The Hardball Times -- Sky Kalkman

The Hardball Times -- Sky Kalkman http://www.hardballtimes.com/main Baseball. Insight. Daily. en studes@hardballtimes.com Copyright 2013 2013-06-19T08:32:15+00:00 Grading three contemporaries: Boggs, Gwynn, and Ripken http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/grading-three-contemporaries-boggs-gwynn-and-ripken/ http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/grading-three-contemporaries-boggs-gwynn-and-ripken/#When:06:53:15 three Hall-worthy catchers, I thought I'd stick with that approach, this time highlighting the careers of three superstars of the 1980s and 1990s who were all inducted into the Hall of Fame within the past four years: Wade Boggs, Tony Gwynn, and Cal Ripken, Jr. Thanks to Sean Smith for providing the data.

Ripken debuted first, with a cup of coffee in 1981. All three players were full time by 1984 and retired within two years of each other, Boggs going first after the 1999 season, with Gwynn and Ripken bowing out after 2001, although Gwynn only collected 249 plate appearances over his last two seasons. In total, Ripken accumulated 2000 more plate appearances than Boggs and 2500 more than Gwynn, which shouldn't shock anybody -- The Streak is to two-word phrases as Madonna is to one-worders. 100 extra plate appearances in a season is worth one-third of a win over replacement, so Ripken's ability to play every days gives him an advantage not only in providing additional above-average production, but in his ability to worse players out of the lineup.

Hitting

Boggs holds the advantage in peak hitting performance, with six seasons from 1982 through 1989 worth at least 40 runs above average. Gwynn doesn't have as many great years, but he managed to remain a +30 hitter far longer than Boggs. In total, Boggs holds a slight advantage in career hitting runs above average, +454 to +434. His years batting in Fenway are adjusted for park, but not run environment, so it's pretty much a draw between these two on offense. (Run environment is accounted for when converting to WAR later, however.) On a per-600 plate appearances basis, both players check in at +26 runs.

While he was a good hitter, Ripken just can't compare to these other two guys, although that's not really a knock against Ripken. Take, for example, Boggs' 1985 through 1988 seasons, when he posted four straight years of .360/.460/.500 production. Gwynn owns a .338 career batting average, which, while perhaps a bit overrated, still can't be a bad thing. Compare to those two, Ripken's career +181 runs above average seems pedestrian, even though a 112 OPS+ is really impressive for a shortstop (we'll get to the "for a shortstop" piece later). On a per-600 PA basis, he was +9 runs.

Fielding

Popular opinion holds that all three players were good fielders for their position (again, "for their position" is coming up later), as evidenced by the Gold Gloves they won. Boggs won two ('94, '95), Gwynn won five ('86, '87, '89-'91), and Ripken won two ('91, '92). Looking at TotalZone, Boggs actually was a good fielder well before he joined the Yankees, hovering around +5 runs above average his entire career. While people say he was a much better fielder with the Yankees, TotalZone disagrees. Ripken was up an down at the beginning of his career, but really took off in 1989, two years before his first Gold Glove. From 1989 through 1995, he averaged +16 runs above average. Gwynn was all over the place, going from -28 runs in 1989 to +30 runs in 1991. Now, some of that is likely due to the seasonal error bars of TotalZone. TZ paints a much bigger picture over long careers, however, and these three players rank, from best to worst compared to their own position, Ripken (+141) / Boggs (+91) / Gwynn (-8). Gwynn also gets credited with +13 runs for his career for throwing arm in the final analysis.

Position

Now it's time to consider the fact that Ripken wasn't merely good at hitting and fielding, he was exceptionally good for a shortstop. It's just more difficult to find talented players who can hit and also handle shortstop competently. With these three players, the relative difficulty of their positions is obvious -- the defensive spectrum puts shortstop as the most challenging, followed by third base, and then right field. The gaps aren't equal, however. (For specifics, read this. For a handy graph, try here.) The difference between shortstop and third base is about five runs over a full season, while the difference between third base and a corner outfield position is about ten runs. Gwynn faces a pretty large penalty relative to Ripken, and fifteen runs per season is enough to close the huge advantage Gwynn held in the hitting department. The variations you see in the above graphs are due to different levels of playing time, a slight change in position adjustments from the 1980s to the 1990s, and the fact that Gwynn spent some time in center field Boggs spent a little time at first base, and Ripken eventually moved to third base full time.

