he had to worry about was accumulating gaudy stats to the ultimate pressure cooker where nobody gives a damn what your numbers are and the expectation is winning the World Series or bust. This was a place where the team had won six pennants and four world championships in the previous eight seasons and was coming off a stinging six-game loss to the Florida Marlins. They didn’t expect A-Rod to hit 50 bombs—they expected him to get the Yankees back to the top of the heap.

Yet Rodriguez hadn’t played a meaningful game since 2000 and now had to share a clubhouse with the man he trashed who was still stinging from those remarks. Further, it was a clubhouse where folks got their own coffee and he would be expected to subordinate his own goals to those of the team without the special treatment he had become accustomed to in Arlington.

Can you say “culture shock?”

252 had already made him a pariah, and while he started red hot in the 2004 postseason batting .424/.472/.788 over the first seven games spanning the LDS win over the Twins and the first three games against the Red Sox, he hit a slump at the absolute worst possible time against the worst possible team—one that almost landed him had his contract not been quite so large. The image from the biggest collapse in baseball postseason history was Rodriguez slapping the ball out of the glove of Bronson Arroyo.

Three more postseasons came and went and the Yankees couldn’t win a series and A-Rod was all but invisible in all of them. After being eliminated in 2007 by the Cleveland Indians (where he was decent, but far below his MVP form of the regular season) Scott Boras disrupted the Fall Classic by announcing that Rodriguez was opting out of the final three years of the most lucrative sports contract ever signed.

For a master of PR, Boras really stepped in it—while the Yankees and their fans were stewing over yet another October one-and-out, the player that is perceived by many to be about money and stats rather than winning and rings is putting himself in a position where it looks like he is leaving the team probably most committed to winning the World Series in search of yet more lucre after a season of statistical greatness.

Ugh.

What better way to reinforce every negative stereotype about Rodriguez than to use a year where he put up amazing numbers in the regular season but couldn’t sustain it when it counted in the minds of a critical public and using those (regular season) stats for more money even if it meant he landed on a club less devoted to success than the Yanks.

To his credit, Rodriguez wanted none of that and booted Boras to the curb and built a bridge back to the Bronx.

While Boras helped negotiate another 10-year deal, in year one he hit like a Hall of Famer with nobody on base (.329/.401/.679; 23 HR) and decently enough, but far worse with runners in scoring position (.271/.406/.458; 8 HR). The Yankees missed the postseason for the first time since the strike. This was followed by an offseason where he was forced to admit using steroids and will miss the first part of the season (and the opening of a new ballpark) after hip surgery.

He has no goodwill to fall back on.

Rodriguez stated that he always wanted to be a Met—one has to wonder what direction his career would’ve taken had he enjoyed different representation and an agent who was more interested in serving his client than setting new standards and concepts in major league contracts.

Would A-Rod have been a Met at eight years/$184 million (just a guesstimate) and still battle hardened from his time in Seattle with a different agent and helped the Mets again reach the World Series in 2001? A contract like that wouldn’t have stuck out as much from the deal Manny Ramirez signed, and the consensus was that Rodriguez would land something in the range of $200 million. He would’ve gone to a winning team where he’d be fulfilling a childhood dream.

Assuming he’s telling the truth, maybe a $184 million deal wouldn’t have made him feel pressured to juice, and the three years of simply playing for stats in Texas never occurred. He’d go on to build upon the legend he began in Seattle. He wouldn’t have been royalty in the Mets clubhouse with Mike Piazza and Robin Ventura to help him stay on an even keel, and he wouldn't have developed the bad habits he acquired in Texas as the crown prince of Rangers baseball and the only reason to watch the team after the first of June.

Sadly, he will always be linked with the most despised man in the game—Scott Boras did make him a lot of money, but he would’ve been rich in any event. Alex Rodriguez may be the author of some of his problems (as we all are), but I think Scott Boras ruined him.

In an alternative time line Alex Rodriguez may have been a legend instead of an enigma.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2009-03-18T05:03:15+00:00 Follow the…Buddy? http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/follow-thebuddy/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/follow-thebuddy/#When:04:04:15
And I have one question regarding Miguel Tejada: Where’s the hate? He used performance-enhancing drugs, he lied to the government—where are the calls to exorcise him from the sport? What’s the matter—isn’t he rich enough for people’s scorn? Did the media fail to tell you why you should want to see him in jail since society needs to be protected from medium-size-headed liars?

It just goes to show—unless you signed a deal that makes people jealous or won’t kiss up to the media, you can pretty much do as you please without raising the ire of the enlightened. Tejada should thank his deity of choice that he became a free agent in a tough market or folks would be calling for his head regardless of its current dimensions.

But I digress. This isn’t about that, I just thought it deserved a mention. After all, what about the children, right?

Anyway, this is about Barry Bonds in a roundabout way in that this (potentially) wouldn’t have happened without the charm and winning personality of everybody’s favourite cranial eclipse.

Believe it or not, Jack Marshall and I chat online frequently about these issues, quite amicably thank-you-very-much and we will be doing a post-arbitration ruling (on the Bonds collusion case against MLB) roundtable discussion here at THT. If MLB is acquitted, I will dine on Corvus Corax-a-la-King with Mr. Marshall pouring my choice of whine to wash it down and if Bonds’ complaint is upheld then expect major Selig-bashing from the both of us. We may differ on what has occurred regarding Barry Lamar, but are completely united on the scourge that is the commissioner of baseball.

One of the points Marshall (and others) have brought up is that the major league cartel is filled with Gordon Gekko disciples and as such would sell their daughters’ virtue on e-Bay to make a buck if people didn’t object (or find out about it).

I guess I should state that is a bit of hyperbole to make the point.

With my posterior suitably shielded, we can continue. Anyway, that being the case, why would teams not follow the money and sign Bonds since, despite the protestations of the media (I mean, if Elijah Dukes doesn’t repel fans, nothing will) he could help win games, help a team in a pennant race. And he could sell tickets if for no other reason than that the fans could jeer and lavish him in their self-righteous indignation over his influence over their children before driving home half drunk going well over the speed limit before telling their spouses that they didn’t drink anything but Pepsi at the park since the kids were along.

Just saying.

I mean, it’s follow the money, right? And owners always follow their financial best interests, do they not?

They do.

There’s the rub, you see; money doesn’t travel in a linear path, especially in major league baseball. Now, Bonds could have paid dividends for a handful of teams in 2008, as I have alluded to once or twice here. (Hi Hendo! Still not reading THT because of me?)

We’ll pause while he backspaces out of here before anybody notices. He’s saving his comments for Ball-Hype, where he’ll inform me that he didn’t read the article and disagrees with what I wrote unconditionally and completely.

Ain’t I a stinker?

Anyway, so Barry Lamar gives a nice little revenue bump in 2008, but what about 2009, 2010 and beyond?

What do I mean? Glad you asked.

Bud Selig is a politician and as one he accumulates a lot of political capital through a number of means, thereby getting clubs indebted to him. As I have mentioned on a few occasions when bellyaching about the Blue Jays, they received equalization payments when the Canadian dollar was low and doubtlessly are hoping for more; this is the reason they‘re going to do what Bud wants when he wants it.

In the last decade (or so), he’s gone to bat for a large number of franchises to line up public money for stadium construction. For instance: He got the Red Sox and Marlins into his back pocket by engineering the sales of those teams to the second-highest bidder (John Henry’s group) and providing loans to Finky and the Brainless in South Florida that became outright cash grants and hand-picked the group to get the Expos (*sob*) in D.C. not to mention the small matter of the $600+ million stadium there 100 percent paid for by the good citizens of the U.S. nation’s (lack of) capital.

Czar Bud is the great dispenser of goodies and because of this clubs could find that it is more financially prudent to stay on the good (such as it is) side of Selig for years to come rather than enjoy the short term benefits of employing the Antichrist‘s mentor and BFF.

After all, you may find yourself saddled with a massive contract courtesy of a Boras-inspired impulse purchase and find someone willing to take said FISCAL BRAIN FART off your hands provided you pick up a chunk of the deal. You’d better hope you’re in the commissioner's office's good graces when you ask for approval of the trade, since a large wad of bills will be changing hands. Clubs realize that it might be wise to hedge their bets and strongly consider any “informal recommendations” made by the man in charge.

