The Hardball Times Articles

Forecasting Prince

Myron Logan — 2012-02-09T13:41:15+00:00

The Detroit Tigers shocked the baseball world by signing Prince Fielder to a nine-year, $214 million contract earlier this offseason. The public opinion on the deal seems to be that: 1) it makes the Tigers really good in the short-term; 2) nine years and $214 million is a lot of money over a long period of time; and 3) that's a particularly large sum of cash to guarantee to a man of Prince Fielder's size and stature.

We've discussed the Fielder signing in detail here at The Hardball Times, but this time around I wanted to specifically focus on item number three listed above; Fielder's size and how it may impact his performance over the length of the deal. I should first note that the Internet is a big place, and naturally this topic has already been explored by Ryan Campbell and Jeff Zimmerman at FanGraphs. Further, I know there have been numerous size/aging studies over the years published at various locations. That said, I still believe it's worth it to continue down this path and see if we can uncover anything new with regards to how productive Fielder will be in his mid-30s.

With that in mind, and with help from my colleagues at THT, I set out to find a group of players similar to Prince Fielder. The specific traits desired in a Prince Fielder comp:

{exp:list_maker}The player must have been productive through his age-27 season.
The player must have been really big, preferably not only in weight but also in Body Mass Index.
The player should have played on the left side of the defensive spectrum, getting most of his value from batting/home runs.
The player must have turned 27 by 2002, giving at least nine years of performance post age-27. {/exp:list_maker}

I figured that, with help from Baseball Reference's Play Index, the task would be easy enough. I was wrong. Great players of Prince's size, somewhere in the neighborhood of 5-foot-11 and 275 pounds, simply don't exist. According to Baseball Reference, only 31 non-pitchers have weighed in at 250+ pounds. Out of that 31, only five posted a career WAR over 15, one of which is Prince Fielder. The other four are Jim Thome, Frank Howard, Adam Dunn, and Carlos Lee. Dunn and Lee are viable comps, but have not logged nine years since age-27. Frank Howard checks in at 6'7'', 255 pounds*, an altogether different body type from Fielder. Thome made the cut.

*Now is probably as good a time as any to mention my concerns with size data, specifically weight. The data I'm using is from Baseball Reference and I'm simply not sure how reliable it is. Further, a player's weight obviously fluctuates throughout his career, and I don't know when these weights were recorded. Some players, like an Andres Galarraga, looked entirely different early in their career as compared to late.

With concerns in mind about a lack of potential comparable players, I attempted to widen the thresholds for inclusion, lowering the weight and performance standards. The subsequent list is larger and includes a number of potential options. Still, putting together a final list of comps isn't easy. For instance, number one on the list in terms of Body Mass Index (32.5), is Miguel Tejada. At age-27 Tejada was playing 162 games at shortstop for the Oakland A's, deriving much of his value out of his ability to (adequately) defend at short. Not exactly Prince Fielder-like. Other guys high on the list are players like Scott Rolen, Hack Wilson, and Bobby Abreu. While these players have similarities to our subject, they gained too much value out of defense/base running to compare directly to Fielder.

I settled on eight players of which to examine, balancing the above-listed traits to best identify good candidates. The players:

On average, the eight players stand at 74.4 inches tall and weigh 231 pounds. They averaged 22.3 WAR through age-27, similar to Prince's 19.6. Over the next nine seasons they averaged 24.7 WAR, highlighted by Jim Thome and Manny Ramirez who aged very gracefully into their mid-30s. I'm using Rally's WAR, located on Baseball Reference in this article. Let's look at a couple of other graphs:

If you can't make too much of that, I don't blame you. Here's the average aging curve of all eight players:

You can see here that the group peaks, perhaps as we'd expect, at age-27. However, they remain productive over their next five seasons, averaging yearly WAR totals of 4, 3.9, 4.3, 3.5, and 3.5. The next four years are more of a struggle. While some players remain productive, a number of guys put up near-replacement level performance or begin to drop out of baseball altogether. Let us just assume, for kicks, that Prince Fielder ages exactly as his comps over the next nine seasons. How much would he be worth?

I came up with $142 million over the next nine seasons, accounting for a five percent increase in dollars per WAR each year. It's a far cry from the $214 million the Tigers paid for Fielder's services, but is it realistic? Our own THT Forecasts, which only project performance six years into the future (how dare they), actually project Fielder to be worth 18.5 WAR over the next six seasons. That's nearly three fewer WAR than the above-listed projection for Prince over six seasons.

Tangotiger looked at 10 first basemen with at least 10 WAR from age-25 through 27 and got a more favorable value projection of nine years, $183 million.

There are likely very few long-term valuations out there that will forecast Fielder to be worth $214 million over the next nine years. There's a reason most of the baseball world was in shock following Fielder's signing in Detroit. That level of years and dollars simply wasn't anticipated. For example, on average, FanGraphs readers expected Prince to sign a 6.5-year, $136 million deal.

Anyway, I don't want to give the impression that the long-term forecast derived here will be (or should be expected to be) accurate over the next nine seasons. Anybody who thinks they can accurately predict player performance over a nine year span should probably be selling their projections on an infomercial for $19.99. While I believe the eight players share similarities with Fielder and can perhaps shed some light on how he'll perform in the future, this method is riddled with any number of potential pitfalls, some of which I've already mentioned. Hopefully, though, you get an idea of how similar players have performed from age-28 through age-36.

For Tigers fans holding their collective breath, there is some reason to be optimistic regarding the signing. First, you get to watch an exciting power hitter play out his near-prime years in Detroit. Second, with Miguel Cabrera and Fielder hitting back-to-back, Detroit will have one of the best one-two punches in all of baseball. Finally, the Tigers are a good team right now and Fielder should put up very productive numbers in the short-term. In a winnable American League Central, the addition of Fielder to the Detroit lineup has a chance to win them a couple of divisions, if not American League pennants. You can make an argument that the Tigers are in prime position to overpay for a superstar caliber player and they made sure to do just that.

Still, there's no reason to sugur-coat the deal from the Tigers perspective. Fielder, a great player, simply isn't great enough to get paid nearly $24 million a year for nine years and earn it, whether he ages like his estimable group of large comparables or like an average player. Even if you consider Fielder to be a five WAR player right now and shave his WAR by a mere .3 WAR per year, he'd still fall $10 million short of his contract. Of course, if he was able to do that you would probably consider the signing a mild success. It would outperform all of his comps performance after age-27, except for Jim Thome, Manny Ramirez, and Johnny Mize, all of whom were better than Fielder up to age-27. Considering that Fielder has only posted two seasons above four WAR through his age-27 season, the idea that he'll do it four times over the next nine years is stretching it.

In the 1982 Bill James Baseball Abstract, James discusses the breadth of a player's skill-set and how it may effect aging. Joe Morgan, he mentioned, experienced a particular late-peak and graceful aging period thanks in part to his ability to do a lot of things well. He was a solid contact hitter, possessed good power, was an excellent base runner, and a solid defender at second base. Morgan's peak years were from 28 through 32, where he posted nine WAR or better five straight seasons.

Fielder's skill-set, on the other hand, is more narrow. He's great at hitting for power, drawing walks, and staying on the field. His contact ability appears to be improving. However, he provides no speed, little base running ability, and no positive defensive ability. If Fielder's central skills decline, mostly his propensity to hit home runs, he'll be left with little baseball value. Still, we don't know what is going to happen to Fielder's specific skills. He could remain a productive power source, while hitting between .270 and .300 for the foreseeable future, retaining much of his current value while declining, if only slightly, in his speed and defense. After all, how much further can Fielder's speed and fielding ability decline.

