The Hardball Times -- J.P. McIntyre http://www.hardballtimes.com/main Baseball. Insight. Daily. en studes@hardballtimes.com Copyright 2013 2013-05-21T08:09:15+00:00 The best and worst of 2007 http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-best-and-worst-of-2007/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-best-and-worst-of-2007/#When:04:05:15 Win Shares, and mere mortals had a workable metric to measure a baseball player's overall worth. Like many noble endeavors; however, Win Shares were inherently flawed, mainly because it only kept track of a player's total positive contributions without completely accounting for any negative he produced.

For example, a glance at the original Win Shares would show Julio Franco's career to be similar to Vladimir Guerrero's.

Rather than allowing a good idea like Win Shares to be kicked to the curb like an aging Steve Finley, THT's Dave Studeman mounted his trusty steed and set out to save Win Shares. The result of Studeman's quest was Win Shares Above Bench, which adjusts for playing time, and show us the Win Shares beyond what a bench player (a player with a ".350 winning percentage") would amass with similar playing time (here is more about the nuts and bolts of WSAB).

Studeman's WSAB allows for some pretty cool things, like comparing all-time greats, evaluating trades, or determining the most worthy MVP. WSAB can also be used to evaluate the entire team a general manager has put on the field.

I'll talk a look at the league by position through the end of May (roughly the first third of the season) to see what teams have been the best and worst at each position. I'll also note the best and worst players at each position. A couple of caveats: WSAB isn't perfect, but in an exercise like this we don't need pinpoint accuracy. Also, THT doesn't always neatly quantify Win Shares by position for utility players, but any slight differences will not matter for this observation.

Catchers

Team                    
AL                      NL
CLE   12                LAN   8
MIN    8                SFG   4
SEA    6                ATL   3

Individual
AL                      NL
Martinez     9          Martin          8
Mauer        5          Molina          4
Posada       5          McCann/McCann   3
The Indians lead the majors in WSAB from catchers. Yes, Victor Martinez has logged 17%of his defensive innings at first base this year, but a catcher hitting well enough to be warrant playing time at first base is a good thing, especially when a team's backup is putting up good numbers as well. Martinez's backup, Kelly Shoppach (+3), has as many WSAB as Ivan Rodriguez, as does Mike Redmond, who has been filling in for Joe Mauer.

However so far this year, 20 catchers, mostly backups, have put up negative WSAB. Let's take a look at the worst catchers so far this year: 
Team                     
AL                      NL
OAK   -3                FLA      -4
TBR   -3                MIL      -3
CHA   -2                CIN/CHN  -2 

Individual
AL                           NL
Kendall           -3         Olivo      -3
Navarro           -3         Estrada    -2
LaRue/Phillips    -2         Barrett    -2
Jason Kendall's offensive production is emulating Charlie Sheen's movie career, except Kendall probably won't have television to break his fall. According to Win Shares, Kendall's defense has been solid, but his 21 OPS+ readily devours any defensive contributions, then prowls for late night fast food drive thrus. Dioner Navarro is a more balanced in his poor performance, but still is a similarly heavy anchor on his team. Jason LaRue immediately helped the Royals the day he went on the DL, but is now back. In the NL, the Brewers and Marlins' catchers are holes in otherwise pretty solid lineups.

First base

1B (team)                     
AL                      NL
TBR    7                MIL   8
LAA    5                SDP   7
TEX    5                STL   7
BOS    5

1B (individual)
AL                      NL
Pena         7          Fielder   8
Youkilis     6          Gonzalez  7
Kotchman     6          Pujols    7
                        Young     7
Carlos Pena and Casey Kotchman, two lynchpin members of the "better late than never" club, have finally started showing why they used to grace the covers of prospect books, while Prince Fielder and Adrian Gonzalez are illustrating why they were on those covers recently.

AL leader Kevin Youkilis is the oldest of this bunch at age 28. The changing of the guard is well under way at first base across the majors. Meanwhile, most of the bottom dwellers are old guys who should be giving serious thought to their next career.
Team                     
AL                      NL
NYA       -3            SFG    -2
KC        -2            ATL    -2
OAK/DET    0            NYN     0

Individual
AL                      NL
Shealy          -3      Aurilia      -2
Mientkiewicz    -2      Fick         -2   
Casey           -2      Three at -1
The only trailer who is not old is Lance Niekro, but his career numbers indicate it is time for a career change also. Ryan Shealy is not ancient; he just plays like he is.

Second base

There is a youth movement at the top of the leader boards at second base. 
Team                     
AL                      NL
TBR    9                ATL   7
BOS    7                PHI   6
DET    6                NYN   6

Individual
AL                      NL
Upton        9          K. Johnson   7
Polanco      6          Utley        6
Roberts      5          Uggla        5
Pedroia      5
League leaders Kelly Johnson and B.J. Upton's combined age is younger than Franco's. Johnson's WSAB is over twice as much as the guy he replaced, Marcus Giles (3). Here are the trailer boards:
Team                    
AL                      NL
LAA    -2               HOU     -1
NYY    -2               STL     -1
CLE    -1               WAS     -1

Individual
AL                      NL
Cano         -2         Biggio   -3
Five tied at -1         Kennedy  -2 
                        Lopez    -2
The Angels parted ways with Adam Kennedy, creating another hole in their infield, but Kennedy (-2) hasn't helped the Cardinals either. Future Hall of Famer Craig Biggio (-3) is hurting his team while pursuing his 3000th hit, but when you are as bad as the Astros, it probably doesn't matter much.

Giving away Felipe Lopez (-2) in a trade for two dubious relievers wasn't exactly a bad thing, and since Austin Kearns (+1) hasn't exactly been setting the world on fire, as of now, Reds general manager Wayne Krivsky is probably sleeping a little easier.

Third base

Team
AL                      NL
NYY    8                FLA    7
BOS    5                NYN    5
TBR    3                Five tied at 3

Individual
AL                      NL
A. Rodriguez 8          M.Cabrera   7
Lowell       6          Wright      5
Glaus        4          Jones       4
Media lightning rod Alex Rodriguez is the most productive third baseman in the AL, while Miguel Cabrera leads the NL. There is a steep drop from the top to the rest of the majors. Eleven teams have WSAB numbers of zero or less, with the worst being:
Team                    
AL                      NL
KCR          -3         COL      -4
MIN          -2         PHI      -2
CHA/BAL      -1         MIL/ARI   0

Individual
AL                     NL
Gordon       -3        Callaspo    -4
L/.Rodriguez -2        Atkins      -3
Eight at     -1        Helms       -2
The Rockies' output at third base has been frightfully bad, like finding a head in the freezer while reaching for the Ben and Jerry's. Garret Atkins (-3) has been the main culprit, but recently released veteran presence of John Mabry (-1) didn't help either. Uber-prospect Alex Gordon (-3) has yet to find anything remotely resembling his groove, and Alberto Callaspo has struggled mightily playing out of his natural position.

Shortstop

Team                    
AL                      NL
LAA    10               NYN        9
NYY     7               MIL        7
CLE     5               ATL/FLA    6

Individual
AL                      NL
O. Cabrera   10         Reyes      9
Peralta       7         Renteria   7
Jeter         7         Hardy      7
Orlando Cabrera receives mad defensive credit from Win Shares, earning 1.1 more Defensive Win Shares than anyone else in the majors. Defensive Win Shares have their issues, so there is a good chance that this disparity is a result of a glitch in the system. Still, Cabrera is having a fine year (he is second overall in WSAB), as are his NL counterparts J.J. Hardy and Jose Reyes. In Cleveland, Jhonny Peralta is back on track while former Indian Omar Vizquel (-1) is showing his age. Cleveland utility infielder Mike Rouse has also been brutal. Here are the trailers:
Team                   
AL                      NL
OAK    -2               CHN    -3
MIN    -1               CIN    -2
TOR    -1               Three tied with -1
KCR    -1

Individual
AL                      NL
Zobrist      -3         Castro    -2
Crosby       -2         Izturis   -2
Rouse        -2         Seven at  -1
Both Ben Zobrist and Juan Castro have done their damage in back up roles. Zobrist is tool old to be a prospect anymore, but still has an upside. Castro, on the other hand, is rapidly approaching ancient, but is an infatuation of Reds general manager Wayne Krivsky. Not only Krivsky feel the need to trade for Castro last year, but Krivsky re-signed Castro for two years last off season. While Castro doesn't play much, he still is a pair of scissors on an inflatable rubber raft.