For all his myriad faults, Selig is very good at working a room and building up a reserve of goodwill and favor among the cartel. He has accumulated a lot of political capital among the clubs (only a small fraction ever becomes public knowledge) and he has the chits to call in. Let’s face it: having discretionary control over the Central Fund doesn’t hurt either.

Bear in mind that Bonds is a symbol to Selig and think of precisely what that particular emblem represents: his failure to address steroids, his friend losing the home run record, having probably never imagined that his lack of diligence and lust for profits and his “renaissance” would cost “The Hammer” the crown. He desperately wishes to be remembered as the commissioner who rid the sport of steroids and not the one that allowed it to flourish unchecked. Bonds was a living, breathing indictment of Selig’s failure and true legacy; watching the commissioner's reaction after home run 755 cleared the fence said it all.

In a sense, A-Rod’s travails help insure that his actual legacy will not be forgotten although his harem in the media will do their level best to make sure that the public thinks it’s all the “greedy players'” fault and not the commissioner who makes almost thirty times what his predecessor earned.

It is personal for Selig and he has accumulated enough clout, political capital and chits owed to indulge his feelings and attempt to create a fictitious heritage of his commissionership. On a more practical level, it also allows him to posture for Congress; I mean, how would it look if the poster boy for steroids and Public Enemy No. 1 in baseball was allowed to put the record further out of reach for a clean slugger to top?

If the feds became even more involved in the issue it might bring a level of testing and penalties to the sport that would further unmask the flaws of the current program—Selig’s pride and joy—and bring about more severe penalties resulting from more comprehensive testing that could cost the game the superstar, ticket-selling-level players and the revenues they provide.

He needed baseball to have the illusion of being as steroid-free as possible while the politicos were making hay with the issue for both for his legacy and maintaining the profitable status quo. Barry Bonds potentially served as a convenient scapegoat to that end: Remove the symbol and the “scourge” follows in the public and media’s eye… the ones before whom the government looks to posture.

Selig knows the fourth estate will fall in step because of its dislike of BLB and the public mindset: Get rid of Bonds and you’ve rid the sport of steroids. Just check out the feedback section on articles dealing with Bonds and various message boards. Up to the point when Sports Illustratedbroke the Rodriguez story, Bonds “was” steroids and as such needed to be exorcised with extreme prejudice. The media provided necessary “cover fire” for any collusion to take place, assuring one and all that “common sense” was simply prevailing as it had in the 1980s conspiracy against free agents.

This is why it’s not crazy for clubs that might have been interested in employing him to understand where their financial best interests lie: one year of Bonds vs. staying on Selig’s good side for years to come—and all the more so when they know how strong his feelings are on the matter.

It’s an easy choice. Hence, a team can both agree to a conspiracy regarding a player while simultaneously “following the money.”

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2009-02-20T04:04:15+00:00 A slap at liberty… http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/a-slap-at-liberty/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/a-slap-at-liberty/#When:07:25:15
Got it? Good.

Now let’s use it and get a grip.

Imagine the following:

You wake up thinking somewhat fuzzily: “Wow, that was some party eh?” (Yes, we party in Canada.)

Well, maybe you couldn’t remember all the details but what the heck—nobody died right? Besides, at least you remembered to go to your doctor’s appointment later this afternoon.

Years pass.

A knock on the door; there are two men in suits and ask if you’ve ever used illegal narcotics.

Indignant, you deny such an accusation … you’re no saint to be sure but some lines aren’t to be crossed. For all your faults you view yourself as a solid citizen and try to live by the golden rule (although you do indulge yourself in imagining certain exquisite tortures on those refugees from natural selection who never learned the proper operation of their motor vehicles).

However, they show the result of a blood and urinalysis taken several years ago that prove that you ingested an illegal drug.

You have no recollection of ever doing so—but there is the evidence. Suddenly the logical question arises: just where did they get their hands on the results of one of your blood and urine tests? You later discover that your doctor’s office was raided by a law enforcement agency for an unrelated investigation.

What ever happened to doctor-patient confidentiality?

Hey, they were investigating a serious matter and when going through the records they came across the results of your tests. Suddenly you learn that the IRS/Revenue Canada wish to audit your tax returns for the last few years, seeing as you might be a disreputable sort (you did ingest an illegal substance and therefore must in league with the forces of darkness—that is just the way it is). After all, there’s no way of knowing whether you’re selling the type of narcotic found in your system to minors, and it doesn‘t hurt to check to see if your income matches your job description, right? Surely giving up a couple of civil liberties is a small price to pay to make sure the children are kept safe from drug dealers.

Uh oh … nobody likes being audited.

Since you were stupid enough to dispose of some of the receipts from years back since you’d never need them again and besides, you might have taken a small liberty here or there. It was harmless (heck, everybody does it), you needed the money more than the government, and c’mon,how can anyone steal their own money?

Suddenly you’re hit with a big tax bill plus interest; money is tight. Do you hire a lawyer and fight?

Just when you didn’t think it could any worse, someone you confided in happens to know your employer, things get embellished in the retelling, and the boss feels that it’s wrong that to have a drug user and a tax cheat on the payroll and reacts accordingly.

You’re out of a job.

You’re informed that you may be charged with providing false information to a government official—after all, you answered that you had never taken drugs, but your test came up positive—that one party perhaps?

You’re up the creek.

Now to add salt to the wound, your neighbous and some of your relatives are unsympathetic—serves ya right for using illegal drugs and cheating on your income tax; the best you can do under the circumstances is apply for legal aid. When all is said and done, you have to pay back taxes plus interest, you won’t go to jail but you now have a criminal record.

But, but … you’re an honest, law-abiding citizen. How could this have happened?

Good question.

Well, among the players that tested positive in the 2003 survey testing, there may have been a small number of false positives and a couple of players who did take a tainted supplement. However, regardless of any potential extenuating circumstances, in the minds of the general public, they are hard core juicers, who probably went trick or treating for testosterone, ate Winstrol and eggs for breakfast, grilled Trenbolone sandwiches for lunch, served testosterone-bone steak for supper and washed it down with “Clear.”

To admit to anything less makes them liars; to defend themselves only solidifies their guilt. Their careers will be irrevocably altered if they’re still in the league, their families will have to endure the barbs of folks in desperate need of a life and self-affirmation at the expense of their betters.

Serves ‘em right for being ballplayers, right? They should’ve known what they were taking into their bodies 24/7/365; they should be able to recall what they have done every moment of their lives and if they don’t, they deserve what’s coming to them.

How dare they make more in a year than you’ll make in the next 20; for playing a game too—the nerve!

Make no mistake—if it can happen to them, it can happen to you. This is the real story in the recent A-Rod saga; it’s the story that will get little coverage in the media’s schadenfreude that Slappy McBluelips has finally been outed for the fraud that he is (in the small minds of many); that finally, after all these years he will receive the punishment he deserved for having the audacity of accepting a proffered quarter billion dollars instead of saying “Let the poor billionaire keep his money, give me less, a lot less so the people who will boo my sorry ass when my skills start to slip can feel better about their miserable little lives” eight years ago.

Just remember this: when a promise or confidence has been broken, and you’re the victim of the arbitrary and capricious act of another, that it was you that applauded this approach to things. It’s your own petard on which you will be hoisted.

Just pray that you’ve been a Boy (or Girl) Scout your entire life, never ingested a single illegal chemical during adolescence (or adulthood), never cheated on a test or homework assignment at school, never broke a single traffic law, always paid every nickel of tax owed, never told a car dealer or real estate agent about a better offer that didn’t exist, never took an unauthorized extended break from your job or never downloaded copyrighted materials without paying otherwise you’re:

a) A lying fraud and cheat that should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law without mercy or sympathy.
b) Human

Bottom line: major league baseball players are not the ones you should be offended by in all this; they are no danger to your liberty. But the actions of the government in all this are; as Fyodor Dostoevsky once said: “Nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer; nothing is more difficult than to understand him” and we should understand that the evil we condemn in ballplayers is simply our jealousy mutating the seeing of our humanity in them.

