The Hardball Times -- Maury Brown

Sale of the Braves Fuels the Corporate vs. Family Ownership Debate

Maury Brown — 2006-05-22T04:05:15+00:00

They say that the only sure thing in life is death and taxes. They didn’t say that the sale of the Braves would be involved, but that may well be the case.

Bear with me.

While the sale of the Nationals has garnered the spotlight over the course of the last six months, the sale of the Braves has been a large and looming deal that has brought the discussion of corporate ownership versus family ownership, with corporate tax breaks as the steady undercurrent in the deal.

Basically, Time Warner (a corporate entity) seems likely to sell the club to Colorado-based Liberty Media (another corporate entity). This has kicked the “corporate entity as owners” discussion into high gear, with the premise being that local “family” ownership would be more concerned about the health and well-being of the franchise, while a corporation will view the Braves as no more than a business holding and an entry on a corporate ledger.

When Chipper Jones was asked about whether corporate or family ownership mattered, his reply to the Associated Press was, “Yeah, it matters. If a company is buying us for investment purposes, then it doesn't benefit us at all."

So, where do the other bidders for the Braves—namely Falcons owner Arthur Blank—fit in? They’re on the sidelines while the deal seems wired in for the two corporate behemoths.

And here’s where MLB and tax breaks fit in.

Both Time Warner and Liberty Media stand to save considerably on the deal by structuring the deal around tax breaks. Time Warner will sell the club without having to pay taxes on the deal, and Liberty Media will divest itself of a large part of Time Warner stock—another tax break.

Through this process, many have pondered—some out loud in the media—how the Nationals deal emphasized family ownership so strongly, while the Braves deal has headed in the polar opposite direction. After all, when asked about the makeup of the Lerner group and their place in the history of the ownership dynamic in MLB, Bud Selig responded by saying, "In the end, I determined that family ownership, and major investment by a central person has served baseball well in the past and will continue to serve it well and in the future," said Selig. "I believe the Lerners will be another excellent example."

So, is it any wonder that many just shake their head and say, “Huh?” when during the same stretch of time, the Braves deal appears headed for corporate ownership with local “family” bidders left of the sideline?

In a conversation with one highly placed MLB executive on placing a franchise in Northern New Jersey, I framed the question of “how can one deal be so inherently different from another” in that way.

“Every deal is unique,” said the executive. “If Bud wants it to happen, he’ll make it happen.” So, looking at the sale of the Nationals and tying it to the Braves deal is an effort in futility when looking at it through the prism that is Bud Selig and MLB.

They’re different.

They’re unique.

But, these two deals do bring up the question: Which is better? Corporate or family ownership?

It should be noted that Liberty Media is not based in Atlanta. Arthur Blank is from Atlanta, and therefore the consensus by many in the media and fans is that he will take more pride in the franchise should he own it. If he has more of an interest in it as someone with local ties, he’ll be more directly involved and invest in the club accordingly.

But, is that really the case? The jury is out on the matter.

Going back over the history of the “corporate vs. family owned” structures, there is no clear pattern as to whether one works better than the other. As Tim Lemke of the Washington Times reported:

For every family like the O'Malleys that brought stability and championships for more than 40 years with the Dodgers franchise, there have been controversial and oft-criticized owners like Peter Angelos in Baltimore, the Pohlad family in Minnesota and Marge Schott in Cincinnati. Meanwhile, corporate-owned teams like the Atlanta Braves and Seattle Mariners have enjoyed great on-field success, and many partnership-owned teams like the St. Louis Cardinals and Boston Red Sox also have thrived.

But, did Fox or Disney exemplify “good ownership” with the Dodgers and the Angels? How about the Tribune Company and the Cubs? It’s hard to say.

Certainly, they didn’t fly the plane into the side of the mountain. The Angels team that won the World Series in 2002 was built during the Disney ownership tenure, and the Cubs were a Steve Bartman fly ball from going to the World Series in 2003.

Maybe it's the case that local ownerships don't guarantee championships any more than money doesn't guarantee success. It is not necessarily a case of the type of ownership, but rather the ownership philosophies, willingness to invest in the club, and most importantly, viewing ownership of a club as a priority from not only an investment perspective, but as a sports perspective, one that emphasizes winning and the long term stability that comes with it.

To tie this all back to the sale of the Braves, John Malone, the chairman of Liberty Media, had made mention that nothing would make him happier than bringing Ted Turner back into the Braves ownership fold. This wasn’t some idea hatched on a whim, as Malone has known Turner for years. The key question is, was the idea of bringing in Turner an attempt to placate those who want to see some type of local attachment to the club. Certainly, Turner would have been a connection to the club’s resurgent past.

Unfortunately for Malone and Liberty Media, Turner has said he’s not interested, although clearly, Turner’s inclusion in the group is not a make or break part of the sale process.

So, for you Braves fans, maybe the way to close this story is to look at the moving parts in the sale of your beloved franchise. It’s shaping up to be heavily weighted toward the “business side” of the deal. You can look at the glass as being half-full or half-empty, depending on your point of view—there’s nothing that says corporate ownership is good or bad. It all depends on who winds up running the show. And finally, I think most all of the Braves fans will agree: If the terms of the Braves sale are heavily dependent on tax breaks, it’s enough to make any diehard fan want to tomahawk chop the process into pieces. Somehow, that aspect should not be what will be remembered as the driving factor in moving from one owner to another.

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Todd Radom and the Art of the Sports Logo

Maury Brown — 2006-05-15T04:06:15+00:00

Chances are, you’ve never heard of Todd Radom. Chances are very good, you’ve seen his work.

Todd is a bit of an anomaly in sports business these days. He designs logos and brands for professional sport franchises as a single entity. No focus groups. No rolling behemoth of a corporation, just a man and his passion for art and sports.

In baseball, he has designed the logo for the Washington Nationals, the new Angels logo, the logo for the Brooklyn Cyclones, the 2003 World Series logo, the official mark commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Jackie Robinson breaking the color barrier, the primary logo from 1994 to 1999 for the Milwaukee Brewers, and the logo for Fenway Park’s 90th Anniversary, to name but a few. (Getting into the details on how this process works with MLB Properties is a conversation that is off-limits ... a Professional Service Contract precludes him from discussing the particulars of how the process between artist and MLB Properties functions. Therefore, the links above point to all the logos in question on Radom's website).

Outside of baseball, he has designed logos and brand design for the Basketball Hall of Fame, Superbowl XXXVIII, the official logo for the 2004 Houston Super Bowl Host Committee, the Indiana Fever of the WNBA, and many others. He has worked for 14 years with the NFL, NBA, and Major League Baseball.

As I said, you may have never heard of Todd Radom, but if you’re a sports fan, you’ve most assuredly seen his work.

Radom comes from a family of professional artists. His paternal great grandfather and grandfather were painters, and his dad a graphic artist/photographer/copywriter. While many families might view involvement in the arts a risky career move, Radom says it was encouraged in his family. “I was fortunate in the sense that a career in the arts was looked on as something that was practical and even encouraged,” Radom says. He attended the School of Visual Arts (SVA) in New York and graduated with a BFA in 1986.

Whether this is a blessing or a curse, he grew up as a diehard Red Sox fan in New York. When he was a kid he used to vacation in Montauk, on the eastern tip of Long Island. As Radom describes it, "At the time there was no cable TV out there, just over-the-air TV from across Long Island Sound, from Providence, hence the only thing on the tube, night after night, was Red Sox games, all summer long."

He combined his love for art and baseball, he says, when he started doodling logos on scorecards around 1977.

He graduated from SVA and worked at a succession of jobs in the book publishing industry in New York, freelancing at the same time. From 1987 to roughly 1995 he did a considerable number of major baseball book covers, so by 1992 he had accrued enough of a portfolio that he was able to cold call MLB and drop off some logo designs. The rest, as they say, is history.

As Radom explains, "I sold myself as not only someone who could conceptualize and execute the work, but as a consumer of their product with a knowledge of the history of the game and a reverence for the culture."

While logos and design are done by the industry to create brand impression, the design has the ability to become iconic, and certainly a part of the history of the sport. Radom recognizes his place in the history of sport in that context, especially as it pertains to Major League Baseball.

"I always aware of the fact that, whatever the merits of my work, they are part of history," he says. "Just as the great Lon Keller created the Yankees logo back in 1946, I created the current Nationals and Angels." Radom adds, "My work was on the field during All Star Games, World Series, perfect games, etc, and I am very fortunate indeed to have the opportunity to be part of the enduring history of the game."

Given his understanding of the history of baseball as it pertains to logo branding, how does he view some of the designs from the past? "Growing up in the 70s, I come at this from a specific place. The Yankees logo, as iconic as it is, could and would not be implemented in 2006," says Radom. "The equity that this and other "traditional" logos (Red Sox, Tigers, Braves, etc) makes them special, and the fact that they have been allowed to evolve organically if you will, makes them great."

For franchises that no longer exist, he loves the Expos logo, sees that the Colt .45s logo would be politically incorrect in this day and age with its smoking gun in the design, and loved Bill Veeck's Brownie and the Seattle Pilots design.

But how you do a redesign the past, as was the case with the Angels logo? Radom says it depends on the amount of equity that the club desires to carry forward. "Hypothetically, designing a new identity for the Marlins, despite their problems, would require some carryover due to two World Series titles," the designer says. "Tampa Bay on the other hand could be blown up and started from scratch, for every obvious reason."

So, it comes as no surprise that Todd Radom sees more than just a mere brand logo creation when he places designs something that is used in professional sport. The logo and design reach into a further place. "I have often said that the graphic traditions of American pro team sports are embedded in the fabric of our culture," Radom concludes. "American pro sports fans are exposed to graphic design every hour of every day, often from a very early age. Logos and uniform designs connect generations of fans who follow their favorite teams daily, sometimes obsessively—the ultimate brand loyalists."

Given Radom's understanding of how the design of a professional sports logo stands in terms of it's place in history, as well as a design's ability to place an immediate stamp on the consumer's psyche, it's a good chance that while you may not see Todd Radom's name when a new design is unveiled, there's a good chance it will be his work.

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You Own The Nationals. Now What Happens?

Maury Brown — 2006-05-09T04:06:15+00:00

29 owners…

It just never sounded right.

On Feb. 15, 2002, the other 29 owners purchased the Expos for $120 million from Jeffrey Loria and his minority partners in a deal that had Loria purchasing the Marlins and shortly thereafter having John Henry purchase the Red Sox along with Tom Werner and Larry Lucchino. The latter of these transactions has some bearing on what we’re about to delve into.

And what we’re about to delve into is the sale of the Washington Nationals.

This past Wednesday, Commissioner Selig finally pulled the trigger and awarded the sale of the Nationals to a group led by Washington, D.C. real estate magnate, Theodore Lerner. The sale price: $450 million.

I’ve been following the Expos' relocation daily since 2001, but about 18 months ago, I started really contemplating what the new owners would be up against. That was when the discussion on the ownership selection started into high gear. It’s also when Stan Kasten came into the picture.

Kasten had signed up for updates on the SABR Business of Baseball committee website, Business of Baseball.com to receive updates. I was looking through the logs when I noticed his e-mail address; how many Stan Kastens are there in the world? I contacted him when it was announced that he was going to be one of the bidders for the Nationals and requested that when the time of the award occurred—no matter whether he was part of the winning bid or not, I wanted to interview him on the process of the selection. About a month ago, Kasten merged with the Lerner group, and well, he landed on the winning side of the ledger.

The interview with Kasten was published yesterday, less than a week since Selig announced the award to the Lerners.

Kasten is the former president of the Atlanta Braves, Hawks, and Thrashers. What’s amazing is he was president of the three franchises simultaneously. He also helped in the development of Turner Field, snagged John Schuerholz from the Royals, and bumped Bobby Cox into the manager's position. Few would deny that all of these moves have been successful.

So, for about a year I’ve been gearing up thinking of all that the new ownership will be faced with. I understood that not all questions would be answered, and therefore it would be pointless to ask. Some questions would be asked, but I had a suspicion that the answers would be “politically correct” in their response.

Here’s what has crossed my mind on what the owners are against, in no particular order. It shows that there is an unbelievable amount of work to undertake. As Kasten said in my interview with him, “My list of items that have to be done as my ‘first order of business' is now 12 pages long.”

Oversee and Influence the Construction of a $611 million Stadium Project

The new owners have new stadium construction to oversee, and not only do they need to get it built, they have to get it online by March 2008 based on the lease agreement negotiated prior to the ownership award. Yes, the onus is on the District. (Actually, it's on the construction companies that have signed on to build it for the District, but there are loopholes that place some level of risk on the District.) The facility design by HOK has yet to get in the hands of the new owners, who will want to add their touches to the design. Kasten made mention of reaching out to non-hardcore baseball fans in an attempt to keep attendance high. The ability to do that, he feels, may be though the addition of amenities the are outside of baseball, be that play areas for kids or in-stadium restaurants.