Outfield

Team        
AL                      NL
DET    17               ATL    13
LAA    14               PHI    13
TBR    11               ARI    11

Individual
AL                      NL
Guerrero     11         Willingham    8
Ordonez      10         Byrnes        7
Sizemore      9         Church        7
Thanks largely in part to Magglio Ordonez (+10), the Tigers outfield leads the way. Curtis Granderson has six WSAB to complement Ordonez. Vladimir Guerrero leads all players with -11 WSAB.

In the NL, the Braves have enjoyed balanced contributions from Andruw Jones (5), Jeff Francoeur (5), and Willie Harris (5), but were nicked by Ryan Langerhans (-3) before he was traded. Langerhans has +1 WSAB with the Nationals, which keeps him off the trailer board:
Team                    
AL                      NL
TEX    -3               LAN     2
CHA    -3               STL     4
BAL    -1               CIN     4

Individual
AL                      NL
Cruz      -3            K. Casto      -3
Five tied at -2         Finley        -3
                        Baker         -3
Kory Casto managed -3 WSAB in just 16 games. The Rockies recently cut bait with Steve Finley, who will hopefully do the sensible thing and retire. Jeff Baker hasn't been any better for the Rockies while Nelson Cruz anchors a horrible outfield in Texas.

That leaves us with the designated hitter in the American League:
Team                    Individual                     
AL  
BOS     7               Ortiz     7
CHA     7               Thome     7 
CLE     5               Hafner    5
DET     5               Sheffield 5

Team                    Individual                     
AL  
LA      -2              Hillenbrand   -2
MIN     -1              Three tied at -1
TBR     -1
SEA     -1
The leaders aren't anyone surprising, and Sheffield (+4) is coming on strong. Meanwhile, Shea Hillenbrand is yet another hole for the Angels. Imagine if that team just had average players at second, third, and designated hitter.

Here are the leader and trailers by team for positional players:
         AL                NL
CLE     35         ATL    30
DET     34         NYN    28
LAA     30         PHI    28

KCR     -5         CIN     6        
OAK      4         PIT     10
CHA      4         SFG     10
Most of those are pretty much what we would expect based on won/loss records. Boston being behind Cleveland, Detroit, and the Angels is a slight surprise, but Boston has not been receiving much production from the outfield (1 WSAB) or catcher (0 WSAB).

Let's move to the pitching side:
AL     SP WSAB    NL     SP  WSAB
OAK    23         NYN    17
CHA    19         ARI    17
BAL    18         LAN    16
BOS    18
A common thread with the starting pitching leaders is avoiding the starters who are going to rack up the negative WSAB. With the AL's leaders, only Baltimore's Jaret Wright (-1) and Oakland's Dallas Braden (-1) are in the negative.

In the NL, the Dodgers have Brett Tomko (-2) while the Mets are the only leaderbboard team to have two negative WSAB starters (Chan Ho Park -1; Mike Pelfry -1). The Pirates have two starters, Ian Snell and Tom Gorzelanny, with +6 WSAB each, but their other three starters have combined for -7 WSAB, effectively sabotaging the effectiveness of the rotation. On a lesser scale, the back of the Padres rotation has accomplished something similar with David Wells (-1) and Clay Hensley (-2). Overall, the Padres' starting rotation is +15, thanks to their top two.
AL                NL
Haren       9     Penny   8
Lackey      7     Peavy   8
Six tied at 6     Three tied at six
Peavy's teammate Chris Young is one the three tied for third in the NL. Oakland packs a similar one-two punch in the AL with Dan Haren and Chad Gaudin (+6).

The other end of the spectrum is a fright show that even Wes Craven wouldn't dream up:
AL      SP        NL     SP
TEX    -10        STL    -4
SEA     -1        FLA     0
TBR      1        WAS     1

AL                NL
Weaver      -5    Redman      -4
Six at      -3    Three at    -3
Four at     -2    Eleven at   -2
Fourteen at -1    Fourteen at -1
Texas' starting rotation has bludgeoned the rest of the team all season. Not one Ranger starters is above zero WSAB, and the Rangers' starters have amassed only 18 Quality Starts this year, four less than MLB's second worst in that category, the Nationals. The Devil Rays make the trailer board despite James Shields (+6) because of the three-man demotion team known as Casey Fossum, Edwin Jackson and Jae Seo, who have -3 WSAB each. Meanwhile, Jeff Weaver and Mark Redman are having terrible seasons.

Success carries a similar tune for bullpens: keep the negatives to a minimum.
AL     RP         NL     RP
BOS    11         SDP    13
MIN     9         LAN    10
SEA     9         ARI     7
TOR     9         ATL     7
The Red Sox have no relievers below zero WSAB while the Padres have just one. Only Toronto and Minnesota have any relievers that combined for more than -2 WSAB. The individual leader boards are filled with relievers relatively new to the scene:
AL
Okajima    5      Isringhausen     5
Jenks      4      Fuentes          4
Janssen    4      Cordero          4
Putz       4      Saito            4
The carnage of the reliever trailer boards is not a gruesome as the starters, although the quantity of individual trailers is rather high:
AL     RP         NL         RP
DET    -3         CIN       -1
TBR    -3         HOU       -1
CHA    -1         PHI/WAS    0

AL                NL
Ten at -2         J. Julio  -3
33 at  -1         Eight at  -2
                  Thirty at -1
The Tigers and the Devil Rays' bullpens have performed the worst according to WSAB. Let's wrap this up by combining the starters and relievers:
Overall
AL               NL
BOS     29       SDP     28
OAK     27       NYN     28
LAA     23       LAN     26
Nothing very surprising there. Here are the trailers:
AL               NL
TEX     -5       WAS      1
TBR     -2       FLA      2
SEA      8       STL      2
NYY      8
Here is a breakdown for pitchers for all teams.

Win Shares Above Bench allow us to neatly breakdown a team by position to see where a team is succeeding and failing. Sure, there are other ways to do that , but WSAB presents that information in a succinct manner that is a definite improvement over the original Win Shares. Hopefully, this broad overview of the 2007 season so far will interest people to explore the THT WSAB pages to pursue exactly how their favorite team or players are performing.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2007-06-14T04:05:15+00:00 The Good, the Bad, and the Cheap: The Cost Efficiency of 162 Starts http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-good-the-bad-and-the-cheap-the-cost-efficiency-of-162-starts/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/the-good-the-bad-and-the-cheap-the-cost-efficiency-of-162-starts/#When:04:08:15
Let's look at how both leagues did in terms of total starts by the five pitchers who had the most starts on their team. Note these numbers are not necessarily by spot in the rotation, just total starts. For instance C.C. Sabathia was the Indians' No. 1 one starter, but he had only 28 starts, fourth on his team.
           #1     #2     #3     #4      #5     SUM     DIFF 
AL AVG.    32.3   30.7   27.4   22.1    17.9   130.4   31.6
NL AVG.    33.3   31.4   26.0   19.6    16.4   126.7   35.3
In fact, on average, teams from both leagues averaged 11 different pitchers to make those 162 starts (here is a full breakdown). We see that the difference between the top five's number of starts and the full 162-game season is about the equivalent of another rotation spot for the average team. Let's look at the outliers (for a full list of all teams, click here):
            #1     #2     #3     #4      #5     SUM     DIFF 
CHA         33     32     32     32      30     159      3
COL         32     32     32     31      27     154      8

TBR         25     24     21     16      16     102     60
KCR         29     21     20     15      12      97     65
The White Sox covered almost all their starts with their original five starters. That wasn't necessarily a good thing when we look at their starters' overall performance, especially with Brandon McCarthy waiting for his chance. Meanwhile, the Devil Rays' and Royals' rotations were a dysfunctional mess in terms of stability, and their performances mirrored that. The Royals were last in the AL in starters' ERA (5.85), while the Devil Rays were 10th in the AL with a 4.96 ERA.

Let's look at how teams did in 2006 in terms of payroll efficiency with their starters. I am using Net Win Shares Value, created by Dave Studeman. To paraphrase Dave's definition, Net Win Shares Value essentially estimates the "expected" production from a player based on how he was signed (as a free agent, arbitration-eligible or not eligible for arbitration) and how much he was paid, then compares that to how he actually did. The difference is multiplied by the average amount teams paid for each Win Share Above Bench last year. If the number is positive, the player was a relatively good deal for the team; if not, not.