Overall, we're left in a familiar situation when trying to project a player's performance years into the future. We simply don't know what's going to happen and whether Fielder stays productive through age-36 or suddenly falls off a cliff in three or four years is largely a mystery to us. The Tigers will hope for the former, obviously, but perhaps more importantly Dave Dombrowski and company will try to assemble a World Series winner in the short-term. It'll be a lot easier to deal with Fielder's potential albatross contract with flags already flying.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

The Homestead exemption act of 1992

Frank Jackson — 2012-02-09T09:41:15+00:00

In 1992 the Baltimore Orioles opened Camden Yards to rave reviews. The success of that facility has affected the design of every new major league park, in varying degrees, over the last two decades. 1992 also brought another significant event that had long-lasting effects on major league ballparks, but that event affected spring training complexes.

For decades, spring training was all but synonymous with Florida, and in 1992 that was still largely true. Of the 26 teams in major league baseball 18 trained in Florida. The eight exceptions were in Arizona: the Brewers in Chandler; the Cubs in Mesa; the A’s in Phoenix; the Giants in Scottsdale; the Mariners and Angels in Tempe; the Indians in Tucson; and the Padres in Yuma. Basically, Arizona had all but one of the West Coast teams (the Dodgers were still clinging to their ancestral spring home in Vero Beach, Florida) plus three Midwest teams. Except for the Indians, all the teams in the Eastern Time Zone were in Florida.

At this point in time, the good people of Homestead, Florida were eager to enter the spring training sweepstakes. Homestead, at the southernmost tip of the Florida mainland, was then a town of about 25,000 and largely agricultural, aside from the local Air Force base. Despite the fact that metropolitan Miami was just a few miles to the north, Homestead was largely isolated. The Everglades lay to the west, the Atlantic Ocean to the east, and the Florida Keys to the south.

Of course, a town in search of a team must pay to play. Well, Homestead was willing to pay, so they found a team. The Cleveland Indians had trained at Hi Corbett Field in Tucson, Arizona since 1947, back in the Bill Veeck era, but they decided to shift spring operations to Homestead. After cutting a deal with the Indians, Homestead spent $22 million to construct a complex for the Tribe, who were to take occupancy in the spring of 1993. The complex included all the amenities expected of a spring training complex in the early 1990s. The design included a full complement of practice fields, dormitories, and a distinctive tropical pink facade wrapping around the 6,500-seat stadium.

Unfortunately, Mother Nature had designs of her own. Hurricane Andrew, a Category 5 storm, devastated Homestead on August 24, 1992. Even though it was the first major storm of the season, the damage to the Indians’ complex was too extensive to be repaired by spring training, 1993. The Indians had an escape clause in their contract with Homestead, but what to do?

The team was truly in an any-port-in-a-storm situation. Returning to Tucson was out of the question, as the Colorado Rockies had secured the Indians’ former home for their inaugural spring training. Sitting out spring training was not an option, so the Indians went in search of a one-year deal. Obviously, they were not in a good bargaining position. The only deal they could find was in Winter Haven, Florida, where the Red Sox had just vacated Chain of Lakes Park in favor of City of Palms Park in Fort Myers. Unfortunately, the Indians could not get a one-year deal. The best they could obtain was a ten-year lease. So Homestead got stiffed, not just for 1993 spring training but forever after.

While the other teams that trained in Florida had dodged the bullet, you can bet they all took note of what happened in Homestead. I don’t imagine MLB executives would score high on empathy tests, but I’ll bet they were all thinking, “Geez, that coulda been us!” Subsequent hurricanes, especially Charley, Ivan, and Jeanne in 2004, swept over Florida. Some complexes sustained damage from those storms but all were repaired in time for spring training 2005.

Nevertheless, MLB executives came to realize that having a spring training complex in harm’s way wasn’t mandatory. Arizona was looking better and better. What was the worst that could happen in Arizona? A sandstorm? Sure, you might need a lot of water to keep the fields green, but the intense heat was only a problem in the summer. Arizona had no hurricanes (alas, no theme parks, space shuttle launches, beaches, or deep sea fishing either), but they did have palm trees and pleasant weather in March. And it was already a second front in the spring training wars so it had been broken in, so to speak.

Eastern seaboard major league teams had long spring training traditions in Florida, so the Sunshine State could probably put them in the “safe” column. Teams in the Midwest, however, were in play. Since the Indians took refuge in Winter Haven in 1993 (they have since returned to Arizona), the only other teams to take up spring residence in Florida are the Marlins and (Devil) Rays, who obviously have a vested interest in the state. Meanwhile, the Rangers, Royals, White Sox, Dodgers, and Reds have joined the Indians in Arizona. The only teams from the Central Time Zone in Florida are the Twins in Fort Myers, the Astros in Kissimmee, and the Cardinals in Jupiter.

I haven’t heard of any of these teams making noises about pulling up stakes, but next year the Astros may look around, see that all their new rivals in the American League West are in Arizona, and wonder why they are in Florida. So when the lease runs out on their complex in Kissimmee, they may take a more critical look at Osceola County Stadium—the smallest in all spring training. They may want to rectify that, among other shortcomings—real or perceived—but not by paying for it themselves. So despite proximity to Disney World, which would seem to be a competitive advantage for families attending spring training, the Astros might start quietly making inquiries about Arizona.

Similarly, the Cardinals and Twins may get itchy feet when their leases are about to expire. Realizing that Arizona is no father away than Florida, they too might start to lean towards the Grand Canyon State. The Cardinals might ponder the revenue they could garner from spring match-ups with the arch-rival Cubs in Arizona. The Twins might notice that all the other teams in their division are in Arizona, except for the Tigers—something of a special case, as they have been ensconced in Lakeland, Florida, since 1934 (aside from the World War II austerity years).

Of course, even in Arizona, the musical chairs routine among MLB teams and cities is still popular. Spring training complexes have a way of becoming obsolete even faster than big league ballparks. Since their inaugural season in 1998, the Diamondbacks, had spent spring training in Tucson at a brand new complex they shared with the White Sox. The joint was jumping throughout late February and March, and the Diamondbacks’ AAA team, the Sidewinders, provided a regular season tenant for the facility.

Now there is no more spring ball in Tucson and the Diamondbacks’ AAA team has moved to Reno. The Padres are temporarily housing their AAA affiliate in Tucson till they can find a permanent home, but as soon as they leave, the facility’s future will be clouded. Now we’re not talking about some dilapidated, outdated, musty old monstrosity but a facility that’s only 14 years old. This spring, the complex is forsaking baseball in favor of soccer, as Tucson is playing host to several MLS teams in training.

And there are plenty of other examples, both in Florida and Arizona. The Rangers moved from Pompano Beach to a brand new complex in Port Charlotte, Florida in 1986. At the time, all was hunky-dory but around the turn of the millennium, the Rangers had second thoughts, and by 2003, they were in Surprise, Arizona.

This year the Red Sox, at home in Fort Myers since 1993, are moving into a new complex in the same city. Since the Sox games are always sell-outs and New England tourists flood the area every spring, Fort Myers was more accommodating than they might have been for the crosstown Twins.

Something seems to happen during the 10-15 year span of a spring training complex. The team starts to grumble about the inadequacy of their current digs and rumors about a possible move start floating around. Spring training host cities are victimized by rising expectations. Teams look at the facilities that have opened in the years since their facility opened and get amenity envy. So they start making noises that they just might have to seek—almost literally—greener pastures. Maybe they’re not really interested in moving but just applying some pressure to the host city to loosen the purse strings.

As a general rule, there’s some municipality out there somewhere that’s willing to build a new complex to order. Had the Homestead complex not been hit by Hurricane Andrew, it’s likely that the Indians would have vacated by now anyway. Given the experiences of jilted towns in Florida and Arizona, it’s hard to believe that any municipality is still willing to spend the bucks to bring baseball to town for a mere six weeks per year.

Of course, MLB execs have played the same game for years in order to get extensive renovations or new ballparks in their regular season homes. The argument usually went something like, hey, if you can’t give us what we need, there’s another city out there who would love to provide a home for our team.

