The Hardball Times Articles

Great Moments in Championship Celebrations

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-20T17:00:50+00:00

This has nothing to do with baseball at all, but this story sent to me by MooseinOhio is so cool that I gotta post it somewhere.*

After the Celtics won the 1986 championship, [Bill] Walton sat alone in Bird’s kitchen drinking Wild Turkey until after the sun came up.

I told Bird I didn’t believe the Walton story. Simply too good to be true.

“Yeah, it happened,’’ he said. “After we won, me and Dinah went out to K.C. Jones’s restaurant. He had a rib place. I had two beers. Remember how we stopped drinking that year?’’ - the ’86 Celtics swore off alcohol for their playoff run - “Well, I had two beers and they didn’t even taste good. I was tired, anyway, so I went home an hour later.

“Bill came over. It was late. Doorbell rang and Dinah answered and she was like, ‘Hey, Bill. Larry’s in bed.’ I heard him, so I go out and I said, ‘Hey, man I ain’t doing this tonight. I can’t.’ He goes, ‘Don’t worry about it. I don’t even need you. I’m just going to sit down here at the table.’ He had a bottle of whiskey. And he said, ‘I’ll be here when you wake up.’ And he was.

Drinking Wild Turkey in a kitchen until dawn > spraying champagne all over sweaty guys in a locker room. Though, yeah, I suppose those things aren't mutually exclusive activities after cutting down the nets.

*As an FYI, after the switchover to NBC, I'm probably going to revive my old dead personal blog for stuff that I can't really post over there, non-baseball stuff, and what have you. As of now there's only some old remembrances and a road trip diary. It might serve as a nice hangout going forward, though.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

My Morning in Exile

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-20T15:10:11+00:00

So I get to take the kids for their H1N1 vaccinations today. That should be a barrel of laughs. On the bright side, they're spending the night at my folks' house, so I'll only have to hear their complaining about it until I drop them off around dinner time. After that, Mrs. Shyster and I grab some fabulous Columbus cuisine and sample the hot Columbus nightlife. Well, what else are we gonna do? We're all through with "The Wire" DVDs.

On the heels of his Cy Young ballot yesterday, you won't be surprised to learn that Keith Law has Carl Pavano at number one on his annual list of Top 50 free agents.

Tim Lincecum's agent, employer and publicist are very, very sorry for his actions.

Gammons and Edes break down the Red Sox' offseason. They'll return to pretending to be national as opposed to local columnists later today.

Aaron Heilman will definitely be coming out of the pen in Arizona.

Stephen Strasburg hurts his knee; Matt Wieters called to lay hands.

Paul Lo Duca: he may be old, he may have been a steroid creation, he may have messed around behind his wife's back with a teenage girl and he may have been caught up in gambling allegations, but . . . wait, I lost my train of thought here. Anyone wanna go get a sandwich?

As for "The Wire," the best thing I got out of it is the certainty that my recent decision to stop watching any non-ballgame-related television was a good one. Unless they bring back "Barney Miller" or something, there's no way any show can top it, so why waste my time?

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

Medium and short-time pitch memory

Max Marchi — 2009-11-20T10:30:39+00:00

Oct. 22, 2008.
Scott Kazmir has already faced Ryan Howard twice in Game One of the World Series.

Everybody in the postseason has avoided feeding the Phillies first baseman fastballs. That leaves lefty Kazmir with his slider and a change-up he seldom uses against left-handed batters.

Back in the first inning, he had served Howard two sliders, resulting in a whiff and a grounder to the shifted second baseman. The second time, he started with a fastball down and inside for ball one, followed by an outside slider chased for strike one. Then he tried to sneak a fastball past the clean-up hitter (foul), and finally he made him fish again on a slider down and away.

Top of the fifth, two outs, nobody on. Kazmir starts with three consecutive sliders outside, but Howard has the bat glued on his shoulder. He then swings through a 3-0 fastball and a slider that nibbles the corner low and outside.