The 2007 THT Annual lists most of the players' Net WS Value, so one perk of purchasing the book is access to all the players' info. The following list includes all pitchers classified as starters (it doesn't include bullpen guys who made spot starts):
AL     NET WS Value (in millions)   NL     NET WS Value 
DET    24.9                         SFG    16.5
OAK    16.9                         ARI    16.2
TBR    15.9                         COL    14.3
LAA    13.0                         FLA    14.2
TOR    11.8                         CIN    12.5
MIN     6.9                         SDP    11.3
TEX     3.4                         MIL     7.9
CLE     2.9                         PIT     6.6
CHA     -.1                         LAN     4.5
BOS    -2.5                         STL    -2.3
NYA    -4.1                         ATL    -4.8
SEA    -5.7                         NYN    -5.7
KCR    -7.4                         PHI    -5.8
BAL    -8.4                         HOU    -8.7
                                    CHN   -10.6
                                    WAS   -14.0
The Detroit Tigers had the most cost-efficient rotation by a considerable margin because not only did their starters pitch well, but most were signed to inexpensive contracts.
             Net WS Value      GS
Verlander    8,003,000         30
Robertson    6,281,000         32
Bonderman    4,636,000         34
Rogers       3,282,000         33
Miner        1,378,000         16
Ledezma      1,362,000          7
Maroth        -145,000          9
Miner and Ledezma earned value in the pen also, so not all their positive Net WS Value came from starting. Roman Colon also made a start, but overall, the Tigers' rotation was stable in terms of who was starting while being cost effective. Let's now look at a team that was the opposite of the Tigers, the New York Yankees:
              Net WS Value      GS
Wang          9,689,000         33
Karstens      1,399,000          6 
Rasner          824,000          3
Wright       -1,184,000         27
Ponson       -1,807,000          3
Mussina      -2,590,000         32
Chacon       -3,930,000         11
Johnson      -6,481,000         33
Despite having one of the best values in baseball in Chien-Ming Wang, the Yankees were 11th in the AL in terms of payroll value for their starters, and that is not even including the $9 million they paid Carl Pavano to heal slowly. Mike Mussina had a solid season, but the Yankees were paying him so much that it was not cost effective. The Yankees received 125 starts from Wang, Johnson, Mussina, and Wright, but used eight other pitchers to make the remaining 37 starts, some with some rather inefficient results.

The Chicago White Sox were very stable in terms of who started their games. Unfortunately for the White Sox, they didn't receive a very efficient return from all their starters:
             Net WS Value      GS
Contreras    2,644,000         30
Garcia       2,342,000         33
Garland        838,000         32
Vazquez     -1,582,000         33
Buehrle     -4,212,000         32
The White Sox had no starter who truly shined, even though management was writing some large checks. A more efficient team was the Oakland A's:
             Net WS Value      GS
Haren        7,062,000         34
Blanton      4,332,000         31
Saarloos     2,096,000         16
Zito         1,087,000         34
Harden       1,101,000          9
Loaiza         988,000         26
Windsor       -585,000          3

Because Harden was not receiving a large salary, his injury did not hurt the A's financially, unlike Mark Mulder of St. Louis, who had a -$9.9 million Net WS Value. Oakland general manager Billy Beane's market philosophy allows him to get a high yield on the money the A's pay their starters.

Let's now look at the disaster known as Washington Nationals:
              Net WS Value      GS
Perez           909,000          3
Patterson       482,000          8
Hill            301,000          6
O'Connor         19,000         20 
Day            -302,000          5
Traber         -882,000          8
Armas        -1,444,000         30
Hernandez    -1,884,000         24
Drese        -1,893,000          2
Bergmann     -2,324,000          6
Astacio      -2,838,000         17
Ortiz        -4,068,000         33
The Nats' rotation, which was not exactly constructed to last, was ravaged by injuries and ineffectiveness. Ramon Ortiz started the most games, which means the Nats had a replacement-level pitcher start 33 games. The Nats had 14 different pitchers start games, and none were effective. If this type of wreck occurred on a freeway, traffic would be shut down for two days while the carnage was cleared and the body bags counted.

In general, home-grown, inexpensive talent is the best route to building a cost-efficient rotation. Throwing good money after bad in hopes something sticks is the worst way to go. There is nothing novel in these premises. Teams that can develop their own pitchers have a huge financial advantage over those that build a rotation primarily through free agency or trading for established, expensive starters. That does not mean a team can't be successful with inefficient spending; the St. Louis Cardinals were not efficient, but defeated the most efficient team, the Tigers, in the World Series.

I'll wrap this up by showing the 10 most-efficient and least-efficient starters in terms of salary value:
Best          NET WS Value         Worst        Net WS Value
Webb          11,412,000           Pineiro      -10,015,000
Liriano       10,376,000           Mulder        -9,910,000
Arroyo        10,068,000           Od. Perez     -8,447,000           
Wang           9,689,000           B. Colon      -8,310,000
Carpenter      9,561,000           Russ Ortiz    -8,219,000
Je. Weaver     9,277,000           Chen          -8,001,000
Capuano        8,229,000           Park          -7,496,000
Verlander      8,003,000           Marquis       -7,347,000          
Bedard         7,902,000           Ra. Johnson   -6,481,000 
Haren          7,590,000           Towers        -6,121,000


Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2007-01-22T04:08:15+00:00 Mark McGwire’s Hall of Fame Worthiness http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/mark-mcgwires-hall-of-fame-worthiness/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/mark-mcgwires-hall-of-fame-worthiness/#When:04:08:15 Mark McGwire's inclusion on the Hall of Fame Ballot has created a maelstrom of controversy; many voters say they'll refuse to vote for him because of the steroid specter. Before the baseball writers embark on their holy crusades, perhaps they should analyze McGwire's contributions as a player. Lost in the misplaced, idealistic chest beating is the question, "Is Mark McGwire a legitimate HOF Candidate?"

Let's use Win Shares to take a look. Win Shares are not the definitive argument for Hall of Fame candidacy, and yes, Win Shares have slight flaws. However, they certainly help define a player's worth in manner that is not cumbersome. Here is how McGwire's career stacks up against other Hall Of Fame first basemen:
Career Win Shares
Lou Gehrig          489
Eddie Murray        437
Jimmie Foxx         435
Willie McCovey      408
Cap Anson           381
Harmon Killebrew    371
Roger Connor        362
Dan Brouthers       355
Tony Perez          349
Mark McGwire        342
Johnny Mize         338
Jake Beckley        318
Orlando Cepeda      310
George Sisler       292
Bill Terry          278
Jim Bottomley       258
Hank Greenberg      267
Frank Chance        237
George Kelly        193
Buck Leonard        NA
An adjustment for the 154 and 162 game schedules would put Johnny Mize ahead of McGwire, but McGwire fares pretty well in terms of career as compared to other HOF first basemen. He is nowhere close to Lou Gehrig, and a good deal behind the likes of Eddie Murray and Jimmie Foxx, but he still holds his own against the others.

Now let's look at peak through cumulative seasons of Win Shares:
Five-Year Cumulative WS Seasons
Gehrig          204
Fox             183
McCovey         169
Mize            164
Greenberg       163
Killebrew       162
McGwire         159
Murray          152
Terry           149
Perez           146
Cepeda          145
Chance          143
Again, McGwire does pretty well, although some of those ahead of him would distance themselves with schedule adjustments and some behind him would catch him.

Now let's look at 10-year cumulative seasons of Win Shares:
Ten-Year Cumulative WS Seasons
Gehrig         384
Fox            325
Mize           296
McCovey        285
Killebrew      279
McGwire        278
Murray         273
Greenberg      262
Terry          255
Cepeda         251
Perez          249
Sisler         239
Chance         206
McGwire fares a bit better in the 10-year "peak," although, again, there would be some jostling of the numbers with schedule adjustments.

However, McGwire played in an offensive era in which Win Shares were "easier" to amass, plus one could say McGwire played in an age of prolific first basemen. Let's take a look at how McGwire compares to the great first basemen of his time:
Career Win Shares
Palmeiro     395
Bagwell      388
Thomas       384
McGwire      342
McGriff      341
Clark        331
Thome        308
Olerud       301
Giambi       284
Delgado      267
Pujols       219
One thing that should be noted is that the strike of 1994 denied most of those players a few Win Shares, but McGwire's numbers were not affected by the strike that much as he was still battling injuries. As of now, McGwire is fourth out of 11 in this ranking. However, Albert Pujols has only played in the majors for six years, and according to MLB records, will only be 27 years old next year. At the rate Pujols is playing, he would pass McGwire's career Win Share total after 10 seasons, provided he can sustain his remarkable production. Jim Thome has a chance of passing McGwire's career Win Share total, although he logged a few seasons at third base and is now a designated hitter. Jason Giambi and Carlos Delgado have outside chances of catching McGwire.