This strategy still works in Arizona and Florida at the spring training level, but it seems to have gone out of style in MLB cities. Today one doesn’t hear much talk of franchise moves. None of the top 30 metropolitan areas without major league baseball (Portland, Sacramento, San Antonio, Orlando, and Las Vegas) is making any noises—at least not loud noises—about obtaining a major league baseball franchise. And if it comes down to voters’ approval, you can pretty much forget about it in today’s economy. The Oakland A’s have been angling for a new ballpark in the Bay Area for a long time, and one can only wonder what will happen if their lease runs out in Oakland and they have nowhere to go.

Meanwhile, back home in Homestead (great name for a country and western song, eh?), what do you do with a damaged spring training complex? It’s no good to anyone damaged, so might as well fix it up, right? Right! So Homestead spent $8 million on repairs in 1992-1993, thinking that another team would come calling.

They were wrong.

Oh, the complex did play host to occasional events. For a while, they were home to the U.S. Olympic baseball team and hosted some college baseball games and various youth league tournaments. The Florida Marlins even played some exhibition games there. And there were other flirtations with soccer, fireworks displays, the movie industry, even pro cricket (I know...who knew there was professional cricket in the USA?), but no heavy-duty tenants. Given the upkeep of such a sizeable complex, it was a white elephant of enormous girth, and Homestead is not among the more affluent South Florida cities. Boca Raton, it ain’t!

Actually, the stadium at Homestead would have made an excellent minor league park. Again, Homestead’s location proved to be a drawback. As part of the Marlins’ marketing area, any affiliated minor league team would have to be part of the Marlins’ network. The Marlins played their first regular season game less than eight months after Hurricane Andrew did its business, but their minor league operations were already in place.

Triple-A ball has not worked in Florida and, aside from Jacksonville, neither has AA ball. The Florida State League (high-A ball) would have been a good fit for the Marlins, but they had already linked up with the Brevard County Manatees. Their Space Coast Stadium was scheduled to open in Viera (near Melbourne) in 1994, and the Marlins would also use the facility for spring training (after spending their inaugural spring training at the Astros’ old facility in Cocoa). While Homestead was in Miami’s backyard, it might as well have been in Alaska, for all the good it did them.

As the years passed, Homestead’s chances of landing a team grew dimmer and dimmer. At one time spring training was popular in South Florida. Over the years Miami, Miami Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Pompano Beach, and West Palm Beach had hosted spring training. But one by one, teams in those towns migrated elsewhere. Teams evacuated the lower reaches of the Atlantic side of the peninsula in favor of the Gulf Coast side of the peninsula, central Florida, and the central Atlantic coast. Circumstances had rendered Homestead more and more isolated for potential exhibition games, which would have involved longer and longer bus rides. Today the closest teams are in Fort Myers and Jupiter, both more than 100 miles away. Time spent on the bus is time wasted, precious time that could be spent on workouts, instructions, or practice.

So Homestead might have been doomed in the long run, even if Hurricane Andrew had chosen a different route. In the short run, at least they would have garnered some revenue from Indians games to help pay for the complex. Nevertheless, despite two decades of disappointment, the Homestead Sports Complex is in surprisingly good shape, thanks to the sale of the complex to the La Ley Sports group, who have renamed it—surprise!—the La Ley Sports Complex. The complex now hosts an assortment of amateur tournaments, not just for baseball teams but for other sports. I suspect the 6,500-seat capacity is rarely taxed, and for traditionalists the ping of aluminum on horsehide will never replace the thwack of wood on same, but better amateur ball than no ball at all.

The isolation of Homestead may not be a problem for youth tournaments, but it definitely worked against spring training exhibition games. In Arizona, they heard the same message loud and clear. With no more than three teams in Tucson, numerous bus rides up I-10 to the Phoenix area were needed to diversity the exhibition schedule. Now the teams are all clustered in metropolitan Phoenix, rendering “away” games no farther away than the distance many commuters in the Valley of the Sun drive every day, and leaving more time for productive pursuits.

For the time being, parity has been achieved in spring training: 15 major league teams train in Arizona and 15 in Florida. But rumors crop up every year about one or more franchises moving, so one state may gain an advantage over the other in the years to come. If so, I would bet on Arizona getting the upper hand. Weather is a major factor – and not just lack of hurricanes. Arizona is dryer than Florida and rain is less likely to wash out workouts or exhibition games.

On the other hand, how many training camps can metropolitan Phoenix absorb? Will it get to the point that every self-respecting Phoenix suburb must have its own spring training complex, just as surely as it must have a Walmart and a Chuck-E-Cheese? Significantly, all the complexes in Arizona that have opened since Peoria (Mariners/Padres) in 1994 have been built to accommodate two teams, thus bringing in twice as many spring game dates and fans, and, theoretically at least, twice as much revenue.

In Florida, the first dual spring training site was in Jupiter in 1998, when the Cardinals and Expos opened their camps. Today it remains the only one of its kind in Florida (the Marlins subbed for the Expos in 2003). The old business model of a single team operating at a single facility may be obsolete, though exceptions might be made for teams with huge followings, such as the Yankees, the Red Sox, and the Phillies.

It will be interesting to see how long parity lasts. It may be just a transitional phase till Arizona gets the upper hand. It is difficult to envision Florida regaining dominance. The annual threat of hurricanes is definitely a wet blanket. Hurricanes don’t pass through during the spring training season, but as Hurricane Andrew showed, that doesn’t mean that spring training will remain unaffected. I’m sure the folks in Fort Myers thought long and hard about that before they went ahead with the new home for the Red Sox.

When Hurricane Andrew did a number on Homestead, Florida, the youngest players training in Arizona this spring weren’t even born. Had that event not happened, a lot of them might be working out today in Florida. But I’d be surprised if any of them had ever heard of either Hurricane Andrew or the Homestead Exemption it wrought.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

Against replay in baseball

David Wade — 2012-02-08T09:26:15+00:00

Major League Baseball has language in its new collective bargaining agreement that calls for the expansion of the use of video replay in adjudicating certain calls on the field. We know at least two possible scenarios for replay include fair and foul balls as well as helping umpires determine whether or not a ball was caught in the air.

A great many people are already welcoming this addition to baseball's rules. But, for all the pleas to "just get the call right," something just doesn't feel right about increasing video replay in baseball.

The prevailing thought is that embracing video replay will ultimately eliminate costly umpiring errors, famous errors like those made by Jim Joyce and Don Denkinger, two men who are household names to baseball fans for blown calls.

Prevailing thought says expanded use of instant replay would make egregious errors like those a thing of the past. Some fans are in favor of eventually expanding replay to include anything from force outs to—as some have even called for—balls and strikes.

Embrace it, and replay could bring us into a new and wonderful age in baseball where there is no doubt the contest is settled fairly and accurately, on the field of play, with precise calls. Real baseball fans would be fools to oppose such an obvious benefit to the game they love.

Yet, something still seems off.

Some of those who favor replay believe all of those who oppose replay are either luddites or simpletons, fools who are falling for one of several logical fallacies. The list of fallacious arguments against replay is filled with terms you may remember from your Introductory Logic course.

One trap opponents of instant replay could fall in is what's known as an "appeal to authority." This would catch anyone who quotes players or managers who have spoken out against replay and uses those quotes as evidence against expanding it. That's a bad argument, according to the textbooks.

At the same time, this thought process prohibits those in favor of replay from using quotes from Buck Showalter, who feels expanded use of replay would be so successful it would only make us wonder why we didn't switch to it years ago. This article quotes Showalter's prediction for a Utopian world of baseball under video surveillance. This is the poor argument Bud Selig used a couple of years ago.

Umpire Jim Joyce admittedly blew a call that cost Detroit Tigers pitcher Armando Gallaraga a perfect game back in June of 2010. Everyone remembers it, and everyone remembers that Commissioner Selig not only declined to reverse the call, but also used the controversial game to point out that he was against the expansion of replay.

The Commissioner said he had talked to luminaries in Major League Baseball, and from what they told him, "Most baseball people are really against instant replay." Appealing to general managers and owners doesn't make Selig wrong, but it's an argument that sets itself up for criticism.