The fate of Tony Tavares, Jim Bowden, and Frank Robinson

Out of these three, only the fate of the first on the list is known. Tony Tavares, the current president of the Nationals will be stepping down. After that, it’s debatable, although some educated guesses can be made.

Jim Bowden is dealing with a DUI charge, and given the direction that Kasten and the Lerners are taking, it seems highly likely that Bowden’s time with the Nationals is at an end.

As for Frank Robinson, if the new owners wish to place their mark on the franchise from the get-go, then Robinson is likely out as manager as well. It may be possible, however, that Robinson could be retained in the front office in some fashion.

Getting Comcast to Show Nationals Games in the D.C. Area

A serious impediment to marketing the Nationals has been the fact that in the D.C. area, Comcast is currently not showing Nats games. Why? A dispute between the Orioles (Peter Angelos) and Comcast over the Orioles' contract with Comcast. You may ask how these are related. The answer is the newly created regional sports network (RSN), Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN).

MASN was created as part of the deal when the Expos were relocated to D.C. in order to show both Orioles and Nationals games. The dispute with Comcast is based on the fact that the Orioles had an agreement with Comcast to show games prior to the creation of MASN, which Comcast feels it should have had the rights to bid on. The dispute has created considerable consternation with members of Congress and the D.C. Council. Both government entities have threatened to intervene.

The total number of subscribers that have been unable to watch Nationals games is reported to be 1.3 million.

Addressing issues while still at RFK

RFK is an interim facility. It’s physically old and is not considered to be a permanent location for the Nationals.

Beyond that, there are issues surrounding the fan experience that need to be addressed. There have been complaints surrounding the quality of food vendor offerings, from the level of customer service to the quality and quantity of food offerings. On top of this, there have been complaints regarding the ticket service, which many season ticket holders say has been sub-par— many fans have complained about the tardiness of tickets arriving via mail.

Ownership will want to wade into these and other issues that revolve around staffing. They will want to address these issues and prevent the slide of attendance, which is already occurring in the second year of the franchise being in D.C.

Since the new ballpark will not be ready until March 2008 at the earliest, ownership will need to make RFK as enjoyable and appealing as possible in the interim.

Redeveloping the On-the-Field Product

Maybe the biggest challenge will be turning a club that has been wards of MLB into a contender.

The Nationals were a .500 ballclub last year, going 81-81. And, for the most part, they’ve been just that—average. They have finished as follows in the NL East over the last 10 years: 5, 5, 4, 2, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2 (avg. over the decade: 3.9).

New ownership will be addressing this, although some fans may not like the fact that immediate gratification is not the overriding factor. As Kasten told me in his interview:

It's not a secret formula. It's something that has been proven many, many times in different contexts. You have to build from the ground up in baseball, it's very much a development sport, unlike basketball. In baseball you really need to focus on scouting, player development and minor leagues.

All those things require time and money, and we're absolutely determined and dedicated to do it that way. Those that would provide not just money, but the time. And time is even more important than money, in many cases. These owners want to build long-term success; they understand that it will take a little while longer to build it that way, but when we finally turn the corner, the success we have will be much longer lasting.

Turning the Nationals from a Revenue Payee into a Revenue Payor

One thing that baseball is pretty much banking on is the ability to turn the Expos/Nationals from a taker in the revenue sharing system into a payer into the system. With the move from a smaller market in Montreal to a top market in DC, the club should be able to do so. It’s the “how” that is key.

Kasten helped develop Turner Field, and he believes that a large part of that success is due to the ability to reach the fringe fanbase: those who come to the game not just for baseball, but for entertainment. This, of course, makes many die-hard baseball fans' stomachs turn. The logic is that over a long stretch of time, winning seasons cannot always be banked upon. Is it crucial? Absolutely, but what Kasten envisions is the ability to sustain over 2 million a year in attendance. That, he feels, comes with entertainment options for kids, seniors, and women. In the case of Turner Field, that has been through the implementation of Tooner Field, the Chop House restaurant, concerts, etc.

Playing Nice with Congress, the D.C. Council, and Mayor

Much was made of the fact that the Lerner and Kasten bids were "quiet." That is, when other groups were lobbying through the press or with members of the D.C. Council, the Lerners were virtually non-existent. In the numerous e-mails that I exchanged with Kasten, it was always a case of pretty much not saying anything about the Nationals. At one point when I mentioned the Nationals, he responded by saying, "Nice try getting me to comment on something regarding the Nationals … which I'm still not doing. But, I do appreciate the thought."

There was never an edict from MLB to stay quiet on the Nationals' process. But how the Lerners and Kasten acted has a significant bearing on where the Nationals reside: the nation's capital.

Think about it: the new owners need to be able to not create any undo controversy in the place where steroid hearings and antitrust are always omnipresent. In some senses it may make more sense for ownership to be heads down and focused on the tasks at hand, while not possibly setting off any landmines in the process. These owners will also have to deal with an oversight committee that the D.C. Council plans to implement to make sure that the construction of the new stadium stays on budget. Being politically savvy will be highly important.

Conclusion

Yes, Ted Lerner, you now own an MLB team after working to land a professional sports franchise for over 30 years. Yes, Stan Kasten, you're back in the sports executive game after being "retired" from the front office since 2003. You have your work cut out for you. It's one part real estate project (the construction of the stadium), one part redevelopment project (the rebuilding of player personnel), one part restabilization of the front office and marketing (creating a better experience at RFK and getting the Comcast/MASN dispute ironed out, one part "place your stamp" on the franchise with the dealings of Tavares, Bowden, and Robinson, and finally, one part don't blow-up MLB by doing something stupid where Congress and the D.C. Council need to be dealt with.

Yes, it's just the sort of ownership that a driven, egocentric type would love. Good thing that's what it takes to own an MLB franchise.

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The Upcoming CBA and the Battles Within It (Part 2) - Revenue Sharing

Maury Brown — 2006-05-01T04:04:15+00:00

Baseball has to address the disincentives created by large scale transfers of revenue from successful clubs to less successful clubs. - John Henry, owner, Boston Red Sox

I'd like to see everybody competing, but we're not a socialist state - George Steinbrenner, owner, New York Yankees

Teams have to be accountable to themselves for spending the money to become competitive - David Glass, owner, Kansas City Royals

The lower-revenue teams, even with revenue sharing, do not have enough money to compete - Jerry Reinsdorf, owner, Chicago White Sox

There are teams in major league baseball that receive more money from central baseball from the national television contract and revenue sharing than they spend on payrolls - Donald Fehr, executive director, MLB Players Association

So, the battle lines are being drawn—revenue sharing will be the key topic of negotiation (and contention) in the next round of collective bargaining.

As I mentioned in Part 1 of this multi-part series, as well as within the 2006 Annual, the real battle coming up in the next round of collective bargaining will be within the ownership ranks, not with the MLBPA. Revenue sharing will be the most contentious issue. (Some had thought that Contraction would be a key issue, but revenue sharing, not contraction, is the issue to watch.)

Will we see discourse on the level of the infamous Kohler meetings, where Selig had to hand notes back and forth between ownership groups? Certainly Bud Selig will be praying as much, and given the upbeat financial state of MLB these days, the chances are lower than that August in 1993, when revenue sharing was first brought forward to address competitive imbalance.

So, before I delve into the revenue sharing figures released by Stefan Fatsis and the Wall Street Journal (subscription required), which Andrew Zimbalist informed me are accurate, let's go over quickly how the revenue sharing system is structured.

How the Revenue Sharing System Works

The following details the key section of the current Basic Agreement detailing revenue sharing:

(2) “Defined Gross Revenue” shall mean the aggregate operating revenues from baseball operations received, or to be received on an accrual basis, as reported by each Club on an annual basis in the Club’s FIQ. “Baseball Operations” shall mean all activities of a Club that generate revenue, except those wholly unrelated to the business of Major League Baseball. Baseball Operations shall include (by way of example, but not by way of limitation):
(a) an activity that could be conducted by a non-Club entity but which is conducted by a Club because its affiliation or connection with Major League Baseball increases the activity’s appeal; and
(b) an activity from which revenue or value is received as a result of a decision or agreement to forego what otherwise would be Defined Gross Revenue.
(3) “Central Revenue” shall mean all of the centrally-generated operating revenues of the Major League Clubs that are administered by the Office of the Commissioner or central baseball including, but not limited to, revenues from national and international broadcasting agreements (television, cable, radio and Internet), Major League Baseball Properties, Inc., Baseball Television, Inc., Major League Baseball Enterprises, Major League Baseball Advanced Media, Inc., the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel, superstation agreements between the Commissioner’s Office and the Clubs whose games are transmitted on a distant signal (“Superstation Agreements”), the All-Star Game and national marketing and licensing.

(4) “Local Revenue” shall mean a Club’s Defined Gross Revenue less its share of Central Revenue.

(5) “Actual Stadium Expenses” shall mean the “Stadium Operations Expenses” of each Club, as reported on an annual basis in the Club’s FIQ.

(6) “Net Local Revenue” shall mean a Club’s Local Revenue less its Actual Stadium Expenses.

(7) The “Base Plan” shall be a 34% straight pool plan. The amount of net payment or net receipt under the Base Plan for each Major League Club shall be determined as follows: Each Club contributes 34% of its Net Local Revenue to a putative pool; that pool is then divided equally among all Clubs, with the difference between each Club’s payment into the putative pool and its receipt there from producing the net payment or net receipt for that Club.

(8) Those Clubs that receive net receipts in a given revenue sharing year under the Base Plan shall be referred to for that year as “Payee Clubs.” Those Clubs that make net payments in a given revenue sharing year under the Base Plan shall be referred to for that year as “Payor Clubs.”

(9) The revenue sharing plan shall also have a “Central Fund Component” under which a portion of Major League Central Fund money will be reallocated from Payor Clubs to Payee Clubs. The amount of net payment or net receipt under the Central Fund Component for each Club shall be determined as follows:
(a) Net Transfer Value. At 100% implementation, the net transfer value of the Central Fund Component, in each revenue sharing year, shall be 41.066% of the net transfer value of the
Base Plan in that revenue sharing year. “Net transfer value” shall mean the sum of the amounts transferred from Payor Clubs to Payee Clubs.
(b) Contributors and Recipients. During each revenue sharing year, Major League Central Fund money shall be reallocated from Clubs that are Payor Clubs for that revenue sharing year
(“Contributors”). Distributions under the Central Fund Component for each revenue sharing year shall be made only to Clubs that:

(i) are Payee Clubs for that revenue sharing year, and
(ii) have a mean Net Local Revenue for the preceding three revenue sharing years that is below the industry’s mean

That covers most everything, but if you want the cribs version, zero in on (7): Each Club contributes 34% of its Net Local Revenue to a putative pool; that pool is then divided equally among all Clubs, with the difference between each Club’s payment into the putative pool and its receipt there from producing the net payment or net receipt for that Club.

The 34% of Net Local Revenue is a jump from the last Basic agreement, in which the figure was 20%. It was a reach last time, and here's the thing ... the MLB brass, and many of the smaller revenue making clubs wish to see and increase from 34% of Net Local Revenue. Paul Godfrey, the president of the Blue Jays has suggested 50%.

Needless to say, there has become sharp divisions over how the revenue sharing system is structured. For example, read the following excerpt from the current basic agreement, which outlines the intent of how revenue sharing dollars should be used (bolding mine):

(5) Other Undertakings

(a) A principal objective of the revenue sharing plan is to promote the growth of the Game and the industry on an individual Club and on an aggregate basis. Accordingly, each Club shall use its revenue sharing receipts (from the Base Plan, the Central Fund Component and the Commissioner’s Discretionary Fund) in an effort to improve its performance on the field. The Commissioner shall enforce this obligation by requiring, among other things, each Payee Club, no later than April 1, to report on the performance-related uses to which it put its revenue sharing receipts in the preceding revenue sharing year. Consistent with his authority under the Major League Constitution, the Commissioner may impose penalties on any Club that violates this obligation.

Clearly, not all clubs are reinvesting back in player payroll, and Commissioner Selig has yet to impose penalties on those clubs. Some, it seems, enjoy welfare, but more on that in a bit.

Who Paid and Who Received?

The following is a breakdown, based on the plan outlined above for those that are payors into the system. To place some context behind this, these 13 clubs moved $312 million to the 17 lower revenue clubs.