The story that you need to know is that your privacy is no longer assured and hopefully you lived your life in such a way that you knew that this day would come.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2009-02-11T07:25:15+00:00 THT EXCLUSIVE : Feds raid dog house on spinster’s property http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/tht-exclusivefeds-raid-dog-house-on-spinsters-property/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/tht-exclusivefeds-raid-dog-house-on-spinsters-property/#When:05:02:15 five World Series, 9/11 and a black president...she has seen crew cuts, hippies and mullets, horses and buggies and cars breaking the sound barrier.

But she never had seen anything like this: She was getting her morning cup of tea ready when she glanced in the backyard of her modest two-bedroom home to see her dog, Chester, being restrained by federal agents while other agents were crammed into her pet’s doghouse.

It took a moment to dawn on her that she was the subject of a federal raid; no sooner had she realized this when her front door came crashing in and her living room was swarming with agents and local police brandishing guns with the canine unit in tow.

It was the culmination of a days-long investigation—and an embarrassing gaffe by the IRS and the DEA.

When queried, a red faced Jeff Novitzky of the IRS stammered that it was an honest mistake.

What had occurred was this—in the ongoing investigation into perjury charges against former San Francisco Giants left fielder Barry Bonds, Novitzky had heard rumors of a backyard lab involving Barry Bonds and an associate of Bonds’ trainer and friend Greg Anderson.

However, Bate’s “association” with Anderson was that she was his nursery school teacher back in 1969.

Novitzky had tapes from wiretaps of Bate’s phone where she repeatedly referred to “Barry Bonds,” plus mentioning her “lab in the backyard,” a reference to “that big black S.O.B. gets bigger every time I see him” as well as a passing remark about “bettering Hank Aaron.” Once the link with Anderson was confirmed through local Board of Education records, the agent wasted little time in coordinating a raid of the woman’s home hoping to find evidence to convict Bonds of perjury and pressure Anderson into testifying against him at the upcoming March trial.

When interrogated, Bate had little recollection of Anderson save that he was “an odd kid” and she’d never seen any child try to get other children to try what he referred to as “Flintstones Injectables.” The feds realized their mistake when she told Novitzky that the wiretap in question was her complaining to her neighbor that Chester was ruining her yard since he would continually bury bones there.

Novitzky played the tape and Bate is heard saying “Oh mercy me, I’m still having problems with my lab in the backyard. Yeah, him—the big black S.O.B. gets bigger every time I see him, every day it‘s the same dad-blasted problem—bury bones, bury bones, bury bones.” When asked to explain the comment about “bettering Hank Aaron” a flustered Bate replied “My neighbor said she could smell that I was baking tarts and I told her I was because I had a butter-pecan hankerin'.”

“It’s an honest mistake—all the pieces were there; Anderson, the lab, the big black S.O.B. the works!” said an initially shaken Novitzky. "How can anybody expect me to tell the difference whether somebody is saying 'bury bones' or 'Barry Bonds'—dammit, I'm a federal agent and not a phonics professor."

Bate is considering litigation after showing the press the cuts and contusions she received during the interrogation process while simultaneously claiming the dog was traumatized by the experience as well and complaining that those that raided her home not only completely ruined her front door but didn’t wipe their feet before they came in or let her get fully dressed before being questioned. “Land sakes, they wouldn‘t even let a body get a shawl on.”

Novitzky disputes her claims about the interrogation and that the canine was in any way affected, stating: “She's a spinster for God's sake, it's probably the first time she's ever been touched by a man so she's probably a little confused when it finally occurred. Besides, if she sues, she ought to take some of that money and get the stupid thing neutered—my knee still hurts and who is going to pay for my dry cleaning bill? I also think she should take a good look at herself in the mirror—she admits involvement with Anderson which links her to Bonds and when you become entangled with those kinds of people bad things are going to happen to you. Ms. Bate ought to simply chalk it up to hard experience and take a lesson away from all this.”

The IRS agent appeared visibly pleased with the cheers of Bate’s neighbours and assembled media when the situation was put into that context.

Novitzky also urged perspective, maintaining that they should all bear in mind who really is responsible “I don’t know how Barry (Bonds) can live with himself knowing all the suffering he is causing by not coming clean—look at what this poor woman suffered because of him; her outward bruises will heal but the scars on her psyche never will and he'll have to be held accountable for that. This whole mess could have been avoided had he confessed right from the beginning instead of costing the taxpayers tens of million of dollars.

"At the very least Bonds should get prison time, at least for that nasty personality. Society needs protected from big-headed liars. I haven't ruled out getting the Department of Homeland Security involved—I view him as that big a threat to the well being of our great nation. Osama can wait,” he added to thunderous applause and spontaneous outbreaks of “God Bless America.”

However, the attorney for the Bate family was indignant with the federal agents, stating that even the Mafia spares the Whippets and Chow Chows.

While regretting the misunderstanding, Novitzky was confident that the public would understand that when doing God’s work, some collateral damage is to be expected: “Ms. Bate will sleep better at night knowing that if a ballplayer is nasty to the media, the government will hunt them down like dogs and spare no expense in putting them behind bars.”

Novitzky was escorted to his car on the shoulders of the local citizenry.

Bonds' trial date for facing perjury and obstruction of justice charges is March 2.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2009-02-06T05:02:15+00:00 The wrong kind of loyalty in baseball http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-wrong-kind-of-loyalty-in-baseball/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-wrong-kind-of-loyalty-in-baseball/#When:05:03:15
Some have wondered if there might be some collusion going on in the marketplace, because let’s face it—Bud Selig will pounce on any opportunity to either drive player salaries downward or “consummate” stadium deals on the public dime. Of course, when you look up the word consummate you get the following: “2. fulfill relationship through sex: to bring a relationship to completion, or gratify a desire, especially by having sexual intercourse (often passive)
3. conclude something: to bring something such as a business deal to a conclusion (formal).” When it comes to dealing with communities the line gets a little blurry between the two definitions when Selig is involved.

But I digress.

The thing is, if there’s one kind of fan I do feel sorry for are the ones whose rooting interests are owned by Selig loyalists, because unless you’re an exceptionally wealthy team with a sharp front office (or a team with an absolutely brilliant and lucky one), chances are your hopes for postseason baseball aren’t really high unless you catch lightning in a bottle.

Yeah, I’m getting ready for more whining—it felt so good last week that I just needed another session.

You see, as some of you may have divined by my past writings, I am a fan of the Toronto Blue Jays.

Seriously!

I’ve followed the team since its inaugural season of 1977 and have dropped mild hints here and there that this is where my rooting interests lie.

At any rate, the team by all accounts should be among the big boys. Toronto is a large metropolitan area, the team has large chunks of the country as its territory, it's owned by its primary broadcast outlet, and the team owns the stadium lock, stock and barrel.

In the early 1990s the Blue Jays were just that: numero uno in payroll and a financial juggernaut. However, a three-pronged fork was stuck in the team: the strike, the takeover by Interbrew, and quite frankly, the loss of goodwill after treating fans like a snooty maitre d' at a fancy restaurant. During the glory years the team was downright nasty, forbidding fans from watching the home nine take batting practice unless they went to the Hard Rock Cafe and/or Windows Restaurant and paid a cover charge.

The organization became stuck up. The Jays thought they were the new Maple Leafs, who didn't care if they lost a customer because there were 20,000 more waiting in the wings. They were wrong. They went from blowing chunks of goodwill to just plain blowing chunks. The franchise let the fans feel that they weren’t really needed, and when the team stopped winning, the fan base returned the sentiment.

When Rogers Communication took over the franchise, it did invest money and began to promote the club. Things are looking better, but there is something holding the team back.

They’re Selig loyalists.

Why is this so damaging?

To be a Selig loyalist one must view players as an expense (something to keep to a minimum) rather than an investment (a vehicle that can be used to increase profits). Right now, the Jays’ current payroll is based (they say) on projected revenue. However, little thought is given to how wise expenditure might improve that projection.