Another logical fallacy waiting to entrap opponents of instant replay is the dreaded "appeal to tradition." This one makes those against replay look like crotchety old-timers who don't want the game to change.

People can be against change because they feel it is bad for the game, but they need to be careful. They can be ridiculed by those who would note that we'd still have segregation in baseball had some traditionalists had their way. To be sure, it's not right to oppose something because it means a change, even if changing something is wrong or undesirable. A 200-year history without replay does not mean replay is invalid.

Others against replay already have argued that the very first foray into implementing such technology, like what has already been used for home run boundaries, would open a "Pandora's Box." They fear replay is already leading us down a slippery slope that could end up with every call reviewed by laser sensors spanning the entirety of the field, perhaps even culminating in R2D2 calling balls and strikes.

Yes, that doomsday scenario of a "slippery slope" is yet another logical fallacy. This one involves a terrible outcome stemming from some new rule or law, for instance.

Bad consequences are possible after change, but it's hard for that arguer to get his case heard when he makes leaps all the way to his dreadful scenario while skipping over several more likely points in between that could surface before we ever get to such a horrible state. The illogical argument as it pertains to replay in baseball goes something like this:

"If we expand replay, where will it stop? Eventually, every play at first will be replayed, and the game, which often takes too long already, will take even longer. This will drive people from the game. Revenue for Major League Baseball will fall. Young children will no longer have dreams of playing professional baseball. Little League enrollment will fall off dramatically. Eventually, no children will even play baseball, and the sport will be wiped off the face of the earth."

Well, that obviously ends in hyperbole. There's no way replay could spell the end of baseball. But even though that's true and "getting the call right" doesn't seem to carry any negative consequences, something still seems bad about it.

Given that the case against replay is fraught with the potential for so many perilously poor arguments, where in the world can I turn to express what is becoming a growing abhorrence for replay in any sport, let alone baseball?

Maybe this is where I should have a little faith. Maybe baseball won't follow the path of the National Football League, where replay has become its own game within a game and where dozens of high-definition looks don't always provide a definite answer, anyway.

Not to mention the fact that replay has the side effect of sucking the joy out of nearly every big play, since nearly every big play could potentially be overturned and has to endure the deepest of analysis before we know if a play even will stand. Furthermore, replay causes a break in the action and makes the game longer than necessary, something that's already a concern in baseball.

In the NFL, there is football strategy—Xs and Os, as they like to say. But there's also the strategy of dealing with replay. A coach has to decide when to throw the challenge flag, and when that flag is thrown, we are no longer watching a football game.

Now we are watching officials examine a play with incredible scrutiny, scrutiny that sometimes leads to announcers disagreeing with each other on what the call should be. In fact, several broadcasts now bring in an official to serve as the "replay expert" in the booth, and even the expert has predicted a different conclusion from what was eventually called on the field. Is that "getting the call right?"

Consider this quote about replay in football:

"When instant replay began, everybody thought we were going to get a piece of film that's absolutely going to nail it down," said Barry Mano, president of the National Association of Sports Officials. "Guess what? You can look at a clip and I can look at a clip and we can see two different things."

Maybe that wouldn't happen in baseball. Maybe MLB will implement something that doesn't put an arbitrary number on how many challenges a manager could use. Maybe they will only choose certain plays to review and have an umpire watching in the booth, taking the onus off the managers. Maybe we won't have to examine every single double-play ball to make sure the middle infielder doesn't use the "neighborhood play" at second. Maybe.

However, even the best implementation of replay can't keep some calls from still carrying a certain degree of uncertainty. And, if that's the case, how do we ever get to a point where we know, absolutely, that the right call is made?

Maybe the majority of players, coaches, and fans still will embrace replay. Maybe calls will increase for expansion until we see Pitch-f/x systems in place to call balls and strikes. Bill James has even argued that we should put sensors on the bases and boundaries so calls can be made electronically and negate even the need for video evidence. Maybe that's the only way to guarantee we absolutely get the call right.

Hopefully that type of change would make the game better and not just impose too much technology on a ball and stick game. But for that type of dramatic change to take place, baseball will have to take a look at its defined rules.

As it stands, baseball is played "under jurisdiction of one or more umpires." For those umpires to yield their jurisdiction to electronic sensors would seem to deviate from one of the main commandments of the game. Of course, in many ways the game would still be under the jurisdiction of umpires, even if they relied on video replay to help on a call. In fact, the umpires' jurisdiction might reach unanticipated levels should video evidence rule a caught ball as trapped.

Video replay may be able to rectify an out into a safe call, but something would have to be done for any potential baserunners, and an umpire, who already had the right to place runners as he sees fit on calls such as fan interference, may also have to place baserunners on an overturned diving attempt at a catch on a fly ball to the gap with runners on.

But again, such calls might be worth it if gross errors are eliminated. Arguing against this may just be a silly attempt to hold on to something that's not attainable anymore. Not when the technology is there to settle disputes as easily and finally as what is seen in professional tennis, which, other than a rogue call or two, is widely accepted by its players and fans.

So, in the end, maybe all there is to offer against instant replay is a gut feeling, a feeling without concrete evidence that the game doesn't need replay to take it into the coming years any more than it needed steroids to save it in the 1990s.

It's just a game, yet it has somehow always been more than a game. As cold, calculating, and valuable as all the statistical analysis in the world may be, it doesn't mean the players aren't playing a game. Baseball didn't need a rash of homers to keep its true base watching, and it won't need replay to validate it.

Isn't all we really need from umpires is impartiality and a strong desire to get their calls right? They already use technology to grade their performance. Maybe that's as far as it really needs to go in a game that so often is a metaphor for life. And in life, you go with the calls you're given, whether right or wrong. You deal with the bad breaks, and they can even define you.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

BOB: Oakland dealt setback in pursuit to keep Athletics

Brian Borawski — 2012-02-08T09:25:15+00:00

Oakland falls out of race to keep Athletics

The city of Oakland was dealt a blow in their attempt to keep the Oakland Athletics by courting them with a new stadium. With the Athletics still looking at San Jose, Oakland has tried to keep itself in the mix with a waterfront ballpark that's now dead in the water. The reason is that the state of California is pulling back it's redevelopment money, and the Oakland Redevelopment Agency is going to be dissolved. That's where the money would have come from for a new ballpark.

It looks like the city now is going to refocus on building in and around the current Oakland Coliseum with a new ballpark being offered up to the Athletics. At this point, Oakland has to court MLB because it seems like the fate of the Athletics is in the league's hands.

The city is going to take the first step by doing an environmental impact review, but the money to pay for that is also tied up, as well. With MLB still sitting on a decision as to how it will manage an Athletics relocation, it looks like there's still some time for the city of Oakland to get its ducks in a row.

Dodgers' bidder may buy stake in the Mets

Investor Steven Cohen, who has been listed as one of the suitors in the Los Angeles Dodgers sale, is close to buying a minority interest in the New York Mets. With the Mets desperate for cash, it's looking like they're keeping with their decision to bring in ten different $20 million investors, and they're tapping Cohen for one of those ownership shares.

The buy-in by Cohen does not preclude Cohen from pursuing the Dodgers, but in the event he becomes an owner in Los Angeles, he'll have to sell his stake in the Mets.

So if Cohen is one of the front runners to buy the Dodgers, that makes this little more than a loan. Cohen has come under some scrutiny because a couple of his former employees are facing insider trading violations, but MLB cleared him in their investigation, and no charges have been leveled at Cohen personally.

This also gives Cohen some leverage, because if he doesn't land the Dodgers and the Mets ever go up for sale, he could be the favorite for a quick sale because he's already been cleared by the league and has a stake in the team.

Wilpon and Katz look to expert witness to minimize damage money

In other Mets news, the owners of the team have their trial coming up with regard to their involvement in the Bernie Madoff scandal. Their lone expert witness is John Maine, who has said that investors like Fred Wilpon and Saul Katz would have had no reason to suspect Madoff and that they shouldn't have to pay back any more than what they gained by pulling some of their money out earlier before the stuff hit the fan.