In fact, McGwire's career Win Share total, when compared to other first basemen of his time, is hardly a ringing endorsement for Cooperstown. He is only one World Series ahead of McGriff, who probably won't be elected by the baseball writers, and is just slightly ahead of Will Clark, who the writers scorned in brutal fashion when he made the ballot.

Let's look at peak:
Five-Year Cumulative Total
Pujols       190
Thomas       172
Bagwell      170
Clark        168
Giambi       168
McGwire      159
Olerud       151
Delgado      150
Thome        149
McGriff      143
Palmeiro     143
McGwire drops to sixth in Five Years Cumulatives and behind Will Clark, who now has to wait for the Veteran's Committee to decide his HOF fate. However, McGwire fares better in 10-year cumulatives:
Ten-Year Cumulative Win Shares
Bagwell      298
Thomas       298
McGwire      278
Giambi       272
Clark        269
Thome        267
Palmeiro     257
Delgado      253
McGriff      248
Olerud       238
Pujols*      219
*six years

Barring something catastrophic, Pujols should easily surpass McGwire (he'd only have to put up four more 15-Win-Share seasons to pass McGwire). Still, McGwire's 10-year cumulative is very impressive.

But how many first basemen from this era will the writers elect? McGwire was middle of the pack in career and five-year cumulatives, and very solid in his 10-year cumulatives. Is that enough to warrant a HOF election?

Before we can answer that question, we need to look at how McGwire compared to superstars at other positions in his time. (Yes, there are some possible problems comparing Win Shares across position because of defensive point assignments, but let's trudge forth anyway):
Career Win Shares
Barry Bonds      693
Cal Ripken       427
Craig Biggio     425
Gary Sheffield   404
Tony Gwynn       398
Wade Boggs       394
Ken Griffey Jr   371
Alex Rodriguez   343
Mark McGwire     342
Manny Ramirez    339
Mike Piazza      322
Jeff Kent        317
Chipper Jones    303
Derek Jeter      278
When the careers of everyone on the list are finished, there is a good chance that only Mike Piazza will be behind McGwire in terms of career Win Shares. Let's look at peak:
Five-Year Cumulative Win Shares
Bonds        244
Pujols       190
A-Rod        176
Thomas       172
Bagwell      170
Biggio       168
Clark        168
Giambi       168
Boggs        165
Sheffiel     164
Piazza       164
Gwynn        162
Ripken       160
Sosa         160
McGwire      159
Ramirez      154
McGwire is 15th on that list, and if Ramirez manages a 32-Win-Share season before he retires, he'll catch McGwire. Here are the 10-year cumulatives better than McGwire:
10-Year Cumulative Win Shares
Bonds        424
Sheffiel     306
A-Rod        306
Thomas       298
Bagwell      298
Biggio       294
Boggs        291
Piazza       282
McGwire      278
Again, McGwire does much better in the 10-year cumulatives, but he is still ninth. Considering everything else, is that enough for the Hall of Fame? Since HOF worthiness is a personal choice, people will make their own decisions based on what types of players should be in the Hall. Personally, I think McGwire would be a marginal Hall of Fame choice. He fares well historically, but not so well against players of his time. While there are many people who would like to keep the Marginals out of the Hall, based on what McGwire did on the field, I would not be upset if he was elected. He certainly isn't an automatic lock for election, which is a stance being bandied around by many writers.

What McGwire illustrates is that people must redefine what constitutes a Hall of Famer in the most modern era. While scribes who romanticize baseball like to think of the sport and its measuring sticks of performance as static, the playing field changes over time. Moral debates over steroids should not dwarf intelligent discussion about overhauling the parameters of Hall of Fame worthiness. Once those parameters are established, then the moral arguments can be made in earnest.

On a closing note, let's compare McGwire to a similar player who put up numbers strong enough to be considered a viable Hall of Fame candidate, but was punished by voters for his actions off the field:
                    Career     5-Year Cum.   10-Year Cum.
Dick Allen           342          181            304
Mark McGwire         342          159            278
Resources: Total Baseball Encyclopedia, Eighth Edition

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2006-12-05T04:08:15+00:00 What Went Wrong with the Tribe? (Part 5) http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/what-went-wrong-with-the-tribe-part-5/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/what-went-wrong-with-the-tribe-part-5/#When:04:04:15
The 2006 Cleveland Indians did not offer answers for their disappointing season in neat packages. There were a great deal of things inherently wrong with the team, and there is no simple answer that will offer a magic pill to make things immediately better or make what transpired easily dismissed. That is not to say the team is a long way from being good; many important pieces are in place for the Indians to be successful in the future. However, unless the pieces are successfully complemented, the results could be similar, which is something Tribe fans do not want to hear.

A "Where It Went Wrong" article employs hindsight, but I want to make it clear that I am not using hindsight to point blame (although, in some cases, blame should be assessed), but to evaluate what the shortcomings of the team were. To dismiss the season as a fluke is to bury one's head in the sand and run the risk of the same results.

This year, the Indians finished eleven games under what could be expected from their Pythagorean Record, which is derived from Run Differential (runs scored minus runs allowed). Before we get into the reasons why, allow me to iterate some important facts because the Pythag might be the most misused tool in baseball analysis. First off all, for a full season of games, the standard deviation in the team's W-L record can be estimated as half of the square root of 162. The square root of 162 is about 12.7, so the standard deviation for a full season is about 6 wins. In other words, any difference of six wins or less from the Pythag and actual record could very well just be random statistical "noise." Also, the Pythag can under-predict home wins.

Secondly, it is a truism that substantial standard deviation from the Pythag is correlated to unexpectedly high or low success rates in close games. Often, success rates in close games are associated with:

1. Bullpen effectiveness or ineffectiveness
2. Tendency (plus or minus) towards "clutch" performance, especially scoring late in close games
3. Managerial in-game acumen

Points one and two can be measured with statistical data, but are by no means absolutes. Yes, “clutch” is an elusive concept to measure, but we can certainly note when a team does better than expected in “clutch” situations over a particular season. Point three may or may not be true; no one has invented a good way to evaluate managers' performances. It certainly makes sense though. A good or bad bullpen doesn't necessarily equate to large differentiation of the Pythag; the run support the bullpen gets plays a large factor. A bad pen that is getting strong run support often is bailed out. Let's take a look at Run Support and Runs Allowed in relief and "Close and Late" (C&L) situations:
          RS C&L   RS REL*  RA/9 IP*   RA/C&L   RS/Starters
MIN        6.39      4.47      3.18     2.39        5.24
TEX        5.36      4.01      4.18     3.91        5.99
NYY        5.29      4.20      4.57     3.87        6.67
BOS        5.26      4.38      4.92     4.16        5.52
KC         5.27      4.83      5.74     4.65        4.74
CHI        5.17      4.18      4.78     3.53        5.86
BAL        5.25      4.04      5.60     3.65        5.34
TOR        5.19      4.36      4.37     3.20        5.53
TBR        5.01      4.61      5.51     4.41        4.23
SEA        4.39      4.88      4.24     3.29        4.61
LAA        4.38      3.59      4.23     3.10        5.29
CLE        4.31      4.30      5.04     4.25        6.01
DET        4.17      4.14      3.95     3.46        5.58
OAK        3.60      3.75      3.87     3.01        5.26
*all relief situations

The Yankees, Red Sox, and Royals had lackluster bullpens overall, but those pens received very healthy Run Support and did not have negative Pythags. The Indians displayed a disturbing pattern of scoring a great deal early (their RS for starting pitchers was second in the AL), then not scoring late as the bullpen gave up a great deal of runs. In other words, the Indians often scored early, only to watch their lead disappear while the offense was often incapable of answering the comeback. While the Indians' bullpen was extremely problematic, the A's, on the other hand, had terrible Run Support late in the games, but their pen was excellent, and their Pythag was +8. The Indians were 18-26 in one run games; the A's 32-22. Expand that to close games, and the Indians were 29-40 while the A's were 47-37.

So what happened to the Indians' offense late in the game? How did the second highest scoring team in the AL overall drop to the thirteenth in Close and Late Situations? One reason was the Indians' strikeout rate increased dramatically in these situations, jumping from 18% to 24% (League Average in C&L was 19%). Still, that increase doesn't account for all of the drop in scoring.