The reason for that is because an expenditure is viewed as just that—an expense, a loss; it is not viewed as something that might bring a return.

For example: right now, Manny Ramirez could be an investment that pays huge dividends to the organization, yet Rogers Communication, like Selig, thinks only in terms of what he might cost and not the revenue he could potentially generate. It’s a risk-averse strategy that rarely does well in MLB. The Royals, Pirates and Nationals are good examples of the low risk/low return approach to player acquisition. They may bid on a player on occasion, but it is generally an exception to the rule.

Another example of this is the slotting system of the amateur draft. Yes, the draft needs fixing, but at the moment, to get top talent a team generally has to choose to pay over slot or focus on players with lesser gifts and abilities. It’s not a big problem if the club has a top-notch scouting department that is adept at consistently identifying and developing diamonds-in-the-rough and finding undervalued talent, but nobody considers the Toronto to be such an club. Sometimes you have to bite the Boras and invest in the obvious stud.

I may have alluded to the potential collusion of Barry Bonds once or twice (in a roundabout way), and if it is indeed borne out that he was indeed the victim of collusion, once again the team's front office being Selig loyalists hurt the Jays in that Bonds would have solved an obvious problem at minimal cost in both money and talent. Part of the reason for this is that when the Canadian dollar was low a few years back, Selig provided equalization payments to the team to help out. While there would be a degree of gratitude towards the commissioner it would naïve to discount the hope for more of the same.

After all, Selig loyalists are trained to be hard-core welfare hounds often gorging themselves at the teat of the tax base as well as the wealthier members of the ownership cartel. It shouldn’t be surprising that the team acts reflexively when there’s free money to be had and asks Bud if he wants one cheek or both smooched.

Nothing can harm a team in the Jays’ position (competing in the AL East) than hoping for welfare to generate profits rather than wise investment. Instead of trying to build up revenues by putting an exciting competitive club on the field, the risk-averse Selig loyalists put in just enough money to increase interest in the club without the heavy investment required to take on the big boys in the division.

This is what we’re seeing in this offseason: Rogers Communication has money to burn after enjoying a tremendous third quarter. The company is not spending it on the Blue Jays this year, partly due to the economy, but chances are good that Selig’s non-stop proselytizing about being especially fiscally conservative this offseason has the club falling into step. There are bargains to be had in the free agent market where the team needs it most (offense) but the Jays refuse to partake—oddly enough at a time when a plea for equalization payments may be in the offing.

So, from the lowest part of player development (the draft) to decisions regarding the major league roster, the Toronto Blue Jays are looking to stay on the good side of the commissioner’s office lest they upset the welfare cart. Until the team has a terrific player development and scouting system in place, chances are good they’ll need to have everything fall their way before they again see the postseason since the Toronto Blue Jays demonstrate that there’s nothing more damaging to a team’s chances at October baseball than fealty to Selig.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2009-01-21T05:03:15+00:00 Daze of whine and posers http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/daze-of-whine-and-posers/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/daze-of-whine-and-posers/#When:05:03:15
Call it a laxative for the soul or as Shrek once opined, “better out than in I always say.”

I speak of course of whining.

Well, the BBWAA’s Hall of Fame vote for 2009 is in the books and I’m too tired to rant, too distracted to be philosophical and too resigned to be indignant. But I am in the perfect frame of mind to fill up the ol’ grievance pool for a good, prolonged wallowing session.

Nah, not going to be commenting much on Tim Raines receiving 22.6 percent of the vote except to do a one-word editorial on the 77.4 percent that left him off their ballot.

Duuuuuuuuuuuuuuuhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.

If you’re one of the 5.2 percent who saw 3,055 hits, 2,295 runs scored, 2,190 bases on balls, almost 300 home runs and over 1,100 RBIs while batting leadoff and for good measure stole 1,406 bases (topping the previous record by a mere 468 thefts—the difference being good for 42nd all time) and thought “I don’t see a Hall of Fame career here,” might I kindly suggest that once the Q-Tip hits something solid for God’s sake stop pushing.

Thanks to this year’s vote, intelligent designers have close to 28 irrefutable arguments against natural selection.

Leaving that aside, what can we discern from this year’s vote? To begin—while offering congratulations to Rickey and Rice—I think it’s undeniable that the standards for induction haven’t been lowered so much as skewered. Let’s face it; there are a lot of outfielders better than Jim Rice on the outside looking in. What becomes of them?

I leave the final word on Dale Murphy to the estimable Joe Posnanski, because if I had to choose which player I want on my team, I take Murphy over Rice (sounds like a sweet and sour dish from Jeffrey Dahmer’s cookbook) every time. Speaking of other outfielders on the ballot:
 BA    OBP   SLG  AB  Runs Hits  2B 3B  HR  RBI GDP  
.290  .339  .471 9358 1272 2712 526 75 339 1493 209 
.279  .323  .482 9927 1373 2774 503 98 438 1591 217 
.298  .352  .502 8225 1249 2452 373 79 382 1451 315

Yes, Rice enjoys the advantages in the percentages, but the other two played a lot longer, were far superior defensively (at more important positions), one was a better base runner the other has post season hardware but can you honestly say that Rice is a Hall of Famer and the other two: Dave Parker (top) and Andre Dawson (next) are not? Don’t forget, both were damaged; Dawson’s knees gave out and Parker’s woes were self inflicted, but was Rice’s career 331 votes better than Cobra or for that matter 350 better than Murphy or 290 better than Rock Raines? Just for fun, let’s toss in Murphy’s (also a superior defender) totals into the above mix (third from the top) and while we’re at it, just below him we’ll add in Dewey Evans (next one down):
 BA    OBP   SLG  AB  Runs Hits  2B 3B  HR  RBI GDP  
.290  .339  .471 9358 1272 2712 526 75 339 1493 209 
.279  .323  .482 9927 1373 2774 503 98 438 1591 217 
.265  .346  .469 7960 1197 2111 350 39 398 1266 209
.272  .370  .470 8996 1470 2446 483 73 385 1384 227
.298  .352  .502 8225 1249 2452 373 79 382 1451 315

There are 24 Gold Glove awards among the above, and Rice counts for none of them. I’m just using the totals that the majority of the BBWAA use when making such decisions. Just for fun, here are two more outfielders of more recent vintage, but with OPS+ in the range of Rice (listed at bottom):
 BA    OBP   SLG  AB  Runs Hits  2B 3B  HR  RBI GDP  
.291  .363  .510 7232 1253 2107 402 63 352 1206 171
.303  .369  .516 7037 1109 2134 421 39 332 1287 195
.298  .352  .502 8225 1249 2452 373 79 382 1451 315

The new arrivals?

Ellis Burks and Moises Alou. Now let’s toss them into the earlier chart:
Player  BA    OBP   SLG  AB  Runs Hits  2B 3B  HR  RBI GDP  
Parker .290  .339  .471 9358 1272 2712 526 75 339 1493 209 
Dawson .279  .323  .482 9927 1373 2774 503 98 438 1591 217 
Murphy .265  .346  .469 7960 1197 2111 350 39 398 1266 209
Evans  .272  .370  .470 8996 1470 2446 483 73 385 1384 227
Alou   .303  .369  .516 7037 1109 2134 421 39 332 1287 195
Burks  .291  .363  .510 7232 1253 2107 402 63 352 1206 171
Rice   .298  .352  .502 8225 1249 2452 373 79 382 1451 315

Here's the thing: do Jim Rice’s totals jump out at you and scream that he is vastly superior to the rest? Of that group, Rice, highest in double plays by a wide margin, was the only one, along with Alou, to never win a Gold Glove—and Alou was decent defensively. Rice is also next-to-last in doubles and right in the middle in both home runs and extra-base hits relative to the rest of the group. Let’s check out their defensive relevance insofar as being outfielders and DH go:
Player  LF   CF  RF   DH GG 
Parker  48   31 1792 484  3
Dawson  40 1027 1284 171  8
Murphy 103 1041  749   0  5
Evans   36   32 2092 282  8
Alou  1244   99  603  23  0   
Burks  290 1062  360 306  1
Rice  1503    1   44 530  0

Rice had the most games where he was a designated hitter, and the rest of the group played more games at a more crucial defensive position and accounted for 25 Gold Glove awards while so doing.