With that, Maine has come under some scrutiny. He was accused in one case of basically acting as a shill for his client and that he hadn't even read any case law on the topic at hand. The judge in that instance also indicated that the written report wasn't provided by Maine but was actually prepared by his client's lawyer.

Irving Picard, the trustee in the Madoff scandal, also has attacked Maine, saying that his report lacked any principle or methodology and that Maine is too far removed from a full-time financial post.

Birmingham ballpark is named

The Birmingham Barons will have a new ballpark in 2013, and they recently sold the the naming rights to Regions Financial Corporation. When the ballpark opens, it will be called Regions Field.. Regions has been a sponsor of the Barons since 2007, and the new ballpark is set to be ready in downtown Birmingham for Opening Day in April, 2013.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

The virtual 1958-68 Giants, Reds, and Cardinals (Part 10: 1966-67)

Steve Treder — 2012-02-08T09:24:15+00:00

Our long and winding road has completed nine-elevenths of its imaginary journey:

1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66

In the 1966 season, we witnessed a stunning reversal of the long-holding dynamic as our Cardinals, the perennial also-rans, suddenly burst out with a 105-victory performance—only to finish second to our Giants, who rose to the challenge to the tune of 106 wins. Who will come out on top in The Summer of Love?

          Giants:  Actual             Reds:  Actual               Cardinals:  Actual
 Year    W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA
 1958    80   74  3    727  698      76   78  4    695  623      72   82  5T   619  704
 1959    83   71  3    705  613      74   80  5T   764  738      71   83  7    641  725
 1960    79   75  5    671  631      67   87  6    640  692      86   68  3    639  616
 1961    85   69  3    773  655      93   61  1    710  653      80   74  5    703  668
 1962   103   62  1    878  690      98   64  3    802  685      84   78  6    774  664
 1963    88   74  3    725  641      86   76  5    648  594      93   69  2    747  628
 1964    90   72  4    656  587      92   70  2T   660  566      93   69  1    715  652
 1965    95   67  2    682  593      89   73  4    825  704      80   81  7    707  674
 1966    93   68  2    675  626      76   84  7    692  702      83   79  6    571  577

          Giants:  Virtual            Reds:  Virtual              Cardinals:  Virtual
 Year    W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA
 1958    83   71  2T   747  692      73   81  5    683  637      77   77  4    640  677
 1959    87   67  1T   737  615      87   67  1T   802  662      84   70  4    725  685
 1960    93   61  1    709  561      76   78  6    705  666      86   68  4    661  632
 1961    88   66  2    787  648     106   48  1    813  629      72   82  6    689  724
 1962   103   59  1    800  632     101   61  2T   779  663      84   78  6    809  703
 1963    97   65  3    726  578     100   62  1    704  540      80   82  6    664  668
 1964   100   62  2    726  576     101   61  1    689  533      87   75  4    662  657
 1965    99   63  1    697  587      98   64  2    843  646      85   76  5    692  622
 1966   106   55  1    739  581      87   73  5    769  677     105   57  2    667  514

The 1966-67 offseason: Actual deals we will make

Nov. 28, 1966: The Cincinnati Reds drafted pitcher Ted Abernathy from the Atlanta Braves in the 1966 Rule 5 draft.

The Rule 5 draft is a highly unreliable source of competent, dependable major league pitching talent. Yet the Reds in the mid-1960s got themselves on a roll of plucking such a useful needle out of the haystack over and over again. In 1961, they took Moe Drabowsky, in ‘62 Al Worthington, and in ’65, it was Don Nottebart.

And this time they’re helping themselves to the best one yet. The submarining right-hander Abernathy intermittently struggled with controlling his wickedly breaking hard sinker, and thus had been inconsistent, and 1966 was one of his down years. But that was on the heels of a brilliant performance in 1965 when he’d set major league records for appearances and saves.

Thus, the wisdom of Atlanta GM Paul Richards in leaving the 33-year-old Abernathy off his 40-man roster on Rule 5 draft day is dubious, and the decision by Cincinnati owner-GM Bill DeWitt (in one of his very final acts before selling the club) to take a flyer on the veteran isn’t. Our Reds will go along with DeWitt’s reasoning.

The 1966-67 season: Actual deals we will not make

Oct. 15, 1966: The Cincinnati Reds sold infielder Gus Gil to the Cleveland Indians.

Gil doesn’t project as anything more than a utility man, and like the actual Reds, our version doesn’t have room for him in the majors. But he’s been putting up .350-plus OBPs in Triple-A, and thus might yield more in the market than just this cash payment. If we have to settle for selling Gil, we will, but we’ll hang on to him for now and see what shakes out during trading season.

Dec. 8, 1966: The St. Louis Cardinals traded third baseman Charley Smith to the New York Yankees for outfielder Roger Maris.

Like the actual Cardinals, we’re intrigued to see what the mighty-yet-fallen Maris might have left in his tank, especially far removed from the sour atmosphere pervading the mighty-yet-fallen Yankees. After all, he’s still just 32 and once presented a marvelous breadth of skill.

But we don’t have Smith, and we certainly aren’t willing to part with Mike Shannon, the third baseman we do have. So we’ll have to pass on the single-season home run king.

Dec. 13, 1966: The San Francisco Giants traded outfielder Cap Peterson and pitcher Bob Priddy to the Washington Senators for pitcher Mike McCormick.

This was a splendid deal by the actual Giants. Alas, our version has already traded Peterson to Washington, so we won’t be able to re-acquire the lefty McCormick, who’s impressively worked his way back from career-threatening arm trouble.

Dec. 14, 1966: The San Francisco Giants traded outfielder Len Gabrielson to the California Angels for first baseman-outfielder Norm Siebern.

Nor do we have Gabrielson, so we won’t be able to pick up the veteran Siebern.

The 1966-67 offseason: Deals we will invoke

Oct. 12, 1966: The Cincinnati Reds traded pitcher Juan Pizarro and cash to the Pittsburgh Pirates for pitcher Wilbur Wood.

Actually, it was the White Sox trading the former star Pizarro to Pittsburgh for the young southpaw Wood.

Though he wasn’t yet 25, the Pirates were the second organization giving up on Wood, despite the fact that his minor league stats were terrific, and he’d acquitted himself decently in the limited opportunities he’d gotten in the majors. The issue, no doubt, was that Wood just didn’t throw hard, and thus wasn’t wowing anyone.

But Wood’s control of his assortment of junk is extraordinary, so our Reds, like the White Sox, are more confident in his future than that of the struggling Pizarro. And we understand the soft-tossing kid has been experimenting with a knuckleball.

Dec., 1966: The San Francisco Giants traded outfielder Jesus Alou and pitchers Dick LeMay and Bob Garibaldi to the Atlanta Braves for pitcher Dick Kelley.

Based on his superb minor league performance (as well as his family pedigree), the 24-year-old Alou had seemed to be a star in the making, but he hasn’t been able to get it going in the majors. We’ve run out of patience with him, and also with the former Bonus Baby Garibaldi, who’s been spinning his wheels, as well, mostly in Triple-A.

The left-hander Kelley is a couple of years older than Alou and Garibaldi and has no star potential, but he appears poised for a nice run as a spot starter/long reliever. It’s plausible the Braves would take this swap, particularly given that in this scenario they don’t have Alou’s big brother in their outfield.

Dec., 1966: The St. Louis Cardinals traded first baseman-outfielder Lee Thomas to the Chicago Cubs for infielder-outfielder Jim Stewart and cash.

Our Cardinals are fed up with the maddeningly inconsistent bat of Thomas. Stewart is just a utility guy, but one with particular speed and versatility.

Dec., 1966: The St. Louis Cardinals traded second baseman Julian Javier to the New York Mets for shortstop Eddie Bressoud, outfielder Danny Napoleon, and pitcher Jerry Hinsley.

And our Cardinals are also quite concerned about the deteriorating offensive output from Javier. We still like his glove, but as he enters his 30s, we fear his value will dwindle, and so we’ll get what we can for The Phantom now. The veteran Bressoud can contribute in a utility role, and Napoleon and Hinsley are decent prospects.