Overall Value

Wins Above Replacement not only includes hitting, fielding, and the position adjustment, but things like baserunning, turning double-plays, and credit for playing above replacement-level for each of a player's plate appearances. Runs are converted into wins based on the run environment the player was a part of, based on ballpark and league. From the graph, both Boggs and Gwynn peaked in the early third of their careers, then held on as productive players until just before the end. Ripken also peaked early, but threw in two 4ish WAR seasons between two 6ish WAR seasons that in turn were bookended by three 8+ WAR seasons. He finished his career like the other two by trailing off towards league-average and a couple forgettable seasons.

If we're looking to compare the careers of these great players, it helps to sort their season WAR totals from best to worst, left to right. Ripken posted the best season, an awesome 11 WAR campaign in 1991 that deserves a display in Cooperstown even beyond the plaque that's already there. He hit .323/.374/.566 (compared to a park-adjusted league average of .256/.324/.388) in 708 plate appearances, rated +20 runs at shortstop by TotalZone, and won the American League MVP award. However, after also bettering Boggs in their second-best seasons, Ripken's production falls below the third baseman for their next five best seasons. In total, Boggs accumulated 92 career WAR to Ripken's 91, a dead heat. In my opinion, greatness is determined by a player's peak ability, so I'd give the edge to Boggs who was a star longer, but your mileage may vary. And it's funny how Gwynn almost doesn't belong in the conversation, with only 71 career WAR. Well, maybe that's not fair -- he can toss in one-liners when the other two guys stop talking. All three players are deserving Hall of Famers, but Boggs' combination of stellar hitting and good defense and Ripken's combination of good hitting and stellar defense both trump Gwynn's combination of stellar hitting and below-average defense.

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Who was the better catcher? Mr. All-Hit Mike Piazza, Mr. All-Field Pudge Rodriguez, or Mr. A Lot of Each Johnny Bench?

Let's start with their hitting, shown in the graph below by sorting each player's seasonal batting runs above average from best to worst, left to right:

Piazza was definitely the best hitter of the three, and his 72 RAA season in 1997 was simply amazing (.362/.431/.638 with 40 home runs.) He had nine seasons at least 25 runs above average, while Bench had four, and Pudge, two. In total, Piazza accumulated 403 career hitting runs above average, to Bench's 245 and Pudge's 105. I should note that runs were scarcer (and thus more valuable) in Bench's heyday, and that Piazza rates 30 runs worse than either other player in baserunning over their careers.

Of course, I doubt anyone is surprised by the above results. We all know Piazza was a great hitter. It's his defensive skills that have always been questioned, and the reason why Bench is often taken to be the better overall player. And Pudge, well, some have claimed his cannon arm can darn near cure cancer. Here are their seasonal defensive runs above average as a catcher, again sorted from best to worst, left to right:

Nothing too surprising in those results, yet again. Piazza had just one season where he rated as an above average catcher, while Pudge had eight worth at least 10 runs above average and those four seasons at +19 to +25 runs are ridiculous. Bench, again, finished in the middle (+97 career catcher RAA), but this time was much closer to Pudge (+152 career catcher RAA) than Piazza (-61 career catcher RAA).

Let's put it together. And not just the hitting and catcher defense, but the baserunning, the GIDP avoidance, the position adjustments (Piazza and Bench spent some time out from behind the plate), the playing time, everything. Here's how the three players compare in seasonal WAR (wins above replacement) over their careers, according to Sean's calculations:

Hmm, all three rate pretty similarly, actually. From their third to 10th best seasons, all three players are indistinguishable by total value. Pudge lacks the dominant nine WAR seasons of Piazza and Bench, but the tail end of his career is better than both (and is still going). Bench hangs on to Pudge's long term pace when Piazza drops out at their 11th best seasons, but eventually falls off at season 14.

I don't want to tell you who had the better career—although I will mention that I prefer Bench's based on his peak being higher than Pudge's and his ability to hang near the four WAR level for more seasons than Piazza—because the data explains why the Piazza vs. Bench debate remains so fierce: the offensive advantages of Piazza exactly counter the defensive advantage of Bench. Yes, exactly. Piazza had 158 more hitting runs than Bench, while Bench had 158 more catching runs than Piazza. And Pudge? He has nearly the same career WAR total as Bench, thanks to his ability to remain behind the plate longer. When Bench tried his hand at other positions, especially at third base in 1982, he wasn't too successful.

Moral of the story? A run on offense is a run on defense, and the Piazza vs. Bench debate is as valid as chocolate vs. vanilla. I'll take both, thanks.

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In addition to average players carrying significant value, there are many types of average players. You can have well-rounded players, players with big bats and no glove, or players who hit like Triple-A veterans but dominate defensively. Here's a quick look at the many faces of average.