My biggest question is: what on earth did Jim Rice do to stand out so far from the others that they say he’s worthy of the sport’s highest honor for his play while the rest do not? The BBWAA held the door open for Rice, and in turn, now Rice holds the door out for a whole bunch of superior players heretofore not considered Hall-worthy. The above list is not comprehensive by any means.

Briefly on Dawson: I am a recent convert to his HOF case coming on board a little over a year ago after being in the “nay” camp. I am not going to sugarcoat his OBP; it’s lousy, and no amount of creative explanation will make it anything but that. However, among players with 1,000 games in center field, he is fifth in baseball history in extra-base hits and 23rd in that department overall; not only that, he played the position at a very high level.

Further, before the silly-ball (or if you will, steroid) era there were three players with careers that featured 300 home runs and 300 stolen bases: Willie Mays, Bobby Bonds and Dawson (and I feel quite strongly that Barry’s dad is deserving). Pretty elite company. (The other three were Barry Bonds, Steve Finley and Reggie Sanders, and the latter duo did it in one of the greatest offensive environments the game has witnessed.)

I think that offsets a .323 OBP—at least it does to me, and fair minds can differ with me on that.

Quick hits on (some of) the others
  • Bert Blyleven (62.7%) … overdue—hopefully in ‘10.
  • Lee Smith (44.5%) … sorry, but no.
  • Jack Morris (44.0%) … is overrated by the traditionalists, underrated by the sabermetric community (IMHO) and I flip flop on him regularly but right now it’s no.
  • Tommy John (31.7%) … while his career falls short there is a part of me that thinks there should be a place for him there since he was a pioneer of sorts.
  • Mark McGwire (21.9%) … I am neither a steroid apologist nor absolutist but I am undecided on Big Mac; the numbers are there but would they be at HOF without the juice?
  • Alan Trammell (17.4%) … like Lou Whitaker before him, the BBWAA deserves a hearty “Duuuuhhhh” for this and makes me think they’re gonna whiff on Robbie Alomar and Barry Larkin next year.
  • Dave Parker (15.0%) … should’ve been in the Hall but partied his way out of it. Had he stayed clean, his numbers would’ve been undeniable; he’s awfully close as it is but just short. Nobody to blame but himself.
  • Don Mattingly (11.9%) … was good enough but not quite long enough.
  • Dale Murphy (11.5%) … I’d say no but it’s hard to keep him out now.
  • Harold Baines (5.9%) … I wish he could’ve hung around long enough for 3,000 hits, 400 home runs and 1700 RBIs—the perfect debate as to the HOF. I love the man and if class were more heavily weighted—a shoo-in but no. Having said that, I am glad to see him stay on the ballot a little while because he had a terrific career.
  • David Cone (3.9%) … I thought he might hang around and wouldn’t be surprised to see him get some attention from the VC.
  • Matt Williams (1.3%) … see: Cone, David.
  • Mo Vaughn (1.1%) … wow, the Angels have been pretty good since you left eh?


Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2009-01-14T05:03:15+00:00 The baseball ethicist…a reply http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-baseball-ethicista-reply/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-baseball-ethicista-reply/#When:05:04:15
I’ve had numerous requests to answer Jack Marshall’s article The Baseball Ethicist Why Nobody Signed Barry Bonds. It’s pretty obvious that he feels that the MLBPA has zero hard evidence that collusion occurred; otherwise there is no real point to his column. I’ve read a lot of the feedback he received both on Ball Hype and Brandon Heikoop’s excellent blog The OLIB (The Outsider’s Look at the Insides of Baseball) and I can empathize—Barry Bonds is a polarizing figure. It doesn’t matter what side of the issue you’re on, you’re going to catch some heat.

Judging by the tone of some of Jack’s replies I’m guessing he’s received a lot of flak.

It’s funny, despite being at opposite ends of the divide I almost feel a kinship with the man, a shared experience—we’ve both been torched for daring to take a hard stand on issues involving Mr. Bonds.

Ah well.

I guess we all know where this is going—I have some concerns with what he wrote and will address them here. I hope he’ll counter this because I feel certain that some of the conclusions I’ve drawn based on what he wrote don’t line up with what he feels or meant to express (communication being the tricky art form that it is). If you’re expecting snark, you’ll be disappointed because I know what the flames feel like and have no desire to inflict on someone something that I have found less than pleasant. I've read his points and found them to be thoughtful and a good faith effort to come to grips with a controversial subject (although not fully cognizant of the history of the game) and not the ill-informed reflexive vitriol that characterizes articles on the subject. That being the case, I will reply to them respectfully and will be willing (and eager) to hear what clarifications and counterpoints he has to offer.

I do not view this as a urination derby between Jack and me. We do have a common dislike of Bonds, although I think it's safe to say that his runs a lot deeper than mine. My lack of affection is based on the fact that he treats people poorly, and if everyone on ol’ Terra emulated his approach the planet would be even more screwed up than it already is. The other issues are common to the sport (save his home run totals) and not something over which I lose a lot of sleep.

This is going to be long so be forewarned—I won’t just be dealing with his article but some of the things he said on Ball Hype defending it.

Standard disclaimer: It’s not about Bonds for me; it’s about collusion and [MLB] hypocrisy.

I think my biggest difficulty with what he wrote was the implication that as a symbol, Bonds warranted different treatment than that received by the multitude of steroid abusers. Lady Justice is pictured as blindfolded for a reason—everyone receives the same standard and weighs the same in the scales in her hand. When you turn people into symbols you run the risk of dehumanizing them; some of history’s greatest injustices occurred when people became symbols of society’s ills and treated accordingly. In recent history we’ve seen what occurred within the United States regarding African Americans (see: Birth of a Nation) and Germany with Jews (Hitler's wording: "The Final Solution" is pretty indicative that he viewed certain people as the "the initial dilemma"—did I just invoke Godwin’s Law?) when people became symbols of a given problem rather than, well…people.

The easiest way to inflict terrible injustices on a person or group is to turn them into a symbol of a given scourge (of society). People have rights, symbols do not, and one can act against a symbol if the feeling is that it serves a greater good.

For true justice, the blindfold cannot be lifted for a moment to see who is involved. If Osama bin Laden—both a man and a symbol—deserves to be treated in a just manner then so does a man working in the entertainment industry.

Obviously Bonds' unemployment will not result in nationwide atrocities, but if one wishes to have a strong divide between right and wrong then it does not matter whether it's two dollars or two million—to steal money is wrong. Whether it's one person or a race of people, having inequitable standards of treatment is also wrong.

Another implication is that the sport needs to move on from the steroid era.

Let’s face it, the genie is out of the bottle, and to think that the game is now steroid-free (or close to it) is naïve—its use of detectable steroids is down and minor league use is down also, but only in the U.S. and Canada. It’s still a major problem in Latin America. What Marshall is suggesting is that the game be allowed to mislead the public into thinking that the steroid era is over, to pretend that the game is now clean and pure when it is clearly not. What Marshall is saying is that Bonds is keeping MLB from creating an illusion it can sell to the public and only after the symbol is removed can the game of make-believe begin.

I cannot see how treating someone as a symbol so a different standard of “justice” can be applied to him in order to create a false front is somehow of benefit to anyone or anything. Is he advocating that MLB be allowed to move on from a problem it hasn’t truly solved? BALCO is gone, Signature Pharmacy is gone, Kirk Radomski and Brian MacNamee are out of business; therefore MLB is now drug free?

C'mon.

What does that teach the public about values if that's the big issue here? That image is everything and that the appearance of solving a problem is good enough so long as people believe? Isn’t that a form of propaganda?

From Ballhype:
“Yes, lots of players have cheated, but the vast majority of players have not, and a cheating player who rises to the pinnacle of the sport like Bonds threatens to make cheating the norm rather than the exception.”