(During this offseason, the Mets actually traded Bressoud and Napoleon to the Cardinals for Jerry Buchek. Unlike the actual Cards, we see the talented but erratic young Buchek as a better second baseman than Javier going forward. Oops: Javier will suddenly deliver the best hitting of his life in 1967-69.)

Dec. 14, 1966: The St. Louis Cardinals traded outfielder Walt Williams and pitcher Don Dennis to the Chicago White Sox for infielder Wayne Causey.

Actually, on this date, the Cardinals traded Williams and Dennis to the White Sox for veteran catcher John Romano. Our Cardinals see the middle infielder Causey as being far more useful than Romano, especially given that we’ve just traded Javier.

Causey is about to turn 30 and slumped a bit with the bat in 1966. But in the past he’s delivered outstanding on-base ability and the capacity to competently handle either shortstop or second base. It’s plausible that the White Sox would agree to expend him instead of the power-hitting Romano in order to get this pair of young players they like, in particular the 22-year-old No-Neck, who’d hit .330 with 54 doubles in Triple-A in 1966.

Dec. 15, 1966: The Cincinnati Reds traded third baseman-first baseman Deron Johnson, pitchers Jim O’Toole and Ted Davidson, and infielder Gus Gil to the Chicago White Sox for third baseman-outfielder Pete Ward, catcher John Romano, outfielder Floyd Robinson, and pitcher Jack Lamabe.

This builds upon the actual trade made on this date, which was simply O’Toole for Robinson, one faded former star for another. This expanded version helps the White Sox get younger, which was the theme in their acquisitions of Wood and Williams, while upgrading their power bat at third base.

For our Reds, the logic is basically that Ward bats left-handed, and thus is a better fit for us as a third-base partner with our emerging young right-handed-batting Tony Perez. We’re taking a risk that the bad back that plagued Ward in 1966 won’t heal, but we think he probably can do well enough in a limited role, and we also see the veterans Romano and Robinson nicely filling spots on our bench.

Jan., 1967: The Cincinnati Reds sold catcher Dave Ricketts to the Kansas City Athletics.

With Romano on board, we no longer have room for this guy.

April, 1967: The San Francisco Giants sold infielder Andre Rodgers to the Pittsburgh Pirates.

Rodgers has had a nice career for us but is finally getting squeezed off the roster.

The 1967 season: Actual deals we will make

May 31, 1967: The Cincinnati Reds purchased pitcher Bob Lee from the Los Angeles Dodgers.

This huge Horse isn’t throwing nearly as hard as he did just a few years ago, but he’s still just 29, and we’ll give him a chance in our bullpen.

Sep. 18, 1967: The Cincinnati Reds traded infielder Len Boehmer to the New York Yankees for pitcher Bill Henry.

A transaction of the merest consequence, no doubt. But it makes sense for us to convert infield surplus into a left-handed prospect, albeit a middling one. (Oh, this is this 1960s left-handed pitcher named Bill Henry, not the other 1960s left-handed pitcher named Bill Henry.)

The 1967 season: Actual deals we will not make

May 14, 1967: The St. Louis Cardinals sold outfielder Ted Savage to the Chicago Cubs.

Our Cards will keep this multi-talented spare part.

May 31, 1967: The San Francisco Giants purchased outfielder-first baseman Ty Cline from the Atlanta Braves.

Our Giants don’t have room for this journeyman.

June 22, 1967: The San Francisco Giants purchased shortstop Dick Groat from the Philadelphia Phillies.

Nor for this declining veteran.

July 16, 1967: The St. Louis Cardinals traded a player to be named later to the New York Mets for pitcher Jack Lamabe. (On Oct. 13, 1967, the Cardinals sent pitcher Al Jackson to the New York Mets, completing the deal.)

Our Cardinals have no interest in Lamabe.

The 1967 season: Deals we will invoke

May, 1967: The Cincinnati Reds sold outfielder Floyd Robinson to the Philadelphia Phillies.

May, 1967: The St. Louis Cardinals traded pitcher Hal Woodeshick to the Philadelphia Phillies for pitcher John Morris and cash.

May, 1967: The St. Louis Cardinals sold infielder-outfielder Jim Stewart to the Chicago White Sox.

May, 1967: The St. Louis Cardinals sold shortstop Eddie Bressoud to the Los Angeles Dodgers.

May 14, 1967: The St. Louis Cardinals sold outfielder Jim Beauchamp to the Atlanta Braves.

None of these guys will survive this year’s mid-May roster trim.

May 30, 1967: The Cincinnati Reds purchased infielder Jake Wood from the Detroit Tigers.

Actually, the Reds made this purchase a month later, but we’ll pick Wood up now to fill in for an injured Tommy Harper.

May 31, 1967: The Cincinnati Reds sold pitcher Jack Lamabe to the New York Mets.

And our Reds will let this veteran go to make room for Lee.

1967 season results

Giants

Following our monster 106-win season, changes to the roster are minimal. Kelley joins the pitching staff, along with rookie right-hander Rich Robertson. And we’ll give spots on our bench to the former Bonus kids Bob Schroder in the infield and Ken Henderson in the outfield, both of whom did well in Triple-A in 1966.

1967 San Francisco Giants     Won 84    Lost 78    Finished 4th

 Pos  Player        Age    G  AB   R   H  2B  3B  HR RBI  BB  SO   BA  OBP  SLG  OPS OPS+
  1B  W. McCovey*    29  135 456  73 126  17   4  31  91  71 110 .276 .377 .535 .912  159
2B-SS B. Schroder*   22  128 322  35  75   9   1   0  17  29  33 .233 .293 .267 .560   62
  SS  H. Lanier      24  121 263  19  56   8   2   0  21   8  31 .213 .232 .259 .491   41
3B-OF J. Hart        25  158 578  98 167  26   7  29  99  77 100 .289 .373 .509 .882  151
RF-CF J. Cardenal    23  108 381  44  93  14   6   6  27  14  60 .244 .270 .360 .629   79
  CF  W. Mays        36  141 486  83 128  22   2  22  70  51  92 .263 .333 .453 .785  123
LF-1B O. Cepeda      29  151 563  86 182  35   0  27 105  62  75 .323 .398 .529 .927  164
  C   T. Haller*     30  141 455  54 114  23   5  14  49  62  61 .251 .341 .415 .756  116

  OF  F. Valentine#  32  121 357  45  87  14   2   9  31  41  64 .244 .333 .370 .702  101
SS-2B D. Schofield#  32  110 255  25  58  11   1   3  15  33  44 .227 .310 .314 .623   80
  2B  T. Fuentes     23  111 261  19  57  10   1   4  21  22  45 .218 .271 .310 .581   66
3B-1B K. Boyer       36   85 231  21  58   9   2   5  23  23  30 .251 .315 .372 .687   97
  OF  K. Henderson#  21   89 215  20  44   8   1   4  16  27  51 .205 .294 .307 .601   73
  C   D. Dietz       25   28  60   5  13   1   0   2  10  12  23 .217 .351 .333 .685   98
  C   T. Talton*     28   46  59   7  15   4   1   0   5   7  12 .254 .324 .356 .679   95
  C   B. Barton      25   22  37   2   8   1   0   0   3   1   6 .216 .237 .243 .480   38

      Others                 113  17  25   3   1   2  12  11  20 .221 .299 .319 .618   78

      Pitchers               447  24  63  11   1   0  12   8 191 .140 .144 .170 .314  -10

      Total                 5539 677 1369 226 37 158 627 559 1048 .247 .315 .387 .702 101