Team 	            Amount paid 
                     (millions) 
New York Yankees          $76 
Boston Red Sox            $52 
Chicago Cubs              $32 
Seattle Mariners          $25 
New York Mets             $24 
Los Angeles Dodgers       $20 
St. Louis Cardinals       $19 
Chicago White Sox         $18 
San Francisco Giants      $14 
Houston Astros            $11 
Los Angeles Angels        $11 
Atlanta Braves            $10 
Texas Rangers             $.035

Is it any wonder George Steinbrenner is looking for a loophole to get out of some of these revenue sharing obligations? That is a key loophole that the lower revenue making clubs will zero in on as a portion of stadium construction can be deducted from revenue sharing obligations as it is viewed as "operating expenses" and therefore falls within section 5 of the revenue sharing provision of the current agreement.

While that's a concern for the lower revenue making clubs, the payees also have to concern themselves with how they are using their revenue sharing funds.

Here are the payees under the revenue sharing system:

Team 	            Amount received
                     (millions) 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays      $33 
Toronto Blue Jays         $31 
Florida Marlins           $31 
Kansas City Royals        $30 
Detroit Tigers            $25 
Pittsburgh Pirates        $25 
Milwaukee Brewers         $24 
Minnesota Twins           $22 
Oakland Athletics         $19 
Cincinnati Reds           $16 
Colorado Rockies          $16 
Arizona Diamondbacks      $13 
Cleveland Indians         $6.0 
Philadelphia Phillies     $5.8 
San Diego Padres          $5.7 
Washington Nationals      $3.9 
Baltimore Orioles         $2.0

So, back to that provision within the CBA where clubs are supposed to use the revenue sharing monies to improve on the field performance ...

The loophole, of course, is that you can "improve" your on the field performance any number of ways, be it investing in scouting, or farm systems, or what have you. The verbiage in the provision is vague, in that sense. But, let's just look at those as payees and their Opening Day payrolls and see whether the clubs are using revenue sharing dollars toward improving on-the-field product:

     Club             Revenue Sharing    Opening Day Payroll     Difference
Tampa Bay Devil Rays    $33,000,000          $35,417,967        -$2,417,967
Toronto Blue Jays       $31,000,000          $71,915,000        -$40,915,000
Florida Marlins         $31,000,000          $14,998,500        +$16,001,500
Kansas City Royals      $30,000,000          $47,294,000        -$17,294,000
Detroit Tigers          $25,000,000          $82,612,866        -$57,612,866
Pittsburgh Pirates      $25,000,000          $46,717,750        -$21,717,750
Milwaukee Brewers       $24,000,000          $57,568,333        -$33,568,333
Minnesota Twins         $22,000,000          $63,396,006        -$41,396,006
Oakland Athletics       $19,000,000          $62,243,079        -$43,243,079
Cincinnati Reds         $16,000,000          $60,909,519        -$44,909,519
Colorado Rockies        $16,000,000          $41,233,000        -$25,909,519
Arizona Diamondbacks    $13,000,000          $59,684,226        -$46,684,226
Cleveland Indians       $6,000,000           $56,031,500        -$50,031,500
Philadelphia Phillies   $5,800,000           $88,273,333        -$82,473,333
San Diego Padres        $5,700,000           $69,896,141        -$64,196,141
Washington Nationals    $3,900,000           $63,143,000        -$59,243,000
Baltimore Orioles       $2,000,000           $72,585,582        -$70,585,582

So, of the 17 clubs that are receiving revenue sharing, five clubs have actually spent less than $40 million of their own money on player payroll (Devil Rays, Royals, Pirates, Brewers, Rockies), and even that could be generous as the USA Today Opening Day Payroll figures do not reflect payments teams receive as compensation in some player trades in the individual or team salaries.

One club, however, stands out head and shoulders above the rest of the clubs for taking advantage of the revenue sharing system: the Florida Marlins.

By now, many of you know that the Marlins drastically cut payroll last season (by $45,410,334, a 75.17% decrease from 2005) to $14,998,500. When you factor in revenue sharing, the Marlins actually have a surplus of $16,001,500. In an email conversation with an ESPN senior writer and television analyst, I mentioned that this was a case of baseball welfare, with the Marlins pocketing the windfall. His reply was that, "The rationalization on the Marlins, and this is true to a certain extent, is that they lost a lot of money the previous three years trying to win. And if it wasn't going to lead to a stadium, then they needed to do what they needed to do to recoup."

My response was that this may be true to an extent, but that it certainly didn't fall within the spirit of that pesky section within the revenue sharing provisions on applying the monies from revenue sharing to improve on-the-field performance. Somehow I doubt that Steinbrenner, Henry, and the other 11 clubs that were payors into the system would view it as such. No one was holding a gun to Loria's head to overspend, and after all, he did get a World Series for his efforts. What's to keep other clubs from using this, "I paid for a World Series, so now I'm going to pocket revenue sharing dollars to make up for my investments back then" precedent in the future?

How Will This Impact Negotiations?

As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, the battle lines are being drawn, with revenue sharing the key topic of negotiation. Those clubs that are paying the most into the system are going to be looking for relief, or at the very least, making sure that there is more accountability into where the monies are going ... into player payroll, or possibly into an owner's pocket. Lower revenue making clubs will be looking for an increase in the percentage of net local revenue, and closing of the loophole where stadium construction costs remove a portion of revenue sharing obligation.

What seems key in this discussion is that MLB's financial outlook is better for all the participants than in years prior. Nothing seems so insurmountable that a strike or lockout would occur. As Bob DuPuy said in the Wall Street Journal article this past week, "Clubs accept the structure that we're in. It's a matter of refining the structure rather than an all-out assault on the structure."

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Relocation? Your Team’s Not Going Anywhere

Maury Brown — 2006-04-25T04:04:15+00:00

"Fear makes the wolf bigger than he is." - German Proverb

On Sunday, March 25, The Kansas City Star ran several articles regarding two upcoming referendum votes for stadium improvements to the Truman Complex, which is comprised of Arrowhead Stadium for the Chiefs and Kauffman Stadium for the Royals. In an article by Randy Covitz entitled "Other cities would line up to woo Chiefs, Royals", Covitz wrote:

Imagine the Portland Royals. Or the Charlotte Royals. What about the Los Angeles Chiefs? Or Anaheim Chiefs?

Those are among the cities that have their eyes on Kansas City’s major league teams if Jackson County voters do not approve an April 4 sales tax measure that would help fund renovations at the Truman Sports Complex.

Without the improvements at Arrowhead and Kauffman stadiums, the county is expected to default on the leases in 2007, freeing the Royals and Chiefs to leave town.

Kansas City residents went to the polls on April 4, and with many a voter dwelling on the word “relocation,” they cast their votes and passed a 3/8 cent sales tax to pay for the bulk of renovations to the Truman Complex. The final vote was 53% yes to 47% no, close enough where the veiled threat of relocation could have held the day for the Royals. The Royals are staying put in Kansas City, but then were they ever really going to leave?

The threat of relocation has been used by clubs and politicians before and will probably be used in the future. But are there really any realistic relocation candidates at this time? When the Expos were relocated to D.C. and renamed the Nationals, would MLB really have pulled up the team after a year playing in their new home if a sweetheart stadium deal didn't come through, given the club was going to be sold for $450 million? Can not only the Royals, but the Marlins, Twins, and A’s use this mantra, “Pay up, or we’ll be forced to look at other options,” to good effect? Can they pack up and go to Portland, San Antonio, Norfolk, Charlotte, or Vegas at this time?

The answer is pretty much no, and here’s why.

When MLB awarded the Expos to D.C., the owners lost their last best leveraging city. All the markets left are, at best, small to mid-market with most of them falling into the former. While all things can change—with political winds shifting on a dime over the course of a vote in selected relocation cities—as it stands now, these teams clamoring for new stadiums (borne on the back of heavy public subsidy) are threatening their home cities with an empty gun.

Let’s look at the franchises that have used the veiled threat of relocation in one form or another, and I’ll then follow up with the relocation candidates that these franchises might explore. But before that, we need to set the stage…

MLB’s Flush With Cash

When MLB purchased the Expos in 2002, they were in a much different state financially than they are today. We can argue and speculate as to the actual levels of financial disarray that Bud Selig touted in front of Congress at the time, but there is little doubting that MLB was in a more depressed state than it is now, and threats of contraction in 2001—either real or of the straw man variety—point to at least the appearance of a sports business that was more “red” than “black” at the time.

With that, threats of relocation tended to seem more reasonable. It certainly seemed more realistic to a number of markets that wished to land an MLB club. While the Expos were the main prize, many other smaller suitors, such as Portland, saw more than one chance at the Brass Ring. If not the Expos, then the A’s, Twins, Marlins, or Devil Rays would be coming up for relocation should the Expos land in D.C.

Well, the Expos did land in D.C., and the other clubs clamoring for new stadiums are still trying to fund and build new facilities. The difference is the economic landscape of MLB now, compared to then.

At this point in time, MLB is on extremely solid footing. Revenues and profits are up substantially, and with that, there comes less urgency for clubs to have to seriously consider relocation. After all, those clubs that have mentioned or acted in a manner that would lead to relocation would be foregoing their larger home markets for smaller untested markets. When times are good, as they are now for most all the clubs, why risk it? Yes, they say, but we can’t be competitive. We’re bleeding red trying to compete in facilities that don’t generate sufficient local revenues. Well, to that I say, look at how much money the current revenue sharing system is distributing to these clubs.

The Royals, that club that could have relocated if improvements to Kauffman were not made, pulled in a reported $55 million in revenue sharing last year. Who paid the most into the system? The Yankees with an estimated $77 million payment. After I looked into the Forbes valuations, five of the bottom 10 clubs gained the most in value from last year to this. In the case of the Royals and A’s, their values went up by over 20%.

So, are clubs desperate without new stadiums? Will they collapse in their host cities and be forced to relocate? Let’s see what these clubs are looking for.

The largest factor for any MLB club in terms of local revenues is not attendance, but rather television broadcast revenues. To outline where clubs talking are at, and where they might land through relocation, I provide the Designated Market Area (DMA) Ranking for the markets as provided by Neilsen Media Research, along with the total television homes within that market.

Also, I'm providing a short recap of where stadium funding is at with these clubs, and what the expressed or implied threat of relocation is, as well as some points of interest that factor into the discussion.

Twins

Population based on the 2000 census (Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA): 2,968,806 (Rank 15th)
Minneapolis-St. Paul Designated Market Area (DMA) Ranking: 15th (TV Households: 1,652,940)

Length of time working on new facility: 1997

Where are they at on the new facility front? On Thursday of last week, the Minnesota House Taxes Committee backed the Twins' effort to avoid a Hennepin County referendum on a sales tax that would finance three-quarters of the team's $522 million ballpark project in the Warehouse District of downtown Minneapolis.

The relocation threat: In February, a District Court ruled that the Twins' lease was year-to-year, and the team could vacate the Metrodome at the end of the 2006 season.

Points of Interest: Twins owner Carl Pohlad is the richest owner in all of MLB. He is ranked as the 282nd richest man in the world. The Twins were ranked second-to-last in franchise value by Forbes’ most recent valuation rating. Forbes reports that although the Twins received substantial revenue sharing, their operating income was -$500,000 for last year.

Marlins

Population based on the 2000 census (Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA) 3,876,380 (Rank 12th)
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale Designated Market Area (DMA) Ranking: 17th (TV Households: 1,522,960)

Length of time working on new facility: 1997

Where are they at on the new facility front? After a deal to build on land next to the Orange Bowl came up $100 million short, the Marlins have been stalled in the Miami area. In South Florida, there have been in talks with Hialeah, which just made a large area of land available that had been outside the “Urban Development Boundary” and therefore unavailable for business development.

The relocation threat: The Marlins officially requested permission from MLB to explore relocation in November 2005 and were granted that request. Since that time, Marlins officials have visited several cities and are in conversations with others as well. The list includes Charlotte, Portland, Norfolk, and San Antonio. On San Antonio, the Marlins have been working closely with Bexar County Judge Nelson Wolff on possible relocation.

Points of Interest: The Marlins slashed Opening Day payroll by $45,410,334 from the year prior to $14,998,500. This drop represents a 75.17% decrease from 2005. The reason given by the Marlins? Inability to work within a stadium facility that will allow them to control revenues.

A's

Population based on the 2000 census (San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA CMSA): 7,039,362 (Rank 15th)
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose Designated Market Area (DMA) Ranking: sixth (TV Households: 2,355,740)

Length of time working on new facility: 1996

Where are they at on the new facility front? The A's have been looking for a new facility ever since the construction of "Mt. Davis," the name given to the addition of 10,000 seats to McAfee Coliseum. Since Lewis Wolff purchased the club, the talks with Oakland have been of the non-productive variety. Wolff seeks to develop more than a ballpark; he wants to develop a ballpark village comprised of mixed-use development to offset stadium construction costs. Currently, the ability to meet that criterion comes not from Oakland, or as some had speculated in San Jose (regardless of the territorial underpinnings as it pertains to the Giants), but rather Fremont, which is still within Alameda County, deemed “Oakland Territory” by the MLB Constitution. To add to this deal, the large area of land being looked at for the ballpark village and stadium is controlled by one land owner, Cisco Systems.