I’m not sure what to make of this statement. Bonds didn’t invent cheating or steroids; to take this point to its logical conclusion, it appears Bonds should be made an example of because of his natural talent and work ethic. He should be penalized for being born with natural gifts and the willingness to fully develop (or over-develop) them. Maybe I’m misinformed, but cheating is the norm—it’s just that the bulk of it occurs unnoticed and unremarked upon because steroids (coupled with Bonds' personality) and not cheating is the hot button issue. At the same time, he has little difficulty with the barons of the sport cheating whether it’s defrauding municipalities of obscene amounts of public dollars (the Yankees are doing precisely this by putting them in a position where they can unfairly dominate the free agent market despite a global economic meltdown&mdashis that not a form of cheating?), the pre-1947 collusion against African Americans, the collusion under Peter Ueberroth, their complicity in the steroid scandal etc. These do not deserve sanction—only the appointed symbol of the game’s PED ills does in order for all to be made right.

Azalel anyone?

Why no penalty for these crimes—not even the flagship franchise's participation in them? Is it O.K. for teams that reach the pinnacle of their sport to cheat but not players? Isn’t that a bit of a double standard—the best of management can cheat and participate in the steroid problem but not the player? No sanction for the Yankees for removing every mention of steroids from Jason Giambi’s contract so they could sign the best hitter on the market in order to try and win the World Series and increase revenues, but at the same time Bonds deserves to be punished with extreme prejudice and deprived of working in his chosen profession?

What do the Yankees symbolize? They are the team version of Barry Lamar Bonds. Born with the most natural gifts and inflating them through unethical and illegal means to further distance them from their peers. What do we do about this particular symbol deemed "The Evil Empire," the Darth Vader of franchises?

Marshall seems to be concerned about protecting a sanctity that the sport never had—he’s protecting a myth that doesn’t hold up to critical examination and taking the blindfold off of Lady Justice in order to accomplish that. Marshall writes:
Cynics may scoff ... but baseball is the one professional sport that carries with it a duty to the American culture. Character counts in America, and baseball is bound by history, tradition and its role in legend and myth to make certain that character counts on its playing fields as well. ... What it does have that no other professional sport even values very much is integrity, or at least an appreciation that integrity is important.

The sport’s history contradicts this: this is a game that excluded non-Caucasian players, had an owner that tried to aid the cover-up of the Black Sox scandal until it became impossible whereupon he threw his players under the bus to save his own hide, tolerated gambling until it turned on them financially, exploited players at every turn, broke rules that they themselves agreed to abide by (collusion) on repeated occasions, extorted and continues to extort tens of billions of dollars for stadium scams through lies and fraudulent claims and misrepresentations of finances (check the sleaze in the new Yankee Stadium project), provided illegal drugs for players (amphetamines), were major enablers of the steroid scandal (something Marshall acknowledges), lied to the federal government as respects their financial state and effectiveness of their drug program etc. I cannot see how anyone can make the claim that the sport has “an appreciation that integrity is important.”

It is corruption that has defined the game, not integrity; integrity is an illusion that the sport has consistently tried to sell to the public the same way it does hot dogs, beer and souvenir caps. It sells it the same way Disney tries to sell the ideals of “magic” and “enchantment” but nobody actually believes that profit isn't the primary motivational directive that approach.
Players who have serious criminal charges, who are accused of rape and spousal abuse, drunk driving and drug arrests just fade out of the game.

Only when their skills fade and not before then. They didn’t come up with the phrase “If you can hit a curveball you can get away with murder” for the heck of it; his statement would have more credibility if he had cited examples of players whose careers ended long before their productivity waned but the facts state otherwise. How many chances did Steve Howe, Daryl Strawberry and Sidney Ponson receive, to name three? Let's see how Brian Giles' career plays out and whether he fades while his skills retain their value.
Baseball made a serious mistake in the ‘90s by looking the other way while steroid abuse mutated its players, distorted game results and warped its record book.

It’s amazing that baseball is said to have made “a mistake” while Bonds is vilified and needs to be removed from the game. To me, this is no different than banning the Black Sox for life and putting Charles Comiskey into the Hall of Fame. Have we learned nothing from history? As we mentioned earlier, Barry Bonds used steroids to make money and hopefully win a World Series from his improved performance. The New York Yankees struck every reference of steroids from the contract given to Jason Giambi to make money and hopefully win a World Series from the team's improved performance. The owner skates and the player banished. Plus ca change.
But the Mitchell Report, released a year ago, was a crystal-clear announcement that the sport was banishing its ethical ambiguity on the matter of performance-enhancing drugs. For this purpose, it was irrelevant that the report was incomplete and limited in scope. The Mitchell Report announced that Major League Baseball believed that steroid and HGH use was wrong, unacceptable, and sullied the game. It would condemn and embarrass any player found to violate this standard. Cheating was not cool, and cheaters were not welcome. The conduct was officially inconsistent with the values and best interests of the game (as it had, in fact, always been), and the owners, players, teams and fans were hereby expected to heed that fact.

No, this happened because Congress was breathing down its neck. The reason steroids gained such a foothold is that the government hadn’t gotten involved yet. As Craig Calcaterra outlined in his chapter in the THT Annual (that I hope Marshall reads at some point), the Mitchell Report was designed to “officially” end “the steroid era.” Steroids and HGH are still used by many because the tests are not comprehensive enough to catch all the cheats. The Mitchell Report is to baseball what the blanket is to Linus—something they can cling to for a measure of security that keeps problems at bay. As with Linus, the blanket does nothing regarding the difficulties of life but merely allows the person holding it to feel that it does; in the same way, the Mitchell Report allows MLB to think the steroid problem has been dealt with when reality states otherwise.
Congress did NOT go after baseball for the reasons you cite. Congress went after baseball because it's baseball, and baseball is different. Baseball is a cultural leader in ways the other sports are not. People screaming on this site don't accept that, but it is true. And I'm pretty sure the Congressmen involved would agree with me. Congress held a special hearing about the alleged PED use of ONE PLAYER! Doesn't that suggest something to you? --Ballhype

Again, he ignores history—this isn’t the first time the game’s poobahs were called before the government because of drugs; Bowie Kuhn had to make a similar journey when cocaine was the problem. MLB has always been lax on drugs absent outside pressure—did George W. Bush’s comments about steroids in sport pertain to Bonds? Was BALCO just about Bonds or high profile sports in general? If the government is having a special hearing about one man then it speaks ill of the government’s priorities and not Bonds.

In both cases, it is obvious that the government was trying to score political points with a hot button issue. In the 1980s Nancy Reagan (wife of then-president Ronald Reagan) was the progenitor of the "Just Say No" campaign regarding narcotics; two decades or so later president George W. Bush was doing likewise (encouraging professional sports to "just say no") with the steroid issue. In both cases, MLB was brought into the mix because of scandals involving illegal chemicals within the sport.

It’s laughable that one man in the entertainment industry—one that few actually like—is some kind of threat to national morality that the federal government needs to address.

Further, never forget this one point: MLB never found its conscience about employing Barry Lamar Bonds until all the checks from the home run chase were cashed and Bonds had given services rendered for the money his contract dictated that he be paid. Only when all the revenue had been wrung out of Bonds’ talents and no member of the ownership cartel would have to swallow a nickel in losses did he become too obnoxious to employ. It’s funny that he was a major draw at home and on the road in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, yet in 2008 his presence would trigger a major fan revolt because he’s too gosh darn evil to tolerate. Where was the concern for the sensibilities of the fans before 2008—waiting until all the money was made off Bonds before being given any consideration?

Stop and think about it: MLB allowed Bonds to break the record because of the money it made for the sport, but now he has to be removed from the game because now that Bonds is a record holder he has become a symbol of why steroid use is wrong and needs to be exorcised from the sport for the sake of its integrity.

Huh?
But no one could deny that Bonds was the face of baseball’s steroid disgrace. That gave him special status, or perhaps a better word is infamy.

I would say that he was the successor to Mark McGwire, and the only reason for that was the fact that McGwire disappeared after his showing before the government oversight committee while Bonds continued to play and was the subject of nonstop media scrutiny—a small point but one worth noting. Also, it’s good to remember that at the outset of Jose Canseco’s allegations, MLB went out of its way to protect and defend “Big Mac.”