Full count, Kazmir winds up and delivers... a change-up.

The least reliable pitch of the arsenal thrown to the best opposing batter in a key game has only one possible explaination: surprise. In the previous two at-bats, Howard has had the chance to time the slider and, to a lesser degree, the fastball; the change-up comes to him for the first time in the game.

Let's go back to the 2008 regular season. I looked at every Ryan Howard second at-bat of the game and split those at bats in two groups:
{exp:list_maker}Bucket One: In the first at-bat he saw at least one change-up;
Bucket Two: In the first at-bat he saw no change-ups. {/exp:list_maker}
Then I calculated the run value on the first change-up he saw on the second at-bat, if any. I kept only the instances in which the first two at-bats came against the same pitcher.

The average value (per 100 pitches) of Bucket One was 5.02 runs higher than that of Bucket Two, meaning that Howard fared better on the change-up when he had already seen one in the previous at-bat.

Is this something that happens to all players? Is it a consistent trait of Howard, at least? Fast forward to the 2009 season; let's repeat the process and we get -0.52 runs for Bucket one, implying that this year Howard fared a bit worse when he had the chance to time the change-up in the first at-bat.

The plot of year 2008 against year 2009 (only batters with at least 20 ABs in each bucket both years) doesn't show any correlation; in fact the Pearson's coefficient comes out at -0.004 (confidence intervals: -0.35; 0.35).

I repeated the process from a pitcher's point of view and, again, it doesn't seem we are dealing with something repeatable.

I'm not going to show them here, but the same plots for curves and sliders produce analogous results.

I'd like to come back on this in a couple of years because, when raising the cutoff at 40 ABs in each bucket, some relation seems to appear on the surface, at least for pitchers; unfortunately, elevating the floor means that fewer players meet the standard and the confidence intervals widen. When we have four complete years of PITCHf/x data, we can compare even year's results versus odd years' results, and a cutoff of 40 ABs should not imply losing many data points.

Let's take another angle of view.

Globally, batters on a change-up produce 0.3 runs (per 100 pitches) better if they have seen the pitch in the previous at-bat. The difference is not statistically significant, meaning that with the data we have, we can not conclude that batters hit the change-up better if they have had a first look at the pitch on their initial trip to the plate. The same is true for the curve and the slider. Again, while the lack of a statistical significance can induce us to dismiss the fact that batters can be better after they have timed a pitch, let's not forget that those who are served one or more change-ups in every at-bat are likely those who are the least proficient against the pitch.

Now let's zoom in: Let's consider single at-bats.

If a pitcher goes back to the change-up after having already delivered one in the same at bat, the expected value (per 100 pitches) is 0.5 runs higher compared to when it's the first change-up of the at-bat. This time the difference is statistically significant and, again, keep in mind that it's very likely that multiple change-ups are served to batters who suffer the pitch. We also get a significant difference for sliders (+0.3 runs), while that's not the case with curveballs.

In 2008, Ryan Howard produced on change-ups 0.16 runs (per 100 pitches) better if he had seen another change-up in the same at-bat. In 2009, the difference was more pronounced, at 4.11. Here are the 2008 results for batters plotted against their 2009 results, for the three main breaking pitches.

And here's the same triplet for pitchers.

Though it's evident from the pictures where correlations exist, here are the correlation coefficients:

pitch     Batters Pitchers
Change-up    .104     .767
Slider      -.000     .723
Curve        .165     .808

Run value differences: year-to-year correlations.

So it's apparent that there's some permanent trait among pitchers. Some of them are more easily timed than others.