      *  Bats left
      #  Bats both

      Pitcher       Age    G  GS  CG   W   L  SV  IP   H   R  ER   HR   BB   SO  ERA ERA+
      G. Perry       28   39  37  18  16  16   1 293 231  98  85   20   84  230 2.61  128
      J. Marichal    29   26  26  18  15   9   0 202 195  79  62   20   42  166 2.76  121
      R. Robertson   22   41  29   3   7   9   0 192 207 107  97    8  111  158 4.55   73
      D. Ellsworth*  27   32  21   3   7   6   0 125 147  70  59    7   36   45 4.25   79
      B. Bolin       28   37  15   0   7   7   0 120 120  71  65   16   50   69 4.88   69
      D. Estelle*    25   13  13   1   4   4   0  64  64  34  26    6   38   44 3.66   91
      B. O'Dell*     34   18   7   1   4   3   0  58  55  38  37    7   26   22 5.74   58

      D. McMahon     37   63   0   0   7   1   5 109  74  30  27    9   38   80 2.23  150
      F. Linzy       26   57   0   0   8   6  14  96  67  21  16    4   34   38 1.50  223
      S. Miller      39   42   0   0   4   8   8  81  69  28  25    5   34   59 2.78  120
      D. Kelley*     27   42  12   1   3   9   2 113 107  54  49    7   48   85 3.90   86

      Others                   2   0   2   0   0  21  19   9   6    1   11   11 2.57  130

      Total                  162  45  84  78 30 1474 1355 639 554 110  552 1007 3.38   99

      * Throws left

Some things turn out just fine. Orlando Cepeda’s knee trouble is fully in the past as he delivers a peak-level performance. Jim Ray Hart is better than ever, Gaylord Perry proves that his 1966 breakout was for real, and Don McMahon and Frank Linzy are superb heading up the bullpen.

But our list of emerging problems is long. Willie Mays suddenly looks every bit his 36 years of age. Juan Marichal misses nearly a third of the year with a leg injury. Bob Bolin and Dick Ellsworth both slump badly, and the rookie Robertson, consequently pressed into heavier service than planned, struggles.

Sophomore second baseman Tito Fuentes flops, Schroder hits poorly when given the opportunity to replace him, and our middle infield overall is an offensive disaster. In the outfield, Jose Cardenal slumps and at first base, Willie McCovey begins to be bothered by a sore knee.

It’s an aggravating year as, despite our real strengths, we’re unable to put together any sustained hot streaks. We stumble in just six games above .500, our least-impressive performance in our decade in San Francisco.

Reds

Attempting to bounce back from our disappointing 1966, we’ve largely revamped the bench via the big trade with the White Sox and also with the promotion of rookie first baseman-outfielder Lee May. Our pitching staff includes multiple new faces as well, with Abernathy joining the bullpen. Additionally, Wood and Lamabe—as well as journeymen Dick Stigman and Rollie Sheldon—all compete for starts.

Perhaps our most significant alteration is a position shift. We’ll allow impressive youngsters Tommy Helms and Cesar Tovar to battle it out for the second base job and move Pete Rose to left field, easing incumbent left fielder Tony Gonzalez into a part-time role. This will improve us defensively as well as insulate our terrific young star Rose from the injury risks inherent in the middle infield.

1967 Cincinnati Reds     Won 94    Lost 68    Finished 1st

 Pos  Player        Age    G  AB   R   H  2B  3B  HR RBI  BB  SO   BA  OBP  SLG  OPS OPS+
  1B  B. White*      33  110 308  35  81   7   2   9  36  51  60 .263 .367 .386 .753  106
2B-OF C. Tovar       26  109 325  52  88  17   4   3  24  21  25 .271 .320 .375 .696   90
  SS  L. Cardenas    28  108 379  33  97  14   3   2  23  34  77 .256 .318 .325 .643   76
  3B  T. Perez       25  140 480  68 139  22   6  21  90  26  82 .290 .326 .492 .818  121
  RF  F. Robinson    31  129 479  91 155  25   8  28 103  67  80 .324 .410 .585 .994  169
  CF  V. Pinson*     28  150 585  89 169  25  12  16  65  23  77 .289 .317 .455 .772  109
LF-2B P. Rose#       26  148 585  97 176  32   8  12  80  56  66 .301 .363 .444 .808  120
  C   J. Azcue       27   95 325  43  86  14   7  12  44  23  36 .265 .315 .462 .776  110

2B-SS T. Helms       26  123 373  33 101  20   3   2  29  17  32 .271 .297 .357 .654   78
1B-OF L. May         24  102 297  40  80  21   2   9  44  14  49 .269 .315 .444 .759  105
  OF  T. Gonzalez*   30   99 254  45  89  12   5   5  33  23  29 .350 .405 .496 .901  145
3B-1B P. Ward*       29   97 234  30  59   9   2  11  37  29  52 .252 .347 .449 .796  116
  C   J. Edwards*    29   72 188  11  39   5   0   2  18  14  25 .207 .256 .266 .522   43
  OF  T. Harper      26   52 122  22  27   6   1   2   7  14  17 .221 .297 .336 .633   73
  C   J. Romano      32   24  58   1   8   1   0   0   2  12  14 .138 .286 .155 .441   24
  IF  L. Boehmer     26   24  43   5   8   1   0   1   3   3   5 .186 .234 .279 .513   40
  2B  J. Wood        30   16  17   1   2   0   0   0   1   1   3 .118 .167 .118 .284  -21
  OF  B. Perry       32   14  16   1   3   1   0   0   2   0   3 .188 .188 .250 .438   19

      Others                  52   6   7   2   0   1   3   6  11 .135 .220 .231 .451   24

      Pitchers               439  22  60  11   2   2  28  19 164 .136 .162 .184 .346   -6

      Total                 5559 725 1474 245 65 138 672 453 907 .265 .321 .407 .728   98

      *  Bats left
      #  Bats both

      Pitcher       Age    G  GS  CG   W   L  SV  IP   H   R  ER   HR   BB   SO  ERA ERA+
      C. Osteen*     27   35  35  12  18  12   0 259 288 122 112   22   49  136 3.89   98
      J. Maloney     27   30  29   6  16  10   0 196 181  76  71    8   72  153 3.26  117
      S. Ellis       26   32  27   8   9  10   0 176 197  86  75   18   67   80 3.84   99
      M. Queen       25   21  15   4  10   4   0 130 103  46  40   11   35  103 2.77  137
      B. McCool*     22   31  11   0   4   6   2  97  92  45  37    8   56   83 3.43  111
      D. Stigman*    31   21  15   2   6   9   0  93 101  52  47   13   45   67 4.55   84
      G. Nolan       19   11  11   3   6   2   0  76  64  24  22    6   21   69 2.61  146
      R. Sheldon     30   10   5   1   3   2   0  48  62  25  22    4   17   31 4.13   92

      T. Abernathy   34   70   0   0   7   3  28 106  63  19  15    1   41   88 1.27  298
      W. Wood*       25   54  11   0   8   2   4 116 131  55  46    4   30   53 3.57  106
      D. Nottebart   31   47   0   0   1   3   5  79  75  25  17    4   19   48 1.94  196
      B. Lee         29   27   1   0   4   3   2  51  51  26  25    0   25   33 4.41   86
      J. Lamabe      30   11   1   0   1   1   0  22  22  10   9    1    6   14 3.68  103

      Others                   1   0   1   1   1  17  11  10  10    2   15   13 5.29   72

      Total                  162  36  94  68 42 1466 1441 621 548 102  498  971 3.36  113

      * Throws left

We may have protected Rose from an injury, but this year our team is nonetheless riddled with injuries. Harper, first baseman Bill White, shortstop Leo Cardenas, and, most ominously, superstar right fielder Frank Robinson all miss significant time with various hurts.

This makes frantic lineup-juggling a necessity and, moreover, the back end of our starting rotation is a jumble, as well. There are ample reasons for this team to swoon.

But we don’t swoon. Instead, we demonstrate the value of tremendous depth. Ward and May prove quite useful off the bench, and Gonzalez hits a ton in spot duty. Neither Romano nor our other veteran catcher, Johnny Edwards, hits at all, so Joe Azcue calmly takes over and performs wonderfully.

Perez busts out as a star, and Vada Pinson persists as one.