Akinori Iwamura

Aki's beloved by Rays' fans, a strange phenomenon for a league-average player, especially one without any great strength. Over 707 plate appearances in 2008, he posted a .323 wOBA, played second base (just slightly on the difficult end of the spectrum, and was the definition of an average-fielding second baseman. Throwing that information into a graphical format yields a pretty boring picture of what made up Aki's 25 runs above replacement. Simply put, he was valuable because he was average:

Note that the Hit, Fld, and Pos bars use zero as average, while PT (playing time) and RAR count up from zero as a minimum.

Carlos Gomez

Gomez was no Iwamura with the bat in 2008, and that's really saying something. While he stole 33 bases in 44 attempts, he had an awful .296 OBP and a wOBA to match. He was 16 runs worse than average on offense. But if he was a sink hole offensively, he was the Old Faithful defensively, saving 17 more runs than the average center fielder, which itself isn't an easy job. Gomez's graph shows off his offensive and defensive disparity:

Jermaine Dye

Dye was the antithesis of Gomez in 2008, an offensive tour de force who would have been more valuable defensively had the White Sox not let him ever step on the field. 34 homeruns and 41 doubles helped power Dye to create 22 more runs than the average player in his 645 plate appearances. But his lack of range in right field left him 15 runs worse than the average fielder at the not-so-challenging position. His graph is the mirror image of Gomez's graph, except for the similar playing time:

Jerry Hairston

Yes, Jerry Hairston. He was extremely productive offensively (only eight runs behind Dye), was completely neutral defensively, but only racked up 297 plate appearances, about half a full season's worth. If you add up his Hit, Fld, and Pos runs, he comes out further ahead of the average player than any of the first three guys, but since he did not play full time, the Reds were forced to field a replacement for 300 PAs. While the Reds did have Jay Bruce lying around, Colin did a nice job recently of explaining why the replacement-level baseline is needed in a value analysis. Hairston's adjustment from the average baseline to replacement level is less than the other three players, leaving him (not-so-shockingly) almost exactly as valuable. All four players appear in the last graph:

In summary

Akinori Iwamura, Carlos Gomez, Jermaine Dye, and Jerry Hairston were all equally valuable in 2008, but went about producing at the level of a full-time league-average player in extremely different ways. That's the glory of measuring all pieces of the puzzle in runs: you can compare a player's strength on offense with his deficiencies on defense. Instead of trying to compare Carlos Lee's RBIs with Mark Ellis' fielding percentage you can compare runs with runs and find that the two players are remarkably similar in value, even thought Lee earns more than three times as much as Ellis. Different players, different skills, same overall value.

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The short story is that Penny immediately injured himself and missed the rest of the season, while the Dodgers still managed to win the division. The long story is that Choi never performed up to expectations, Mota's been a disappointment for the Marlins and Indians, and LoDuca's still a nice catcher, but his legend status has disappeared. Penny, after an above-average 2005 season where he managed to toss 175 innings amidst injuries, has turned into an early Cy Young candidate in 2006. Paul DePodesta is long gone, but is this the year that his 2004 trade is finally recognized as a plus move for the Dodgers?

Penny's ERA currently sits at 2.53 in 53.1 innings pitched. That's an ERA 1.4 runs below his career rate and currently ranks him fourth in the National League. He's never posted a full-season ERA below 3.00 before, but came close in 2004.

Penny Seasonal ERA

So, let's see what Penny's doing better this season that explains the ERA drop. He's been consistently average with his strikeout rate over his career and 2006 is no different. Control-wise, he's walking half a batter more per game this year than last, but the 2.7 BB/9 is in line with his career rate and better than average.

Penny Season K-9 Small

On the other hand, Penny's homerun rate has been amazing so far in 2006 -- he's only given up 2 homeruns in 53.1 innings. Keeping the ball in the park has been a strength throughout his career, but he's actually allowing more fly balls this season than in the past, in addition to fewer groundballs and more line drives. A shift like that in batted ball profile would tend to imply an increase in homeruns, but Penny's only allowing 3% of fly balls to leave the yard, compared to a career norm of about 9%. Expect that number to rise, and Penny's ERA along with it.

Penny BIP Profile

A second indicator of a potential rise in ERA is Penny's left-on-base rate in 2006. Over his career, 72% of base-runners were left on base, whereas that number is up to 81% this season. That number will likely regress as the season goes on and with it more runners will score.

Penny Seasonal LOB

Penny's Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) sits at 3.31, significantly higher than his actual ERA. FIP accounts for the high LOB%, but unless Penny continues to be historically stingy with the homeruns, expect his ERA the rest of the season to be at least 3.75. If he can stay healthy enough to pitch 200 innings, however, his 2006 season will still garner a lot of attention, especially if the Dodgers continue to rebound from 2005 and challenge for the division lead.

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