Let's sum up what we have seen so far.
{exp:list_maker}When it comes to throwing a change-up in the first at bat vs. the second, there may be a relationship that says that the change in the second at-bat is more effective if it isn't thrown in the first at-bat. However, we don't have enough data to clearly draw that conclusion.
When it comes to throwing a change more than once in a single at-bat, we can safely say that the second change is less effective (from the pitcher's perspective) than the first.
This trend holds regardless of the batter. Or, said differently, batters don't show any consistent tendency to beat this pattern over time. As we collect more data, we may find some batter-specific trends.
Pitchers clearly show a consistent pattern. Some can throw a very effective second change, while others have consistently shown they can't. This is another way of categorizing the effectiveness of a pitcher's change (as well as his slider or curve). {/exp:list_maker}
Looking at a few top/bottom lists can be helpful.

The most and the least "timeable" pitchers/pitches.
(Positive values mean the pitch is easier to hit the second time it's delivered in the same at bat).

Change-up
              last      first delta
           Eveland       Dana  8.97
           Holland      Derek  8.59
              Lehr     Justin  7.56
            Martin       J.D.  7.50
          Richmond      Scott  6.59
...
            League    Brandon -4.52
           Condrey       Clay -4.82
     Rowland-Smith       Ryan -4.84
            Street     Huston -6.03
            Madson       Ryan -6.53

Slider
              last      first delta
          Thompson       Brad  7.59
         Borkowski       Dave  7.46
             Wells      David  6.58
            Cahill     Trevor  5.73
          Stauffer        Tim  5.70
            Madson       Ryan  5.64
...
        De La Rosa      Jorge -4.31
          Donnelly    Brendan -4.62
           Rosales        Leo -5.11
            Walker      Jamie -5.26
           Ramirez      Edwar -6.41

Curve
              last     first delta
              Fogg      Josh  7.53
           Batista    Miguel  6.32
          Springer      Russ  6.04
              Lowe     Derek  5.58
              Huff     David  5.31
...
            Bailey    Andrew -4.04
        Falkenborg     Brian -4.31
          Carrasco      D.J. -5.47
           Hinshaw      Alex -5.73
           Belisle      Matt -6.24

Data since 2007, where available.

For the pitchers with negative values (e.g. Street's change-up, Donnelly's slider or Belisle's curve), the breaking pitch is actually more effective the second time it is thrown. Is the first time they throw the breaking pitch like a warm-up for them? Do they simply know better who the batters are who get killed by that pitch?

Further analysis is necessary to answer these questions, as well as to understand what makes certain pitches easier the second time they are coming.
It can have something to do with pitch selection: Pitchers who mix them better might be harder to time (seeing Madson low in the change-up list and high in the slider ranking doesn't make a good case for this hypothesis). It could be in the characteristics of the pitch: Maybe a change-up with a very high speed differential from the fastball can fool the hitter once but not twice.

Until we discover what it is, Derek Holland should avoid throwing multiple change-ups to the same batter, if he wants to lower his 6.12 ERA.

PS: Ryan Howard fouled off Kazmir's change-up, thus prolonging his at bat. Kazmir didn't serve him another change until Game Five.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.

Cooperstown Confidential: Olbermann is off base

Bruce Markusen — 2009-11-20T10:00:27+00:00

Olbermann equals errors

I don’t ordinarily spend a lot of time in this space nitpicking about the work of other writers and authors; there is much more important subject matter, both contemporary and historical, worth discussing. Unfortunately, some people are so hollow in their words and actions that they need to be called out for their transgressions. No one is guiltier of this in the baseball world than Keith Olbermann, who began writing his “Baseball Nerd” blog for MLB.com this past spring.

Is there anyone connected to the game who is more annoying than Olbermann? Perhaps, but that person would have to go a long way to outdo Olbermann. As both a broadcaster and writer, Olbermann has made a cottage industry of pointing out the mistakes, supposed and otherwise, committed by others in the media. Years ago, he reveled in compiling a master list of all the errors that he found in Ken Burns’ miniseries, Baseball. And then earlier this year, Olbermann railed against fellow MLBlogger Curt Smith, the author of a new biography on longtime Dodgers broadcaster Vin Scully, for misquoting one word of a transcript of one of Scully’s most famous broadcast calls.