The relocation threat: The A’s year-to-year lease expires in 2007, although talks of extending the lease “to at least 2010” are occurring.

Points of Interest: Lewis Wolff is a change from the prior ownership of Schott and Hoffman. Prior owners seemed content to let things move at their own pace, while Wolff has actively worked on a new facility. Wolff served as VP of Venue Development during the Schott/Hoffman era.

Relocation Cities

Below are profiles on possible relocation cities

Portland

Population based on the 2000 census (Portland-Salem, OR-WA CMSA): 2,652,232 (Rank 23rd)
Percentage of increase between the censuses: 26%
Portland, OR (DMA) Ranking: 23rd (TV Households: 1,099,890)
Number of Fortune 1000 Corporations: four
Number "Big-4" franchises currently in market: one (Trailblazers)
Number of other professional sports: Lumber Jax NLL - Lacrosse

Pros: When the Expos were awarded to D.C., Portland became the largest city without an MLB franchise. At 2,2652,232 Portland is ranked as the 23rd-largest market in the US growing 8.63% between the censuses.

In 2003, at the height of the Expos derby, the Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bill 5, which would allow Oregon to earmark any of the income taxes paid by home and visiting players when they played in Oregon. This method also reached to front office personnel for the home team. The total figure for this funding method is capped at $150 million and has no sunset provision. They also worked up a comprehensive vetted framework to complete the deal, which could act as a launch point.

Portland also has a good interim facility in PGE Park, which could be expanded to 25,000 while a new stadium was being built. Portland was in the running for the Expos.

Cons: Portland is butted up against several issues that have stalled the effort there. The largest of these issues is that Mayor Potter has been dead set against any discussions regarding public subsidy of a new facility. This stance is based in part on a continued crisis involving education funding dollars in the Portland area and the NBA Portland Trailblazers' request for public assistance. In the case of the latter, Paul Allen has met with Potter, and there is speculation that the sale of the franchise could be in the offing.

The Skinny: Given these factors, the Portland effort has opted to wait out the issues facing education funding and the Blazers—biding time, as it were. When asked about how integral government participation is in a relocation/expansion effort, and if it is obstructionist in nature, how effective the Portland effort can be at this time, Drew Mahalic, CEO of the Oregon Sports Authority said:

Government involvement is integral, and it can take form in a number of different ways. The fact that the state legislature and Governor [Ted] Kulongoski stepped up with a commitment of up to $150 million in financing is a major first step—one that separates Portland from other candidates. The potential relocation of a team is always going to have some aspects that are controversial, both in the team's current locations and in each of its potential locations. There's a necessary educational process that occurs in each locale—details of the public involvement, appropriate safeguards, the economic and cultural benefits, etc. That process continues here in Portland and we are optimistic that it will prove successful.

To add to this, the dollars associated with SB5, the state funding that earmarks the state income taxes of players and executives, must be associated with a third party guarantor. While there are different scenarios for the guarantor (ownership, naming rights, seat lisences are some), if guarantor were to be coupled to Portland in some fashion, (and as the law is worded, the stadium can only be placed in Portland, not an outlying county), then dealing with Mayor Potter may come into play with this issue, as well.

Charlotte

Population based on the 2000 census (Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA): 1,499,293 (Rank 34th)
Percentage of increase between the censuses: 29%
Charlotte, NC (DMA) Ranking: 27th (TV Households: 1,020,130)
Number of Fortune 1000 Corporations: 13
Number "Big-4" franchises currently in market: 2 (Bobcats and Panthers)

Pros: The Twins flirted with the idea of relocation to Charlotte in 1998. Local lawyer Jerry Reese has proposed a funding scheme that is largely based on private financing (details not given) for a $600 million facility.

Cons: Small market coupled with over saturation of professional sports options (NFL Carolina Panthers and NBA Charlotte Bobcats).

The Skinny: While Charlotte has been on the list for the Twins, mostly as a stalking horse, and mentioned as a possibility during the Expos' relocation derby, the market size, coupled with two other pro sports franchises makes Charlotte an extreme long shot. As Charlotte Mayor Pat McCrory told the Charlotte Observer, "We're not ready. If [the Marlins] see the same numbers we have, you question why they're interested. I want to make sure we're not being played."

San Antonio

Population based on the 2000 census (San Antonio, TX MSA): 1,592,383 (Rank 30th)
Percentage of increase between the censuses: 20.2%
San Antonio, TX (DMA) Ranking: 37th (TV Households: 760,410)
Number of Fortune 1000 Corporations: five
Number "Big-4" franchises currently in market: 1 (Spurs)
Number of other professional sports: two (Texans – CFL Football; Missions – Double-A Texas League baseball)

Pros: Growing market, and political leadership willing to push forward and negotiate with the Florida Marlins. Interest from prominent local entities wishing to invest in an MLB team in San Antonio ranging from Nolan Ryan to billionaire BJ “Red” McCombs to the San Antonio Spurs

Cons: Small market with concerns related to impacts to Astros and Rangers broadcast territories. The cost of the stadium has been pegged at $310 million, which many analysts predict will be far short of the actual cost. No interim facility for a team to play in while an MLB-ready stadium is constructed.

The Skinny: Bexar County Judge Nelson Wolff has been spearheading an effort to lure the Florida Marlins to San Antonio. He has proposed a deal in which an extension on hotel/motel and rental car taxes used to help finance the Spurs' AT&T Center would be placed before the voters. If passed it would generate $200 million towards the stadium construction, Wolff has said. The San Antonio baseball effort has been aggressive, to the point of Jeffery Loria inviting Wolff, San Antonio Mayor Phil Hardberger and District Attorney Susan Reed to take in Opening Day at Minute Maid Park in Houston. There’s a catch in this deal, however.

Wolff wants the Marlins to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with San Antonio stating that the Marlins will only negotiate with San Antonio and no other markets (outside of South Florida) regarding relocation. The Marlins have stated that MLB would have to approve of such a deal. As of late, the San Antonio effort has tried to play a little hardball. Bexar County officials are giving the Marlins until May 15 to accept their offer, or the deal’s off the table. As Precinct 3 commissioner Lyle Larson said to the San Antonio News-Express, "It definitely looks to me like they are using us to leverage a (stadium) deal in Florida," Larson said. "I say that because I've seen their owner on national TV on two different occasions saying his preference is to stay in South Florida. He's not mentioning us.

"It's like we're a boy who's asked a girl to the prom and she says, 'I'd love to go with you, but I'm waiting on another boy to ask me. If he doesn't accept my offer, then I'll get back to you.' We shouldn't have to sit by the phone like that."
Of all the relocation candidate cities, San Antonio has been the one market that has been the most aggressive as of late in trying to lure a team (specifically the Marlins). By May 15, we’ll see if the San Antonio effort for the Marlins takes off or dies before ever starting.

Norfolk

Population based on the 2000 census (Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC MSA): 1,569,541 (Rank 30th)
Percentage of increase between the censuses: 8.8%
Norfolk-Portsmth-Newpt Nws (DMA) Ranking: 42nd (TV Households: 704,810)
Number of Fortune 1000 Corporations: 4
Number "Big-4" franchises currently in market: 0

Pros: Worked aggressively during the Expos' relocation derby, and local baseball boosters claim to have a funding proposal that is attractive to any relocation candidate (read: low ownership equity component). The funding model is designed with rebates of state and local taxes generated on site and also with revenue streams—a portion of the city’s meals and hotel taxes—already dedicated for a major sports facility. Norfolk also has an interim facility in Harbor Park (to be expanded from 18,000 for MLB purposes), while a new facility is built. Was in the running for the Expos.

Cons: Norfolk is still deemed a small market. Also, since the Expos relocated to D.C., there have been concerns that Norfolk is too close in proximity to the D.C. This is in part due to the thorny issue of how Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos and MLB had to negotiate the deal to place the Expos in D.C. A team in Norfolk would complicate that matter.

Las Vegas

Population based on the 2000 census (Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA): 1,563,282 (Rank32nd)
Percentage of increase between the censuses: 83.3%
Las Vegas Ranking: 48th (TV Households: 651,110)
Number of Fortune 1000 Corporations: 7
Number "Big-4" franchises currently in market: 0

Pros: Las Vegas is the fastest growing city in the U.S., and the city claims over 2 million visitors a year. Mayor Oscar Goodman has been a tireless advocate for a professional sports franchise in Vegas. Market would be a magnet for corporate purchases of suites and long-term season ticket packages given Vegas’ entertainment factor. Was in the running for the Expos.

Cons: Baseball on the books in Vegas is the biggest hurdle. MLB initially said that times may have changed, but when the Marlins started actively looking at relocation cities, MLB put the kibosh on Vegas. MLB President Bob DuPuy told the Marlins that Las Vegas is one market that they cannot explore due to gambling concerns.

The Skinny: Oscar Goodman has been pushing for an MLB team since the Expos relocation derby, to the point of bringing showgirls and an Elvis impersonator to the Winter Meetings. Reggie Jackson has said he has interest in bringing a club to Vegas as well. The market is growing at an unbelievable rate, but the DMA size is the smallest of all the markets being discussed for relocation, with a ranking of 48th. In other words, outside of Las Vegas proper, there’s little more than scrub brush.

When coupled with the gambling issue, Vegas is still a ways off, although many believe it is simply a matter of time before a professional sports franchise calls Vegas home.

How Population and Television Territories Impact Relocation

Now that you have read through the data as it pertains to the markets that currently have clubs that have been considered possibilities for relocation, a look at the DMA and population paints a picture as to why relocation at this time would have to come with a sweetheart stadium deal, and even then, it could be debatable.

Below is the DMA data presented in graph format, with existing markets with MLB where relocation has been discussed, along with possible relocation candidates.

As the graph illustrates, television households drop considerably from the markets that a franchise currently is in, to a possible relocation markets, dramatically in some cases. We’ll touch more on television territories in a minute, but first let's just talk about pure population.

As the graph illustrates, the DMA and population can be different. In some cases, the markets have divergent population to television numbers.

On population figures: If there is one area of contention when discussing markets it is how their populations are represented. In these cases, how a market is represented can be a case of multiple cities comprising what is deemed to be a metropolitan area.

For this discussion, however, we’re not going to split hairs. As the graphs and numbers illustrate, no matter how you slice it, market size would be a considerable downgrade for all the franchises that might relocate.

It should be noted that in the case of San Antonio, there has been talk of tapping into the Austin market, which would bolster the market size discussion for San Antonio. The city's baseball boosters argue that San Antonio and Austin residents are more "commuter friendly," and therefore tapping an outlying market, such as Austin, will minimize the small market concerns.

Television territories come into play in all the markets, to a certain extent. The U.S. is split up by all the MLB clubs, with many of them sharing areas. When local television revenues come into play, there is most assurdedly a compensation component involved, as was brought fully to light over the relocation of the Expos to D.C., and the indemnification package that included an RSN within it for Peter Angelos.

On MLB’s television territories: I haven’t seen the map as it relates to these territories, and let me tell you, not many outside of MLB owners and executives get the luxury, as well. Those that I have spoken with that have seen it are bound by non-discloser agreements, and therefore any details are impossible to get.

That said, Dan Werr of Baseball Think Factory did a fascinating research project as it pertains to MLB broadcast areas. Dan has allowed me to use this map to outline why relocation is so difficult given these broadcast territories. (I delve into this further, and a larger map can be accessed at the link provided.)

As the map shows, relocating a club to any of the possible relocation markets would land them in another franchise’s broadcast territory. For Portland, it would be in the Mariners' broadcast territory, although if a franchise were to broadcast to the lower part of Oregon (which it would undoubtedly do), the A’s and Giants come into play, as well.

As for San Antonio, they would need to deal with the Astros and Rangers. This is something that Marlins President David Samson already has latched onto. As Tom Orsborn of the San Antonio Express-News reported:

(Stadium) naming rights, suite deals, season-ticket ticket sales, corporate support—without all of that there is no franchise," Samson said. "But TV revenue is the engine that keeps the train rolling."

But Samson also said it has been difficult to determine how much television revenue is available in San Antonio because it doesn't know what kind of territory MLB would carve out for the team. Wolff said the Marlins are considering asking MLB to include northern Mexico in the equation.

"The stadium deal we've offered will work fine and the economic forecast for San Antonio is favorable," Wolff said. "The two big unknowns are the media piece and what kind of territory MLB would give."

So, when discussing relocation, a compensation element is involved as a relocating club would need to "carve out" a television territory out of an area already occupied by one or more exisiting franchises. This too becomes a key factor in the relocation discussion.