The Indians weren't very good at manufacturing runs, something that is very important in low-run scoring environments. In the 2007 Bill James Handbook, a system for counting Manufactured Runs is introduced. Essentially, James' methodology revolves around the general definition that a manufactured run is a run "that is at least one half of the offense doing something other than playing station-to-station baseball." The methodology is very detailed, so you should click on the link and purchase the book if you're interested in the details. The Indians were tied for 11th in the AL with the Blue Jays with only 139 Manufactured Runs (MR). In comparison, the Twins led the majors with 224 MR, and the AL Average was 163.

Manufactured Runs don't necessarily correlate to team success; the Tigers were last in the AL in MR. However, the Tigers, A's, and the Indians, the bottom three of RS in C&L, were all poor run-manufacturing teams. In the Indians' case, it appears they didn't manufacture a great deal of runs because they did not play a great deal of "small ball." The Indians were near the bottom of the AL in Sacrifice Bunt Attempts, Stolen Base Attempts, and putting runners in motion (another cool thing that is tracked in this year's Handbook), plus they were near the bottom in Sacrifice Flies and were not the type of team that strung a bunch of singles together to score.

This is not necessarily a bad thing; after all, the Indians were second in runs scored. However, in a low scoring environment late in close games, this inability to manufacture runs bit them about eight inches below their numbers. Plus, the Indians appeared to shy further away from small ball in C&L situations. They only attempted eight stolen bases in C&L, at an abysmal 50% success rate. Only thirteen of their 30 successful sac bunts came in C&L situations.

The lack of the Indians' small ball, while a weakness in low-scoring environments, is not a criticism of strategy. The team that was assembled was not made to play small ball; it was rather slow and not filled with a great deal of high contact hitters. Attempting to play small ball with a team that lacks those skills is a recipe for disaster. Plus, when the Indians did play small ball, they did it with a modicum of success in certain areas. They were above average in stealing and successful sac bunt attempts, so manager Eric Wedge either chose when to employ small ball tactics wisely or was fortunate.

What the Indians were not was a good base running team. Bill James improved upon his base running metric this year in the Handbook. While this metric is by no means perfect, we can use it to examine another weakness of the 2006 Tribe. James’ metric measures a few things for guys who reached based fifty or more times: runners going from first to third on a single; scoring from second on a single; scoring from first on a double, bases taken (advancing on defensive miscues); base running outs, and runs scored as a percentage of times on base. The last category is extremely context driven; teammates and order of the line up greatly influence this. Here’s how the Indians fared (M stands for "Moved" and C stands for "Chances" to move):
                            1st to 3rd    2nd to Home   1st to Home
Player       OB    Scored     M      C      M      C      M      C
Sizemore     271     39%     12     37     25     29      1      3
Michaels     188     36%      8     17     12     17      7     11
Belliard     193     25%     11     23      8     19      2      3
Hllndswrth    65     30%      1      6      5      5      0      1
Boone        127     33%      4     14      7      9      1      8
Choo          72     27%      2      4      5      8      0      0
Broussard    151     26%      7     21     11     15      1      2
Peralta      209     33%      2     20     10     25      3     11
Blake        166     26%      4     24     14     17      4      5
Perez         66     19%      1      9      5      8      0      0
Garko         74     28%      0     10      2      8      0      2
Hafner       212     27%      3      7      4      6      1      1
Martinez     261     25%      3     34      9     20      1      9
Here's the rest of the info. O.A. stands for the number of times a baserunner was out attempting to take an extra base on a hit. Doubled off is when the runner is caught off base on a ball hit in the air, and "BR" is the number of time a runner was out attempting to advance on a wild pitch, passed ball or sacrifice fly. The final Rank column takes all of these elements into account.
Player         Bases Taken  O.A.  Doubled Off    BR   Rank
Sizemore            29       0            6       6     19
Michaels            14       0            1       1     15
Belliard            18       1            1       2      4
Hllndswrth           4       0            0       0      3
Boone                9       1            1       2     -1
Choo                 4       0            1       1     -1
Broussard           14       1            3       4     -2
Peralta             15       1            0       1     -3
Blake                7       1            1       2     -4
Perez                2       0            0       0     -4
Garko                3       0            0       0     -3
Hafner               8       2            3       5    -20
Martinez            15       1            2       3    -20

Total              142       8           19      27    -17
Grady Sizemore and Jason Michaels did very well under this metric. Of course, guys at the top of the lineup fare better under this metric, but Sizemore ranked twelfth overall in the majors, despite being doubled up six times. Sizemore ranked first in the majors with guys over twenty chances in scoring from second on a single. However, most of the Indians did not fare well on this metric. The Indians were doubled up nineteen times, a figure that seems very high. I would venture most of those happened when Wedge put runners in motion, indicating bad luck or foolish strategy. Also, we don’t know how many times putting the runners in motion benefited, so we can’t tell if the Indians experienced enough success outweighed the negative. Travis Hafner and Victor Martinez were detriments on the base paths, which is not that surprising considering their speed.

Interestingly, Bill James notes that David Ortiz, another slow footed slugger, fared decently with this metric, a zero ranking, much better than Hafner. James notes that Ortiz is “slow, but he is alert; he reads the ball well off the bat; he hustles, and he knows what he can do.”

The Indians lost a great deal of close games because of a combination of their bullpen’s inability to prevent runs and the Indians’ offense inability to score runs late. Greatly attributing to the Indians’ late game offensive woes was their inability to manufacture runs and run the bases in an advantageous manner. This was more of a result of the construction of the team rather than strategy. The Indians could use some more speed and smarts on the basepaths, something that will hopefully be addressed this offseason.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2006-11-10T04:04:15+00:00 Where It Went Wrong for the Tribe (Part 4) http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-four/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-four/#When:04:10:15 C.C. Sabathia, was supposed to develop into an ace; another, Cliff Lee, looked as if he could be a number two starter; while the third, Jake Westbrook, looked to be a number three starter. Kevin Millwood was a mystery, coming off a lackluster year and a serious injury, and Scott Elarton looked as if he could hold down the five spot well enough for the Indians' offense to have a chance to win his games. Let's look at what transpired:
                PRC    ERA+     WSAB     GS    IP
Millwood       100     145     9        30    192.0
Lee             88     109     7        32    202.0
Sabathia        85     103     7        31    196.7
Westbrook       69     92      2        34    210.7
Elarton         62     90      2        31    181.7

Because of Millwood and Lee's performance, the Indians had a very solid five man rotation, totaling 404 Pitching Runs Created over 1006.2 innings pitched. Also important, these five starters combined for all but four of the Indians' starts (which went to Jason Davis).

However, Millwood and Elarton became free agents, and their performances couldn't be expected again. Millwood led the 2005 AL with a 2.86 ERA, but his Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) was 3.75 and his Expected FIP (xFIP) was 3.98. Elarton's FIP was 5.07 and his xFIP was 5.18. Both were benefactors of luck or a solid defense behind them. Both were going to command too much money on the free agent market, so Shapiro cut them loose (he did try to re-sign Millwood). As with the bullpen, Shapiro was faced with a reconstruction project for his starting rotation, and like the bullpen, the pieces Shapiro brought in to shore up the rotation crumbled.

In early December, Shapiro signed Paul Byrd to a two-year, $14.25 million dollar deal with a club option for the third year. Shapiro had been negotiating with Kenny Rogers and almost signed him, but the deal broke down because Shapiro did not want to commit to a two-year deal. Three days after Byrd signed with Cleveland, Rogers signed a two-year, $16 million dollar deal with the Detroit Tigers. In January, Shapiro signed Jason Johnson to a one-year, $3.25 million dollar deal, completing the Indians' rotation.

It is doubtful that Shapiro thought Byrd and Johnson would replicate Millwood and Elarton's 2005 performance. Instead, he expected his other three starters to improve while Byrd and Johnson shored up the middle and back of the rotation. Here's how it played out in 2006:
            PRC     ERA+    WSAB     GS     IP
Sabathia    100     138       9      28    192.7
Westbrook    84     109       6      32    211.3
Lee          74     103       4      33    200.3
Byrd         52     92        0      31    179.0
Johnson      20     90        -2     14    77.0
Sowers       40     125       4      14    88.3

Part of Shapiro's plan worked, Sabathia and Westbrook had much better years. However, Lee dropped significantly from his 2005 performance while Byrd was a replacement-level pitcher and Johnson was below replacement.