Olbermann shouldn’t be criticizing anyone who writes about baseball, if only because of his own poor record of getting his facts right. Perhaps he should point that highly introspective microscope at himself one of these days.

Olbermann’s blog routinely contains errors, both factual and interpretive. He has referred to Pittsburgh Pirates right-hander Ross Ohlendorf as Russ Ohlendorf, misidentified team names in game recaps, written Jerry Manuel’s name as Erry Manuel, mischaracterized Eric Bruntlett’s role in “saving” a game after he had actually committed an error, and referred to All-Star Jayson Werth as Dennis Werth, the former Yankee who is actually Jayson’s stepfather. Those are just some of the errors Olbermann has made since starting the blog in March.

Last week, Olbermann reached the boiling point in a shoddy piece about the managers, owners and umpires being considered by the Hall of Fame’s Veterans Committee. By my count, Olbermann made at least three factual errors, two that were relatively minor and one that was monumental:

(1) In arguing for Billy Martin’s election to the Hall of Fame, Olbermann claimed that in eight of nine full seasons as a manager, “Billy the Kid” had led his teams to first or second-place finishes. Olbermann counted wrong. Martin spent 10 full seasons as a manager, recording first or second-place finishes eight times. All in all, a minor error, and one that is understandable.

2) In running down the candidates on the two Vets Committee ballots, Olbermann supplied a defense for Danny Murtaugh as a Hall of Fame manager. Although I agree with Olbermann on his assessment of Murtaugh—a highly underrated manager if there ever was one—he made a mistake in reviewing the manager’s career. Olbermann provided an inaccurate count of the number of division titles Murtaugh won as the skipper of the Pirates. Olbermann credited Murtaugh with five National League East titles, perhaps failing to realize that “The Whistling Irishman” actually missed out one of those titles (1972) because of poor physical health. Murtaugh won only four division titles with the Pirates. Again, a relatively minor error, but now the second error in Olbermann’s post.

3) In arguing against Bob Howsam for the Hall of Fame, Olbermann blamed the former Cincinnati Reds general manager for making the ill-fated trade that sent Frank Robinson to the Baltimore Orioles for pitchers Milt Pappas and Jack Baldschun and outfielder Dick Simpson. “The Frank Robinson trade gets you into Cooperstown?” Olbermann wrote in casting a no-vote for Howsam. After all, how could the man responsible for that disaster possibly be considered a Hall of Fame general manager? There is one fundamental flaw in Olbermann’s argument. Howsam did not become the Reds general manager until 1967, two full years after the Reds sent F. Robby to the O’s for Pappas and two journeymen. Howsam wasn’t even working for the Reds organization at the time; he was still employed as the primary decision maker for the St. Louis Cardinals.

Blaming Howsam for the Robinson trade is like blaming George Steinbrenner for mistakes made by CBS as the owners of the New York Yankees. Unlike the two previous instances involving Martin and Murtaugh, this was an egregious error by Olbermann. The whole basis for his argument against Howsam was the Robinson trade, but Howsman had nothing to do with it!

I was tempted not to include the first two mistakes in Olbermann’s entry because of their relative inconsequence. Neither error refutes Olbermann’s arguments in favor of Martin and Murtaugh as worthy of Hall of Fame consideration. But Olbermann does not deserve to be spared criticism of those errors because of the petty, malicious way that he goes after the inconsequential mistakes of others; he merits the same treatment that he dishes out, whether it’s about Curt Smith, Bob Raissman, or yes, even Bill O’Reilly. Furthermore, Olbermann compounded his lazily written piece by making a huge error about Howsam, one that should be embarrassing to anyone considering himself a baseball historian.

To his credit, Olbermann admitted to his mistake about Murtaugh, but said nothing about the errors relating to Howsam and Martin. Perhaps Olbermann was too embarrassed about the Howsam remark. Or perhaps he was just hoping that nobody noticed. Or perhaps he was praying that we would all forget.