Conclusions

When looking over this research, it becomes clear that relocation for franchises, at this time, is not favorable. The economics of franchises in existing markets is much better than the last time a serious discussion on relocation occurred, which places less stress and strain on clubs to force themselves into changing markets.

As for those that are looking for MLB through relocation or expansion, maybe the man that I worked with during the Expos' relocation derby in Portland has some insight.

David Kahn headed the Portland effort at that time, was the general manager of the Indiana Pacers, and now owns four NBA D-League teams in the Southwest. I asked Kahn, given MLB's current state of well being from a financial perspective, if clubs are less likely to realistically explore relocation given the fact that in all cases, franchises would be jumping from far larger markets to smaller ones, such as Portland and San Antonio. As Kahn said:

Of course. In a nutshell, that's why D.C. landed the Expos—as soon as D.C. said it was willing to finance a baseball stadium, [Portland’s] effort was over because of the disparity in market size.

Having said that, it's important to note that cities such as Portland can lure a team from a larger market (such as Oakland), but only if the team being relocated is convinced it will make its franchise more secure (and increase its valuation) through a new stadium's revenue streams and a sweetheart lease deal. Any efforts to redirect those revenue streams into a finance plan are non-starters. That's why the plan [Portland] crafted with former Mayor Katz was an excellent starting point: it assumed the relocated team would capture all the stadium revenues (aside from user fees) and, for all intents, be a single tenant in a new facility. Not a bad deal.

And that outlines it in a nutshell for all the candidates, and why it can be politically messy.

Relocation only comes with a stadium tied up in a shiny bow. Given the fact that more and more municipalities are latching on to the facts that I outline, they see that providing heavy public subsidy as not favorable, nor possibly needed. With that, MLB clubs will, most likely, continue to reference relocation in one manner or another, and work to try and get funding in their current markets, the relocation threat ever present.

So, for you fans of the franchises that have been discussed here today, remember: your team, at least for the time being, isn’t going anywhere. Not, at least, when markets are, for the time being, not offering up enough to make it attractive. As I said, clubs may be threatening, but the gun’s not loaded.

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Opening Day Player Payroll: Inside the Numbers

Maury Brown — 2006-04-10T04:06:15+00:00

"I paid too much for it, but it's worth it." – Samuel Goldwyn

“Baseball has all the money.” – Brett Hull

Funny thing about Major League Baseball … it seems to cost a bit of money to put players on the field. Not that the owners aren’t turning a profit these days, but you know, it’s not exactly sandlot ball, right? Players need to get paid the green.

With Opening Day, comes Opening Day payroll figures, and with that, hey! I’ve got article.

First off, shocker of all shockers, the Yankees are still paying through the nose for talent. Oh, and the Marlins made a *(ahem)* "market adjustment". In between, there have been some changes that show that, at least for the moment, there’s some financial stability league-wide.

Total Team Payroll

There has been considerable talk about how revenues league-wide have been up. To place some numbers behind this, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in 2006 is projected at $450 million, up 50% from $300 million in earnings in 2005 (source: Sports Business Journal). It’s an incredible jump. So, with that in mind, player salaries have gone up in parallel, right? Teams are all opening up their checkbooks to land those much needed free agents that many of them couldn't afford in the past.

Well …

The following chart shows total Opening Day player payroll figures for 2005 and 2006 (based on USA Today figures, which may differ from other sources):

Blue = 2006
Purple = 2005

Here are the numbers associated with the chart above:

Club	                    2006	        2005

New York Yankees         $194,663,079     $208,306,817 
Boston Red Sox           $120,099,824     $123,505,125 
Los Angeles Angels       $103,472,000     $97,725,322 
Chicago White Sox        $102,750,667     $75,178,000 
New York Mets            $101,084,963     $101,305,821 
Los Angeles Dodgers      $98,447,187      $83,039,000 
Chicago Cubs             $94,424,499      $87,032,933 
Houston Astros           $92,551,503      $76,779,000 
Atlanta Braves           $90,156,876      $86,457,302 
San Francisco Giants     $90,056,419      $90,199,500 
St. Louis Cardinals      $88,891,371      $92,106,833 
Philadelphia Phillies    $88,273,333      $95,522,000 
Seattle Mariners         $87,959,833      $87,754,334 
Detroit Tigers           $82,612,866      $69,092,000 
Baltimore Orioles        $72,585,582      $73,914,333 
Toronto Blue Jays        $71,915,000      $45,719,500 
San Diego Padres         $69,896,141      $63,290,833 
Texas Rangers            $68,228,662      $55,849,000 
Minnesota Twins          $63,396,006      $56,186,000 
Washington Nationals     $63,143,000      $48,581,500 
Oakland Athletics        $62,243,079      $56,186,000 
Cincinnati Reds          $60,909,519      $61,892,583 
Arizona Diamondbacks     $59,684,226      $62,329,166 
Milwaukee Brewers        $57,568,333      $39,934,833 
Cleveland Indians        $56,031,500      $41,502,500 
Kansas City Royals       $47,294,000      $29,679,067 
Pittsburgh Pirates       $46,717,750      $38,133,000 
Colorado Rockies         $41,233,000      $48,155,000 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays     $35,417,967      $29,679,067 
Florida Marlins          $14,998,500      $60,408,834

Here are the teams that have spent more this season than last:

Club	                    2006	         2005         Difference

Chicago White Sox        $102,750,667     $75,178,000     $27,572,667 
Toronto Blue Jays        $71,915,000      $45,719,500     $26,195,500 
Milwaukee Brewers        $57,568,333      $39,934,833     $17,633,500 
Kansas City Royals       $47,294,000      $29,679,067     $17,614,933 
Houston Astros           $92,551,503      $76,779,000     $15,772,503 
Los Angeles Dodgers      $98,447,187      $83,039,000     $15,408,187 
Washington Nationals     $63,143,000      $48,581,500     $14,561,500 
Cleveland Indians        $56,031,500      $41,502,500     $14,529,000 
Detroit Tigers           $82,612,866      $69,092,000     $13,520,866 
Texas Rangers            $68,228,662      $55,849,000     $12,379,662 
Pittsburgh Pirates       $46,717,750      $38,133,000     $8,584,750 
Chicago Cubs             $94,424,499      $87,032,933     $7,391,566 
Minnesota Twins          $63,396,006      $56,186,000     $7,210,006 
San Diego Padres         $69,896,141      $63,290,833     $6,605,308 
Oakland Athletics        $62,243,079      $56,186,000     $6,057,079 
Los Angeles Angels       $103,472,000     $97,725,322     $5,746,678 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays     $35,417,967      $29,679,067     $5,738,900 
Atlanta Braves           $90,156,876      $86,457,302     $3,699,574 
Seattle Mariners         $87,959,833      $87,754,334     $205,499

At the head of the class of those that have opened up their pocketbooks from 2005 to now are the Chicago White Sox with $27,572,667, with Jim Thome's $14,166,667 salary for 2006 taking up the brunt of the increase.

But, in terms of the largest percentage of increase in payroll, it's the Toronto Blue Jays, with a $26,195,500 increase, leading the way.

The Blue Jays are posting a mind-boggling increase of 57.3% over the year prior.

With the White Sox, the investment is based on the winning of the World Series. They have invested and banked on the increased ticket sales, and television viewing.

The situation with the Blue Jays is based, in large part, on the increase in the value of the Canadian dollar.

In 2004, the Canadian dollar averaged 77 cents US, up 7.5 percent from 2003 levels. Furthermore, the Canadian dollar continued to rise in value as the year progressed, breaking the 80-cent mark late in October of last year, and indicators are that it will continue to rise. Rogers is investing in the future after being stuck in international exchange rate woes for nearly a decade. One could also argue that the Blue Jays, like many of the other lower revenue making clubs, is banking on an increase in revenue sharing in the next collective bargaining agreement, as well as increased revenues from centralized funds such as those collected through MLB Advanced Media (USA Today is reporting that MLBAM has inked a 50-50 deal with Signature Networks to deal with non-baseball related web broadcasting and supporting Internet technologies for musicians. MLBAM generated $195 million in revenue last year, and CEO Bob Bowman says that that could soar by as much as 70% this year), and the revenues from the sale of the Washington Nationals, which is on the cusp of occurring. A large part of the Blue Jays 2006 payroll will be dedicated to Roy Halladay ($12,750,000) along with newly aqcuired B.J. Ryan ($4,000,000), and A.J. Burnett ($2,200,000).

Other smaller revenue-making clubs have dipped deeply into the pocketbooks, as well. The Brewers ($17,633,500 increase from 2005, a 44.16% change), Indians ($14,529,000 increase from 2005, a 35.05% change), Astros ($15,772,503 increase from 2005, a 20.54% change), Royals ($17,614,933 increase from 2005, a 28.23% change), Nationals ($14,561,500 increase from 2005, a 29.97% change) and Tigers ($13,520,866 increase from 2005, a 19.57% change), to name a few. These clubs are looking at MLB’s increased revenues and have decided that they need to invest now to try and gain back some fan support that has been waning, or in the case of the Nationals, the last season in which the club is owned collectively by MLB, and MLB's willingness to give them a nudge with the sale of the franchise pending.

In the final analysis, 11 of the bottom 15 clubs spent more this offseason than last.

As MLB’s Chief Financial Officer, Bob DuPuy said, "There are still concerns at both the top and the bottom. The goal would be to get a tighter range that would ensure that even more than 20 clubs at Labor Day still have a chance to compete for playoff spots, that playoff spots are based on skill and talent and blossoming stars and not just on plugging holes with economics."

Of course, with the current CBA set to expire on Dec. 19 of this year, it will be interesting to get the MLB Players Association take on this given that …

Here are the clubs that have spent less this season than last:

Club	                    2006	        2005          Difference

Florida Marlins          $14,998,500     $60,408,834     ($45,410,334)
New York Yankees         $194,663,079    $208,306,817    ($13,643,738)
Philadelphia Phillies    $88,273,333     $95,522,000     ($7,248,667)
Colorado Rockies         $41,233,000     $48,155,000     ($6,922,000)
Boston Red Sox           $120,099,824    $123,505,125    ($3,405,301)
St. Louis Cardinals      $88,891,371     $92,106,833     ($3,215,462)
Baltimore Orioles        $72,585,582     $73,914,333     ($1,328,751)
Cincinnati Reds          $60,909,519     $61,892,583     ($983,064)
New York Mets            $101,084,963    $101,305,821    ($220,858)
San Francisco Giants     $90,056,419     $90,199,500     ($143,081)

The eye-popper on this list would be the Marlins with a whopping $45,410,334 cut in payroll deemed a “market correction.” When you see that this drop represents a 75.17% decrease from 2005, it makes the change all the more dramatic. Seventeen of those on the 25 man roster for the Marlins will make the league minimum of $327,000 per year. The reasoning for the drop in player payroll is being directly tied to the club’s inability to finalize a stadium deal, which would allow them to have access and control to more revenue streams. That saga, coming up on a decade in the making, still continues.

Some may look at the fact that the Yankees are spending $13,643,738 (-6.55%) less than last year as a sign that spending doesn’t always bring you a World Series. The number is misleading. The Yankees are still spending $84,801,692 more than their nearest competitor, the Red Sox. With that you’d be all of $6,847,775 short of the entire payrolls for the Marlins, Devil Rays, and Rockies combined. It’s difficult to say that the Yankees are hurting given these figures.

What's interesting is when you look at Opening Day team payroll in relationship to 2006 ticket price increase or decrease for the clubs lowering total team payroll from the year prior (source: Team Marketing Report):

Club	                Ticket Price %(+/-) 
                        from the year prior     Rank

Florida Marlins         7.39% (avg. $16.70)     27th
New York Yankees        3.38% (avg. $28.27)     4th
Philadelphia Phillies   0.55% (avg. $26.73)     5th
Colorado Rockies       -1.34% (avg. $14.72)     29th   
Boston Red Sox          4.27% (avg. $46.46)     1st
St. Louis Cardinals     12.09% (avg. $29.78)    3rd
Baltimore Orioles       0.0%  (avg. $22.53)     12th
Cincinnati Reds         0.0%  (avg. $17.90)     22nd
New York Mets           6.86% (avg. $25.28)     8th
San Francisco Giants    5.64% (avg. $24.53)     9th

Of the clubs lowering team payroll from this time last year, only the Rockies are actually dropping prices, with the Orioles and Reds holding steady (OK, we'll give the Phillies a pass as well, since they nearly kept the status quo). The increase by the Cardinals is due to Busch III opening ... ownership seeing interest in fans wanting to take in the new facility.