In fact, Johnson was traded to Boston in late June, and Jeremy Sowers took his place in the rotation until he was shut down late in the year. The emergence of Sowers tempered the fallout of a very bad design by Mark Shapiro. The five starters that began the season only put up 330 PRC, 74 PRC less than the starting five in 2005. Even with Sowers' strong performance, the Indians' starters only mustered 370 PRC, 34 short of the previous year—about 3.5 team wins below 2005. The 2006 Indians had 10 starts from three other pitchers who finished the season with a combined -2 WSAB.

Most importantly, Shapiro spent just under $10 million dollars on Byrd and Johnson (the teams that picked up Johnson paid the league minimum for his services) in 2006, plus $7.25 million for Byrd next year. Let's look at what might have happened if Shapiro had forgone the Byrd/Johnson plan, signed Rogers and started the year with Jason Davis as his fifth starter. It is easy to use a general manager for target practice when armed with hindsight, so I am not really faulting Shapiro for not finalizing the Rogers deal, but instead looking at what might have been:
             PRC    ERA+   WSAB  GS    IP
Sabathia     100    138     9    28    192.7
Rogers       84     115     8    33    204.0
Westbrook    84     109     6    32    211.3
Lee          74     103     4    33    200.3
Davis*       25      90     0    14     77.0
Sowers       40     125     4    14     88.3

* pitching at a replacement level

That combination would have amassed 407 PRC, slightly more than the 2005 squad. Signing Rogers for two years at $16 million would have been cheaper than the $17.25 million Byrd/Johnson failure. Kenny Rogers wasn't a sure bet coming into 2006, let alone 2007, so Shapiro having reservations about signing him is understandable. After all, Rogers might have choked Carl Monday with a microphone cord by July.

Rogers was on the wrong side of 40, plus he had had a rather steep decline in the second half of 2005. However, Byrd and Johnson had more red flags than a construction crew assigned to re-route traffic from a bridge that collapsed in a river. Shapiro was already gambling with $17.5 million and would have been better off rolling the dice with Rogers.

The signs that Byrd and Johnson would be gas cans juggling hand grenades were in plain slight last offseason. In 2005, Byrd posted a 3.74 ERA, but his xFIP was 4.77, which was very close to his 2006 ERA. Most importantly, his K/9 IP, which was never that good at the major league level, dropped to 4.6. Pitchers with strikeout-rates that low usually don't sustain success, plus Byrd gave up more hits than innings pitched in 2005, another bad sign.

Johnson was a 31-year-old journeyman who pitched only three WSAB in 2005 and had a K/9 IP under 4.00. He gave up 233 hits in 210 innings. He projected to be around a replacement level pitcher, but Shapiro felt the need to send $3.25 million his way. The Indians could have found at least a replacement level pitcher from their own system and saved the money they wasted on Johnson. Paying veterans seven-figure salaries to receive less than replacement level pitching is not to way to build a successful team.

Because of Sabathia, Westbrook, and Sowers, the Indians starting rotation did not fall into Lake Erie like the bullpen and defense did. Having a guy like Kenny Rogers instead of Paul Byrd and Jason Johnson would not have saved the season; the bullpen and the defense created too much damage for that to happen. However, the Indians starting rotation that Shapiro built was not that of a contender—the Tigers received 372 PRC from their top four starters, plus picked a fair share of PRC from their various fifth starters.

The good news is that the starting rotation is probably the easiest thing to fix for next year. Sabathia looks to be coming into his own and Westbrook is a solid middle-of-the-rotation guy. Lee scuffled in 2006, but finished strong and has the type of stuff to bounce back in 2007. Sowers will probably experience some growing pains next year as he appeared to receive some luck this year (his FIP was a full run better than his ERA), but barring an injury, he should develop in a middle-of-the-rotation guy for 2007 with more upside for the future. The Indians are a quality starter away from a very solid rotation. Byrd would be an expensive, but probably somewhat effective long reliever/spot starter, but the mistakes of the past cannot be undone. However, they can be fixed for a price, and most importantly, avoided in the future.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2006-10-26T04:10:15+00:00 Where It Went Wrong for the Tribe (Part 3) http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-3/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-3/#When:04:05:15
These days, serious students of the game drop all sorts of abbreviations like FIP, BIZ, BOZ, BABIP, DER, UZR, ZR, DIP, and FRAA into discussions about a defense. The Average Joe fan is often left wondering just what the heck all those capital letters are supposed to tell us and what happened to those things called errors? After all, aren't the guys making a great deal of mistakes the worst fielders? Not necessarily so. A player like Brandon Inge might have a high error total, but if he is getting to a great many balls that other players can't get to, then he is turning those balls into outs.

Often errors are incorporated into advanced defensive metrics without much discussion about them, as talk centers around balls in zone, vectors, range, etc. However, until metrics that include precise Ball in Play Data are published this off season in publications like The Hardball Times Annual, looking at individual players through traditional metrics often yields a fuzzy picture at best.

For instance, Range Factor, which was designed to measure the rate a player makes outs, can paint a very distorted picture unless pitching tendencies are correctly accounted for. Most of the time, the infielders with the highest Range Factor are the guys that are having the most ground balls hit their direction, not the guys who are scooping to the most balls hit to their left or right. Even metrics like Win Shares that attempt to adjust for pitching tendencies can be inaccurate sometimes.

However, in a team context, errors, while unsexy, still tell us a great deal, just as the rock a caveman used to foil a rival suitor was an excellent, albeit primitive, communicator. Let's step away from the advanced defensive metrics (when the BIP metrics are published, we can return in earnest) and just look at errors to give us a backdrop for another weakness for the Indians in 2006, defense. Yes, errors are only a part of defensive analysis, but when a team is making errors like the Indians did this year, those miscues become a very large part of the analysis.

Errors By Position

Team   1B    2B    3B    SS    CF    LF    RF    P     C    TOT
BAL     6    10    20    22    5     10    3    12    14    102
BOS    10     8     9    14    1     3     3    11     7     66
CHI    10    10    13    18    6     8     6    12     5     90
DET    12    10    22    30    2     5     7    15     3    103
KC      8     5    22    24    6     4     10   10     9     98
LAA    10    10    27    21    8     3     12   14    15    124
MIN     9     9    16    23    5     9     5     6     4     84
NYY    17    12    26    19    3     3     6     6    12    104
OAK    11     3    13    21    5     6     6    14     5     84
SEA     6    18    15    21    6     3     3     6    10     88
TB      6    14    27    28    6     7     8    10    11    116
TEX     4    24    15    15    8     4     1    11    16     98
TOR    13    10    19    36    4     1     3     9     5     99
CLE    16    17    23    19    3     4     8    17    10    118

AVE   9.6   11.4   19.1  22.2  4.9  4.9   5.8   11.0  9.0  98.1
With 118 errors, the Indians seemed to be engaged in a soccer match with the Angels, booting balls with reckless abandon. However, according to the THT Team Page, the Indians committed 44 throwing errors, which was slightly above the league average of 42. The Indians just weren't kicking the ball around; they were throwing it all over the place also.

Position wise, the Indians were worst in the AL at first base and pitcher. Ben Broussard and Eduardo Perez, no longer with the organization, combined for nine errors, but Ryan Garko made six in just 396 innings played. The pitchers' high error totals were most certainly related to the stone golems at first base, especially on pick-off throws. The brick hands of the first basemen probably contributed to throwing errors from other infielders as somewhat errant throws were not saved.

The Indians weren't very good at most of the other positions, in fact, they were only above average in three positions: shortstop, left field and center field. Second base and third base were by no means pretty. Ronnie Belliard committed eight errors at second base over 786.3 innings played, but his replacements, Hector Luna and Joe Inglett were worse, combining for nine errors over 587 innings. Aaron Boone was an absolute disaster at third, committing 16 errors in 842 innings played. Andy Marte committed six errors in 428.7 innings played, but unlike Boone, showed an ability to get to balls that were not hit right at him.

According to John Dewan's Plus/Minus System, the Indians were -81 in ground balls, second worst in the AL. Much of that had to do with the Indians' infield errors, but the Indians infielders were also not able to get to record as many outs on balls hit in their vicinity. A good chunk of that was probably Boone's fault, but others certainly weren't wearing out their leather either. Jhonny Peralta fared well in non-BIP metrics, but early reports with BIP data indicate that Peralta was probably closer to average, and since the Indians pitchers induced a great deal of ground balls, many of those balls hit way resulted in hits that a superior fielder would have recorded as outs. Peralta also had a defensive slump that lasted most of the last month of the season.