Our pitching problems are overcome via two mid-season promotions from Triple-A: first, converted outfielder Mel Queen and then teenage sensation Gary Nolan, both of whom perform like veteran stars down the stretch. And all season long, our bullpen is staunchly anchored by Abernathy, who is dominant, astoundingly good.

This Cincinnati ballclub courts disaster but deftly sidesteps it and finds itself at the head of the parade when the season ends, back in the winner’s circle after a two-season absence. We’ve featured better Reds teams, but perhaps never one with more organizational resilience.

Cardinals

Thrilled though we were with our 105-victory breakthrough last year, we’re not blind to the fact that we achieved it despite some offensive weaknesses. And we’ve made several bold moves to address them.

Moving from shortstop to second base will be Buchek, who hasn’t yet developed as we thought he might but is still young and could benefit from a bit less defensive stress. Taking over as the primary shortstop is the veteran Causey.

Art Shamsky will open the season as our primary first baseman, but if speedy rookie Bobby Tolan proves ready for a regular job in the outfield, then we might slide the veteran Felipe Alou in to first base instead.

1967 St. Louis Cardinals     Won 90    Lost 71    Finished 3rd

 Pos  Player        Age    G  AB   R   H  2B  3B  HR RBI  BB  SO   BA  OBP  SLG  OPS OPS+
1B-RF F. Alou        32  140 574  68 161  28   4  11  68  32  49 .280 .324 .401 .725  108
  2B  J. Buchek      25  124 411  44  98  11   3  13  46  27 100 .238 .285 .375 .660   89
SS-2B W. Causey*     30  124 350  34  83  13   5   1  37  36  40 .237 .302 .311 .614   77
  3B  M. Shannon     27  130 482  48 118  18   3  12  69  37  89 .245 .301 .369 .670   92
RF-CF B. Tolan*      21  110 319  42  83   9   3   7  34  22  50 .260 .311 .373 .684   96
  CF  C. Flood       29  134 514  61 172  24   1   5  45  37  46 .335 .375 .414 .790  128
  LF  L. Brock*      28  159 666  99 199  31  12  20  66  23 105 .299 .326 .471 .797  127
  C   T. McCarver*   25  138 471  61 139  26   3  14  62  54  32 .295 .367 .452 .819  135

  SS  D. Maxvill     28  122 286  20  64   8   2   1  22  28  41 .224 .292 .276 .569   65
 1B-C D. Pavletich   28   74 231  25  52  14   3   5  34  22  39 .225 .301 .377 .678   94
  IF  P. Gagliano    25   73 217  18  48   7   0   2  19  19  26 .221 .280 .281 .561   62
  1B  A. Shamsky*    25   88 182   9  35   4   1   3  18  18  41 .192 .271 .275 .546   58
  OF  T. Savage      30   88 155  24  33   7   1   3  20  26  38 .213 .332 .329 .661   91
  3B  E. Spiezio     25   55 105   8  22   2   0   3   9   7  18 .210 .265 .314 .580   67
  C   B. Uecker      32   36  78   6  12   2   0   1   7   9  25 .154 .236 .218 .454   32

      Others                  36   5   5   0   1   0   1   4   9 .139 .225 .194 .419   22

      Pitchers               430  34  64   5   0   0  15  24 163 .149 .185 .160 .346    1

      Total                 5507 606 1388 209 42 101 572 425 911 .252 .306 .360 .666   91

      *  Bats left

      Pitcher       Age    G  GS  CG   W   L  SV  IP   H   R  ER   HR   BB   SO  ERA ERA+
      L. Jackson     36   40  37  11  13  15   0 262 240  97  87   16   56  142 2.99  110
      S. Carlton*    22   30  28  11  13  10   1 193 173  71  64   10   62  168 2.98  110
      B. Gibson      31   24  24  10  12   8   0 175 151  62  58   10   40  147 2.98  110
      L. Jaster*     23   34  23   2   9   8   3 152 141  57  51   12   44   87 3.02  109
      D. Hughes      29   25  18   8  10   5   2 148 109  48  44   15   32  107 2.68  123

      J. Hoerner*    30   57   0   0   4   4  15  66  52  25  19    5   20   50 2.59  127
      N. Briles      23   49  14   4  13   6   6 155 139  45  42    8   40   94 2.44  134
      E. Fisher      30   46   0   0   4   2   3  90  89  42  39    7   25   50 3.90   84
      L. McDaniel    31   41   3   0   2   6   5  73  69  32  29    4   25   48 3.58   92
      A. Jackson*    31   38  11   1   8   4   1 107 117  61  47    7   29   43 3.95   83
      J. Gelnar      24   10   1   0   0   1   0  19  30  17  17    4   11    5 8.05   41

      Others                   2   0   2   2   2  28  20  12  10    0   15   17 3.21  102

      Total                  161  47  90  71 38 1468 1330 569 507  98  399  958 3.11  106

      * Throws left

Our middle infield shuffle isn’t a resounding success, but it does deliver marginally more offense at those positions. And while Shamsky lays an egg, the young Tolan stands up well enough that, with Alou at first, we’ve got every position at least reasonably productive, supporting star turns by Lou Brock in left field, Curt Flood in center, and Tim McCarver behind the plate.

And though our pitching can’t sustain the dazzling pace it kept in 1966, it's very good. A broken leg suffered by ace Bob Gibson is a significant challenge, but the depth of this staff is up to it. Nelson Briles strides forward, as does retread Dick Hughes, but perhaps most impressive is the showing of 22-year-old left-hander Steve Carlton, back from a year in the minors following his Bonus Baby debut of 1965.

We’re a genuinely good team; the ’66 beauty proves to be no fluke. But we aren’t as good as the Reds, who outpace us by three-and-a-half games, nor quite as good as an upstart Chicago Cubs team that comes in just a shade ahead of us in second. Finishing in third place again is frustrating, no doubt, but we are a serious contender. We know it won’t take much more to get to the top.

Next time

In our eleventh and final season, will the Giants rebound? Will the Reds defend their title? Will the Cardinals break their two-decade pennant drought?

          Giants:  Actual             Reds:  Actual               Cardinals:  Actual
 Year    W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA
 1958    80   74  3    727  698      76   78  4    695  623      72   82  5T   619  704
 1959    83   71  3    705  613      74   80  5T   764  738      71   83  7    641  725
 1960    79   75  5    671  631      67   87  6    640  692      86   68  3    639  616
 1961    85   69  3    773  655      93   61  1    710  653      80   74  5    703  668
 1962   103   62  1    878  690      98   64  3    802  685      84   78  6    774  664
 1963    88   74  3    725  641      86   76  5    648  594      93   69  2    747  628
 1964    90   72  4    656  587      92   70  2T   660  566      93   69  1    715  652
 1965    95   67  2    682  593      89   73  4    825  704      80   81  7    707  674
 1966    93   68  2    675  626      76   84  7    692  702      83   79  6    571  577
 1967    91   71  2    652  551      87   75  4    604  563     101   60  1    695  557

          Giants:  Virtual            Reds:  Virtual              Cardinals:  Virtual
 Year    W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA       W    L  Pos   RS   RA
 1958    83   71  2T   747  692      73   81  5    683  637      77   77  4    640  677
 1959    87   67  1T   737  615      87   67  1T   802  662      84   70  4    725  685
 1960    93   61  1    709  561      76   78  6    705  666      86   68  4    661  632
 1961    88   66  2    787  648     106   48  1    813  629      72   82  6    689  724
 1962   103   59  1    800  632     101   61  2T   779  663      84   78  6    809  703
 1963    97   65  3    726  578     100   62  1    704  540      80   82  6    664  668
 1964   100   62  2    726  576     101   61  1    689  533      87   75  4    662  657
 1965    99   63  1    697  587      98   64  2    843  646      85   76  5    692  622
 1966   106   55  1    739  581      87   73  5    769  677     105   57  2    667  514
 1967    84   78  4    677  639      94   68  1    725  561      90   71  3    606  569

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