With errors like these, which have happened all too regularly since beginning his blog earlier this year, Olbermann badly lacks credibility. He continually fails to uphold the high standards of accuracy that he places on others. Frankly, he needs to stop spending so much time ripping other writers for their mistakes, and spend more time fact-checking his own.

Remembering Ron Klimkowski

Former Yankees and A’s reliever Ron Klimkowski died last Friday from heart failure. He was 65. A junkballing right hander, Klimkowski enjoyed some success as a middle reliever from 1969 to 1972, but then saw his career end abruptly because of knee trouble. He also missed out on the A’s’ 1972 world championship because of Oakland’s decision to release him in mid-May, a move that led to an immediate but brief reunion with the Yankees.

I have no special insight on Klimkowski’s pitching career, but I’ve always been intrigued by his 1972 Topps card with Oakland. Wearing the old-style green and gold combination that Charlie Finley loved so much, Klimkowski is sporting one of the widest grins I’ve ever seen on a baseball card. He looks absolutely thrilled to be photographed by the Topps cameraman.

Based on my memories of this card, I’ve always imagined that Klimkowski was one of the most fun-loving, outgoing players of his era. In reading about him in the obituaries reporting his death, that seems to be exactly the kind of guy Klimkowski was. In an interview with Newsday, longtime friend Tom Reilly Jr. described him as “a charming and very gregarious individual. If you met Ron, you'd never forget him. He had a pretty overwhelming personality.”

Sometimes a baseball card can give you a pretty good idea of what a guy is really like.

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Your Thursday afternoon tizzy

Craig Calcaterra — 2009-11-19T20:24:38+00:00

There is some brewing discontent over the NL Cy Young vote, as two members of the webby portion of the BBWAA -- our friends Keith Law and Will Carroll -- did not include Chris Carpenter on their three-man Cy Young ballots. Keith voted Javier Vazquez second (Lincecum first and Wainwright third) and Will voted Wainwright first, Lincecum second and Danny Haren third. They were the only ones who included Vazquez or Haren on their ballots.

A comment about this from reader Ron in the thread below my earlier post:

“Two voters, Will Carroll of Baseball Prospectus and Keith Law of ESPN.com, did not include Carpenter on their ballots.” Nice. Leave the best pitcher in the NL off of your ballots to insure the saber-metric favorite wins. The BBWAA guys might not be the best at voting, but the saber friendly guys don’t have the right to accuse them of manipulating the vote anymore.

Ron, I love you. You've been reading this blog longer than just about anyone and I always appreciate your input. But you're factually wrong here inasmuch as even if Will changed his vote for Haren to Carpenter and and Law did the same with his Vazquez vote, Lincecum still wins. And really, if Will was really trying to throw it to Lincecum, wouldn't he have voted him first?

But I don't mean to single out Ron. I posted his comment simply because it stands at the somewhat extreme end of the discontent I've read at a few message boards. There really are people out there scratching their heads at this, and I imagine there will be at least a little grousing about their votes over the next couple of slow news days.

For my part, I wouldn't have voted the same way Keith and Will did -- neither Vazquez nor Haren would have made my ballot -- but they explain their rationale and I understand why they voted the way they voted even if I disagree with it. At the very least I understand docking Carpenter based on innings pitched, and that seems to be the point of controversy here. I'm a bit more of a romantic than Keith and Will are, I think, so I'd probably have included him on my ballot for reasons associated with his comeback from injury and all of that, but it's certainly legitimate to not include him.

I predict that some people will use Keith's and Will's votes in some argument that statheads shouldn't be given the franchise over the next couple of days. Such an argument, if it comes, should be rejected out of hand. At most this is some down-ballot curiosity, the sort of which we see on the votes for every award.

Read more great baseball stuff at The Hardball Times.