The outfield fared a better. Using the Plus/Minus system, the Indians fared well with fly balls, recording a +48, best in the AL. However, the Indians right fielders racked up a very unhealthy error total. Jason Michaels struggled with angles in left field and certainly was not as effective as Coco Crisp was last year.

The catcher position was hardly a highlight either. Not only did the Indians rack up 10 errors at that position, their catchers' ability to throw out runners was putrid. Yes, some of that is the pitchers' fault, but Victor Martinez would have been hard pressed to throw out someone on a softball field diamond. He only threw out 22 runners in 122 steal attempts, a dismal 18%. Kelly Shoppach threw out a very respectable 37%, but only caught 40 games. The positives are that the Indians backstops only allowed seven passed balls, third best in the AL, and the Indians only had 46 wild pitches, seven fewer than the league average of 53.

Not surprisingly, the Indians gave up the most unearned runs in the American League, 84, which was 23 runs over the AL Team Average. Poor defense affects more than just unearned run totals. Errors also put more stress on the pitchers, requiring them to throw more pitches, usually in higher leverage situations. Coupled with a bad bullpen, the Indians defense ensured that the Tribe was a losing team in 2006.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2006-10-12T04:05:15+00:00 Where It Went Wrong for the Tribe (Part 2) http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-2/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-2/#When:04:04:15 How To Make a Whole Bunch Of Ugly. Put a picture of the love child of Ann Coulter and Bill Maher on the cover, and the book could crack the New York Times bestseller list because America loves to rubberneck.

In particular, one article can't completely cover the Indians' bullpen woes, so I am returning to the scene of the crime this week to summarize just how bad the pen has been this year and to examine how it could have been avoided.

In the previous article, I used David Gassko's Pitching Runs Created (PRC) to illustrate just how bad the bullpen has been. PRC is a relatively new metric that not everyone is familiar with, and some people had questions about this metric such as "Why do we need a new measuring stick to tell us what we already know? The pen is awful; we don't need a new set of numbers to tell us that!"

The answer is that PRC gives us a very quick method of comparing players at all positions. Yes, we could go through the conventional ways of examining pitchers, but to properly do that, we must examine many different indicators, and in the end, some might be still scratching their heads, saying, "Well, just what value does a reliever with a 4.00 ERA over 50 innings have to a team?" PRC answers that question very quickly and accurately. For instance, in terms of value to the Indians, most of the relievers have not contributed as much as Todd Hollandsworth with his .237/.253/.442 line over 160 plate appearances. That speaks volumes.

Let's use another metric, Win Shares Over Bench, to reinforce PRC. In the case of pitchers, WSAB is a player's production beyond what you could expect from a normal bench (replacement level) player if he were to take the mound and throw the same amount as the player in question has.
Pitcher       WSAB              
Betancourt      1
Davis           1
Mastny          0 
Brown           0
Wickman         0
Graves          0
Mujica          0
Cabrera         0
Lara            0
Miller          0
Perez           0
Sikorski        0
Slocum         -1
Guthire        -1
Sauerbeck      -1
Mota           -2
Carmona        -3

Total          -6
When Win Shares are small numbers, there are some problems due to rounding and Win Shares' tendency to "compress" small values. Obviously, all of those zeros aren't exactly "equal". However, we can determine that the Indians pen as a whole has been about 20 runs below what a group of replacement pitchers would be, while its best relievers have only been about three runs above bench. Here is another way to look at it—the Indians' top three relievers are a total of +2 WSAB (about 6.5 runs); the Twins' top three relievers are 21 WSAB (about 70 runs). That is quite a difference.

Now that we have defined just how bad the Indians pen has been in 2006, let's move forward and examine how the construction of this year's pen was a recipe for some very bad witch's brew. Prior to this year, the Indians pen had been a weakness for some years, but the 2005 Indians' relief cadre was very good. Here are the Indians' five primary relievers last year:
              IP         PRC
Wickman      62.0         40
Howry        73.0         42
Betancourt   67.7         41
Riske        72.7         35
Rhodes       43.3         28
Total       317.7        186
General manager Mark Shapiro elected not keep that group together, which was a smart decision. However, his plan to re-tool, similar to his bullpen plans prior to 2005, was off the mark. His first mistake was to go after a big name closer, which he never actually signed, while neglecting to secure a setup man. In essence, he created two holes on the above list because trying to sign a name closer meant that Bob Wickman wouldn't come back. While Shapiro tried to sign a closer, the middle relievers on the free agent market, including Bobby Howry, were being snapped up at rather high prices.

From the early stages of the free agent "season," it was evident that the market for middle relievers had changed, a fact that Shapiro failed to realize or ignored. Shapiro has said that he only had the money to go after either a closer or middle relief. That is suspect, since he opened the season about $5 million under his budget ceiling, but let's run with it for now.

If a general manager is in an either/or situation, he better darn well finish the path he starts down. Shapiro didn't because he vastly underrated the market for closers and found himself unable to close any sort of deal. By the time he realized he was in trouble, most of the middle relievers were snatched from the market.

Most importantly, his plan to go after a closer while neglecting middle relief would not have significantly improved the team. Yes, there were glaring signs that Wickman needed replacing. He was a rolling time bomb that never quite detonated last year. He continuously scraped through self-induced jams, as he was allowing too many runners on base and his strikeout rate wasn't anything to get misty over. His LOB% was a completely unsustainable 93% (anything above 80% is usually unsustainable, except for very dominant strikeout guys).

Let's examine how the Indians pen would have done had Shapiro signed the closer he was closest to signing, Trevor Hoffman, and assume Hoffman finishes with 50 PRC (he has 44 now. Let's also assume the other Indians relievers met last year's performance.
              IP        PRC
Hoffman      70.0        50
Betancourt   67.7        41
Riske        72.7        35
Rhodes       43.3        28
Miller       29.7        24
Total       283.4       178
We could substitute Fausto Carmona for Matt Miller, and even if we bump up the fifth reliever's innings, the pen would have been the same, assuming last year's performances were met—a very big assumption. Having a pen as good as last year's would have been a good thing, but suddenly the price for that performance would be much higher.

As spring training neared, Shapiro was forced to re-sign Wickman, and just about all the quality middle relief was off the market. Even if that bullpen had matched last year's performance, it was without a Howry-type pitcher and worse for it. Then the opportunity to land Andy Marte presented itself, and Shapiro struck what should be a deal that helps Cleveland at third base for a long time. However, he put the final touches on decimating the bullpen in the process and had no options. When the dust had settled from the acquisitions that brought Marte to Cleveland, the pen looked like this using last year's numbers:
               IP        PRC
Wickman       62.0        40
Betancourt    67.7        41
Mota          72.7        35
Sauerbeck     43.3        28
Miller        29.7        24
Total        275.4       168

Getting rid of David Riske and Arthur Rhodes wasn't necessarily a bad thing; getting squat for the bullpen in return was. Guillermo Mota had an outstanding 2003 season. However, it was a season in which he was overworked, pitching 105 innings in 76 games.

Research by Ron Shandler illustrates that any reliever who throws over 100 innings in a season while average fewer than two innings per outing is a prime candidate for future arm problems, and that is exactly what happened to Mota. The Dodgers dumped him in 2004, he faded quickly and was bothered with elbow and shoulder problems in 2005. Those health concerns lingered into the offseason, and the deal was almost nixed because of those concerns. Betting on a 32-year-old reliever with a career ERA+ 116 with health issues was a bad move, especially since the reliever only had three seasons in his career in which his ERA+ was above average, one of those being his rookie year.

The other thing these trades did was bump Scott Sauerbeck from a left-handed specialist role to a primary reliever. Overall, Sauerbeck had a decent year in a superficial sense in 2005 for the Tribe, but when Rhodes left the team for family reasons and Sauerbeck's role was elevated, the results were messy. He posted a 5.91 ERA in 24 appearances, finishing the season 0 WSAB. He hasn't had a really good season since 2002, yet Shapiro was calling on him to shoulder a much larger responsibility. That is like the pig who built his house with straw.