In the case of the Marlins, it's, well ... The only logic that can be made is that Loria and Samson feel that they've been bleeding red in the past, and now they plan on making up for it a bit. They can claim that they are still 27th in the league for average ticket prices. Cutting payroll by over 75% while raising ticket prices by 7.39% ... It does look bad, however. No wonder fans are upset.

Median Salary

According to Ronald Blum of the AP, "The median salary—the point at which an equal amount of players fall above and below—rose to $1 million from $850,000, breaking the previous high of $975,000 set in 2001."

The following chart outlines the total median salary for each of the 30 clubs for Opening Day of 2006:

Here are the top eight clubs by median salary:

Club	                Median Salary

Boston Red Sox           $3,023,894
New York Yankees         $2,925,000
Chicago Cubs             $2,500,000
Philadelphia Phillies    $2,500,000
Chicago White Sox        $2,325,000
Los Angeles Angels       $2,250,000
Los Angeles Dodgers      $2,205,000
Toronto Blue Jays        $2,200,000

Note that there is a $425,000 drop between the Yankees and the Cubs. Between the number three club (Cubs) and the number eight club (Blue Jays), there is only a swing of $300,000 in median salary.

There is dramatic drop is in difference between this group of eight and the rest of the league.

Here are the median salaries for the rest of the league:

Club	               Median Salary

Baltimore Orioles        $1,512,500
Cleveland Indians        $1,500,000
San Francisco Giants     $1,488,079
Cincinnati Reds          $1,300,000
St. Louis Cardinals      $1,000,000
Houston Astros           $940,000
Arizona Diamondbacks     $932,000
San Diego Padres         $925,000
New York Mets            $912,500
Minnesota Twins          $900,000
Washington Nationals     $900,000
Detroit Tigers           $865,000
Oakland Athletics        $800,000
Milwaukee Brewers        $775,000
Texas Rangers            $750,000
Seattle Mariners         $650,000
Tampa Bay Devil Rays     $550,000
Kansas City Royals       $500,000
Atlanta Braves           $462,500
Pittsburgh Pirates       $424,000
Colorado Rockies         $350,000
Florida Marlins          $327,000

The reason for the separate tables is to outline the drop between Blue Jays in the first table and Orioles in the second table in terms of median salary: a swing of $687,500.

The other drop is between the Indians ($1,500,000) and Cardinals ($1,000,000) a $500,000 difference, with the Giants ($1,488,079) and Reds ($1,300,000) sandwiched in between. From the Cardinals to the Marlins (a total of 18 clubs), the average median salary sits at $720,167. The difference between this group of 18 being all of $673,000 (Cardinals at $1,000,000) and the Marlins at $327,000). As the graph shows, it's a gradual and even spread across the clubs.

Putting Some Analysis Behind the Numbers

There isn’t anything overly dramatic about the differences between this year and last, and that may be something to look at. Given the increases in total revenues between this year and last, clubs are not turning much of these monies around into player payroll, with the possibility of the bottom 11 of 15 revenue making clubs aside.

The league average team payroll for 2006 is $77,556,890, up $4,708,716 from 2005's $72,848,173 league average. Contrast this with the difference between 2004 ($69,042,198 league average) and 2005, a difference of $8,514,691.

What we have is a bit of profit making, or if you are MLB, fiscal responsibility. The argument has been made that the 2005 offseason wasn't exactly a bumper crop for free agent talent. But then, we've seen the average ticket price jump 5.7% this off-season, as well (source: Team Marketing Report). You make the call as to whether it's profit making or fiscal responsibility.

What’s clear is that the MLBPA and clubs such as the Yankees and Red Sox that are investing heavily in player payroll will want to see clubs investing these increased revenues more directly into player payroll, or the on-the-field product. The lower revenue making clubs are pushing for increased revenue sharing (currently at 34% of all local revenues, minus stadium improvements or development).

Donald Fehr, the Executive Director of the MLBPA doesn’t see it that way.

As Ronald Blum reported in the AP:

"I don't see a need for increased revenue sharing," Fehr said, adding that revenue sharing and the luxury tax discourage teams from growing revenue.

Players also are concerned about teams that receive money, which according to the labor contract must be spent by a franchise "in an effort to improve its performance on the field."

"There's an issue as to whether or not clubs are using revenue-sharing receipts in an appropriate way," Fehr said.

And let’s make sure that we all understand what Fehr is implying when he says, “appropriate way”… it’s spending the green on talent, not pocketing it. After all, we want to continue to see labor peace on the horizon.

Something to remember ... There are 30 clubs, which makes for 30 different sub-stories from this look inside Opening Day player payroll, league-wide. There are sub-plots within this data—the hows and whys as to increases and decreases beyond this offering. You may have more questions than answers after looking at the data. That article (or articles) on individual team data, will have to come another day, because, remember ... it's a week after Opening Day; we all still need to get our baseball fix in after the Winter.

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Rob Neyer and Baseball’s Blunderous Past

Maury Brown — 2006-04-05T04:04:15+00:00

“This is worse than a crime, it's a blunder” - Charles M. de Talleyrand

I can remember it like it was yesterday…

Yelling at the tube like a blithering idiot, my head swiveling back and forth so hard I nearly pulled a Linda Blair. Hands in the air. Eyes rolled into the back of my head. Teeth gnashed...

"Ah, crap! He's going to leave him in!!! Take the ball from him... Take the &@*& ball!!"

It's so painfully obvious that the decision being made is going to have disastrous consequences; why the heck doesn't the yahoo coming out of the dugout see it?!? Where's the TV brick? Where's something to kick?...

The place? Game 7 of the 2003 ALCS.
The event? Grady Little leaving Pedro Martinez in during the eighth.

With Bernie Williams on first, left-hitting Hideki Matsui coming up to bat, and Alan Embree all set to come in, Little leaves Pedro in, and, well…

Matsui lines a double into right, scoring Williams. Posada hits a bloop double to center, tying the game. The game goes into the 11th when Aaron Boone jacks one over the fence after he sized up the first knuckleball pitch thrown by Tim Wakefield. Game over, another blunder recorded.

Show of hands: how many of you were asking yourself, "Little, what were you thinking?!?"

At the time, it must have seemed like one more blunder in a long list of blunders that had rolled down the pike for the Red Sox. At least 2004 made up for a portion of them, maybe all of them, maybe not.

Rob Neyer has spent a good deal of time looking into the “blunder” and has a book coming out on some of the biggest ones in the history of the game. Little's blunder gets no more or no less play than a host of others in the book, and, for Red Sox fans, maybe that will make the sting of that one a little less painful. As the Swedish proverb goes, "Shared joy is a double joy; shared sorrow is half a sorrow." Yeah, but on occasion, sitting in sorrow thinking about others in sorrow can take the edge off for a bit, know what I mean?

Maybe it's our fascination with the crash and burn that makes Rob Neyer's Big Book of Baseball Blunders: A Complete Guide to the Worst Decisions and Stupidest Moments in Baseball History such fun to read. Maybe it's that sick feeling we get in the pit of our stomach when we remember some of them happening. Or maybe it's that comical sense of hindsight where some of the blunderous decisions become so painfully obvious that will draw many to Neyer's Blunders.

With the book getting ready to be released (the official publication date is May 2, but stores can begin selling the book on April 11), it seemed it might be more interesting to ask Rob about the book than write a review of it. Since the journey of book writing seems to lead many to wisdom (clearly then, I need to get started on writing one, and don't stop going through the exercise until I drop dead), Rob's responses make understanding the book process which, let's face it, is more enjoyable than me blathering on about whether the book is good or not, a better read.

It's a Neyer book. If you liked the Big Book of Baseball Lineups, you're more than likely going to like this one just as much, maybe more. Rob and I sat down over beverages one day and came up with doing this as an interview. Here's what he had to say...

Brown: How did you come up with the concept for the book?

Neyer: When I came up with the title for Rob Neyer’s Big Book of Baseball Lineups—not the idea, because it wasn’t my idea—I assumed that if the book was commercially successful, it would make some sense to do other “Big Books." To “brand” the idea (as people who wear suits would say). I don’t remember if I actually gave any thought to what those might be, but certainly by 2004 I was working on some ideas. I eventually came up with three: blunders, and two others that I can’t talk about quite yet (because I’m not sure which of the other two I’m doing first).

“Blunders,” I think, was inspired by those shows on the History Channel about military blunders. Now, in the grand scheme of things it’s pretty silly to suggest that John McNamara falling asleep in 1986 was as important as the U.S. Navy falling asleep in 1941. But I don’t write about the momentous events in recorded human history. I write about a silly boy’s game, and within that context I figured it would be fun to write about the silly decisions that have changed the course of the game’s history.

Brown: What did you use as the criteria for a "blunder"?

Neyer: I had fairly rigid criteria in my head when I started. The “perfect” blunder would satisfy three conditions. One: it was premeditated. Two: it could have been avoided with a bit of intelligent analysis. Three: it resulted in some serious negative consequence.

In the event, though, I didn’t stick to those with any great consistency. Every blunder in the book was premeditated, which is why there’s not a chapter about Merkle’s Boner or any of the many lousy pitches that have been thrown over the years. But there are a few “blunders” that really were perfectly reasonable at the time (selling Babe Ruth), and there are a few that weren’t reasonable, but wound up not hurting anybody all that much (letting Carl Hubbell get away). If a particular blunder didn’t meet all three criteria but seemed interesting enough to write about anyway, then I wrote about it. If you want to send the Blunders Police after me, go ahead…

Brown: How did you determine what did and didn't make the cut?

Neyer: There were some blunders that I had to write about, because if I didn’t that’s all anybody would talk about. But aside from those, I just chose the ones that seemed like they’d be fun to research and write about. And the ones that I could convince others to write about (for instance, Collusions I, II, and III, which I convinced some guy named Maury to write about). I’m sure that I missed some obvious blunders, but I’ll say this . . . I asked about a dozen crazy-knowledgeable fans to suggest blunders, and I wrote every suggestion down in my little book of quotes and ideas and whatnot. So, if nothing else, at least I can claim I did my due diligence.

Brown: Well, there's a blunder; using me for the book. Apologies if you take a hit in sales. Which blunder came to mind as a "can't miss"?

Neyer: Well, when I got this idea, the first blunder that popped into my head was McNamara not replacing Buckner in Game 6 of the ’86 World Series. But what made it interesting, for me at least, was that the biggest blunder was not leaving Buckner in the field for the ninth inning. The biggest blunder came earlier in the game (but I’ll save specifics for when you actually get the book).

Brown: On Frazee's sale of Ruth to the Yankees...How comical was it to read how bad the deal was going to be for the Yankees in the two excerpts you use from the 1920 Reach Guide?

Neyer: It’s easy, and I suppose fair, to second-guess Red Sox owner Harry Frazee. The move certainly didn’t work out. But when you read the contemporary accounts...there were a great number of writers, both in Boston and elsewhere, who thought Ruth wasn’t worth the trouble. He occasionally jumped the team, he said he wouldn’t play in 1920 if Frazee didn’t tear up his old contract...and Frazee got an immense amount of money from the Yankees. In fact, I don’t know if I’d have written this up as a “blunder” if I hadn’t found a lot of stuff that most people don’t know about.

Brown: Why do you think the Mariners went for Maury Wills as Manager? Pure name recognition?

Neyer: That’s hard to say. Wills certainly was articulate and intelligent, and he’d written an entire book about what he would do, if he were a major league manager. And supposedly Wills had been offered the job as Giants manager a few years earlier, but turned it down because the Giants were offering just a one-year contract (which, as things turned out, was smart of them). But Wills was just a complete mess, both professionally and personally. As I say in the book, he might have been the worst manager ever.

Brown: As a fan of Finley, it's interesting to read about the owners ignoring his statement that the owners should have made all players free agents after the Seitz ruling. Was it the orange baseballs, the white uniforms, or Finley's way of simply pissing everyone off in the room that saved Marvin Miller?

Neyer: Maybe that was part of it. But I think what really motivated the owners was a simple unwillingness to give the players any more freedom than absolutely necessary. Yes, it might have been in the owners’ financial self-interest to make the players free agents every year (multi-year contracts notwithstanding). But in case you haven’t noticed, the owners do things every day that aren’t in their financial self-interest.

Brown: Learn anything new doing the book?

Neyer: Oh, sure. As most authors will tell you, if you write books expecting to make good money you’ll quickly be disillusioned. And the psychic income is nice, but the ego gratification decreases with each new book. I write books because I know I’ll learn from more writing one book than I would from reading 20. Not because my books are so educational. But because I get so immersed in the research and the writing that a fair amount of it actually sticks to my brain.

Brown: What's the biggest blunder in the book? The #1?