Now that’s special status!
A team could employ one of the many mediocre, borderline or journeyman players whose names appeared in the Mitchell Report without making the implied statement that it was endorsing and rewarding a cheat. Signing Brendan Donnelly, Paul Lo Duca or Paul Byrd would not be seen as an enlistment in the Dark Side.

Why? Suppose players were involved in a kiddie-porn ring; would the same logic be applied? Only the most notorious offender need be culled from the game while teams could sign those that weren't as involved without enlisting in the Dark Side?

Bad example? Kiddie-porn doesn't affect the record book?

O.K. let's try amphetamines: For fun, let's rewind to the end of 1998: new home run milestones have been set. Barry Bonds is 33 years old and coming off a season when he hit .303/.438/.609. He is sitting at 411 career home runs. You're having a beer with a buddy discussing Bonds and the new home run levels. One of you pipes up: "Suppose Bonds plays another 10 seasons and ends up getting close to as many plate appearances as saaaaaay—Hank Aaron in this environment. How many home runs do you think he hits?" Chances are good that you'd peg him somewhere between Willie Mays and Babe Ruth.

A little thought (and a Blackberry accessing Baseball Reference) tells you that from age 33 through retirement Aaron hit 313 home runs. So Bonds could have (drum roll) whoa, 724 home runs! Then you remark: "But Aaron hit some of those in a period when a pitch at the letters was a strike; where pitchers stood atop a 15-inch mound...where guys weren't mashing 60-70 home runs..." (pause) "Geez, do ya think Bonds could reach 'The Hammer' in the greatest home run environment in the sport’s history?"

Had Bonds been signed for 2008 at his normal pre-steroid home run pace he may well have been pushing Aaron regardless. Bonds was busted for amphetamines, ergo he needed them to get into games that he might not otherwise have been able to get into. He hits home runs in those games and 755 falls.

Are we having this discussion that Bonds is now a symbol for what amphetamines does to the record book? Did Aaron ever use? Would he have gotten into enough games to best Ruth without them?

Of course it's not about cheating, or non-anabolic (though illegal) drugs that might impact the record book. It's about steroids and the fact that the home run record holder used them and isn't a nice person.

What if it wasn't steroids but another drug, perhaps a second cocaine scandal. Does the same rule of thumb apply? Getting back to Marshall...
Bonds was a different matter entirely, if for no other reason than he had ridden performance enhancement drugs to the pinnacle of baseball’s records. He was the Big Enchilada, the Numero Uno: his career stood for the proposition that steroid use could turn a great player into a super-human juggernaut, shattering all previous limits; that they could allow players to improve dramatically when historically athletes began to decline; that the drugs could lengthen their careers, make the players become more valuable to their teams, and earn them millions more dollars than they would have earned otherwise—and they could get away with it.

But, but … he became numero uno with MLB's help and complicity. He became the Big Enchilada because MLB wished to employ him until Hank Aaron's record fell because there was money to be made. Earlier, Marshall stated "The evidence that Bonds was a long-time, intentional, unapologetic and incredibly successful chemical cheat had been mounting for years." But it was only at the end—after all the checks had been cashed—that MLB was right to act despite long standing knowledge that Bonds was juicing. Had the sport acted earlier he would not have become “the Big Enchilada” is that not so? Doesn’t that make Bonds’ becoming such a joint venture between MLB and BLB?
Bonds was regarded differently because he was different. His success made him different. His arrogant public stance that there was nothing wrong with his conduct made him different. How a team regarded Barry Bonds was unavoidably going to be a statement about steroids, rules, lawbreaking, character and baseball’s values.

Let's see, MLB arrogantly denied there was a drug problem for years and Bud Selig went so far as slapping a gag order on the sport’s employees regarding the subject. He then deliberately presented misleading information before the government reform committee regarding the effectiveness of its drug test program and gleefully cashed the checks from the home run boom knowing that the achievements were tainted and illegal. (It must be so if Bonds' usage was known “for years” and didn’t they have the statements from David Wells, Curt Schilling, Ken Caminiti and Jose Canseco as well or were they too busy trying to get them to recant?) And they didn’t act until government pressure made it impossible to avoid or ignore any longer.

These are “baseball’s values?” I’m sorry; all I see are two sides of the same coin.

Regarding Bonds’ effect, Marshall states to sum up his point of cognitive dissonance:

I would not continue to follow or support the team if it embraced the warped ethics of Barry Bonds and the steroid apologists by signing him. I would, I am quite sure, actively dislike the team until a new regime took over, and it would probably never regain my previous level of loyalty or good will. Cognitive dissonance dictates that the team’s unavoidable decline on the value scale would also pull down others associated closely with it, such as its players, management, and major league baseball itself.

Two things jump out regarding this—one, he fails to cite a single other example in the history of the sport where such a thing might have taken place ignoring that statutory rapists, racists, spouse abusers, drug users and dealers (both PED and narcotic), tax evaders, those that issue legitimate death threats toward their children and so many other phallucranial, testiculacking acts have yet to trigger such a reaction in the baseball marketplace. Even some of the Black Sox were re-signed for 1920. Two, Marshall projects his own very strong feelings on Bonds and assumes the population at large feel the same way without taking the aforementioned history of such things into account. Yes, he could take a poll and probably get enough people to agree with him but talk is cheap—what have the actions of fans since the institution of the National League demonstrated to be the case regarding such things? We may be witnessing a first—a talented player that would hurt business (even though before 2008 he was a cash cow of aurochian proportions); a business predicated on success and winning at any costs including yes…cheating.

The team that hired Barry Bonds would be making a devastating statement of its own values and priorities, which would be this: "Cheating and using performance enhancing drugs is not as big a negative on our scale as winning is a positive. So if you help us win enough games, cheating is OK. In fact, it will be rewarded: observe how we hire Barry Bonds despite overwhelming evidence of steroid use and multiple federal indictments." Hiring Barry Bonds would specifically contradict the Mitchell Report and what it stood for, which was essentially setting the cognitive dissonance value for using performance-enhancing drugs as prohibitively negative.

One would have to ask that were the above true, what does it say about a team’s values (and MLB as a whole) about hiring and retaining in recent years: Darryl Strawberry, Doc Gooden, Steve Howe, Willie Wilson, Sidney Ponson, Luis Polonia, Albert Belle, Brett Myers, Julio Lugo, John Rocker, the Mitchell Report players, Dave Parker, Keith Hernandez, Elijah Dukes, Jose Mesa and so many others but to avoid Bonds suddenly sanctifies the sport while the employment of many others does not sully it to the extent Bonds would?

How many people turned away from their teams or the game because of these miscreants presence in the game yet we're to believe that Barry Lamar Bonds could accomplish what the aforementioned could not as a combined unit? How many fans did the Giants and MLB lose from Bonds' employment from 1999-2007—should that not give us an idea of the costs of having him on a roster?

Remember, as we discussed earlier, that the Mitchell Report got its names from (1) the BALCO investigation (2) Kirk Radomski and Brian MacNamee (3) The Signature Pharmacy and that’s it. Does anyone think that those were the only sources for PED used by players? However, that turned up almost 90 names—tip of the iceberg indeed, yet banishing Bonds suddenly gives the sport an air of sanctity and integrity and undoes over a decade of damage (from this particular issue and this one alone) and allows baseball to expiate its sins?
Sure: some factors could raise a player’s score: cooperating with Mitchell (Giambi), apologizing (Pettite), minimal use (Paul Byrd), not being good or healthy enough to matter (lots of guys). But Bonds had many factors that deepened his negative score: greed, warping the records, encouraging other players to use by his success, arrogance, embarrassing the sport through his prominence, and more.