The negative chaining effect continued as Danny Graves made the Opening Day roster. Let's look at the pen that opened the season for the Indians, with 2005 numbers:
             WSAB      PRC
Wickman       3         40
Betancourt    3         41
Miller        2         24
Cabrera       2         24
Sauerbeck     0         28
Mota          0         22
Graves       -2          3
Total         8        182

That isn't the pen of a contender; it is a pen about 12 runs over replacement over the amount of innings an average bullpen would throw. Last year, the Indians pen compiled 267 PRC; these guys compiled 182. Compound April injuries to Miller and Betancourt, who were temporarily replaced with replacement relievers, plus C.C. Sabathia going down which put more stress on the pen. Add the fact the starting pitching and middle relievers often couldn't even get to the ninth inning with a lead despite a potent offense, and it should be no surprise things were very ugly before the Indy 500.

But what about Betancourt, Miller, and Fernando Cabrera? Shapiro was obviously expecting them to pick up the slack. Was he foolish to think that? Let's look at the individual pitchers to see if there were any red flags, starting with Betancourt.

There were no warning signs of collapse from Rafael Betancourt's performance last year, other than a slight second half drop. However, he was nailed for a "banned performance-enhancing drug" last year. Getting caught doesn't immediately erase all the benefits of PEDs. Who knows how long he has been on them, but he didn't make the majors until he was 28 years old (yes, he started as a position player, so he wasn't pitching in the minors right away).

We also don't know how much of Betancourt's past success was PED aided. I don't think it is fair to put the onus of blame on Shapiro not recognizing that Betancourt would have such a dismal year (Betancourt has pitched much better in the second half). Entrusting him with a setup job might have been a bit much with the specter of PEDs, but Betancourt's injury probably had a much bigger impact on his struggles early in the year.

Matt Miller's career has been an injury lurking around the corner, and while he pitched brilliantly last year, he didn't pitch after July 15. Counting on him to be healthy enough to contribute greatly to the pen was a long shot, and bullpen's stretched thin by their design can't afford those type of bets. Granted, Shapiro had Cabrera as the third or fourth man in the pen, but when Danny Graves is your last safety net in a seven-man bullpen, chances are the trapeze artist is going to go splat.

Cabrera has been a mystery this year. His LOB% was 90%, but his strikeout-rate was high (9.0/9 innings), so there should not have been too much reverting to the norm. His walk-rate increased dramatically this year (4.8/ 9 innings from 3.4 9 innings last year), and his home run-rate jumped. This sounds like a pitcher who gets himself behind the count due to control problems, then overthrows to get himself out of jams. The result is a flat pitch that major league hitters put out of the park. However, his breaking stuff has been hit hard this year. Shapiro can't really be faulted for not seeing this in advance; Cabrera looked to be a young pitcher ready to have a breakout type season.

In the end, what Shapiro can be faulted for is trying to build a bullpen from the top down while ignoring the foundation below. Completely underestimating the closer market undermined his strategy since he staked his entire bullpen reconstruction on a top closer, then failed to finish the deal. While a closer is important into today's game, a great closer can't carry a pen of pitchers at or just above the replacement level.

At best Shapiro entered the season with a couple of relievers suited for the middle of the pen, maybe a guy who could handle the set up role, an old, potential gas can for a closer, and a few replacement level pitchers. At worst, he received what he has now.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2006-09-28T04:04:15+00:00 Where It Went Wrong for the Tribe: Part 1 http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-1/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/where-it-went-wrong-for-the-tribe-part-1/#When:04:05:15
Things went south quickly for the Indians. By late June, the trees in the Metroparks surrounding the cities were screaming to the skies to be drowned, long dormant smokestacks in the industrial areas were begging to be demolished, and Indians fans were once again forced to eat a steaming bowl of stinging disappointment by the All-Star Break as the orange construction barrels that sprout along the city's infrastructure in warm weather howled in glee.

So where did things go wrong? The obvious answer is the train wreck known as the bullpen Mark Shapiro assembled. The Indians lead the American League in blown saves (22) and are last in the AL in save percentage (50%). Blown saves, however, are just one part of a bullpen's contribution over the course of a season.

Let's take a look at the bullpens of the teams in the AL Central that are ahead of the Indians this year using David Gassko's Pitching Runs Created. PRC give us a nice, neat number to sum up a reliever's worth, and most importantly, a number we can readily compare to both starting pitchers and position players.
               PRC     IP        PRC/IP (through 9/15)
Twins          272     466.7    .58
Tigers         262     411.0    .64
White Sox      174     377.4    .47
These numbers include spot starts from relievers, so not all the PRC were in relief. I thought about separating the spot starts, but over the course of a 162-game season, the pen is going to be called upon to start a few games. I did not include relievers who pitched more than five starts.

The Twins and the Tigers have two of the best bullpens in baseball. The Twins have accrued more PRC because they have been used more, while the Tigers' relievers have had a better rate. Now let's contrast that to the 2006 Indians' pen (through 9/15):
               PRC     IP       PRC/IP
               149     414.5    .36
The Indians' pen has been about 11-12 wins below the Tigers' and Twins' pens. That is a rather massive drop from the contenders in the division. Here is how the Indians' pen has done individually:
              PRC     IP    PRC/IP
Betancourt    24     52.7     .46
Cabrera       23     56.3     .41
Carmona       19     62.7     .30
Davis         19     50.7     .37
Mota          11     37.7     .29
Wickman       10     28.0     .35
Mujica         8     16.3     .49
Mastny         7     15.7     .45
Sikorski       6     13.7     .44
Guthrie        5     18.3     .27
Miller         4     10.0     .40
Perez          4      8.7     .46
Sauerbeck      4     13.0     .31
Brown          2      7.0     .29
Graves         2     14.0     .14
Lara           1      3.0     .33
Slocum         0      6.7      0

Total         149    414.5    .36
The top Indians' performers in the pen have only amassed 47 PRC while the Tigers' top two performers (Zumaya and Walker) have combined for 101. The Twins' top two performers (Nathan and Reyes) have combined for 113. Jason Johnson, the starter that was deservedly run out of town, had 19 PRC with the Tribe. On the position side, Todd Hollandsworth had 21 RC, meaning the Indians’ best reliever has only contributed three more runs over the season than Hollandsworth.

This year's Indians pen is also a far cry from last year's Tribe pen. In 2005, the Indian's bullpen amassed 267 PRC; through September 15 this year, the Indians' bullpen has 149 PRC. Last year, the Indians' pen averaged .57 PRC per inning pitched; this year .36. Let's look at last year's pen to determine why the drop-off occurred.
              PRC     IP    PRC/IP
Howry         42     73.0     .58
Betancourt    41     67.7     .61
Wickman       40     62.0     .65
Riske         35     72.7     .48
Rhodes        28     43.3     .65
Miller        24     29.7     .81
Cabrera       24     30.7     .78
Sauerbeck     15     35.7     .42
Davis         15     40.3     .38
Tadano         2      4.0     .50
Guthrie        1      6.0     .17
Tallet         0      4.7      0

Total         267    469.8    .57
This year, Rafael Betancourt leads the Indians' relievers with an anemic 24 PRC; last year the Indians had three relievers with 40+ PRC (Howry 42, Betancourt 41, and Wickman 40). Howry left as a free agent while Shapiro was trying to sign a big name closer.

Howry's performance has dipped this year as his ERA has dropped from 168 in 2005 to 135, but he has still put up 39 PRC over 71.3 IP. Arthur Rhodes was traded to the Phillies for Jason Michaels, a bust for both teams. David Riske was traded to Boston as part of the Marte/Crisp deal, and unfortunately, the Indians acquired Guillermo Mota in that trade.

While the face of the Indians' pen had changed entering the season, Shapiro counted on those returning and the new acquisitions to pick up the slack. They didn't. Betancourt was much better last year when he was testing positive for illegal substances, and Cabrera has been very disappointing. Shapiro foolishly banked on Scott Sauerbeck as being his primary lefty in the pen; Sauerbeck pitched as well as he eluded the law after a few too many drinks. No one in the Indians' has pitched well for a sustained time. The pen is a disaster.

Had Shapiro kept last year's pen together, it would not have come close to repeating last year's performance. Relievers are not that consistent from year to year, and no one should have expected some of the solid performances from last year to repeat. However, Shapiro's bullpen creation this season resembled a kid spray painting a mud puddle, and it's the number-one culprit in the Indians' disappointing season.

The bullpen isn't the only reason the Indians have faltered. In my next article, I will use Win Shares Above Bench to determine which Indians' positional players were below average as compared to other teams in the league. Here is a hint: the outfield, shortstop, catcher, third base, and second base.

Click here to learn about THT's download subscriptions.]]> J.P. McIntyre 2006-09-20T04:05:15+00:00