Neyer: Gosh, that’s hard to say. Most of the worst player deals—the Red Sox selling Babe Ruth, the Cubs trading Lou Brock, the Reds trading Frank Robinson, the Cardinals trading Steve Carlton—actually didn’t look too bad at the time. I put all those in the book because I felt like I had to, but I wasn’t too rough on the men who made the deals. Maybe the biggest blunder in the book, at least regarding personnel, is not one trade but three. After the 1959 season, Bill Veeck made a series of deals that quite possibly cost the White Sox three pennants over the next eight seasons.

Brown: Do you think we all have someone inside that is attracted to the disaster of a blunder in baseball? The head slap as you're watching it unfold?

Neyer: Of course. Because we figure if only we’d been in that spot, we’d have made the right decision. Is there a Red Sox fan alive who doesn’t think he’d have pulled Buckner? Is there a Devil Rays fan doesn’t think he’d have kept Bobby Abreu? It’s these obvious mistakes—even when they’re obvious only with the wisdom of hindsight—that make us think hey, we could do that job if only they’d give us a chance. Baseball’s version of Monday-morning quarterbacking.

Too, there’s just something more interesting about failures than successes. How do you second-guess a success?

Brown: Any blunders that you've ever committed you'd like to publish?

Neyer: [smirking] Not necessary; my blunders have already been published, for many years now, in book, magazine, and (especially) column form. Seriously, leaving aside my various mistakes and misbehavior relating to various lovely women (before I was married, I mean), maybe my biggest blunder was not learning Spanish when my brain was still pliable enough for such tasks. It’s pretty ridiculous for anybody who wants to be involved in baseball to pay as little attention in Spanish 101 as I did (though, in my defense, at that time I had no reason to think I would actually be a professional baseball writer someday).

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Five Questions: Washington Nationals

Maury Brown — 2006-03-23T04:05:15+00:00

Last year at this time, the rice was still being thrown. The honeymoon had just started, and the love affair renewed in Washington, D.C. as the 34-year absence of Major League Baseball in our nation’s capital returned. The thing is, this year isn’t much different from last year; the Nationals are still owned collectively by MLB. That’s about to change. But the question is, what will this translate into for the Nats' 2006 season?

1. Are John Patterson and Chad Cordero really that good?

After going 4-7 with 5.03 ERA in 19 games with the Montreal Expos, John Patterson was looking to hold down a roster spot entering last season with the Nationals. By the end of the season, Patterson had the stingiest ERA with the Nationals, posting 3.13 ERA and a 9-7 record over 31 games. Patterson will be looked upon to pick up some slack, with Esteban Loaiza traded this offseason to the A’s and Livan Hernandez moving into his 30s.

Not content with a low-90s fastball, great curve and slider, Patterson has added a changeup to his repertoire of pitches this offseason. As Patterson said to the AP, ''The pitch I'm most impressed with right now is my changeup,'' the right-hander said. ''It's come a long way, and it feels really good.''

Patterson threw just under 200 innings last season (198.1 IP). Look for more innings out of Patterson and for his stock to climb further in 2006 if he's able to effectively use the newly added changeup. He's also been a bright spot for the Nats in Spring Training. His line reads:

W  L   ERA  G  GS  CG  SHO  SV  SVO    IP  H  R  ER  HR  HBP  BB  SO  
1  0  0.00  3   3   0    0   0    0  12.0  7  0   0   0    1   2  13

The other pitcher to watch will be Chad Cordero. Up until the last week of Spring Training last season, Frank Robinson talked of going the "closer by committee" route. He opted to go with just Cordero, and it paid off handsomely.

Cordero led the league in saves last season with 47 in 74 games and posted a skinny 1.82 ERA and a 0.97 WHIP. Last season, when Cordero came out of the bullpen, the Nats posted a 59-15 record. He had 31 saves before the All-Star break alone.

The key will be in the ability to get him in the game. As Robinson said, "I'm not going to sit here and say we expect him to save 47 games this year because saves are kind of an odd situation. You have to have the opportunities to do it, and things have to go right for you behind you defensively and offensively," Robinson said. "We expect him to go out there and do a good job for us with the opportunities that he will have."

2. How big is the loss of Luis Ayala?

In three seasons, Robinson has used Luis Ayala 214 times in relief. This season, he won't have that luxury, as Ayala will soon need surgery after an acute sprain of the ulnar-collateral ligament in his right elbow, a black mark from the WBC when Ayala was pitching for Mexico.

How big of a hit is this to the pitching staff? Let's let Robinson put it in perspective. "Are we going to miss him? You're damn right we're going to miss him," he said. ”There's no doubt about it. I'm going to miss him. He's a very important part of our staff for three years, ever since he set foot here."

More bad news: of the 15 National League pitchers who made 200 or more appearances over the last three years, only Houston's Brad Lidge had a better ERA (2.59) than Ayala.

3. What to do with Alfonso Soriano?

General Manager Jim Bowden is in a pickle, and it's his doing. As Alfonso Soriano comes back from the WBC, the key question was whether the $10 million investment that the Nationals made (hey, he was asking for $12 million, but lost in arbitration) will move to left field. Given that Soriano has the worst fielding percentage of any player in the past 50 years with a minimum of 650 career games at second base, it's obvious that he won't be supplanting Jose Vidro at second. He rode the pine during the WBC and came up as a pinch hitter in the ninth inning against Cuba. How'd he fare? He struck out, thus eliminating the Dominican Republic.

So here the Nationals sit with a $10 million investment that had refused to play left field. Chalk this distraction to a list of distractions that Robinson is dealing with before even one regular season game is even played.

To Robinson's defense, he was able to sit down one-to-one with Soriano just before the WBC to try and negotiate with Soriano—get him to play ball as it were.

On Monday, March 20, Soriano was slated to play left field in a game against the Dodgers and was on Robinson's lineup card. The problem was that when the team took the field, only eight players came out of the dugout. "He made it pretty clear that he was not going to play," Bowden said. "We hope that when he reflects on it, we hope that he changes his mind and plays left field."

On the following Weds., Soriano bent and played left against the Cardinals. He has said that he will play left for the remainder of the season, but the situation has been a huge distraction. The whole situation has had me wondering if there will be changes in the Uniform Player's Contract due to the events with Soriano.

Before Soriano has played one regular season game with the Nationals, there has been talk of trading him. No one has bitten, leaving the Nationals in this awkward position as the regular season approaches.

And even though Bowden was granted a one-year extension, is it any wonder that his butt is on the line on this ordeal?

4. Will the new owners translate to changes on the field this season?

To rip off Harry Caray, Holy Cow, the Nationals are soon to get new owners!

As the Nationals start the 2006 season, they're saddled with the same problem that they've had since MLB purchased the Montreal Expos: MLB owns the club.

This season, more than others prior, this issue seems to have clouded the club going into the season. With the ownership issue held in limbo, and concern by MLB over whether the new stadium for the Nationals would ever be approved (it finally has been, and here's the pictures to prove it), the Nationals front office was stuck in purgatory, for the most part.

Now that the funding has been approved, talk has been that the sale of the franchise will occur before the beginning of the season. (The Lerner family has been rumored to have won the bidding process, with former Braves President Stan Kasten being brought in to run the day-to-day baseball operations.) The official announcement will come sometime after the beginning of the season.

The change, unfortunately, means little in terms of the on-the-field player personnel.

With the sale ostensibly occurring after the beginning of the season, the Nationals will be dealing with front office issues and transition. Player personnel changes with the new ownership will be no more than minor adjustments (look for Ryan Zimmerman). The next year is when there will be real changes. Welcome to another season of MLB-owned baseball.

5. Which team will show up?

The Nationals finished 81-81 last season, and they had a season that could only be described as split personality. After going 52-36, and going into the All-Star break in first place, the wheels came off as they went 28-45 after the break and were eliminated from playoff contention on Sept. 26.

To put this in perspective, the Nationals set a record by having over 10 consecutive one-run wins AND losses in one season. The Nats won 12 straight one-run games before the All-Star break. On the loss side of things, the Nats dropped 13 consecutive one-run losses during one stretch from July 9 until they beat Houston by one run on Aug. 9. Washington led the league with 30 one-run wins and 31 one-run losses.

The question is, what team will show up? If Spring Training is any indicator, it appears the team that was losing at the end of the season will be more prominent in 2006. With the loss of Ayala and a suspect starting rotation (after Hernandez and Patterson, there is little firm foundation), pitching is a large hole going into the season, and Robinson has already had closed door meetings due to lackluster play in Spring Training. (As of March 17, the Nats had committed 26 errors in 18 games; they had committed two or more errors in a game five times.)

The Nationals finished fifth in the NL East last season. Unless Robinson and the Nationals are able to capture what made them winners in the first half of last season, look for a repeat of a fifth-place spot in the NL East for 2006.

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Book Review: In the Best Interests of Baseball?

Maury Brown — 2006-03-14T04:03:15+00:00

For those who have monitoring the state of MLB over the last few years, for the most part (steroid issue and fumbling attempts at contraction aside), the health of MLB as an industry has been rosy.

The relationships among the ownership ranks has grown better in many senses. The relationship between the players' association and management is better. The marketing is better, because there is finally a proper marketing director, which had been missing before 1996.

In addition, the creation of the MLB Advanced Media as a centralized entity has allowed MLB to no longer be an outdated establishment when it comes to burgeoning technological delivery methods for baseball. Revenue sharing is now part of the economic landscape of MLB. The increase in public subsidies of stadium development has been, on one hand, a boon to the owners, and in the view of many, a bane to the tax-paying public. And by working in concert with Congress (a large consideration) to get the players' association to open up the collective bargaining agreement not once but twice, a substantive drug testing policy has been implemented, with steroids as the chief target.

The game has changed in terms of structure as well. Interleague play and the Wild Card are two prominent changes to the game that have come about in the last 20 years.

All of this has been negotiated during Bud Selig's tenure.

How this has all come about is detailed in a new book by Smith College Professor of Economics Andrew Zimbalist, titled, In the Best Interests of Baseball? The Revolutionary Reign of Bud Selig.

One may look at the title and assume that this is about ranking Selig—a bio-topic foray into Selig the man, and his stature as viewed through the lens of history. What the book actually does—in strikingly good detail—is outline the change in how MLB has been structured from a governance standpoint. He documents the shift from the image of Landis and the all-powerful commissioner that is wholly independent from his employers (the owners) to the CEO model that Selig exemplifies.

It is this direction, outlining the remarkable changes in how Selig has governed MLB during his tenure, that is the main thrust of the book.

Those who are to purchase the book sight unseen would find that 108 of the 218 pages of the book are purely dedicated to the current commissioner. Zimbalist presents the governance history of Selig’s predecessors in the preceding chapters, touching on Selig throughout. I initially found this to be a bit of a distraction, as I view Selig as a fascinating subject; given his longevity, I would have almost been unsatisfied with a tome of 600 pages on Selig alone. As a whole, however, the details on those who have governed MLB prior to Selig set the stage for understanding the change that has occurred under Selig's watch.

Zimbalist does an adept job of making the book enjoyable for everyone, from those who study the economics and business of baseball from an academic standpoint to anyone who may be interested in furthering their understanding of why MLB, as a body, acts as MLB does.

What reading the book did for me was take the context of the position of commissioner and break it down fundamentally into its various dynamics, and explain the shift that occurred when Selig slid into position after Fay Vincent's ouster. Zimbalist addresses how this action allowed a "settling in period" for the owners after dealing with the turnover of multiple commissioners in a relatively short period, while, as Zimbalist describes it, "[I]t turned out that the owners liked the ambiguity of the commissioner's mission."

Throughout the book, communication between the commissioner and the owners is a critical component. Whether it is outlining how this functioned poorly during Bowie Kuhn's or Vincent's tenure with the owners, or with how it works to Selig's benefit, it is a thread that weaves itself throughout the book.

Selig, for the most part, is viewed by the public as a dull, mostly benign figure in comparison to those he governs. While Jerry Reinsdorf or George Steinbrenner seem to encapsulate the view of the verbose intimidating figure that Zimbalist describes in his section on former commissioner Peter Ueberroth, Selig’s skill at working to get everyone in the room on the same page has been a hallmark of his tenure. He is, at least at this point in time, a man who has few detractors within the ownership brethren.

How big of a factor was Selig’s ability to communicate effectively in the changes we've witnessed during his reign? Zimbalist replied, “I think Bud has superlative communication skills and every ounce of these skills, plus Bud's boundless energy and tenacity, were essential as baseball confronted its revenue-sharing and labor battles of the 1990s. I'm not convinced that Bud continues to depend on open communications today as he did prior to becoming the full, in contrast to the 'acting,' commissioner in 1998.”