Again, Marshall forgets that records were warped because MLB wanted the money from Bonds “warping” them and didn’t act until after they were “warped” yet assigns no harm, no foul to the sport’s complicity in the “warping.” As to the other issues…

Greed? See MLB—BLB’s accomplice. Encouraging other players to use by his success? Who encouraged Bonds to use? What about "chicks dig the long ball?" What encouraged usage more? What about the massive contracts teams handed to the steroid-fueled big boppers—did that encourage players to use? I think were you to make a list of reasons why a given player juiced you would find Bonds way down on the list. He was a unique talent before steroids and most players recognized that PED wouldn't give them what they gave BLB. Arrogance? Like asserting that the sport didn’t have a drug problem and threatening fines for anyone discussing it and later trying to rewrite history in their favor? Oops—that was Bud Selig, not Barry Bonds. Embarrassing the sport through his prominence? MLB profited handsomely from his prominence. It failed to act until that prominence paid off, is that not so? Could some embarrassment have been spared had MLB found its conscience when money was still on the table?

Again, all I see are two sides of the same coin: BLB / MLB—a big head and a horse's tail (end).
Thus it should not have come as a surprise to anyone that no team took that course, nor should any team have been accused of negligence or collusion for reaching the only responsible and logical conclusion available. But a lot of sportswriters and sports commentators think values, standards and ethics are irrelevant to baseball.

They are so wrong.

But what if the evidence the MLBPA has in its possession is damning—then what?

I think Marshall misses the point—this particular commentator and writer feels quite strongly that “values, standards and ethics” aren’t irrelevant in baseball; I just feel that they simply do not exist there (and history bears this out) and the unofficial expulsion of Barry Lamar Bonds is proof of that, not proof that the sport possesses such things because it never has. I feel that Marshall—most likely a conscientious and good-hearted man—has fallen into a trap and come to a conclusion and molded his values and data to fit that conclusion and has allowed his strong dislike of Barry Bonds to cloud his ethics in this particular instance.

If that makes me unreasonable and unethical, so be it. I will recant what I have written over the last year if an independent arbitrator looks at the evidence and determines that MLB did not collude in this instance. What will Jack Marshall say if they are indeed found guilty?

I, for one, would love major league baseball to embrace integrity and honor; however if it is to do so then it first must look in a mirror. Barry Lamar Bonds is a creation and reflection of the standards and ethics of the sport and not an apostasy from it. Baseball's corruption is a large 130-year-old tree and Bonds is a twig attached to it. Remove the twig and the tree remains corrupt because the disease is at the roots and not the tips. At the roots we see the color line, syndicate baseball, the reserve clause, John T. Brush, Andrew Freedman, Charles Comiskey, Cap Anson and much else.

This toxic root was given an antitrust exemption and absolute power over its domain with predictable results—the tree trunk featured player exploitation, the rape of communities, union-busting, amphetamines provided by clubs and collusion. From the trunk came the branches of selling out to corporate interests, finding ways to avoid revenue sharing obligations by hiding revenue, taking the game away from the public despite massive subsidies from that very public, ignoring a burgeoning steroid problem, lying to the government, canceling a World Series, Jeffrey Loria, Carl Pohlad, Bud Selig, Jerry Reinsdorf, John Ellis, George Steinbrenner etc. and putting profit above every other consideration ethical or otherwise. The entire tree was covered with bark consisting of lies, deception and acting in bad faith with anyone outside (and many times within) the cartel. From one of these branches sprang a twig named Barry Lamar Bonds.

As a young Jewish rabbi once stated about 2000 years ago: "Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles? Likewise every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit. A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit ... Thus, by their fruit you will recognize them." He is the result and not the cause of baseball's corruption.

Yet, Jack Marshall feels that the removal of this twig is necessary lest it ruin the tree.

Bonds is a product of the environment in which he was raised; the bastard child of which MLB refuses to acknowledge paternity and is trying to disown. They should not be applauded or encouraged for taking the easy way out but would be better served re-evaluating how they run their family.

We’re finally done—hopefully nobody is in the bathroom when you get up there.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2008-12-31T05:04:15+00:00 Raines man! http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/raines-man/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/raines-man/#When:05:05:15
In recent weeks, with the retirement of Mike Mussina and the sound of crickets where the sound of crackling (or cackling if you’re Scott Boras) should be in the hot stove league there have been a cornucopia of articles discussing his potential worthiness five years hence.

Now, with the 2009 ballot coming front and center, we’re seeing articles about Jim Rice’s last chance, probably the only chance Rickey Henderson will ever need and the seeming no chance of Mark McGwire.

Of course Rickey will make it but you know, back in the day there was another leadoff hitter who was known as the NL version of Rickey Henderson: Tim Raines.

On the surface, the comparison might seem absurd since the “man of steal” finished his career with over 3,000 hits, 2,000 runs scored and walks, 1400 bases swiped, and for good measure—despite being a leadoff man—just under 300 home runs (297) and 1,115 RBIs.

Bottom line: we may never see the likes of him again.

However, there was a significant period of time when the comparison wasn’t out of line; for years debate raged about who was better. Check out the seven-year stretch between 1983 and 1989:

Player   BA   OBP   SLG   Runs  RC  RCAA  SB   SB% 
Rickey .290  .401  .449   803  772  321  552  84.6
Raines .308  .398  .456   710  802  340  429  87.1


Obviously Rickey was the more prolific base thief, but Raines was clearly more efficient, plus he swung a slightly more potent stick.

While most feel that Jim Rice will make it in this year, it’s laughable to state that he was better than “Rock:”



PlayerAVGOBPSLGRuns  Hits 2B 3B HR RBI  RP SBCS GIDP
Raines.294.385.42515712605430117170 9802381808146 142
Rice.298.352.50212492452373 7938214512318 58 34 315


Obviously Rice was a superior long ball hitter—that and RBIs are what define him in the eyes of many, and indisputably he is superior in that regard to the former Expo. Nevertheless, let’s look at the entire record. Baseball games are won by whichever team scores the most runs. Now we’re going to look at this from the eyes of the BBWAA (hence some of the measures used in the above chart); we see Raines beat Rice in runs produced: 2,381 to 2,318. Granted, Raines had about a season’s worth more at-bats. We’ll give Rice a slight edge in this category.

However, Rice’s slight edge is destroyed when you consider that Raines stole 750 more bases while annihilating him in stolen base percentage (84 to 63 percent). Further, that extra season’s worth of at-bats puts into sharper focus the fact that Raines grounded into 173 fewer double plays than Rice. The Red Sox left fielder hit into well over twice as many twin killings than the Expos left fielder and wouldn’t have been out of place in the Blue Jays’ 2008 lineup in that regard.

Yet Raines garnered 24.3 percent of the vote while Rice received 72.2 percent last year.

Finally, we’ll compare Raines to another Hall of Fame leadoff hitter—Lou Brock. Obviously Brock enjoys a couple of distinctions: 3,000 hits and the title of all-time NL leader in stolen bases. Still, baseball aficionados know that while hits are always nice, batting atop the order requires setting the table for the hitters that follow. While attempting to swipe bases is helpful in both gaining 90 feet of real estate as well as keeping pitchers and infields jumpy, swiping bases and not getting nailed is far better, and in that regard even Brock can’t hold a candle to Raines. In 10,332 at-bats Brock reached base 3,833 times and stole 938 bases at a 75 percent success rate. Raines reached base 3,977 times in fewer than 9,000 at-bats (8,872) and nabbed 808 bases at a 84 percent rate of success.

Both at the plate and dancing off first base Raines made far fewer outs than Brock. Using Lee Sinins’ Runs Created Above Average (RCAA) and Baseball Reference’s Batting Runs (BR) we see just how big the gap between HOFer Brock and underappreciated Raines really is:

Player  RCAA    BR
Brock    223  107.4
Raines   516  332.8


Hopefully, the BBWAA will remember when filling out their ballots that Raines is not only qualified, he is criminally overqualified for the Hall of Fame. I have only scratched the surface of the case for Raines. Tomorrow, my partner in crime (along with Jonah Keri, Neate Sager and Craig Burley) in "Project Raines" will go into much more depth about "Rock." Consider my entry to be an introduction and overview to what Mr. Tango will cover for you since he is much smarter, better looking and can carry a tune (ask him to sing you the score from "HMS Pinafore" sometime) far better than yours truly.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> John Brattain 2008-12-03T05:05:15+00:00