Here is the book's description of Selig during his early tenure in the ‘70s and ‘80s with the Brewers and MLB’s inner workings:

As the 1970s wore on, Bud became more inured to baseball’s peculiar management style and began to participate on more owners’ committees. Then in 1980 when Ed Fitzgerald moved to Tennessee and resigned from the Brewers board, Bud became more active and more central to baseball’s governance committees. In part, Bud’s prominent role was because most owners shunned the administrative responsibilities. In part, it was because Bud loved being involved in all aspects of the game. When he was not rooting for his Brewers with all his heart and soul, he was spending hours upon hours talking on the phone with other owners. He listened and always seemed to be on the side of whichever owner he was speaking to.

It is here that we see where Selig’s skill in governance is. He has been a part of the governing of MLB and has been familiar with his constituency for over 30 years now. He’s a known quantity. The owners see him as “one of [them].” It is this, along with Selig’s constant state of achieving consensus and cajoling his fellow owners in a way that looks like lockstep by comparison of the former commissioners (with Landis the possible exception), that makes him so effective in the eyes of those he serves.

Given the short tenures of commissioners up until Selig’s current reign, I asked Zimbalist if continuity has helped lend some stability to the relationships between the owners and the players' association. “Continuity of leadership is important,” Zimbalist said. “It facilitates communication, cooperation and planning. It is possible to develop continuity without having the CEO in the job for 14 or for 17 years however. At some point, too much longevity can become stale. What came before Selig was very counterproductive? Between the end of Kuhn's reign in 1984 and the beginning of Selig's in 1992, counting the bookends, there were five commissioners.”

The book touches on all the key moments and issues that have arisen in Selig’s tenure. The Kohler meetings, the proposed revenue-sharing system that was tied to a salary cap, which led to the 1994 strike; the Blue Ribbon Panel and Collective Bargaining; the 2002-2006 Agreement; the issues surrounding the funding of Miller Park, which to this day remains a sore spot in his home state; the public subsidy debate in stadium construction; the relocation of the Expos to D.C., and the funding issues that have, until last week, finally been resolved in D.C.; and finally, the issue of drug testing as it pertains to steroids, all are covered.

Since Zimbalist has better insight into the role of the commissioner after writing the book, I asked if he felt the position of commissioner of Major League Baseball would continue to evolve. "Yes, I suspect that, as the sports industry changes and the nature of the challenges baseball faces mutates, the parameters of the commissioner's job will shift," Zimbalist said. "One thing I can guarantee: when Selig retires, MLB will adopt the same provision to its constitution that exists in the NFL and NBA constitutions: the commissioner cannot hold stock in any team, either in baseball or any other sport."

So, what’s the recommendation on In the Best Interests of Baseball?: The Revolutionary Reign of Bud Selig?

Zimbalist has written an insightful and thought-provoking book that peels the cover off the ball of the position of the commissioner to see the threads inside. I highly recommend it.

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When the Hall of Fame and Controversy Collide

Maury Brown — 2006-03-06T06:17:15+00:00

There always seems to be an element of politics surrounding the Baseball Hall of Fame. Passionate people feel strongly about their revered sports icons, and the nebulous process in analyzing players has made for a mercurial state of mind in the selection process for the HOF, especially in the past when the Veterans Committee has been involved.

This past week, the process was yet again under fire when 17 Negro and pre-Negro League players and executives were selected by a special committee in a one-time vote to the Hall of Fame, doubling the total number of Negro and pre-Negro League players enshrined in Cooperstown. And while there was an element of controversy in those selected, it was the non-selection of John "Buck" O’Neil and “Minnie” Miñoso that has created the real fervor.

What really is on trial, however, is the selection process, and the view that two on the list—that in many minds would be shoo-ins—missed the cut.

Former commissioner Fay Vincent chaired the voting and screening committees. Vincent was a non-voting member of the committee, and directed the discussions with the committee members. Hall of Famer, and now Washington Nationals Manager, Frank Robinson counseled the committee.

The voters on the committee are arguably the most knowledgeable and passionate researchers when it comes to the subject of Negro and Pre-Negro league players and executives. In February of 2001, the Board at the Hall of Fame selected "The Negro Leagues Researchers/Authors Group" research team, led by Dr. Hogan of Union County College (NJ), Dick Clark, and Larry Lester, to conduct the study on the history of African Americans in Baseball, from 1860-1960. Those three then led a group of more than 50 authors, researchers, and historians on the study that led to the selections. The voting committee was comprised of 12 members:

Todd Bolton, Greg Bond, Adrian Burgos, Jr., Dick Clark, Ray Doswell, Leslie Heaphy Dr. Larry Hogan, Larry Lester, Sammy Miller, Jim Overmyer, Rob Ruck, and the late Robert Peterson, who passed away just over two weeks ago.

As the press release from the Hall of Fame reports:

The research resulted in a raw narrative and bibliography of nearly 800 pages and a statistical database, which includes 3,000 day-by-day records, league leaders and all-time leaders. The research was culled from box scores from 128 newspapers of sanctioned league games played from 1920-54.

With the research now complete, the study includes sanctioned league game box scores from almost 100% of games played in the 1920s, in excess of 90% of the box scores from games played in the 1930s and box scores from 50-70% of games played in the 1940s and 50s, during which time the various leagues began to disband and newspapers ceased to report game information. The end result is the most comprehensive compilation of statistics on the Negro leagues that have ever been accumulated.

It is here where some of the initial controversy started.

While the members of the Researchers/Authors Group were comprised of many members from the Society For American Baseball Research, the data was not released to the public to advance the vetting process. More on that in a bit.

So, on the 27th of February, 12 players and five executives were selected in this—mind you—a one time vote to the Hall, with O’Neil and Miñoso absent from the list.

This has sent many baseball fans and the media into an uproar, especially in the case of O’Neil. Instead of trumpeting the selection of the 17 that history may have overlooked due to the lack of collected data, the Hall has had to go on the defensive, overshadowing what was thought to be a shining moment for the HOF.

Thrown into the mix on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday has been longtime SABR member, and MSNBC TV and ESPN radio personality, Keith Olbermann.

Olbermann, who may be the greatest definitive resource on Fred Merkle in the world, blasted the Hall on his MSNBC show Countdown w/Keith Olbermann in not selecting O’Neil and Miñoso. In a bit of guilt by association, he also threatened on the show Tuesday to drop his membership in SABR, after being a member for 22 years, due to many on the voting committee being members of SABR; never mind that SABR was not directly involved in any of the process, and has yet to gain access to the data used in the study.

To Olbermann and his producer's defense, they had the Executive Director of SABR, John Zajc, on the show Friday, where SABR's position on the matter could be addressed.

When Olbermann asked if SABR planned to do anything or recommend about Buck O'Neil, Zajc responded, "As you point out, Keith, SABR is a research organization rather than an advocacy group. And we've chosen to remain neutral on issues like this in the past. We've never taken a stand on things like interleague play, or the DH, or steroids in baseball. We feel this neutrality is important to help researchers to have an environment where they can do their research and have it lead where it may."

So, yet again, it is the process of the selection that has lead to this situation.

What seems indisputable is that O’Neil is one of the greatest ambassadors that baseball has ever had—Negro leagues or otherwise. He served on the Hall’s Veterans Committee for nearly two decades. He gained a great deal of his celebrity when he was featured prominently in the Ken Burns documentary, Baseball. His love and enthusiasm for the game—especially those that he was associated with through the Negro Leagues—has done invaluable good for the sport.

But the question is, was O’Neil’s play worthy of entry into the Hall of Fame? Based on the Macmillan Baseball Encyclopedia (8th edition), O’Neil’s lifetime numbers break down as follows:

335 G, 1396 AB, 402 H, 39 2B, 15 3B, 11 HR, .288BA, .361 SA

O’Neil won the 1946 Negro American League batting title with a .353 average.

In the '42 Negro League World Series between the Homestead Grays and O’Neil's Kansas City Monarchs, he hit .353, as well.

So, as great as O’Neil is as an ambassador of the game, the best that one might say about his playing is that he was an above average player. He, like many other players during the ‘40s, missed playing time due to military service in World War II (he served from ’43-’45), which could have impacted his numbers, for better or worse.

Where it becomes less clear is when his managerial record and scouting career come into play.

O’Neil managed the Monarchs from 1948-1955 winning a total of five pennants and served as the manager of the West squad for four straight All-Star games from ’51-’54.

As a scout, he signed Lou Brock, Joe Carter, Lee Smith, Oscar Gamble, Matt Alexander, George Altman, Harvey Branch, Jophery Brown, John Hairston, J.C. Hartman, Lou Johnson, Donnie Moore, and Bill Robinson. Also, over time it's been reported that Ernie Banks was signed by O'Neil. This is incorrect. Banks' contract was sold to the Cubs in 1953, while O'Neil was still managing the Monarchs. He was the first black coach ever hired in the majors, when the Cubs signed him in to that position in 1962.

So, for argument sake, let's say that O’Neil comes down on the side of “above average” as a player and manager. Is there a category for "ambassador" in the HOF? That’s the question.

Over and over on Olbermann’s show last Tuesday, that word kept resurfacing. Whether it was Olbermann, or his guest, former Cubs great, and Hall of Famer, Ernie Banks, the issue of O’Neil’s numbers as a player and manager were passed over for the discussion on his ability to be a great ambassador for the game.

And therein lies the conundrum: How do you induct a member into the Hall of Fame for something that there is currently no criterion for? As revered and loved as O’Neil is, is that worthy of entry into the Hall of Fame? And, if so, does that open up the conversation as to whether players such as Johnny Pesky, or Dominic DiMaggio, or Dale Murphy belong in the Hall?

In the case of Saturnino Orestes Armas "Minnie" Miñoso Arrieta, his problem may well be that he spent a fairly limited time in the Negro Leagues ('45-'48), with the New York Cubans. The bulk of Miñoso's career was played in the Majors ('49, '51-'64, '76, '80) with time spent in-between in the Mexican League ('65-'73). He hit .336 up until August of 1946, before settling back to earth at the end of the season and finishing at .294. He was the starting third baseman in the '47 and '48 East-West All-Star games before going entering into the Majors with the Cleveland Indians in 1949. Miñoso played in the major leagues for 17 seasons, mostly with the Chicago White Sox, and hit .298 lifetime. He was a seven-time All-Star and won three Gold Gloves in the outfield.

He had good career in his home country of Cuba playing eight season of winter ball there with his Cuban career averages of .294, .294, 285, .263, .321, .271, .327, and .295 for the years 1945-'54, except for the winter of 1949-'50 when he did not play winter ball.

If the criterion of the voting committee was to determine whether Miñoso should enter the Hall under the Special Committee vote for Negro Leagues, Pre-Negro leagues eras, then sadly, Miñoso would fall short here as well. His unbelievable intangible qualities through innovations in the game, that Alex Belth so eloquently defined in his article for SI.com, may, unfortunately, never be fully appreciated.

And while we're at it, let's talk about the numbers I present here.

We're back to the other primary issue in this debate: the data to make the determination as to whether O'Neil or Miñoso merit entry into the Hall of Fame based on their numbers. The problem is, the data available to myself and the general research public is, for the most part, 'flat". The ability to apply ballpark factors, or know if some of the data covered barnstorming games, or tours, or any other number of factors that could be revealed in the data that the Hall is holding onto isn't known, making a definitive determination by those with inaccessibility to the study data, at best, difficult.

So, what are we left with? Unfortunately, it seems that the Hall is in a no-win situation. There seem to be cases that could be made for inducting both O’Neil and Miñoso, but not under the criteria of the Special Committee vote. Certainly in the case of O'Neil, there could be consideration of an alternative method for induction based on his "contributions to the game."

If the overwhelming sense is that some of the most dedicated, and knowledgeable researchers on the planet on Pre-Negro and Negro league players and executives somehow missed the mark on this vote (something I'm certainly not qualified to say), maybe the Hall should consider re-evaluating this selection process as more than just a one-time vote. Release all the data to the baseball research community at-large, which would allow for a complete vetting process, and then determine whether there is a way to get Buck O’Neil and Minnie Miñoso into the Hall of Fame, based on the numbers. If that route isn't available, and it's a more intangible quality such as "ambassadors" that would be considered for induction, certainly some form of lifetime achievement award could be applied to O’Neil’s case. Whether this is acceptable to O'Neil, the Hall, or the baseball community, only God knows.

There should be a solution to this unfortunate problem. It's a matter of the politics of the situation, something for which the Hall of Fame will have to live with or decide to alter. It is their system. It is their results. It was a secret vote. And, the data has been shielded. In the end, it was the process that was flawed, regardless of whether O'Neil or Miñoso deserve to be in or out of the Hall of Fame.

Until the dust settle, it seems that this will be one more controversial chapter in the book of the Baseball Hall of Fame based not so much on O'Neil and Miñoso, but rather what constitutes making an individual "Hall of Fame worthy". That, it seems, means different things to different people.

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